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Assessing ontological commitments. Peter of Spain's realism in *Summulae logicales*

Abstract: Peter of Spain's doctrinal content developed in *Summulae logicales* has been interpreted in various ways by the modern scholarship. As a result, when describing his ontological commitment, a number of different, often opposing, labels were ascribed, ranging from doctrinal neutrality to realism or anti-realism. Starting from the varieties of interpretations, we propose an assessment of Peter of Spain's ontological commitment regarding the universal, by arguing for the existence in his *Summaries* of two intertwined tendencies, one realist, another anti-realist. The former tendency will be argued in accordance with his theory of predicables, signification, supposition and appellation; the latter one, will be tracked in a series of distinctions: *via logicae* vs *via naturae*, *praesentia* vs *existentia*, *res* vs *dispositio*.

Keywords: Peter of Spain, *Summulae logicales*, realism, anti-realism, ontological commitment, universals.

1. Introduction

In the history of philosophy, when constructing descriptions regarding philosophical figures and their theoretical constructions we are often inclined to use labels according to which we group specific individuals by taking into account their ontological commitments. With this purpose, 'realism', 'conceptualism', 'nominalism' are some of the terms broadly used in the history of philosophy, often without specific regard to the historical realities, doctrinal movements and theoretical constructs they designate. This endeavor often results in a tension between the doctrinal content and its assimilation in the modern historical narratives, assimilation which develops in certain cases opposing and conflicting interpretations. We think that this is the case for one of the most important medieval handbooks of logic, *Tractatus* or *Summulae logicales* (*SL*) attributed to Peter of Spain.

The current scholarship presents Peter of Spain's ontological commitment from *Summulae logicales* in different, often conflicting, ways. For

example, José Meirinhos argues for a doctrinal neutrality, accountable both for Peter's lack of originality and for the great success of his logical work among its numerous medieval commentators (Meirinhos 2002, 337, 349). Gyula Klima, when comparing the theoretical construction of Peter's theory of supposition with the account offered by Buridan, considers the first as being very close to the position of an "extremely extreme realism"[1] (Klima, 2011, 120). Pieter A. Verburg in his analysis of Peter's theory of language from the same *Tractatus*, interprets the same doctrine as being an anti-realist one (Verburg 1998, 74-82)[2]. How can we project on one and the same text and doctrinal content such hermeneutical attitudes, ranging from doctrinal neutrality to "extremely extreme realism" and anti-realism?

Before trying to answer our question, we must note that in its long diffusion, between the late 13th century and the early 17th century, *Summulae logicales* has faced various interpretative attitudes ranging from partial or complete theoretical endorsement to direct refutation[3]. Regarding the doctrinal commitments involved, De Rijk points out in his introductory study that Peter of Spain's *Tractatus* had such a success that was commented by Thomists, Albertists, Scotists and even by "moderate nominalists"[4] (De Rijk 1972, XCIX). Regarding the last point, we know, for example, that John Buridan's[5] logical treatise *Summulae de dialectica* was in a certain degree intended to be a commentary to Peter's *Summulae logicales*. However, Buridan goes far beyond Peter of Spain's logical considerations, since he discusses subjects that are lacking from Peter's handbook and reworks parts of his text by inserting his own considerations when Peter's position cannot be held. The last option can be seen especially in treatise dedicated to supposition theory where the nominalist attitude regarding the universal is clearer[6]. As a representative of *via moderna* or nominalism, Buridan's considerations enter in contrast with the 13th century supposition theories which, to a certain degree, can be described as having a realist orientation. In fact, Peter was conceived as one of the main figures of the old way of doing logic. This particular aspect can be seen especially in the 15th century, in the so called *Wegestreit* or *quarrel of the ways* between *antiqui*, term that in this century designates the realist authors, and *moderni*, the nominalist thinkers. In the context of this dispute, *Summulae logicales* was extensively and mainly commented by authors of the first orientation, whether they were Thomists or Albertists (Braakhuis 1989). Probably we can state that, although Peter's text was construed in different ways by commentators of different orientation, the dominant tendency was that of considering the doctrine of *Summulae logicales* as confined to a realist view regarding the universal.

Against this perspective, an in spite of his "extremely extreme realist" label, Gyula Klima identifies a mitigating doctrinal tendency within Peter's considerations, especially but not only, in the distinction made in the *solutio*

section of *SL* VI, that between *via naturae* and *via logicae* (Klima 2011, 117-121). This fact makes Klima to consider that in Peter's ontology we can find quasi-*res* or quasi-things, objects that are not in fact real things but "things-as-conceived and signified" (Klima 2011, 118). However, before arriving at such a strong thesis with modist inflections[7], attention must be paid regarding Peter of Spain's logical theory as a whole. Despite the theoretical resources available since Aristoteles's *De interpretatione*, Peter of Spain is ignoring altogether the domain of mental entities or concepts and their manifestation according to the signifying function of language[8]. The situation being as such, we can only try to identify tendencies for a certain ontological commitment in *SL*.

Our purpose in the following parts of the paper is to track down Peter of Spain realist and anti-realist theoretical tendencies. In the first part we will try to show Peter's ontological commitment regarding the real existence of the universal in his theory of: predicables, signification, simple supposition and appellation. In the second part, we will discuss his anti-realist tendencies express by a series of distinctions: *via logicae* vs *via naturae*, *praesentia* vs *existentia*, *res* vs *disposition*.

2. Realist tendencies

In the following short four sections we will try to illustrate the main features of Peter of Spain's logic from *Summulae logicales* that enables us to qualify his theoretical construct as being committed towards a realist account regarding the universal. The theory of predicables, signification, simple supposition and appellation will let us understand that for Peter the universal is not merely a logical or epistemological entity and thus a pseudo-entity but a real object.

Predicables

The first important trait of realism is offered at the beginning of the second treatise, *De predicabilibus*, where the five Porphyrian predicables are taken into account. There, Peter offers a first hint for the nature of the universal in a parallel definition with the notion of predicable: "*'predicabile' proprie sumptum et 'universale' idem sunt, sed differunt in hoc quod predicabile diffinitur per dici, universale autem per esse. Est enim predicabile quod aptum natum est dici de pluribus. Universale autem est quod aptum est esse in pluribus*" (De Rijk 1972, 17, l. 7-11). According to this passage, the universal is the existing counterpart of the predicable such that, putting aside their ontological difference (pertaining to language vs. pertaining to reality) they can be considered the same. As the predicable is said of many, so the universal exists in many. But as stated in the *SL*. III.2, the universal can be in (*esse in*) many in different

ways[9]. From the eight modes offered there, only two are of interest to us, the fourth and the fifth mode. The fourth tells us that there is a way of being in something as the genus is in its species, for example as *animal* is in *homine*[10]. The fifth brings forward the hylomorphic concepts, since it tells us that there is a way of being in something as the form is in the matter. Regarding this mode, Peter differentiates between a substantial and accidental form. The substantial form, for example, the soul, is said in a proper way to be in something material, for example, a body, while the accidental form, for example, the quality of being white, is said in an improper or accidental way to be in another[11].

Those considerations let us understand that a universal is an entity that exists in many particulars and is represented in language and logic by a predicable. Understood through the hylomorphic elements, a universal seems to be the same thing with and bares the same ontological matter-dependence as the form, be it substantial or not. But although the mode of *being in* has been explained to certain extent[12], these considerations beg the question on the problem regarding how the universal exists in many. It is multiplied in each individual according to its unique configuration such that we can speak about a multiplicity of different universals that pertain to a same general genus? This would mean that there would exist different and multiple universals of humanity for each individual human. Or there is a unique, identical, and undifferentiated universal in all the individuals? This would mean that the same humanity is in every particular human.

Some of those aspects will be taken into account in the supposition theory. For the moment, we can consider as a trait of realism the fact that the universal is defined by *esse* although its numerical unity is not clear yet, especially if the universal is meant to have the ontological consistency of an Aristotelian form. If such, the Aristotelian form, be it substantial or accidental, does not have the same ontological status as an individual.

Signification

Peter's theory of signification is offered as a preliminary ante-propositional property of a term that will be contrasted with the property of supposition. The signification (*significatio*) of a term is defined as the representation of a thing made by a vocalization according to convention: "*significatio termini [...] est rei per vocem secundum placitum representatio*" (De Rijk 1972, VI.2, 79, l. 11-12). As the Aristotelian and Boethian sematic model suggests, the signification process should include three distinct realms: of language, written or spoken, of objects in the world and of concepts or mental entities[13]. Peter insists only on language and extra-mental/extra-linguistical entities remaining silent about the mental entities. He considers the *res* signified by terms to be either universals or particulars, thus

envisioning signification as a relation, between linguistic items and objects[14]. He excludes from the process of proper signification any part of speech that is not a term, that is, that cannot signify a universal or a particular. Propositional signs, e.g., universal and particular signs as '*omnis*', '*aliquis*' etc., cannot be terms since they cannot signify by themselves the requested entities.

What we can call 'species of signification' are conceived according to the ontological correspondents of the two constitutive parts of a proposition or, more precisely, according to the mods of things (*modi rerum*) signified. Thus, there are two cases: a) a substantive noun (*nomen substantivum*) signifies a substantive thing (*res substantiva*) – 'man' signifies a man (particular or universal substances); b) an adjectival name or verb (*nomen adiectivum vel verbum*) signifies an adjectival thing (*res adiectiva*) – 'white' or 'runs' signifies the fact of being white or running (particular or universal accidents)[15]. The terms employed by Peter in this context, *substantive* and *adiective*[16], are adaptable both to the ontological (*res*) and linguistical (*nomen*) registry as needed, confirming the parallelism thesis between language and world, as highlighted by Gyula Klima. The word '*substantive*' *(sub+stare)* refers indeed to the fact of a noun being the possible subject for a predication – since what stands under is an inferior about which the superior ca be predicated – and to the fact that a thing as substance can be subjected to different accidents. The same goes for '*adiective*', which literary means *that which is added*: the adjective and the verb represent that which is added to the noun; accordingly, qualities and affections are those things which are added to a logical or ontological subject. However, Peter considers the *adiectivatio* and *substantivatio* as modes of things which are signified (*modi rerum que significatur*) and not modes of significations, fact that puts again the accent on the realm of *res* (De Rijk, VI.2, 80, l. 1-4).

The isomorphic relation between language and reality required for a realist thesis seems to be quite straight forward. Nouns, adjectives, and verbs (*nomen, nomen adiectivum, verbum*), i.e., linguistic entities, are considers terms in virtue of the fact that they signify things (*res*). Each *res* can be either a universal, an entity that can be in many and usually signified by a common term (*terminus communis*, e.g., '*homo*'), or an individual, the primary substance signified by a discrete term (*terminus discretus*, e.g., '*iste homo*' or '*Plato*').

Simple supposition

After discussing signification, in *SL*. VI.3 Peter offers a theory of supposition. Supposition is understood by him as the property according to which a substantive term that already has a signification can be taken for something else: "*Suppositio vero est acceptio termini substantivi pro aliquo. Differunt autem suppositio et significatio, quia significatio est per impositionem vocis ad rem*

significandam, suppositio vero est acceptio ipsius termini iam significantis rem pro aliquo"
(De Rijk, 1972, VI.3, 80, l. 8-11). Supposition can be understood as a
relation between a term, the *supponens* and one or multiple objects, the
suppositum or *supposita*. While supposition is different from signification, the
possible type of entities for which a term can stand in supposition is taken
from the domain of signification. Thus, the type of *res* or object for which a
term can stand is determined by the type of supposition[17]. In turn, each type
of supposition is determined by specific syntactic and semantic conditions.
The most relevant type of supposition for Peter's ontological commitment
is *suppositio simplex* or simple supposition. According to *SL.* VI.4, simple
supposition is a subspecies of common and accidental supposition. This
means that the suppositing term is a *terminus communis* or common term and
that it stands for what is requested by the other elements of the
propositional contexts[18].

Simple supposition is defined as "*acceptio termini comunis pro re universali
significata per ipsum*" (De Rijk, VI.5, 81, l. 12-13) or the taking of a common
term for the universal object signified by it. Accordingly, in propositions as
"*homo est species*" or "*risibile est proprium*", the subject term stands in relation of
supposition for a universal entity, higher in the Porphyrian tree than the
individual, i.e., the human in common or, in the second example, the
common capacity to laugh. It is important to note that in the explanations
provided about simple supposition, Peter talks about the supposition of a
common substantive term posited on the part of the predicate or in
exceptive constructs. The examples offered are: "*omnis homo est <u>animal</u>*",
"*omnis animal praeter <u>hominem</u> est irrationale*" and "*omnium contrariorum eadem est
<u>disciplina</u>*". This type of supposition is verified through direct inferences
showing that a false conclusion will be obtained if the common terms in
question will be take personally, i.e., by inferring the same proposition with
the changing of the common term with a discrete one, as in the case of
"*omnis homo est animal, ergo omnis homo est hoc animal*".

According to the notion of simple supposition, we have yet again a
position that seems to commit towards a realist ontology. Depending on the
meaning of the propositional context, a substantive common term
(*supponens*) can stand for an object (*suppositum*) of universal nature. This
universal nature is called '*res universalis*', meaning the entity signified by the
common term. This fact brings again the one-to-one mapping between
words and objects established by the theory of signification. Thus, for Peter
the term "human" from "human is a species" stands in this specific
predicative context for the human nature or humanity which is considered a
res.

Appellation

One of the clearest endorsements of realism comes from the small tenth treatise dedicated to the property of *appellatio* or appellation. Although appellation played an important role in the development of supposition theory, Peter differentiates it from supposition despite the similarity between the two notions[19]. Yet, he is defining appellation almost as a sub-species of supposition[20], since appellation is said to be "*acceptio termini communis pro re existente*" (De Rijk 1972, X.1, 197, l. 4). By understanding this property as a taking of a common term for an existing object, Peter leaves no ambiguity regarding the ontological status of his *res*: in the case of appellation, we have an existing extra-mental and extra-propositional object. The following lines will confirm this position even regarding the universal.

According to our author, appellation, signification, and supposition are different, since the last two relations can comprise even non-existent *res* (De Rijk 1972, X.1, l. 1-10). Further in his analysis, Peter is discussing appellation in contrast to signification and supposition, according to the types of terms. Singular terms, like proper names, signify, stand in relation of supposition and stand in relation of appellation for the same existing object[21]. In the case of the common terms the situation is different depending on the type of supposition they have. On the one hand, a common term with simple supposition signifies, stands in relation of supposition and appellation for the same existing entity, a universal; in '*homo est species*', '*homo*' signifies, supposits and appellates for the same common nature[22]. On the other hand, a common term with personal supposition signifies a common nature but stands in relation of supposition and appellation for existing individuals. In "*homo currit*", '*homo*' signifies the human nature, but supposits for individual humans and appellates existing individual humans[23].

Regarding the aforementioned observations on appellation, we must note that in the passages dedicated to the appellation of a common term with simple supposition Peter seems to fully embrace the realist commitment regarding the existence of universals. In the case of a term with simple supposition, the signification, supposition, and appellation are identical, describing three overlapping relations between a common term and a universal or a common nature that exists: "*terminus communis idem significat et supponit et appellat, ut 'homo' significat hominem in communi et supponit pro homine in communi et appellat hominem in communi*" (De Rijk 1972, X.3, 197, l. 23-198, l. 3). What Peter means by existence can be seen from the examples given after the definition of appellation and its use in the case of discrete or singular terms. The notion of existence that appellation uses seems to refer to the material existence of an entity. '*Cesar*', '*Antichristus*' and '*chimera*' have no appellation since the entities that they describe do not actually exist, even

if their notions are conceivable, i.e., we understand what 'Cesar' 'Antichristus' and 'chimera' mean (De Rijk 1972, X.1, 197, l. 5-7)[24]. Although the example offered in *SL.*X.2 for a singular term is 'Sortis', when exemplifying appellation Peter is careful enough to use names as 'Iohannes' and 'Petrus' which can signify actual existing individuals and not historical figures that in the moment of appellation do not exist, as the usual 'Sortes', 'Plato', 'Cicero'.

The appellation of a term with simple supposition shows us that the universal is a *res existens*, i.e., a universal object which has material existence. In virtue of the identity between *significatum*, *suppositum* and *appellatum* in one and the same entity as postulated in *SL.* X.3, we can conclude that in all the other theoretical instances where the universal is taken into account – the doctrine of predicables, the doctrine of signification and the doctrine of supposition – Peter does not conceive the universal or *res universalis* as a quasi-existent entity, but as an object existing in reality. This fact confirms again Peter of Spain's commitment towards and extreme form of realism regarding the universal. However, in what follows we will try to assess some of his mitigating tendencies of such a realist attitude.

3. Anti-realism tendencies

In spite of the doctrinal articulations presented so far which bare witness for the strong realist attitudes, there are passages in *Summulae logicaes* which seem to support and opposing stance. The *solutio* section of *SL.* VI, along with *SL.* XI, where the property of restriction is taken into account, and *SL.*XII, where the property of distribution is considered, contain parts of a theoretical content which seem to soften the realist tendencies. Interesting enough, they all seem to appear in portions of texts of a different nature from the normal doctrinal exposition of logic, namely, they appear inside *dubia* or *sophismata*. In what follows we will explore some of those points.

Via logicae vs *via naturae*

In the *solutio* section of *SL.* VI, where Peter is explaining how the confused supposition works in contrast with simple supposition, an important distinction is made between *via logicae* and *via naturae.* The example in question is "*omnis homo est animal*". What is at stake here is basically the ontological status of the universal. Since in this proposition a universal distributive sign is applied to the subject term, the proposition implies a multiplicity of humans of which a genus or universal is predicated. Peter tells us that although we have a simple supposition in the predicate extreme, the term "*homo*" does not stand only for all the humans but for all the humans which are animals. This means that a direct proportional

relation between the number of universals of humanity and the number of universals of animality will be established for each individual human. This is the case, since it is pointed out that the expression "*omnis homo*" from the proposition in question is to be understood through the definition of man: "*omnis animal rationale mortale*". Moreover, the way in which the universal exists in each individual is such that, each type of universal is essentially different from the other of the same type. Thus, the humanity or animality of one individual human is essentially (*per se*) different from the humanity or animality of another: "*natura humanitas mea est per se et alia est ab humanitate tua, sicut anima mea per quam est humanitas mea in me, alia est ab anima tua, per quam causatur humanitas tua in te*" (De Rijk 1972, 87, l. 27-88, l. 1).

It is important to note here that the universal conceived in this manner refers to the universal understood as a form of a particular matter. This fact is pointed out in *SL.* XII.7, where distribution is discussed. On the one hand, Peter distinguishes a form which is a form of a matter. This form is a part of the whole and is not predicable about it. It is the case of the soul which is considered the form of the body. This form is different in each individual as the soul is different in each individual human. On the other hand, there is a predicable form which has as matter individuals. It is the case of genus, species and difference, as '*animal*' and '*homo*' (De Rijk, 1978, XII.7, 213, l. 25-31)[25]. Accordingly, the animality multiplied differently in each individual human seems to be a form of the first kind. It is the animality presupposed by the subject term of "*omnis homo est animal*" and not by its predicate term. The animality which pertains to the second type of form is the animality implied by the predicate with simple supposition. But regardless of the differences between types of forms, Peter makes a distinction between a way of considering the universal according to nature and according to logic. Whenever matter comes into question and the way in which the universal actually exist in a particular matter, the universal multiply according to matter in each individual. This corresponds to the natural way of dealing with the universals. According to logic, the situation is different. Although the universal seems to be ontologically existing, it is the same in each individual. Thus, the humanity will be the same in each individual human: "*Et ideo est quod tot sunt ibi animalitates quot humanitates, naturaliter loquendo, quia eadem est humanitas, secundum viam logice, non nature, in quolibet individuo hominis; sicut homo in communi idem est. Unde quod sit hec animalitas vel illa hoc est ratione materie*" (De Rijk, VI.12, 87, l. 22-25).

These considerations open the possibility for a less realist interpretation. According to logic, although the universal is not conceived as a concept or an intention of the soul, it is made numerically one for all the individuals in which it exists. But regardless of this fact, according to nature, the universal still multiplies according to the requirements of matter.

Praesentia vs existentia

Another tendency of decreasing the ontological commitment can be found in the distinction made between presence and existence. The problem of existence begs more questions when the expression used in the theory of supposition '*acceptio pro presentibus*' – in the case in which a term is forced to stand in the place of present things – is put in contrast with the expression '*acceptio pro existentibus*' – in the case of appellation. Although Peter seems to be silent for the most part of his work regarding the difference between presence and existence, some clarifications will be offered in the eleventh treatise dedicated to the problem of restriction. There, in the paragraphs 16 and 17, our author states that the verb, according to its consignification, is only responsible for the temporal aspect of the subject's *supposita* and not for their existence, and thus can make the subject to stand for present, past or future entities, depending on the temporal aspect of the verb that come under the form of the term (De Rijk 1972, XI.16, 17, 206-207). Accordingly, for example, a verb at present tense restricts the *supposita* to entities that presently come under the form of the suppositing term independent of their existence. A term can have a present *suppositum* while it does not have an *appellatum*. For example, in "*Caesar currit*" the subject stands for Caesar which presently comes under the form of the suppositing term, while Caesar does not exist actually, it does not appellate an existing entity. Or a term can have a present suppositum which is identical with an existing entity, its *appellatum*. In "*iste homo currit*", the running individual pointed out, which presently comes under the form of the discrete term is an existing entity[26]. Thus, supposition is not concerned about the existence of its *suppositum* but only about its presence in a certain time indicated by the verb. However, the difference between material existence and presence under the form of a term is not so clearly defined in Peter's case. In the absence of a semantical conceptual tool for establishing unique individuals, the boundaries between *ens* and *non-ens* are not accurately marked.

However, according to this difference, Peter seems to soften the ontological consistency of *supposita*. There is a difference between *supposita praesentia* and *supposita existentia* or *appellata*, meaning that, for example, if the verb *esse* is used in a propositional context, it does not restrict the supposition to existing *supposita* but only to present ones, which in certain cases, can be non-existing. In cases of names for non-beings, like 'chimera', 'Antichrist' and 'Cesar', a relation to a *significatum* and a *suppositum* can be made but not to an existing object (De Rijk 1972, X.1, 197, l. 5-14). This fact would seemingly place the *supposita* in a strange ontological taxonomy of quasi-*res*.

Res vs *dispositio*

The strongest argument against the realism of *SL* will be the postulation of a kind of entity that is not strictly speaking a *res*, an existing external object, and thus it cannot be properly considered as a universal or a particular. If this kind of entity was hinted by what we could coin as *supposita praesentia non existentia,* Peter has another doctrinal stance that can be interpreted in the same anti-realism way.

In *SL* VI.2, the treatise dedicated to the theory of supposition, we have already seen that universal or particular signs are not considered to be terms, since they do not have a signification understood as the ability to signify a particular or universal object (De Rijk 1972, VI.2, 79). However, in *SL.* XII, the situation seems more nuanced. The details regarding the way in which a distributive sign can have a certain semantic content is explored in full extend in the analysis of the universal affirmative sign '*omnis'* through a *quaestio*: "*queritur quid significet hoc signum 'omnis'*" (De Rijk 1972, XII,5, 210, l. 14). There is a necessity for signs to have a certain kind of signification, given that they contribute to the truth value of the propositional context they are placed in. For the case of '*omnis*', Peter states that since '*animal est homo*' is true and '*omne animal est homo*' is false and since the only difference between those two propositions is the word '*omnis',* the distributive sign must have a certain semantic content that enters in the calculus of the truth value of the proposition (De Rijk 1972, XII.5, 210, l. 20-25). However, the semantic content of the universal sign does not consist in signifying a universal thing (*res*) but in signifying something in a universal manner. The think that is signified in the case of '*omnis*' is the fact that the common term is taken for each of its inferiors. In this way, the universal sign signifies something about the subject on which it is applied, or in other words, it signifies the way in which the subject to which the sign is added must be taken: "*quod 'omnis' non significat universale, sed quoniam universaliter, quia significat terminum communem sumi pro omni, ut 'omnis homo'; et sic 'omnis' significat rem aliquam*" (De Rijk 1972, XII.5, 211, l. 1-4). However, the „*rem aliquam*" that appears in Peter's explanation must be taken in a specific sense. *SL* makes here a distinction between two types of objects or *res*[27]. On the one hand, there is a type of *res* suggested by the definition offered in *SL* VI.2: "*res subicibilis*" and "*res praedicabilis*". This *res* can be either a universal or a singular and is signified by a term which can be put logically and grammatically either as subject or as predicate. On the other hand, there is a *res* understood as a disposition of those two entities: "*dispositio rei subicibilis vel praedicabilis*". The *res* signified by '*omnis*' does not follow the first definition but the second. The signs or syncategorematic word thus signify only a disposition of the real objects, which propositionally translates into a

disposition of the constitutive parts of the proposition on which they are applied.

By considering the syncategorematic words as having the capability to signify not objects but dispositions of objects, Peter of Spain seems to accept the existence of quasi-*res* in his logical theory. We can say that those entities do not fit his realist ontology formed by words mapping universals and individuals. Similar to the last theoretical elements discussed so far, the extension of the meaning of *res* to dispositions bear witness for a latent anti-realist attitude.

4. Conclusions

At the end of our brief discussion, we can see Peter of Spain's degree pf ontological commitments in *Summulae logicales* in another light. The core of his logic is dominated by a realist orientation. The theory of predicables, signification, simple supposition and appellation are formed on a realist framework in which the universal is considered to be an external object independent of our mental or linguistic processes. Outside of this core, a series of distinctions related to specific instances of language analysis are offered which seem to denote an opposite ontological attitude. The fact that these anti-realist considerations are caused by analyzing specific language situations is evident. The distinction between the modes of considering the universal according to logic and according to natural philosophy is borne form the analysis of the proposition "*omnis homo est animal*", where the distributive effect of the universal sign placed on the subject term is questioned in relation with the predicate. The distinction between present and existent *supposita* is offered after a discussion of the restrictive effect of the "esse" verb. The distinction between proper objects (universal and individuals) and quasi-object or dispositions is endorsed after observing the difference in meaning between two specific propositions: "*animal est homo*" et "*omne animal est homo*". The necessity of introducing such distinctions of anti-realist import seems to come from observing how language works. They are all offered in portions of texts where the author of *Summulae logicales* moves away from the simple doctrinal exposition an comes closer to a type of literature similar with *quaestio* or *sophismata*. The tension between the realist doctrinal exposition and the few anti-realist problematizations, make us wonder if those passages are not in fact Peter of Spain's own reaction in front of a common and widespread doctrine of his time that he managed so well to summarize. Since the anti-realist tendencies are expressed not in the proper content of the doctrine he exposes, but in a dubitative material that bear witness for the limitation of the realist ontology, Peter of Spain may be consider a logician in transition.

In the end, the whole situation invites us to study the doctrines of logic and language of the past as theoretical constructs involved in an historical development. Doctrinal tensions or opposing doctrinal attitudes within the same work can be considered as marking acknowledged theoretical problems and omens for the later developments in the historical evolution of a particular doctrine.

Notes

[1] "In accordance with the foregoing, 'extremely extreme realism' would be the kind of semantic theory in which different syntactical categories distinguished in terms of their different semantic functions would be taken to be in a one-to-one correspondence with different ontological categories, given that the different semantic functions of the different syntactical categories would be explained precisely in terms of being related to entities in those different ontological categories. Thus, if in this framework we would take singular and common terms to belong to different syntactical categories on account of the different semantic functions they have, then we would take this difference to consist in the fact that terms in these different syntactical categories signify entities in different ontological categories: to put it simply, singular terms are singular because they signify singular entities, whereas universal terms are universal because they signify universal entities. Thus, by the lights of this theory, the singular name 'Socrates' would be singular because it signifies the singular man Socrates, whereas the universal term 'man' would be universal because it would signify a universal entity, the universal man or human nature, or in modern times the so called 'abstract entity', the 'property' of being human, perhaps, properly referred to by the name 'humanity'" (Klima 2011, 111).

[2] "The basic theme here is not a reflection or representation of reality within the human mode of understanding and mode of signifying, but the service which language gives to predication and the expression of thought, in which the only requirement is a constant application of suppositions in order to arrive at predications which are correct in themselves, and therefore reach correct conclusions. The truth value in the real world of what has been thought and named can thus be disregarded." (Verburg 1998, 75); "Terministic logic has a latent tendency to construct an autarkic deductive epistemology independent of a reality which lies outside the mind or a metaphysics which invokes such a reality." (Verburg 1998, 75).

[3] For a complete refutation, see the humanistic attack on Juan Luis Vives in *Adversus Pseudodialecticos* (Guerlac 1979, 47-110).

[4] De Rijk is mentioning a few examples: John Versor, Lambert of Heerenberg (Thomists), Gerard of Harderwijk and Arnold of Tongeren (Albertists), Nicholas de Orbellis and Peter Tartareus, Johannes de Magistris (Scotists) and John Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen (nominalists). We would refrain from calling positions like those found in Buridan as pertaining to "moderate nominalism".

[5] Regarding Buridan's importance in medieval philosophy see Klima, *John Buridan* (2009).

[6] See Buridan's position on universals from *Summulae de dialectica*: "Universalia secundum praedicationem principaliter dictam non sint praeter animam, illa non sunt nisi conceptus animae quibus anima concipit indifferenter plures res, ut quia omnes homines indifferenter concipit conceptu a quod imponitur hoc nomen 'homo', et sic de conceptu animalis quantum ad animalia. Ideo cum genera et species sint universalia secundum praedicationem, apparet quod species et genera sunt tales conceptu animae." (Lecq 1998, 39, l. 19-24). For the rejection of personal supposition as conceived by Peter of Sapin see Lecq (1998, 38-39)

[7] For the modist tradition see, for example, Ebbesen (2018), De Libera (1982), Ukelman, Lagerlund (2017, 136-138).

[8] See especially the first paragraphs of *Summulae logicales* (De Rijk 1972, 1-5).

[9] See De Rijk (1972, III.2, 27, l. 7-28, l. 13).

[10] See De Rijk (1972, III.2, 27, l. 19-20): "Quartus modus essendi in est sicut genus in specie, ut animal in homine et unumquodque diffiniens in sua diffinitione et unequeque diffinitiones in suo diffinito."

[11] Cf. De Rijk (1972, III.2, 27, l. 22-28, l. 4): "Quintus modus essendi in est sicut forma in materia. Et iste quintus modus subdividitur, quia est quaedam forma substantialis, ut anima est forma substantialis homini; alia autem est forma accidentalis, ut album homini. Et prima harum dicitur proprie esse in sicut forma in materia, ut anima in corpore; alia autem dicitur esse in sicut accidens in subiecto, ut albedo in pariete et color in corpore."

[12] For the apparent incompatibility between the fact that the universal is in many and *SL III.3* where the universal substances, i.e., the secondary substance or the genus and species of the category of substance are not in the subject, see *De Libera* 2014, 835-836. Peter of Spain, as Aristotle, understand the property of *esse in subiecto,* ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ εἶναι, to be in a subject, from *Categories* as a specific way of being in, that of being in as an accident.

[13] See Aristotle, *Peri hermeneia*, 16a3–8 for the semantic triangle formed by φωνή - πᾰθήμᾰτᾰ - πρᾰγμᾰτᾰ.

[14] De Rijk (1972, VI.2, 79, l. 12-13): "Significatio termini, prout sic sumitur, est rei per vocem secundum placitum representatio. Quare cum omnis res aut sit universalis aut particularis, oportet dictiones non significantes universales vel particulares non significare aliquid. Et sic non erunt termini prout hic sumitur *'terminus'*; ut sunt signa universalia et particularia".

[15] See De Rijk (1972, VI.2, 79, l. 17-19): "Significationis alia est rei substantive et habet fieri per nomen substantivum, ut *'homo'*; alia est rei adiective et habet fieri per nomen adiectivum vel per verbum, ut *'albus'* vel *'currit'*."

[16] Regarding the English translations, *CNP* (Copenhaver, Normore, Parsons eds., 2014) seem to understand those terms mainly as adverbs offering the following couplets: 'substantive name' - 'thing as substance' and 'modifying name' - 'thing as modifier' (*CNP.*, 241), while Dinneen makes calques from the Latin forms, see Dinneen (1990, 69).

[17] On this specific interpretation of supposition as a property which determines the type of object for which a term can stand see Dutilh (2018, 96).

[18] De Rijk (1972, VI.4, 80, l. 19-22): "Suppositionis alia comunis, alia discreta. Suppositio communis est que fit per terminum communem, ut *'homo'*. Suppositio discreta est que fit per terminum discretum, ut *'Sortes'* vel *'iste homo'*." De Rijk (1972, VI.4, 81, l. 5-9): "Accidentalis autem suppositio est acceptio termini communis pro eis pro quibus exigit adiunctum, ut 'homo est'; iste terminus 'homo' supponit pro presentibus; cum autem 'homo fuit', supponit pro preteritis; cum vero dicitur 'homo erit', supponit pro futuris."

[19] For a short analysis of the concept of appellation in 13th century see De Libera (1981, 227-250); for the conceptual interplay between the terms of 'appellatio' and 'suppositio' in the early fallacy tradition, see Ebbesen (2013, 73-75).

[20] See De Libera (1981). De Libera understands Peter's appellation as a supposition restricted to existing things.

[21] See De Rijk (1972, X.2, 197, l. 16-19): "Terminus singularis idem significat et supponit et appellat, quia significat rem existentem, ut *'Petrus'* vel *'Iohannes'*". Excepted from the property of appellation are terms used for non-beings as 'Cesar', 'Antichristus', 'Chimera' (De Rijk 1972, X.1, 197, l. 5-7).

[22] See De Rijk (1972, X.3, 197, l. 21-198, l. 3): "Item, appellationis termini communis alia est termini communis pro ipsa re in communi, ut quando terminus communis habet simplicem suppositionem. Ut cum dicitur *'homo est species'* vel *'animal est genus'*. Et tunc

terminus communis idem significat et supponit et appellat, ut *'homo'* significat *hominem* in communi et supponit pro *homine* in communi et appellat hominem in communi.”

[23] See De Rijk (1972, X.4, 198, l. 4-8): “Alia autem est termini communis pro suis inferioribus, ut quando terminus communis habet personalem suppositionem. Ut cum dicitur *'homo currit'*, tunc *'homo'* non idem significat et supponit et appellat, sed significat *hominem* in communi et supponit pro particularibus hominibus et appellat particulares homines existentes.”

[24] See De Rijk (1972, X.1, 197, l. 5-7): “Dico autem *'pro re existente'*, quia terminus significans non ens nichil appellat, ut *'Cesar'* vel *'Antichristus'* et *'chimera'*, et sic de aliis.”

[25] See De Rijk (1972, XII.7, 213, l. 25-31): “Duplex est forma, quia quedam est que est forma materie, ut anima mea est forma corporis mei et tua tui, et ista forma est pars et non predicatur de eo cuius est forma. Alia autem est forma que est forma predicabilis, et sic omnia superiora, ut genera et species et differentie, dicuntur forme inferiorum, ut homo, equus, animal, et consimilia.”

[26] For Peter's explanation and examples see De Rijk (1972, XI.17, 207, l. 9-21): “Ad aliud dicendum quod duplex est forma termini communis, quia quedam est que salvatur tantum in rebus existentibus, ut *'humanitas'*, que est forma hominis, et *'animalitas'* animalis; et in talibus terminis omnia supposita presentia sunt existentia. Alia est forma termini communis que salvatur tam in rebus existentibus quam non existentibus. Ut *'enuntiabilitas'*, que est forma enuntiabilis, quia quedam enuntiabilia sunt existentia, ut *'Deum esse'* et omnia vera, et alia sunt non existentia, ut *'hominem esse asinum'* et omnia falsa; et in talibus cum restringitur terminus communis ad presentia, restringitur tam ad existentia quam ad non existentia. Unde istius propositionis: *'rosa non est'* sensus non est: *rosa que est, non est,* sed is est sensus: *rosa presentialiter sumpta non est.*”

[27] De Rijk (1972, XII.5, 211, l. 4-11): “Sed res est duplex, quia est quedam res subicibilis vel predicabilis, ut *homo* vel *animal*, vel *currit* vel *disputat*; et de hac re obicit primo et verum est quod *'omnis'* nichil significat, quia omnis talis res aut est universalis, aut singularis, et *'omnis'* neque significat universale, neque singulare. Alia autem est res que est dispositio rei subicibilis vel predicabilis; et talem rem significat hoc signum *'omnis'*. Et tam ab ista re quam ab illa causatur veritas vel falsitas in oratione”

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