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Petru BEJAN *

Can We Represent the Truth?

Abstract: The Romanian language gives the notion in question neutral significations. The ambiguity is found in the undecided formula that states that 'the truth is in the middle', neither on one's side, nor on the other's. The doubts take the certainties' place and inversely. According to circumstances, we oscillate undecidedly between duty and inclination; the duty to tell the truth and the inclination – pragmatically justified – to hide it. The only localization somewhat firmer comes from the Latin tradition, when we admit that *in vino veritas* ('in wine there is truth') – that is in the very source of head disturbances, when euphoric speaking can no longer be censored. The French language, instead, gives truth feminine dignity (*la vérité*), dissociating the undisputed attribute of beauty from the negative qualifications (trickery and deceit) fatally inherited by all of Eve's descendants. This is precisely why the painters, sculptors and philosophers, almost in unison, will endeavour to portray especially the pleasant, attractive side of the truth. In the following pages I will seek to answer two questions: Can we represent the truth? And if we can, how can we represent the truth?

Keywords: Image, Truth, Body, Representation, Beauty, Liberty, Emancipation

When we think – linguists say – we bring to attention not the things themselves (it would even be impossible), but only their concepts or their mental images. We think, therefore, in images, even when the subjects have a rather abstract stake. Invoking *the truth*, for instance, we 'visualize' situations that don't have an immediate justification to us. We often say that we are 'in search' for it, that we want to 'reveal' it or to 'bring it to the surface', that we wish to 'possess' it entirely or to contemplate it 'stark-naked', that is exactly how it really is. We speak as if the truth had concreteness, a distinct body, tempting us with its charms. The causes should be sought in the very manner to configure our own language; we think according to how we speak, but also according to how exactly we mentally represent our words. Things seem complicated, therefore I would prefer to explain myself...

Starting with Nietzsche, the philosophers have expressed optimism regarding openness towards art, indicating it as the favourite land of speculative halts. One of the suppositions regarding art claims that in the work of art there is a hidden or camouflaged truth, which must be found, located and 'brought to light'. Last century philosophers argued in favour of a complicity between art and truth. Art – Heidegger writes – is the 'enactment' of the truth; it would 'install' the truth in the world. The work of art facilitates

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the 'occurrence' of the truth, its removing from 'oblivion', from the multi-millenary 'hiding'. Plastic artists thus pass as 'installers of the truth', as they proceed in the assembling of objects, or in the collage of materials by which they signify most sophisticated ideas and concepts.

There is truth in painting. So claims even Jacques Derrida in one of his books of reference (*La vérité en peinture*, Flammarion, Paris, 1978). He identifies four hypostases of truth in painting: as 'presentation' (the real truth, circumventing any representation), 'representation' (the truth portrayed allegorically), 'disclosure' (regarding the proper sense of presentation or representation) and 'adequacy' (regarding the subject of the painting or the fidelity of pictorial art). Scrutinizing the picture, we find the truth in several ways: we have truth in the evoked subject, also in the fair and adequate pictorial representation, in the proper, unequivocal meaning – evident in the picture, and in regarding the authenticity or falsity of the work, but also represented in its portrait itself.

How truth represented in its portrait itself looks like? The classical artists had insisted on the allegorical association of the truth with the woman (beautiful and seductive, but incomprehensible), captured in her nudity (undressed of the veils). This is how it appears at Botticelli, for instance, as antithesis of calumny – as can be seen in the work with the same title (*Calumnia*, 1495). Cesare Ripa, in its famous *Iconography* (1603), describes the truth in the outline of a naked woman, stepping with one foot on the Earth globe; in one hand she holds the sun, and in the other – a wide open book and a palm branch. What does each detail symbolize? Nudity may be the clue of simplicity and of natural purity. The sun is the friend of the truth, lighting it persistently with the radially distributed rays. The book shelters between its covers the profound wisdom or the hidden truth of things. The artist suggests thereby that the truth, as sovereign value, stands above the world, drawing attention to its authority and majesty.



Sandro Botticelli, *Calumnia* (1495)



Cesare Ripa, *La verita* (1603)

Some of the modern representations depict the truth in mythological garment, assuming the paternity of Time; it firmly intervenes to save it from the arms of deceit and envy. It is the motif practiced, among others, by Annibale Carracci, Rubens, Nicolas Poussin, Giovanni Battista Tiepolo and François le Moine. In their works, truth is shown fragile, vulnerable, yet enjoying the affectionate protection of its parent, the one who protects him from the hostile attacks.

A theme equally prolific is the one of the truth hidden in the depths of a pit. This can be encountered in two of the paintings belonging to Jean-Léon Gérôme (around 1895), but also an Édouard Debat-Ponsan (1898). The artists capture at first instance a truth immersed in the darkness of the fountain, reflecting the light with the help of a mirror, but also another one, managing to surface, against the resistance of those who oppose it. The attitude is one of tension, decidedly bellicose, reminiscent of Liberty leading the people, by Delacroix. Besides, in the depictions of the time, freedom and truth seem to intermingle, as we see at a sculptor such as Augustin Dumont. Brought to light, contemplated in its nakedness and beauty, the truth radiates power and seduction. In his work *La vérité* (1870), Jules-Joseph Lefebvre insists especially on these qualities.

Enriched with several new elements (the torch and the crown), the image will become the model of the Statue of Liberty, the one built also by a Frenchman – Frédéric Auguste Bartholdi – in Paris and New York. The truth appears now as a symbol of solidarity, emancipation and power. Only *Nuda veritas* (1899), the work of the Austrian Gustav Klimt, will emphasize the erotic and slightly misogynistic size of representing the truth, impression given by the association of the woman with the snake – symbol of cunning and hypocrisy.



E. Delacroix, *La Liberté guidant le peuple* (1830) *La statue de la Liberté*, New York



How should be viewed, therefore, "the body" of truth? The option for nudity sends us to eroticism and desire. The woman-truth is subject to an irresistible attraction. To possess the truth means to possess knowledge. Enveloped or enrobed excessively, it raises suspicions. It is precisely why it ought to be released from the burden of appearances and 'un-veiled', brought to the surface. The mirror symbolizes the willingness to reflect – term which regards both reflection-thinking and reflection-light. The truth needs the mirror not to admire itself, but to acknowledge itself.



Jean-Louis Lefebvre,
La Vérité



Jean-Léon Gérôme,
La Vérité au fond du puits




Édouard Debat-Ponsan,
La Vérité sortant du puits

How does the truth look like in the eyes of the nowadays artist? I would propose for illustration a project of Romanian *Liliana Basarab*, entitled *Truth/s*. Its sphere of interest regards the recycling of symbols, the visual transposition of some concepts and studying the mechanisms for converting abstract languages in plasticizing formulas.

Liliana Basarab is the adept of collaborative (participatory) projects, to which she asks for the involvement of other artists and even the public. In a previous endeavour ('Monument for concepts') were tested the significances of notions such as Neutrality, Objectivity, Stability. Innitiated in Iași, the project *Truth/s* continued in Chișinău, then in Poland, being finalized in the USA. It consists in a three-minute video made in successive stages, on the pattern of a *work in progress*. In the present context, three ballerinas have been invited to 'interpret' through dance and suggestive movements the concept of truth. The filmed images have been posted online, for 'the best represented truth' to be voted. The winning interpretation has been the ob-

ject of two more interpretations, the last one finalized by precisely the movie made by the artist.



The idea of validating the representations by democratic vote is close to the pragmatic concept of truth, one that needs the public's conviction and adhesion in order to be accepted as useful or functional. The sum of subjective votes gives us, in principle, the largest possible objectivity.

Can art represent the truth? Yes, art can represent the truth, but it will be only a (symbolic) representation, an image or a projection of it, not the truth itself. A photograph or a painting is not reality, but only the representation of reality. Art reveals the truth, brings into light the truth, but is a lie, a construction that takes into consideration the differences between countries and people.

We think, therefore, in images articulated according to the caprices of our own vocabulary. This explains the fact that, when they speak of the truth, the French think first of... the woman (*cherchez la femme...*), taking her body as pretext for the delights of symbolization and allegorizing. The Romanian, instead, prefers to cultivate the equivocal. The truth has neither body, nor face; we find it 'in the middle' or in the wine. In the best of wine.

Christophe PERRIN *

De la musique avant toute chose ? Heidegger compositeur **

Abstract: When it comes to aesthetics, Heidegger may remain almost dumb about music, he appreciated it, and even was inspired by it. We would be at least well inspired to consider it from a hermeneutical point of view. To understand indeed a thought which confides only in one who knows how to "see in thought" and to understand a thinker who persuades that "hearingisseeing" and seeinghearing, it is not vain and rather sensible to envisage his words as notes, his texts as partitions, that reading would make listen to and that listening would mean reading. Making the hypothesis of a *Beiträge zur Philosophie*'s writing like a fugue, even of *Sein und Zeit*'s writing like a sonata form, we try to imagine Heidegger as a composer and to discover the influences which he undergoes. That of Mozart, of course. That of Bach even more.

Keywords: Heidegger, Music, Mozart, Bach

Heidegger ne l'appréciait pas seulement, « il aimait par-dessus tout Mozart »¹. Ainsi, quand, le 27 janvier 1956, jour du deux-centième anniversaire de la naissance du maestro, le maître entame, à Fribourg, la neuvième séance de son cours du moment, en pleine variation sur le principe de raison depuis le début du semestre d'hiver, il ne peut s'empêcher de lui rendre hommage pour son sens et sa vision de la composition, dont il reconnaît qu'ils peuvent le guider dans sa propre méditation. Aussi son propos s'interrompt-il un instant pour laisser résonner, du virtuose au piano aussi bien qu'au violon, ce mot sur la création musicale², dans lequel celui-ci

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** Les références des textes de Heidegger sont données suivant les tomes de la *Gesamtausgabe* qui, depuis 1975, paraissent aux éditions Vittorio Klostermann, Francfort-sur-le-Main – abrégés *GA*, tome et page –, sauf *Sein und Zeit* – abrégé *SZ* –, cité – paragraphe et page – suivant sa 10^{ème} édition, Max Niemeyer, Tübingen, 1963. Seront utilisées, dans la mesure du possible et quitte à les modifier, les traductions françaises existantes – pour *Sein und Zeit*, celle que l'on doit à Emmanuel Martineau – Alençon, Authentica, 1985.

¹ Ce sont les termes d'Heinrich Wiegand Petzet – *Auseinen Stern zugehen. Begegnungen und Gespräche mit Martin Heidegger 1929-1976*, Francfort-sur-le-Main, Societäts-Verlag, 1983, p. 22. Sur le rapport de Heidegger à Mozart, rappelons l'étude de Günther Pöltner, « Mozart und Heidegger. Die Musik und der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes », *Heidegger Studien*, n° 8, 1992, pp. 123-144.

² « En voyage, par exemple, en voiture, ou après un bon repas, en promenade, ou la nuit quand je ne puis dormir, c'est alors que les idées me viennent le mieux, qu'elles jaillissent en

précise quand une mélodie lui vient à l'esprit, mais surtout comment il imagine telle partie d'un morceau, puis développe telle autre, avant de procéder à leur accord ou, mieux, à leur raccord, jusqu'à l'orchestrer pour les écouter ensemble en même temps, le tout mentalement. C'est que, pour Heidegger, « entendre (*Hören*), c'est voir (*Blicken*) » ou, si l'on préfère, que « "voir" le tout "d'un seul regard" et "entendre ainsi tout à la fois" sont un seul et même acte », et même que « l'unité inapparente de cette saisie par le regard et par l'ouïe détermine l'essence de la pensée »³. Heidegger avait certes déjà évoqué, lors de la septième séance de son cours, soit deux leçons auparavant, cette coappartenance du voir et de l'entendre. Mais il l'avait fait en partant de la pensée grecque et en l'illustrant avec Bach⁴. Cherchant à embrasser du regard ce qu'il avait entendu en accentuant, dans l'énoncé du principe de raison, un mot sur deux – *nihil est sine ratione* –, il exposait à ses étudiants pourquoi notre expérience de la fugue ne commence pas avec la réception passive des sensations acoustiques produites en nous par chacune des notes qui la composent, mais par notre accueil, notre disponibilité à l'être qui se révèle alors à travers sons et couleurs, de même qu'il leur expliquait en quoi entendre et voir ne sont dès lors pas seulement des métaphores sensibles du suprasensible, mais ce qui est accompli par l'âme elle-même, et non par ces organes que sont les oreilles et les yeux⁵. Mais trêve de détails. Répétons-le : entendre, c'est voir, et ne retenons que cette équivalence affirmée par Heidegger à l'aide des deux plus grands compositeurs de l'histoire occidentale, dont l'un fut pour ainsi dire l'élève de

abondance. Celles qui me plaisent, je les garde en tête et sans doute je les fredonne à part moi, à en croire du moins les autres personnes. Lorsque j'ai tout cela bien en tête, le reste vient vite, une chose après l'autre, je voix où tel fragment pourrait être utilisé pour faire une composition du tout, suivant les règles du contrepoint, les timbres des divers instruments, etc. Mon âme alors s'échauffe, du moins quand je ne suis pas dérangé ; l'idée grandit, je la développe, tout devient de plus en plus clair, et le morceau est vraiment presque achevé dans ma tête, même s'il est long, de sorte que je puis ensuite, d'un seul regard, le voir en esprit comme un beau tableau ou une jolie personne ; je veux dire qu'en imagination je n'entends nullement les parties les unes après les autres dans l'ordre où elles devront se suivre, je les entends toutes ensemble à la fois. Instants délicieux ! Découverte et mise en œuvre, tout se passe en moi comme dans un beau songe très lucide. Mais le plus beau, c'est d'entendre ainsi tout à la fois » – Mozart, Wolfgang Amadeus, *Das Musikleben*, Mayence, Melosverlag, 1948, 1^{re} année, 1^{er} cahier, p. 18/*Der Satz vom Grund*, GA 10, 99.

³ *Der Satz vom Grund*, GA 10, 100.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 69-70.

⁵ On se souviendra du fameux « c'est l'âme qui sent et non le corps », décliné ensuite par Descartes dans l'analyse du sens de la vue : « c'est l'âme qui voit et non l'œil » – *La dioptrique*, discours IV et VI, AT VI, 109 et 141. D'où suit que c'est là une thèse proprement cartésienne et, par suite, une reprise par Heidegger d'un motif métaphysique que Derrida a d'ailleurs commenté en comparant les positions du penseur allemand sur la main et l'oreille – Derrida, Jacques, *Politiques de l'amitié*, Paris, Galilée, coll. "La philosophie en effet", 1994, p. 377 *sq.*

l'autre⁶ avant de devenir, en quelque sorte, le maître du nôtre, à tout le moins l'une de ses sources d'inspiration majeures⁷.

Or, cette formule : « entendre, c'est voir », ne nous ferait-elle pas précisément voir ce que Heidegger voulait que l'on entende au printemps 1963, à savoir que la pensée qui est proprement la sienne – une pensée qu'il retient par-devers lui en faisant choix, non seulement de ne pas la partager, sur le tard, au moyen des « médias modernes, comme la radio et la télévision »⁸, mais encore, et très tôt, de ne point vouloir faire paraître la troisième section de la première partie de son *Hauptwerk, Sein und Zeit*, ni publier de son vivant le manuscrit de son « *eigentliches Werk* »⁹, les *Beiträge zur Philosophie* – est une pensée si difficile « que peu de gens seulement peuvent être éduqués à son niveau », celui où l'on parvient à « voir en pensée (*Sehen im Denken*) »¹⁰? Mais si entendre, c'est voir, et s'il convient donc de s'exercer à voir en pensée, saurait-on y arriver autrement qu'en s'entraînant précisément à « entendre (*Hören*) » – à entendre, c'est-à-dire « avant tout à écouter en prêtant une oreille recueillie (*gesammeltes Horchen*) », bref, en étant « tout oreilles (*ganz Ohr sein*) »¹¹? Dès lors, en tendant l'oreille à ce que

⁶ Si Johann Christian Bach fait à Londres, en 1763, découvrir au jeune Mozart le pianoforte et comprendre l'architecture d'une symphonie, ce sont les rencontres musicales dominicales régulières organisées par le baron Gottfried van Swieten en 1782 à la Librairie impériale de Vienne, qui révèlent à celui-ci une partie de l'œuvre du père de celui-là. De Johann Sebastian, Wolfgang Amadeus admire aussitôt l'art du contrepoint et s'emploie *illuvia* à en assimiler l'héritage, commençant par transcrire plusieurs de ses fugues pour trio à cordes – *Sechs dreistimmige Präludien und Fugen für Streicher* (KV 404a) – avant d'en composer lui-même, d'abord dans la douleur – ainsi celle, inachevée, du final de la *Violin Sonata in A-Dur* (KV 402) ou celles, alambiquées, du *Prelude und Fugue in C-Dur* (KV 394) et de la *Suite in C-Dur* (KV 39) –, puis, manifestement, avec plus d'aisance – ainsi celles, pour vents, de la *Serenade in c-Moll* KV 388, pour piano de la *Fuge für zwei Pianoforte in c-Moll* (KV 426) par la suite transcrise pour orchestre dans les *Adagio und Fuge in c-Moll* (KV 546), ou pour orgue des *Zwei Fantasien in f-Moll für eine Orgelwalze* (KV 594 et KV 608). Son écriture en est changée et ses productions en témoignent, ainsi le final du *Streichquartett in G-Dur* (KV 387) ou le final de la *Jupiter-Symphonie Nr. 41 in C-Dur* (KV 551), comme la *Große Messe in c-Moll* (KV 427) ou plusieurs passages de *Die Zauberflöte* (KV 620).

⁷ Heidegger fait de lui « l'un de ceux qui ont le mieux entendu parmi tous ceux qui entendent : il l'"a été", c'est-à-dire qu'il l'est essentiellement, qu'il l'est donc encore », si bien qu'il nous faut l'entendre lui jusque dans le distique 366 du *Cherubinischer Wandersmann* d'Angelus Silesius : « "Un cœur calme en son fond, calme devant Dieu comme celui-ci le veut,/Dieu le touche volontiers, car ce cœur est Son luth". Ces vers sont intitulés *Le luth de Dieu. C'est Mozart* » – GA 10, 100.

⁸ C'est Bhikku Maha Mani qui parle – *Aus Gesprächen mit einem buddhistischen Mönch*, in *Reden und andere Zeugnisse*, GA 16, 589.

⁹ C'est ainsi qu'Otto Pöggeler désigne les *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* – « "Praktische Philosophie" als Antwort an Heidegger », in Bernd Martin (éd.), *Martin Heidegger und das "Dritte Reich". Ein Kompendium*, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1989, p. 95.

¹⁰ *Aus Gesprächen mit einem buddhistischen Mönch*, in GA 16, 589.

¹¹ *Logos (Heraklit, Fragment 50)*, in *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, GA 7, 219. Ces éclaircissements sont donc apportés par Heidegger lui-même le 4 mai 1951 à Brême, l'année même où la ville accueillit la statue des animaux musiciens façonnée par Gerhard Marcks en hommage au célèbre conte des frères Grimm.

Heidegger dit de l'entendre et en se laissant convaincre de la nécessité d'avoir l'oreille aux aguets quand on le lit, comment mieux former son oreille qu'à écouter retentir le dit heideggérien et, à travers lui, son dire, exactement comme s'il s'agissait d'une partition – une partition que lire ferait écouter et qu'écouter reviendrait à lire ? À supposer en outre que les mots heideggériens puissent résonner comme des notes, comment ne pas songer que la rhétorique qui préside à leur emploi ne fasse pas bien le principe de l'*Art poétique* verlainien : « De la musique avant toute chose »¹² ? C'est de ce point de vue que nous aimerais, sur les *Beiträge zur Philosophie* comme finalement sur *Sein und Zeit*, porter notre regard ou, ce qui doit revenir au même, y tendre l'oreille.

De l'écriture fuguée des *Beiträge zur Philosophie*...

À donc ouvrir grand nos oreilles aux mots heideggériens pour y goûter leur musicalité et les écouter parler pour entendre ce qu'ils ont à nous dire, plus que ceux de « *Geläut der Stille* »¹³ – ce bruit que fait la voix silencieuse de l'être recueillie dans le discours sonore –, plus que celui de « *Gesang* »¹⁴ – ce chant qui, à être chanté, « signifie : être présent dans le présent lui-même – exister »¹⁵ –, plus, même, que celui de « *Stimmung* »¹⁶ – ce terme qui, avant d'être le titre d'une œuvre de Stockhausen, est travaillé par Heidegger autant à partir de ce qui le forme : *Stimme* (la voix) qu'à partir de ce qu'il sert à former : *Einstimmung* (l'accord), *Übereinstimmung* (l'accord redoublé, la conformité), *stimmen* (sonner juste), etc. –, c'est celui de *Fuge*¹⁷ qui retient notre attention¹⁸, lui qui, d'ordinaire, déchaîne les passions. La faute à son homonymie. Tantôt "jointure", au sens du résultat de l'action de joindre, d'adjoindre pour assembler un élément à un autre, comme au sens de la puissance même qui joint et assemble ce qui s'appartient, tantôt "fugue", au sens musical et à partir du latin *fuga*, la signification du terme *Fuge* dans l'usage qu'en fait Heidegger est rendue par lui plus ardue encore sitôt

¹² Verlaine, Paul, « Art poétique », in *Oeuvres poétiques complètes*, Paris, Gallimard, coll. "Bibliothèque de la Pléiade", 1992, v. 1, p. 326.

¹³ Pour les occurrences du mot, cf. Jaran, François et Perrin, Christophe, *The Heidegger Concordance*, Bloomsbury, Londres/New Dehli/New York/Sydney, 2013, t. 1, p. 581.

¹⁴ Pour les occurrences du mot, cf. *ibid.*, p. 596.

¹⁵ C'est ainsi que Heidegger commente, le 29 décembre 1946, le vers de Rilke : « *Gesangist Dasein* » – « *Wozu Dichter?* », in *Holzwege, GA 5*, 316.

¹⁶ Pour les occurrences du mot, cf. Jaran, François et Perrin, Christophe, *The Heidegger Concordance*, *op. cit.*, t. 2, p. 437-438.

¹⁷ Pour les occurrences du mot, cf. *ibid.*, p. 525.

¹⁸ Sauf, paradoxalement, celle d'Eduardo Marx qui, s'il considère le motif dans son excellent *Heidegger und der Ort der Musik* – Würzburg, Königshausen & Neumann, coll. "Epistemata/Reihe Philosophie", 1998, p. 48, 49, 52, 53, 65, 76, 81, 89, 104 –, n'y consacre aucun chapitre, ni paragraphe, ni même alinéa, pas plus qu'il ne le fait d'ailleurs avec les *Beiträge zur Philosophie*, toujours évoqués en notes – *ibid.*, p. 14, 48, 54, 65, 73, 75, 76, 78-80.

évoquée, dans le *Vorblick* des *Beiträge*, la « *Fuge des Seyns* »¹⁹ puis, dans leur §39, ses trois niveaux de compréhension. En effet, la « *Fuge des Seyns* » est à la fois 1. un *Gefüge* de l'estre, autrement dit un "ensemble articulé" ou un "ensemble d'articulations" comme l'est la fugue musicale, 2. une *Verfügung* de l'estre, une "ordonnance", une "disposition", au sens d'une disposition d'ensemble et 3. Une *Fügung*, une "fatalité", une "destinée" de l'estre. Attendu que, sémantiquement, *Gefüge* et *Verfügung* se rejoignent et que *Fügung* semble apporter à cette disposition de l'ensemble articulé l'idée de sa nécessité, attendu que, terminologiquement, les deux traductions américaines existantes des *Beiträge*²⁰ ne reprennent pas la dimension musicale de *Fuge* en allemand puisque *Fuge* s'y traduit ou par "jointure" (*jointure*), ou par "conjoncture" (*conjuncture*), on estimera sans doute que cette dernière n'a pas lieu d'être, en tout cas pas lieu d'être rappelée, hors version originale, par un artifice langagier qui, de toute façon, alourdirait considérablement le propos heideggérien – ainsi si l'on tentait en français de rendre *Fuge* par "jointure fuguée"²¹. Du reste, même ignorant en musique, chacun sait, puisque qui dit "fugue" dit *Art de la fugue* et que qui dit *Art de la fugue* dit Bach²², génie qui mariait jusqu'à cinq ou six voix²³ et les faisait se répondre en canons dans des morceaux à l'architecture émérite, que la fugue, l'acception musicale de *Fuge* ne ferait qu'insister encore, pour rendre *Fuge*, sur ce que désigne déjà clairement ce qu'elle est – *Gefüge* et *Verfügung*. Mais plutôt que de choisir notre camp entre ceux qui, pour des raisons dogmatique et étymologique, fermeront leurs oreilles à l'idée de fugue²⁴ et

¹⁹ *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, GA 65, 18, puis 228. Il n'est que deux mentions de l'expression dans l'ouvrage.

²⁰ *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)*, trad. amér. de Paris Emad et Kenneth Maly, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, coll. "Studies in Continental Thought", 1999 et *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, trad. amér. de Richard Rojcewicz et Daniela Vallega-Neu, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, coll. "Studies in Continental Thought", 2012.

²¹ Ce que ne fait pas François Fédier dans sa récente traduction – *Appports à la philosophie. De l'avenance*, Paris, Gallimard, coll. "Bibliothèque de philosophie", 2013.

²² *Die Kunst der Fuge* (BWV 1080) est bien cette œuvre inachevée de Bach commencée aux alentours de 1740 ou 1742 et poursuivie jusqu'à la mort du compositeur, en 1750, en sorte qu'elle passe traditionnellement pour son testament musical.

²³ Disons jusqu'à six, comme en fait foi le *Musikalisches Opfer* (BWV 1079), dont la légende veut que, mis au défi par Frédéric II de Prusse, le 7 mai 1747, d'improviser et de développer tout un discours musical à partir d'un thème joué par le souverain à la flûte, Bach, qui s'acquitte de plusieurs variations et d'une fugue à trois, puis quatre et enfin cinq voix, estime qu'en ajouter une sixième est impossible... avant d'y parvenir dans cette œuvre qu'il envoie au roi deux mois plus tard, jour pour jour.

²⁴ Ainsi Hans Ruin: « it is tempting to read *Contribution* as a fugue also on the musical sense, and even to suspect that Heidegger was inspired by this particular form. He himself does not, however, address this connection, so there is not much to build on. The apparent etymological connection is not significant, since the musical term comes from Latin and Italian, recalling an "escaping" (*fugare*) movement of melody, with no connection to the German *Fuge*, in the sense of joint » – « Contributions to Philosophy », in Hubert L. Dreyfus et Mark A. Wrathall (éds.), *A Companion to Heidegger*, Malden/Oxford/Carlton, Blackwell, coll. "BlackwellCompanions to Philosophy", 2005, p. 361.

ceux qui, pour des raisons lexicale et musicale, voudront raisonner à partir de ce qui sait résonner²⁵, plutôt même que de les rassembler sur ce qu'ils rappellent également²⁶, à savoir l'écho de l'ἀρμονία antique dans la *Fuge* heideggérienne, il ne sera peut-être pas vain de s'assurer de ce qu'est exactement une fugue. Sait-on jamais.

Si la fugue se définit le plus souvent comme une « forme de composition contrapuntique fondée sur l'entrée et le développement successifs de voix selon un principe strict d'imitation qui donne à l'auditeur l'impression que chaque voix fuit ou en poursuit une autre »²⁷, ce que le dictionnaire ne dit pas en disant cela est que la fugue renvoie ainsi ou à une technique d'écriture musicale spécifique – une forme particulière de contrepoint qui repose sur le principe de l'imitation, chaque voix reproduisant un motif original l'une après l'autre –, ou à un genre de composition – des compositions écrites sous cette forme. Mais au-delà de l'écart entre le procédé et le résultat, *fugue* peut désigner aussi bien une œuvre entière qu'un passage isolé au sein d'une forme plus vaste. Par ailleurs, la fugue relève autant du répertoire instrumental que vocal. Insistons-y : l'image de la fugue ne convoque pas tant celle du chant que celle de la voix comme partie intégrante d'un ensemble polyphonique, réalisé selon des règles rigoureuses – ces voix doivent être complémentaires harmoniquement, tout en restant intelligibles dans leurs énoncés respectifs. En tant que forme musicale, la fugue se constitue principalement selon une dynamique d'alternance entre une section fuguée et des intermèdes écrits plus librement – les divertissements. Traditionnellement, elle a pour caractéristique essentielle d'être entièrement composée autour d'un thème récurrent – le sujet de la fugue. Dans les sections fuguées, la conjonction de la dimension verticale – les accords constitués dans l'énoncé simultané des différentes voix – et horizontale – le

²⁵ Ainsi Philippe Grosos : « *Fuge* [...] signifi[e] à la fois le joint ou la jointure et, en un sens musical, la fugue. Cette polysémie n'est pas sans conséquence car, pour parvenir à la compréhension de la jointure (*Fuge*) comme "injonction s'adjointant l'appel et ainsi fondant le *Dasein*", Heidegger va préalablement la penser à partir de moments constitutifs tel l'*accord* (*der Anklang*) ou l'*interlude* (*das Zuspiel*), autant de concepts dont les résonances musicales ont pour vocation de souligner ce qu'il est possible de nommer l'articulation *harmonieuse* de l'être » – *L'existence musicale. Essai d'anthropologie phénoménologique*, Lausanne, L'Âge d'Homme, 2008, coll. "Être et devenir", p. 103.

²⁶ Ainsi Hans Ruin : « ...for the specific choice of this term, which does indeed recall musical terminology in a more general sense, one could point to Heraclitus' *harmonia*, from *harmozein*, joining, which Heidegger in his readings, following Diels, translates precisely as *Fügung* », comme Philippe Grosos : « ...comme le dira plus tard Heidegger, dans une conférence de 1956 intitulée "*Was ist das – die Philosophie?*", "qu'un être s'ajoute (*sichfügt*) à l'autre dans la reciprocité, que les deux [soient] l'un et l'autre originellement ajoutés parce qu'il leur est dévolu d'être ensemble", c'est là ce que les Grecs, et parmi eux Héraclite, ont nommé "ἀρμονία" » – respectivement « Contributions to Philosophy », art. cit., p. 361 et *L'existence musicale*, op. cit., p. 103.

²⁷ *Trésor de la langue française informatisé*, art. « fugue ».

déroulement linéaire propre à l'énoncé de chaque voix – est donc marquée par la dynamique des entrées successives de nouvelles voix, comme autant d'ajouts du sujet à lui-même. Mais n'entrons pas davantage dans les détails – ainsi ceux des possibilités de modulations d'une fugue, qui diffèrent théoriquement selon les sections de la fugue que sont son exposé, ses divertissements ou son développement. Bornons-nous à faire remarquer qu'il est toujours deux types de répétition au sein d'une fugue : celle qui alimente le travail de contrepoint, lorsque différentes voix se font entendre alternativement, la voix qui a exposé le thème intégralement se muant alors en voix d'accompagnement, et celle qui consacre le retour du sujet à la suite d'un divertissement, ouvrant du coup une nouvelle section proprement fuguée. Dans ces conditions, la forme de la fugue doit, dans son organisation interne, être distinguée de l'écriture fuguée – que l'on peut retrouver au sein d'autres formes musicales à titre de section d'un thème et/ou de variations.

Ceci posé, saurait-on rapprocher cette structure formelle de la fugue musicale – articulée selon une dynamique d'alternance entre les sections fuguées et les divertissements plus libres, où il est possible d'introduire de nouveaux motifs, voire de nouveaux thèmes, indépendants du sujet de fugue – à celle des *Beiträge zur Philosophie* ? Nous en douteron d'emblée, étant donné qu'il paraît difficile de trouver l'équivalent de divertissements dans les *Beiträge*, ces petites phrases musicales – ou épisodes – servant de transition. Reste qu'une idée vient d'émerger qui nous fera résister à la tentation de ne point tenir compte de la dimension musicale de la *Fuge* des *Beiträge* : une fugue se présente toujours comme la répétition incessante du même, quand bien même cette répétition peut aussi bien être comprise comme le jeu de cette perpétuelle reprise et de l'extinction d'un même motif, le sujet de la fugue finissant, à force, par disparaître en se fondant dans le tissu polyphonique. En somme, la répétition du même s'entend comme corollaire de la fuite perpétuelle du thème. On rejoint là le sens latin de *fuga*, dérivé de *fugare*.

Mais après la structure de la fugue, disons encore un mot du principe de l'écriture fuguée – la "fugue" au sens du procédé cette fois, et non plus de son résultat. Ainsi comprise, la fugue fait une pratique spécifique du contrepoint, technique de composition dont le nom est attesté dès la première moitié du XIV^e siècle, technique de "point contre point" et, quand les notes de musique ne seront plus figurées par des points, de note contre note, au sens où se développent simultanément plusieurs lignes mélodiques, technique, du reste, qui trouve son origine dans le déchant du XII^e siècle dans lequel une voix d'accompagnement s'ajoutait à la voix principale qui exécutait le chant liturgique pour orner de plusieurs notes une des syllabes accentuées ou non de son texte. Avec la généralisation de l'écriture polyphonique fleurissent aux XIII^e-XIV^e siècles, dans le genre du motet, des

compositions à trois ou quatre voix où l'idéal d'une conciliation des contraires s'exprime bientôt dans l'écriture par mouvements opposés – un motif ascendant est simultanément complété par un motif descendant porté par une autre voix –, par l'emploi de modes rythmiques distincts ou de langues différentes pour chaque voix – au chant sacré latin de la teneur vient s'unir un texte profane en français. La fugue, l'écriture fuguée qui parvient à une forme stable au XVII^e siècle, hérite de cette évolution pour se caractériser comme un contrepoint où prévaut l'imitation, chaque voix énonçant à son tour le motif initial du sujet en écho à la première – ces voix sont nommées réponses. Le fragment mélodique exécuté pour commencer est appelé l'antécédent. Le conséquent est le fragment qui en est la reproduction. La fugue repose ainsi sur un mécanisme de conversion : chaque voix opère le passage du statut de voix principale – énonçant le sujet – à celui d'accompagnement de la réponse – elle est alors dite contre-sujet –, abandonnant donc le thème pour devenir son nécessaire complément harmonique. Et ce processus de se poursuivre jusqu'à ce que toutes les voix soient intervenues, d'où une dimension cumulative dans la progression linéaire du sujet.

Ceci acquis, saurait-on envisager qu'un texte comme les *Beiträge* puisse être non seulement comparable à, mais encore déchiffrable comme une fugue ? Avant de l'affirmer cavalièrement sur la seule base de cette homonymie comme on l'a d'abord fait²⁸, resterait à en faire l'exakte démonstration – ce à quoi s'emploient désormais les commentateurs qui n'ont pas bouché leurs oreilles à cette éventualité²⁹, sans que, toutefois, ils ne parviennent encore à accorder leurs interprétations. Incapable d'entreprendre ce travail

²⁸ Ainsi Walter A. Brogan : « *Die Fuge* in German can mean the fugue, the musical composition itself, and also the jointure, the interplaying structure that hinges together the parts of such a composition. [...] Thus, this book is written like a musical fugue whose score requires one to listen to each of the six parts of the text in the way they mutually pursue and alternately duplicate each other. It is important to hear the episodes of the text not only as they appear alongside each other but also in their interplay. Reading this text requires not only that we follow its linear and vertical progression but also – as in a fugue – that we follow each part horizontally as it is addressing and being addressed by the other parts. This requires attentiveness to the multilayered character of the composition » – « Da-sein and the Leap of Being », in Charles E. Scott (éd.), *Companion to Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, coll. "Studies in Continental Thought", 2001, p. 172-173.

²⁹ Renvoyons aux études d'Iain Thomson – « The Philosophical *Fugue*: Understanding the Structure and Goal of Heidegger's *Beiträge* », *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 2003, vol. 34, n° 1, pp. 57-73 –, d'Ingeborg Schüssler – « Le système de la fugue : deux modes de pensée », in Emmanuel Mejía et Ingeborg Schüssler (éds.), *Heideggers Beiträge zur Philosophie/Les Apports à la philosophie de Heidegger*, colloque international des 20-22 mai 2004 à Lausanne, Klostermann, Francfort-sur-le-Main, 2009, pp. 85-101 – et de David Nowell-Smith – « The Art of Fugue: Heidegger on Rhythm », *Gatherings. The Heidegger Circle Annual*, 2012, n° 2, pp. 41-64.

ici, tenons-nous en à ce qui pourra être facilement admis pour rebondir et, par-delà les *Beiträge zur Philosophie*, en revenir à *Sein und Zeit*.

... à la forme-sonate de *Sein und Zeit*

Lorsque, en 1938/1939, Heidegger écrit pour lui que « la métaphysique est la fugue (*Fuge*) – l'ensemble articulé sur le mode d'une fugue (*dasfügende Gefüge*) – de l'histoire occidentale en tant qu'histoire de l'abandon (*Verlassenheit*) de l'étant loin de l'être, abandon qui culmine lui-même en oubli (*Vergessenheit*) »³⁰, même musicophile, l'on doutera difficilement ici de son usage de la métaphore musicale. L'image de la fugue illustre en effet la répétition d'un même thème par des voix plurielles en même temps que sa désertion par chacune d'elle, ce thème n'en finissant ainsi jamais de finir, car de passer et de s'éteindre, avant qu'une nouvelle bouche ne s'ouvre pour le faire ressurgir et, par là même, le relancer. Mais quel thème ? Puisqu'il en va de la métaphysique, celui de la vérité de l'être : sa caractérisation première comme ἀλήθεια au commencement grec de la philosophie pourrait très bien correspondre, au sein de la fugue, à son sujet, donc à l'exposition originale du thème, dont chaque relais par une autre voix – autre voix qui s'ajouteraient à la voix précédente comme garante de son sujet renouvelé et qui serait nécessairement complétée par l'accompagnement en lequel se muerait la première voix – constituerait une réponse en imitation – une réponse différant par exemple dans sa tonalité. Car le caractère polyphonique de la fugue tient à ce qu'une même voix ne peut revenir telle quelle : l'amplification polyphonique consubstantielle à la fugue trouve sa condition dans une augmentation de l'ambitus vers le grave ou l'aigu. S'ensuit qu'aucune voix ne part du même son. Monodique, la première voix donne le ton à partir duquel les autres voix se situeront. Sous cet angle, il serait légitime de considérer l'idéa platonicienne comme la seconde voix offrant à la première – celle, présocratique, de l'être comme φύσις – sa première réponse, celle donc qui énonce à nouveau le thème – ainsi en transformant l'ἀλήθεια en ὄμοιώσις – et, ce faisant, attire l'attention sur elle au détriment de l'écoute de la première voix qui en est pourtant la source. Du fait de sa reprise par une deuxième voix, l'être chanté comme tel par la première voix passerait nécessairement au second plan – d'où son retrait – jusqu'à ce que l'auditeur, qui l'écoute bientôt indistinctement, finisse par ne plus l'entendre qu'inconsciemment – d'où son recouvrement. C'est là la loi de la fugue : son chant devenant contre-chant sitôt son tour passé, la voix initiale se fond toujours davantage dans l'ensemble du chœur qui lui répond. Dans ces conditions, la fugue – au sens musical – mimerait, de manière sonore, la fugue – au sens locatif – à laquelle s'adonne l'être de manière invisible. Dit

³⁰ *Die Überwindung der Metaphysik*, in *Metaphysik und Nihilismus*, GA 67, 51.

autrement, la fugue ferait *entendre* ce qui ne peut se *voir*: la fuite perpétuelle du sujet initial de la voix primordiale qui s'enrichit lui-même de son oubli. Dans cette perspective on l'aura compris, ce sont deux fugues qui s'accorderaient entre elles, l'une *ontologique* – la fugue comme fuite répétée de l'être lui-même –, l'autre *métaphysique* – la fugue comme contrepoint de plusieurs voix audibles dans la tradition philosophique –, celle-ci, que jouent à tue-tête les grands penseurs de Platon à Nietzsche, s'accordant avec celle-là, que nous ne pouvons pas ne pas déjà avoir en tête, puisqu'elle l'occasionne.

On le voit – et on l'entend –, l'emploi fait par Heidegger de la métaphore de la fugue en marge des *Beiträge zur Philosophie* est non seulement tout à fait cohérent, mais semble pouvoir faire croire à la mobilisation de tout un paradigme musical en eux. Reste que ce paradigme, si l'on en fait l'hypothèse, risque de renvoyer davantage à la pensée de la métaphysique du dit premier Heidegger – celle qui en appelle à la « destruction de l'histoire de l'ontologie »³¹ en raison de l'oubli de l'être par l'oubli de sa question – qu'à la pensée hors-métaphysique du Heidegger de la maturité. Aussi avançons prudemment en avançant l'idée d'une fugue dans, voire des *Beiträge*, et réservons-lui le rôle syntaxique qui est le sien quand elle désigne ce procédé d'écriture. C'est que l'auteur de ce livre aux mots d'autant plus inouïs qu'ils ont été longtemps tenus secrets cherche à articuler la fugue ontologique *et* la fugue métaphysique, plus précisément à faire voir la fugue qui incombe à l'être lui-même en faisant entendre et bientôt taire la fugue qui s'échappe des traités philosophiques majeurs de l'histoire. Musicalement, il y aurait bien fugue en ce que, d'abord, opposition de deux voix qui répliquent l'une à l'autre, donc s'expliquent, autant qu'elles se répondent, donc se fécondent. Cette opposition serait de ce point de vue le contrepoint de l'être et de sa pensée historique, jusqu'à leur conciliation dans une pensée de l'être qui serait enfin tout ce qu'elle doit être. Or, comment la pensée de l'être qui, de fait, n'a pas tenu promesse dans le passé, puisqu'elle s'est faite pensée de l'être de l'étant et, partant, pensée de l'être comme étant – *étantité* de l'étant peut-être, mais *étantité de l'étant* cependant –, pourrait-elle, de droit, pour cela seul que Heidegger l'appelle de ses vœux, échapper à l'avenir au piège dans lequel elle a commencé par tomber ? Réponse : en se donnant pour tâche d'articuler elle-même la fugue en sorte que, pour la première fois, celle-ci consiste en « la libre fugue de la vérité de l'estre (*die freie Fuge der Wahrheit des Seyns*) »³². Heidegger choisirait ainsi de modeler les *Beiträge* comme une fugue pour deux raisons : et parce que ce modèle musical qu'est la fugue permettrait de comprendre la métaphysique historique, et parce que battre le rappel de l'être en tant que tel ne se pourrait jamais mieux qu'à montrer pourquoi il s'est tu. Au fil des âges en effet, la voix de la *φύσις* a été

³¹ SZ, § 6, 19.

³² GA 65,4 – pour le premier emploi.

doublée en philosophie par celle de l’*ἰδέα*, elle-même doublée par celle de l’*ἐνέργεια*, doublée à son tour par celle de la substance, puis celles du sujet, du concept, de la volonté, de la volonté de puissance et de la volonté de volonté³³ se sont succédé, toutes renforçant progressivement l’opposition contrapuntique à laquelle s’est opposé, par son « refus (*Verweigerung*) »³⁴, l’être lui-même. C’est que l’être, parce qu’*esse*, ne peut que foncièrement se refuser à être ce *summum ens* qui culmine dans les systèmes de la métaphysique moderne. Ayant connu une telle « décomposition (*Verzersetzung*) »³⁵, il n’est pas étonnant que son lointain écho ne retentisse plus aujourd’hui. Reste que le silence de l’être, qui glace le sang du *Dasein* en le plongeant dans « l’effroi (*Erschrecken*) »³⁶ lorsque celui-ci découvre l’étant par lui déserté, est aussi ce qui prépare son retour, puisque ce qui, seul, autorise une nouvelle fugue à commencer – cette fugue inédite qui le serait d’être libre.

Si c’est donc bien à dessein que Heidegger paraît opter pour l’écriture fuguée en 1936-1938, le procédé, que l’efficacité justifie, nous étonnera beaucoup moins sitôt fait remarquer que notre auteur s’est semble-t-il déjà inspiré de la musique pour composer son chef d’œuvre en 1925-1926. À en effet dresser l’oreille en relisant *Sein und Zeit* après l’avoir exercée en écoutant résonner les *Beiträge zur Philosophie*, on apercevra sans doute mieux – ou autrement – ce que l’on y a d’abord forcément perçu, soit que l’auteur s’y emploie à larépétition de l’analytique existentielle au chapitre 4 de la deuxième section (§§ 67-71) dans sa reprise, pour réinterprétation au fil directeur de la temporalité, des structures d’être de l’exister du *Dasein* mises au jour au cours de la première section – la spatialité (§ 24/§ 70), l’affection (§ 29/§ 68 b), le comprendre (§ 31/§ 68 a), le parler (§ 34/§ 68 d), la déchéance (§ 38/§ 68 c), la quotidienneté (§ 51/§ 71). Or, une oreille musicale ne résistera pas à appliquer le schéma de la forme-sonate pour se représenter la chose³⁷, forme-sonate qui, de la mort de Bach au début de la période romantique, est en réalité celle qui vient à former le premier mouvement de toute composition musicale – par où Heidegger se révélerait tout à fait classique. Principalement développée par les compositeurs de tradition germanique de cette seconde moitié du XVIII^e siècle, la forme-sonate est,

³³ Cf. « *Die onto-theo-logische Verfassung der Metaphysik* », in *Identität und Differenz*, GA 11, 73.

³⁴ *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, GA 65, 8 – pour le premier emploi.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 308 – pour le premier emploi.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 14 – pour le premier emploi.

³⁷ L’idée n’a été suggérée qu’une fois à notre connaissance, par Joan Stambaugh qui, dans la préface qu’en tant que traductrice elle rédige à *Sein und Zeit*, écrit : « The word *Wiederholung*, which I have translated as "retrieval", could also be translated as "recapitulation" since that word is used in music to refer to what Heidegger seems to intend by *Wiederholung*. In music (specifically in the sonata form) recapitulation refers to the return of the initial theme after the whole development section. Because of its new place in the piece, that same theme is now heard differently » – *Being and Time. A Translation of Sein und Zeit*, Albany, SUNY Press, coll. "SUNY Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy", 1996, p. xv-xvi.

comme son nom l'indique, une forme musicale associée à l'origine à ce type d'œuvre qu'est la sonate, c'est-à-dire toute composition instrumentale pour soliste ou petit ensemble. Elle s'en distingue néanmoins en ce qu'il est des sonates dont les mouvements peuvent ne pas être de forme-sonate et des pièces musicales autres que la sonate qui la suivent³⁸. La forme-sonate se compose généralement de trois parties principales : l'exposition, le développement et la réexposition. D'où une parenté de la forme-sonate avec la forme ternaire, forme musicale en trois sections, schématisées d'ordinaire A-B-A, la première et la dernière étant identiques ou quasi musicalement, quand la deuxième contraste avec elle. La forme-sonate se ramènerait donc simplement, elle, au plan ABA'. Toutefois, sa première section ne forme pas une section fermée et finalement autonome comme dans la forme ternaire. Voilà précisément ce que la forme-sonate hérite de la forme binaire, forme musicale en deux sections, schématisées d'ordinaire A et B et exécutées deux fois chacune, soit : AA'BB'. Cependant, la forme-sonate se différencie aussi de cette forme par la reprise intégrale qu'elle fait, même si modifiée, de sa première partie après sa partie centrale, alors que la forme binaire n'en suppose qu'une brève évocation. Bref, la forme-sonate se reconnaît à son architecture bipartite dans une structure tripartie – l'exposition d'un côté, l'ensemble formé par le développement et la réexposition de l'autre. Ajoutons que le plan de la forme-sonate est bithématique et, pour une grande part, bitonal. L'exposition se constitue en effet de l'énoncé de deux thèmes contrastés dans deux tonalités distinctes, énoncé qui se conclut traditionnellement sur une cadence et constitue ainsi une unité close. Elle est relayée par le développement, qui s'inspire des thèmes A et B, les reformule, les enrichit de nouveaux motifs et les module selon des tonalités éloignées en portant leur opposition à son paroxysme, avant d'en revenir au ton principal, celui par lequel il a été commencé. Lui succède la réexposition, qui reprend le thème A avec, le plus souvent, de nouvelles variations, puis le thème B dans la même tonalité et de la même façon, avant une coda. Si la différence entre les deux thèmes demeure, le conflit qui résultait de leur premier jeu dans deux tonalités se résout. Une consonance terminale chasse pour ainsi dire une dissonance originale.

Que de la forme-sonate se rapproche le mouvement d'ensemble de *Sein und Zeit*, traité inachevé certes, mais qui est bien paru en l'état, autrement dit composé d'une introduction et d'une seule partie de deux sections de six chapitres chacune où « l'analyse fondamentale préparatoire du *Dasein* »³⁹ se renouvelle dans une herméneutique temporelle, voilà qui ne se défend pas seulement formellement, mais encore thématiquement et tonalement.

³⁸ Si le français laisse libre de mettre ou non un trait d'union à *forme(-)sonate*, nous le faisons pour prévenir cette confusion.

³⁹ SZ, VII.

Thématiquement, car de quoi est-il question dans *Sein und Zeit* sinon de l'être et du temps – bithématisme –, de l'être (*sein*) de mon être (*Dasein*) en vue de l'être lui-même (*Sein*), de l'être (*sein*) de mon être (*Dasein*) comme temps (*Zeit*), du temps (*Zeit*) de mon temps (*Zeitlichkeit*) comme être (*Sein*), du temps (*Zeit*) de mon temps (*Zeitlichkeit*) au regard du temps lui-même (*Temporalität*) ? Tonalement, car le ton principal de l'analytique existentialie, qui est celui de l'exister inapproprié (*uneigentlich*) tel qu'il se manifeste de prime abord et le plus souvent, est bientôt modulé pour aboutir à un ton voisin, mais distinct – bitonalisme –, celui de l'exister approprié (*eigentlich*) tel qu'il pourrait être dans la quotidienneté. En ce sens, charge à la résolution (*Entschlossenheit*) du *Dasein*, par laquelle celui-ci sort du On (*Man*), de résoudre le conflit tonal qui est assurément, de la forme-sonate, bien plus que la "guerre des thèmes" dont on a pu parler, la tension essentielle.

Que conclure de ce bref interlude qui s'est risqué à imaginer Heidegger compositeur et ses *magna opera* comme faisant droit et place à de la musique avant toute chose ? Deux choses. D'abord, que la conclusion que d'aucuns tirent souvent de la discréption du penseur quant à la musique lorsqu'il est question d'esthétique, à savoir qu'elle ne le toucherait pas⁴⁰, ne tient pas. Heidegger bien sûr, qui évoque la musique wagnérienne⁴¹ sans manquer de rappeler la suprématie de l'art lyrique sur les autres chez Nietzsche⁴², mais toujours en omettant de se prononcer sur le sujet, ne fait qu'une seule allusion à la musique médiévale⁴³, une seule à la musique allemande⁴⁴, et pas davantage à la musique tout court, même lorsqu'il s'agit pour lui de rendre hommage à son compatriote Conradin Kreutzer en 1955⁴⁵. Sans doute

⁴⁰ C'était l'avis de *Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker* que Françoise Dastur partagerait presque à écrire que « Heidegger's almost total silence on music – with the exception of one reference to Beethoven's quartets in 1936 [...] and another one to a letter from Mozart in *Der Satz vom Grund* [...] is amazing compared with the interest for music shown by many German philosophers » – « Heidegger's Freiburg version of The Origin of the Work of Art », in James Risser (éd.), *Heidegger Toward the Turn. Essays on the Work of the 1930s*, Albany, SUNY Press, coll. "SUNY Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy", 1999, p. 140, note 11 ; cf. encore, du même auteur, *Heidegger et la question anthropologique*, Louvain/Paris, Peeters, coll. "Bibliothèque philosophique de Louvain", 2003, p. 92, note 34.

⁴¹ *Nietzsches Wort "Gottisttot"*, in *GA* 5, 225 ; *Nietzsches II*, *GA* 6.2, 81, 252 ; *Nietzsches: Der europäische Nihilismus*, *GA* 48, 100 ; *Nietzsches Metaphysik*, *GA* 50, 28.

⁴² *Nietzsches I*, *GA* 6.1, 7, 69, 84, 85, 87, 88, 97, 130, 131, 221 ; *Nietzsches: Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst*, *GA* 43, 11, 84, 101, 103, 105, 115, 134, 150-152, 154, 157-60, 271.

⁴³ *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation)*, in *Phänomenologische Interpretationen ausgewählter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zu Ontologie und Logik*, *GA* 62, 370.

⁴⁴ *Zu Ernst Jünger*, *GA* 90, 135.

⁴⁵ Heidegger eût pu développer toute une pensée de la musique. Il ne fera état que de sa pensée de la pensée, en musique peut-être, mais finalement contre elle : « En ce jour résonnent donc, choisis dans l'œuvre de Conradin Kreutzer, des mélodies et des chœurs, des morceaux d'opéra et de musique de chambre. [...] Mais cela suffit-il à une fête du

trahit-il ici et là son émotion face à la musique. Ainsi en 1944 quand, après avoir écouté Edith Picht-Axenfeld jouer pour lui la *Klaviersonate in B-Dur* (D 960) de Schubert, il rompt le silence qui s'ensuit pour confier à son mari : « Nous ne pouvons pas faire ça avec la philosophie »⁴⁶. Ainsi en 1962 quand, dérogeant à la règle qu'il s'est fixée de « ne pas répondre aux enquêtes », il avoue à Heinrich Strobel qui l'interrogeait sur Stravinsky que la *Symphonie de psaumes* et *Perséphone* « sont de la musique au sens le plus élevé du terme : des œuvres offertes par les muses »⁴⁷. Reste que, par deux fois⁴⁸, Heidegger rappelle que le terme *Satz* en allemand peut également désigner la phrase musicale et que, dans ce cas, « c'est la phrase musicale qui conduit le musicien, qu'elle se présente, revient, se développe et se concentre sans cesse, jusqu'à ce que l'esprit s'y soit complètement plié et soumis »⁴⁹. Par où l'on en revient au mot de Mozart sur la création musicale par lequel nous commençons et où l'on en vient à notre second point.

N'est-ce pas là, donnée par un auteur si sensible à la musique des mots, l'autorisation qu'il nous manquait pour envisager musicalement ses phrases ? Et quand bien même qui écoute « une sonate de Beethoven » – ou une page de Heidegger – « ne saura pas encore exactement après elle ce qu'est la musique à proprement parler » – ou la pensée en général, du moins sa pensée en particulier –, « quelle est sa structure, quelles sont ses lois, il se trouv[era] pourtant dans sa proximité la plus proche et écout[era] peut-être quelque chose à travers elle »⁵⁰. Ce « peut-être » – on aimerait dire ce "peu d'être" – nous suffit, car suffira à justifier notre entreprise. Le fera-t-il de ses résultats ? Non. Cette représentation de Heidegger en compositeur et cette interprétation musicienne des œuvres phares qui sont les siennes ne sont ni les premières qui nous viennent à l'esprit, ni les dernières auxquelles nous voudrons le borner. Mais force est d'avouer qu'il n'est pas plus impossible de penser à la forme-sonate en lisant *Sein und Zeit* qu'il n'est impensable que les *Beiträge zur Philosophie* reprennent deux éléments clés de l'écriture fuguée : le contrepoint – l'opposition de parties qui se soutiennent mutuellement et ont une même origine – et l'imitation – la redite perpétuelle d'un seul et

souvenir ? Toute commémoration (*Gedenkfeier*) exige que nous pensions (*denken*). Mais que penser, que dire, lors d'une fête consacrée au souvenir d'un musicien ? Ce qui caractérise la musique, n'est-ce pas qu'elle nous "parle" déjà, par le simple retentissement de ses notes, et qu'elle n'a donc nul besoin du langage ordinaire, qui est celui des mots ? On le dit. Et pourtant la question demeure : célébrer une fête par de la musique vocale et instrumentale, est-ce bien là célébrer une fête où l'on pense ? À peine semble-t-il » – « *Gelassenheit* », in GA 16, 518 (trad. mod.).

⁴⁶ Anecdote rapportée par Georg Picht, « *Die Macht des Denkens* », in Günther Neske (éd.), *Erinnerung an Martin Heidegger*, Pfullingen, Neske, 1977, p. 205.

⁴⁷ Über Igor Strawinsky, in *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens*, GA 13, 181.

⁴⁸ GA 10, 132 et *Grundsätze des Denkens*, in *Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge*, GA 79, 109.

⁴⁹ GA 10, 132-133.

⁵⁰ *Einübung in das philosophische Denken*, GA88, 282.

même motif. Or, les *Beiträge* semblent s'y bien s'inspirer de ces procédés syntaxiques que leur composition rivalise de complexité, en philosophie, avec les plus grandes fugues composées en musique. Ne serait-ce point parce que Heidegger y joue du Bach et non du Mozart – à tout le moins y joue comme Bach et non comme Mozart ? Car il y a « les sonates de Mozart »⁵¹ et « les fugues de Bach »⁵², non que Mozart n'ait jamais écrit de fugues, mais parce qu'il n'y excelle pas d'emblée, lui qui eut de la peine à s'approprier le style savant de la fugue pour avoir longtemps baigné dans le style galant de la sonate. Aussi n'en doutons pas : Heidegger avait beau aimer Mozart par-dessus tout, en bon fils de sacristain⁵³, il ne s'en inspirait ni ne s'en inspirera pas moins de Bach, avec et après lui.

⁵¹ *Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem*, in *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie*, GA 56/57, 67-68.

⁵² *Logik. Die Fragenach der Wahrheit*, GA 21, 23 et 285.

⁵³ Souvenons-nous de ces souvenirs rapportés en 1954 par Heidegger, auquel son enfance d'enfant de chœur, rétrospectivement, se donne comme un morceau de musique semblable à ceux du célèbre cantor, dominé qu'il est par « la fugue mystérieuse (*geheimnisvolle Fuge*) selon laquelle s'ajointaient les fêtes liturgiques, les vigiles, l'alternance des saisons et les heures du jour, matinales, de midi et vespérales, de sorte que c'était toujours un unique bourdonnement qui traversait les jeunes coeurs, les rêves, les prières et les jeux – c'est elle sans doute qui abrite en elle un des mystères les plus enchanteurs et salutaires et durables du clocher, pour le dispenser à chaque fois, transformé et non itérable, jusqu'à l'ultime bourdonnement dans l'abritement de l'estre » – *Vom Geheimnis des Glockenturms*, in GA 13, 115-116.

Marius CUCU *

The Time of the Aesthetic Experience according to H.G. Gadamer

Abstract: Does following the call that the work of art addresses to its contemplator's consciousness lead to sequential reintegration into another existential area? Is the full living of the aesthetic message a form of extrapolation in a moment of temporal and spatial suspension, in a meta-moment that opens itself towards primordial ontic grounds? If this interpretive version is accepted, then isn't it necessary to re-assess the role of art in the human paradigm? By opening these topic areas, H.G. Gadamer tries to deepen the themes arising here, starting from the understanding of the art phenomenon as a celebration of the spirit.

Keywords: Aesthetic, Artistic Approach, Rejoicing, Temporality of Art, Creation, Celebration, Work of Art

Writings that point out the *art* phenomenon have tried and will always try to find and postulate decisive responses to queries such as: Why do we construct works of art? Why is the artist present in the excitement of a world often insensitive to the aesthetic dimension and how does he assume the drama and the sublime of his existence? What fascinates us in the art and towards what does it lead and transpose us? If, according to Dostoevski, *beauty will save the world*, then can the artist be regarded as a saviour of the human spirit, a pioneer towards the light of transcendence? Are there, according to Petre Țutea, two ways to absolute: one belonging to *sanctification* and the other to the *artistic genius*? Follower of the metaphysical and hermeneutical thinking mode of Heideggerian type, H.G. Gadamer will attempt an analysis of the artistic phenomena, surprising an undiscovered aspect of it, namely its *celebrating character*, the fact that art is a celebration of human consciousness. Focusing on this feature, Gadamer will also indirectly bring answers to the above-mentioned questions.

One of the states likely to induce to the human being the most intensive convulsive moods, feelings of maximum collapse and rare lucidities, which may be dramatic as well, is represented by *loneliness*. Aristotle tells us that man is a social human being, outside the city he could only be beast or god. One of the most efficient forms to avoid the twilight of loneliness was discovered by humanity in *the act of celebration*. Any celebration requires alliances, communions, gathering together of people and thus, it is not only

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a temporary relegation of loneliness, but also its sequential forgetting. In the midst of celebration, the one who is celebrating forgets the stuffy difficulty of his/her own existence and the way in which he/she is always alone in front of vicissitudes which he/she constantly encounters throughout life. The celebration releases him/her and gives him/her a respite, a pause-syncope, a parenthesis in the flow of an ebullient life, projecting him/her in another spatial and temporal dimension, in the complex dimension of what is being celebrated. But this projection does not separate him/her from the other human beings, does not isolate him/her, by presenting him/her as a solitary individuality. On the contrary, here is refused any type of isolation, and is instead cultivated the communion, the participation to the celebration being a *collective* act. To take part in a celebration means to join a group which celebrates and the one who is not celebrating is excluded from that group, more precisely, he/she excludes from it himself/herself, he/she refuses himself/herself to the celebrating act, an act that can only be committed together, through the reunion of various individualities¹. The celebration involves the stopping of daily activities, the stopping of human beings' anchoring in the rush of mundane realities. There is a suspension in which people's gathering in order to celebrate is doubled by the jumping over ephemeral worries of the daily life. These worries do not have any longer the capability to provide guidance on an individual, he/she as an individuality does not matter anymore, he/she is not important anymore, for that they are no longer invested with existential value. When the celebration occurs, the worry loses its overwhelming influence on the one who celebrates. The split with the presses and the goals imposed by engaging in the mechanisms of the mundane shall be carried out in such a context, in common, by inscribing each individual in a new collective, the group of those who are celebrating a feast. So if the day-to-day work, the effort of production and the exhaustion in the consumption that open towards a new production involve an individualization, despite appearances, the celebration gives rise to a real, active and alive communion. In the daily activities and actions, people are working next to each other but, in fact, they are bore away, in the sense of alienation, of the lack of openness to each other. The role of the person operating in mundane along with the others is nothing more than the role of a spiritually extinguished individuality, showing an ossified consciousness to one another. When working together, as a matter of fact, people are solitary souls, each and every one stepping on his/her road, *parallel* with the other one's road. In the act of celebration, there is an opening towards the others for the joy of celebration. Here we only have one way to be followed by several people.

¹ Gadamer, H.-G., *Actualitatea frumosului (The Actuality of Beauty)*, Polirom Publishing House, Iași, 2000, p. 110.

They acquire, in this context, common values and targets, create a community governed by the genuine solidarity. Foreigners holding a single common way, they join one another for the same fact and thus transform themselves into comrades for a single feast, comrades who could have never been such when dealing with daily activities of the everyday life, widespread in its always new determinations and expectations. The celebration does not propose new objectives to be achieved, always other plans that should be materialized and completed. On the contrary, it does not have a future to lead towards, or a past that is always evoked. It only occurs in an *over-time* stamp, in a suspended present, in a moment without developmental transit. In the celebration's over-time, everything happens now and here. What is celebrated is not re-mentioned but lived each time *as if it were* for the first time.

In Gadamer's opinion, the celebration which brings people to an active communion holds powerful artistic meanings. It is not an accident that humanity often celebrated the act of artistic creation. The celebration is perhaps the most advanced framework for reliving, releasing artistic resources, aesthetic creative potencies. Starting from this observation, it may be noticed that most means, representation forms for celebrations have been and are of artistic nature. Thus, in the celebration are to be found almost always artistic elements and acts such as: the festive speech that is related to the rhetoric art, beautiful words, habits, traditions, rites and clothes appropriate to the concerned celebration. All of these items can be potentiated, in Gadamer's opinion, by *the festive silence's presence*. It is about the state called by the common expression: to be stuck dumb with admiration. This silence of the one who celebrates is the resultant, materialized at the body level, of the status of highest aesthetic delight. The admirer/contemplator may be seized by a moment of silence in front of a brilliant artistic creation in the sense that he does not find adequate words to express the feeling he gets in front of such masterpieces. Here, the aesthetic celebration of the spirit called and raised by the vision of the masterpiece is shrouded in the absence of words, of the utterance. In front of a masterpiece, the spirit feels that any word would be pointless, only the living and assuming of the revealed beauty are important in this context. The art as a celebration of the spirit not only meets, but also gives the common impulse of collective participation in an *intentional activity*. Thus, it picks and puts together with a view to celebrate, assigns to the common will an end and a belief which aims at the celebration a determined factor. This collective fixation that leads to a unique direction the pulses of the will and thinking of those who participate in the celebrations act generates *the association* and prevents the splitting of the group which is celebrating in separate individualities that isolate and close themselves, by redirecting their personal areas. In the midst of celebrations there are no individual areas or

boundaries, but only a single common sphere of ecstatic experience. The celebration favours the communion and cancelling of the individuality, by its loss in the exuberant excitement of the common celebration.

According to Gadamer, the loss of a clearly demarcated individuality occurs while is felt a detachment from a day-to-day temporal dimension and an integration of the consciousness of fluctuations in the time of celebration. The time of celebration represents a homogeneous and indivisible fact that cannot be fragmented in divided moments. So, when a group of people are celebrating, they anchor the rhythm of their beings during the celebration. The mundane time is suspended, more precisely, the one who celebrates lives the experience of the spatial and temporal suspension, the projection in another spatial and temporal dimension. Gadamer thinks that art is exceptionally this opening towards another ontic, as well as gnoseologic dimension. Art determines, for those who are celebrating, the projection from the daily space and time to other universes of emotion and understanding, it influences the consciousness of those initially involved in the time and space which characterize the superficial mundane, for leading them towards depths of the spirit, towards which one can direct himself/herself through exercise and through assuming the artistic experience. According to Gadamer, the work of art means in relation to a consciousness that celebrates it, an organic whole, a homogeneous structure that gravitates around its own centre-atom, it cannot be dealt in a fragmented manner. You live a work of art in its entirety or you do not experience it emotionally and cognitively at all. It is not possible to only engage in a fragment of a work of art². This time of celebration of this work of art cannot pull you out from the time of the partial trivial mundane time, but it projects and re-situates you totally, in such a way that to celebrate a creation of art means to celebrate this achievement in all its spiritual senses and dimensions. This *time of the work of art* is conceptually similar to the *sacred time* evoked by Mircea Eliade or to the *psychological time*, tackled by Bergson's analyses. For Bergson, the foundation of dynamics that defines life is represented by the pure duration. The present may not be thought, in this context, as a fragment of this duration, from this active flow of permanent becoming. The duration cannot be fragmented and presented under different states discontinuously. It lasts for the purposes of a ceaseless process, of a modification that always maintains the same substance, but changes constantly its auxiliary forms. Thus, the past is connected to the present and the future is already included in it. *The subjective time* involved here going down in the telluric dimension of life, the detachment of the rhythm of temporal surfaces, the exile from the boundaries of second temporalities, from the flow of the mundane time towards the depths of a primordial

² *Ibidem*, pp. 111-114.

pulsation which has its own ontic rhythm³. In Mircea Eliade's opinion, the duality profane time – sacred time involves a primordial difficulty essential for the believer in the existence of Divinity. This difficulty will be confined to the impossibility of full anchoring in a temporal boundary to the other persons' detriment. The believer is unable to assume a radical and irreversible detachment of the profane temporality, being connected to it in an ontic manner through his/her mortal temper, through his/her profound structures bearing the stigma of impermanence. Being, however, a believer, he can neither abandon, nor reject the dimension of the sacred, concretely and completely integrating in the universe of profane time. Therefore, he must choose the moments he considers the most redeeming for his consciousness and to always relive these capital events, by evoking them not as though they had occurred once but, on the contrary, as though they are going on each and every time they are celebrated⁴. In the same way, the celebration of the work of art involves the transit through a time of the latter which induces the state of actuality, of living presence of the universe described and opened by the work concerned. It is not, therefore, a structure that has been constructed once and now just sits towards exposure to the general public. On the contrary, it continues to be fulfilled and each admirer of it is a co-participant, along with the creator artist, to the completion of its composition.

The genuine work of art, although it owns, according to the Kantian analysis, a finality of the forms that are situating it from a structural point of view, must not be hedged by any reason. Only in this way it is possible to co-participate in its ascent to an ideal of perfection, ascent for which is also needed the contribution of the one who celebrates, he himself/she herself, by such an approach, advancing to phases of a consciousness that gravitates around the platonic idea of Beauty. The poetry, the painting, the music, and any art, considers Gadamer, have their *times*. Thus, for example, a musical part has a tempo of its own and a poetic text develops the flowing of its verses under a tone that bears it and incessantly sustains it. The submission of consciousness in front of this temporal tact determines the co-participation in the modulations and pulse, in the ontic rhythmicity of that particular artistic creation. Gadamer insists here on the idea of constructive joining between the contemplator and the creator. In this way, when we look at a sculpture, we participate in its construction and maybe we reconfigure it according to our aesthetic dimensions. In the same way, when we walk through the spatial opening circumscribed by the columns of a temple, we

³ Bergson, Henri, *Evoluția creațoare* (*The Creative Evolution*), Institutul European Publishing House, Iași, 1998, p. 21.

⁴ Eliade, Mircea, *Mituri, vise și mistere* (*Myths, Dreams and Mysteries*), Univers Encyclopedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 1998, p. 161.

do not only admire and meditate on those structures designed and implemented in material by the manufacturers, but we also experience a state of re-construction of the temple by this inner initiative, being, in this way, similar to the original authors of such a majestic project. Thus, states Gadamer, we *re-build* or *re-paint* at the level of consciousness a building or a pictorial implementation, we walk and we enter in universes opened by these works of art. For Gadamer, a work of art cannot be deeply understood than by its spiritual conquest. We must, therefore, extrapolate in the fields, in the universes of that works and such a projection involves a sustained effort of concentration and devotion, of attention and close following of the route already got through and accomplished by the creator artist. It is only when we become *consorted* in this way with the artist that his work opens towards our conscience, facilitating the access to its deepest meanings, to its pulsatile telluric dimension, telluric dimension which, in its turn, opens the contemplator to the primordial and metaphysical meanings of the world. Along with the accession to the eidetic fund of a work of art, the contemplator will feel the real suspension of the temporality in the sense of detachment of the multiple connections which linked his/her consciousness to past memories, but also to future expectations. In such a moment of his/her aesthetic experience, the contemplator lives in a *present* like never before, a present that is hovering over the profane reality, an era never touched by the ephemeral dimension, a moment which only concentrates in itself the artistic mirage⁵.

To linger in this moment of existential and also gnoseologic suspension, means to anchor your human being in the ground of the finished replica of the eternity maybe as propaedeutical state which prepares the consciousness for a meeting with eternity. According to Gadamer, art teaches us to *linger* while being patient, to break up of the daily rush, re-sitting down in the plenitude of ourselves and engaging to the access to our own forgotten deepness⁶. The meditative-aesthetic delay re-learns to us the course and the tact of eternity, split us in relation with the daily vulgarities, opening new doors for us, towards spiritual feelings and plenitudes impossible to predict before meeting the call of art, which challenges our consciousness in such a revitalising way.

⁵ Gadamer, Hans-Georg, *Adevăr și metodă* (*Truth and Method*), Teora Publishing House, Bucharest, 2001, p. 102.

⁶ Idem., *Actualitatea frumosului* (*The Actuality of Beauty*), Polirom Publishing House, Iași, 2000, p. 117.

Ciprian JELER *

Image médiatrice et image mentale, Bergson et Sartre

Abstract: This paper draws a comparison between Bergson's notion of mediating image and Sartre's theory of mental images. An example of a mediating image provided by Bergson is looked at from two different perspectives, following two treatments it has received from Nietzsche and Edgar Allan Poe. This enables us to isolate two general attitudes which, I will argue, accurately describe Sartre's and, respectively, Bergson's attitudes towards images. However, the end of the paper shows that the two attitudes are not incompatible: even though it is very critical towards Bergson, Sartre's theory of the mental image only seems to reinforce and to confer more precision to Bergson's view on images.

Keywords: Mediating Image, Mental Image, Intuition, Hans Pfaall, Quasi-observation

Dans l'histoire de la philosophie, on trouve très peu de discussions sur le rôle des images mentales dans le travail philosophique. Une exception notable est celle de Bergson, qui consacre, en 1911, une conférence à la description de l'importance des images mentales pour la pratique philosophique. Notre intention dans ce texte n'est pas celle de clarifier le statut – d'ailleurs très problématique et trop difficile pour être traité dans le cadre d'un article isolé – de ces images dans la philosophie bergsonienne, mais plutôt de suivre une série de déplacements conceptuels à l'égard de l'image mentale qui ont lieu entre l'œuvre de Bergson et celle de Sartre. Même si Sartre est très critique à l'égard de la conception de l'image de Bergson, il nous semble que la théorie sartrienne de l'image mentale ne fait, en bien de points, que préciser la position de Bergson et, en un sens, ne fait que la renforcer. C'est ce que nous allons essayer de montrer ici, d'une manière sans doute schématique et provisoire, à travers une lecture en parallèle de « L'intuition philosophique » de Bergson et du livre de Sartre sur *L'imaginaire*.

La conférence sur « L'intuition philosophique » a été prononcée par Bergson lors du Congrès de Philosophie de Bologne de 1911. Bergson parle donc devant un public de spécialistes en philosophie, et l'auditeur est composé, avec les mots de Bergson, de personnes qui « enseignent l'histoire de la philosophie » (Bergson 1996, 117) et qui ont donc souvent eu l'occasion

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de revenir sur « l'étude des mêmes doctrines » philosophiques (Bergson 1996, 118). Et ce que Bergson propose en premier chef dans cette conférence est, en effet, une théorie de la lecture philosophique. Il faudrait voir dans cette théorie moins une étude systématique sur les manières de lire les textes philosophiques (Bergson ne cite aucun texte sur la lecture en général, il ne cite aucun « texte de spécialité » sur le sujet), mais plutôt comme un témoignage sur la manière même de lire de Bergson. On a donc plutôt affaire ici au récit d'une expérience personnelle de Bergson, au récit, en fait, des étapes par lesquelles les lectures de Bergson avaient l'habitude de passer.

Nommons brièvement ces étapes. Lorsqu'on commence l'étude d'un philosophe, on rencontre d'abord une somme de thèses et de concepts qui sont mises ensemble, ramassées, pour ainsi dire, dans le cadre d'une œuvre. Ces idées et ces concepts, n'appartiennent d'habitude pas seulement à ce philosophe, mais sont reprises d'ici et là, de certains prédecesseurs ou de certains commentateurs des philosophes plus anciens ; mais le philosophe en question a su donner une nouvelle synthèse de ces idées et concepts. Sans doute, cette première étape, qui fait de l'œuvre d'un philosophe une simple mosaïque ne pourrait suffire. Elle nous livre seulement à des incessants – et, à vrai dire, infinis – travaux de comparaison entre ce philosophe et d'autres, pour élucider ce qui leur est commun et ce qui les sépare. Ces travaux, si poussés qu'ils peuvent l'être, ne nous autorisent jamais par elles-mêmes à prétendre que nous connaissons une philosophie, que nous connaissons ce qui lui appartient en propre.

Nous passons alors, dit Bergson, à la deuxième étape, qui est celle de penser la philosophie elle-même comme étant en devenir, et l'œuvre du philosophe étudié comme étant un moment dans cette évolution. Son œuvre ne se réduit ainsi plus à une somme de thèses reprises d'ici ou de là, mais elle gagne une sorte d'individualité propre, semblable si l'on veut – et selon une comparaison que Bergson ne fait pas lui-même dans ce contexte –, à celle que l'adolescence peut avoir dans la vie d'un homme. On ne peut pas réduire l'adolescence à l'enfance qui la précédé : elle la continue, sans doute, mais en lui donnant un tout autre visage, qui annonce déjà l'adulte à venir sans s'identifier à celui-ci non plus. Pourtant, nous dit Bergson, il y a deux inconvénients de ce nouveau type de lecture. D'abord, cette lecture prête plus de continuité à l'histoire de la pensée qu'elle n'en a vraiment ; ensuite, dit Bergson, ce type de lecture maintient notre attention sur la « complication extérieure du système » (Bergson 1996, 122), sur ce qu'il y a de prévisible d'une manière seulement superficielle dans ce système. Autrement dit, cette deuxième étape nous garde encore loin de « la nouveauté et la simplicité du fond » (Bergson 1996, 122) de cette philosophie.

Nous devons donc passer à la troisième étape, à celle qui nous assure la plus grande maîtrise, pour ainsi dire, de la philosophie étudiée. Une longue

et assidue fréquentation d'une philosophie nous permettra, dit Bergson, d'arriver à ce qu'il appelle une « image médiatrice » ; dans les mots de Bergson :

ce que nous arriverons à ressaisir et à fixer, c'est une certaine image intermédiaire entre la simplicité de l'intuition concrète et la complexité des abstractions qui la traduisent, image fuyante et évanouissante, qui hante, inaperçue peut-être, l'esprit du philosophe, qui le suit comme son ombre à travers les tours et détours de sa pensée, et qui, si elle n'est pas l'intuition même, s'en rapproche beaucoup plus que l'expression conceptuelle, nécessairement symbolique, à laquelle l'intuition doit recourir pour fournir des « explications ». Regardons bien cette ombre : nous devinerons l'attitude du corps qui la projette. Et si nous faisons effort pour imiter cette attitude, ou mieux pour nous y insérer, nous reverrons, dans la mesure du possible, ce que le philosophe a vu. (Bergson 1996, 119-120)

Il y a plusieurs remarques schématiques qu'on devra faire à partir de cette citation.

a) L'image médiatrice – ou intermédiaire entre « l'intuition concrète » du philosophe et la « complexité des abstractions qui la traduisent » – n'est évidemment pas l'intuition concrète du philosophe. En effet, pour Bergson, chaque philosophie a sa source dans une telle intuition concrète ; mais cette intuition, quoiqu'elle soit donnée au philosophe, ne reste pas moins difficile à rendre, à exprimer. Une philosophie n'est rien d'autre qu'une longue et, à vrai dire, interminable tentative d'exprimer une telle intuition.¹ Nous n'avons pas à entrer dans les détails de cette notion d'intuition ici. Nous nous contenterons seulement d'indiquer que l'image médiatrice nous permet, selon Bergson, de nous rapprocher plus de l'intuition initiale du philosophe qu'aucun type de lecture conceptuelle. Soit sous la forme d'une mosaïque de thèses, soit sur celle d'une évolution organique de certaines thèses de l'histoire de la philosophie, les lectures conceptuelles ne nous permettront pas de rendre compte de l'individualité propre d'une philosophie, de ce qui, en fait, fait « tenir ensemble » la somme des thèses que cette philosophie défend. Arriver à une image médiatrice signifie donc trouver une sorte de centre de gravité autour duquel les différents thèmes de ce philosophe se distribuent d'une manière naturelle.

b) Mais l'image n'est pas un simple « support », n'est pas une simple « prothèse » qui nous aide dans la lecture. Elle joue un rôle dans la création philosophique elle-même. Les indications pour cela ne se trouvent pas dans

¹ La pensée d'un philosophe est ainsi toute entière suspendue à un point unique, ramassée, comme dit Bergson, dans un seul point : « En ce point est quelque chose de simple, d'infiniment simple, de si extraordinairement simple que le philosophe n'a jamais réussi à le dire. Et c'est pourquoi il a parlé toute sa vie » (Bergson 1996, 119).

le passage cité, mais Bergson prend soin d'indiquer que « l'intuition concrète » ne vient pas sans ses propres images. Il parle, par exemple, de « la puissance de négation immanente à l'intuition où à son image » (Bergson 1996, 121). Il s'agit, cette fois-ci, d'une image du philosophe lui-même – et non pas de nous, les lecteurs – ou, en d'autres termes, de la figure que prend l'intuition pour le philosophe lui-même. Sans entrer, encore une fois, dans les détails, nous pouvons déjà exprimer le soupçon que si l'image médiatrice nous permet de nous rapprocher le plus de l'intuition initiale du philosophe, c'est parce qu'elle entretient une parenté, une affinité spéciale avec cette intuition, et que cette affinité est à trouver dans son statut d'image : l'intuition initiale du philosophe a sa propre ou ses propres images, et c'est parce qu'elle est elle-même imagée que l'image médiatrice nous permet de nous approcher le plus de cette intuition originale.

c) Mais il y a un dernier point à faire sur le passage cité. Il renferme, en effet, une contradiction évidente. Car, nous dit Bergson, ce que nous arriverons « à ressaisir et à fixer » est l'image médiatrice, qui est elle-même une « image fuyante et évanouissante ». On arrive à fixer une image sans qu'elle soit « fixable », car elle est évanouissante. Bergson va même jusqu'à dire que cette image « hante, inaperçue peut-être, l'esprit du philosophe ». Etrange image que celle qui reste inaperçue ! Evidemment, si elle n'est pas perçue, c'est qu'elle n'est pas image ; ou, inversement, si elle est image, c'est qu'elle est perçue. Pourtant Bergson insiste bien, comme nous l'avons vu, sur ce caractère d'image, et cette insistance de Bergson est suffisante pour nous indiquer que nous avons affaire à un type spécial de « visibilité » ici, comme il ressortira de la suite de ce propos.

Passer à l'analyse d'un exemple que Bergson donne nous aidera à mieux saisir l'étrangeté des images auxquelles Bergson songe. Il donne, en effet, deux exemples dans « L'intuition philosophique », deux images médiatrices qu'il « a » en lisant Spinoza et, respectivement, Berkeley. Nous nous contenterons d'en discuter la première. A travers – ou au-delà de – tous les concepts massifs de Spinoza, au-delà de la Substance, de l'Attribut, du Mode, de la Pensée et de l'Etendue, la philosophie de Spinoza se concentre pour Bergson dans une seule image médiatrice dont nous citerons en entier la description :

Disons, pour nous contenter d'une approximation, que c'est le sentiment d'une coïncidence entre l'acte par lequel notre esprit connaît parfaitement la vérité et l'opération par laquelle Dieu l'engendre, l'idée que la « conversion » des Alexandrins, quand elle devient complète, ne fait plus qu'un avec leur « procession », et que lorsque l'homme, sorti de la divinité, arrive à rentrer en elle, il n'aperçoit plus qu'un mouvement unique là où il avait vu d'abord les deux mouvements inverses d'aller et de retour, – l'expérience morale se

chargeant ici de résoudre une contradiction logique et de faire, par une brusque suppression du Temps, que le retour soit un aller. (Bergson 1996, 124)

Il est, bien entendu, très difficile à envisager comment une telle formulation pourrait être représentée en une image. Comment mettre en image l'acte par lequel nous connaissons – parfaitement, qui plus est – la vérité ? Et surtout, comme représenter l'acte par lequel Dieu engendre la vérité ? Mais cette formulation, dit Bergson, n'est sans doute qu'une approximation, et nous devrions peut-être, pour arriver à l'image, éliminer ce qu'il y a d'évidemment et irréductiblement conceptuel dans cette formulation (à savoir, la vérité, Dieu, etc.). C'est, par ailleurs, dans ce sens que va le passage de Bergson, car c'est la fin du passage qui nous fournit la forme la plus concentrée de cette formulation : l'idée d'un aller qui soit en même temps un retour, un aller qui soit *lui-même* un retour. L'image, s'il y en a une, est donc celle d'un mouvement unique qui, néanmoins, va dans deux directions opposées à la fois sans pour autant se diviser en deux mouvements. Nous nous permettons de l'appeler, pour la facilité de l'expression, un « double mouvement unique ».

Pourtant, même en ayant réduit la formulation à son noyau dur, nous n'avons toujours pas isolé ce qu'il y a de véritablement *imagé* dans cette « image ». Si nous essayons de nous représenter ce mouvement unique qui va dans des directions opposées, nous butons rapidement sur une sensation d'impossibilité. Bergson semble encore une fois nous jouer des tours, en nous donnant comme une « image » – fût-elle médiatrice – quelque chose qui est, en effet, irreprésentable. Mais, encore une fois, nous ne devons pas nous dépêcher pour en tirer des conclusions.

Remarquons plutôt qu'une « image » similaire avait déjà gouverné le troisième chapitre de l'*Evolution créatrice* de Bergson, où se trouve la phrase dont Jankélévitch disait qu'elle est secrètement la plus importante du bergsonisme (Canguilhem 1989, 353). La phrase, publiée donc quatre ans avant la conférence sur l'intuition philosophique est la suivante : « L'élan [vital] est fini, et il a été donné une fois pour toutes » (Bergson 2007, 254). Cela signifie que l'élan est limité, mais il n'est pas limité par quelque chose qui lui soit extérieur (la matière, qui s'oppose à l'élan, n'étant en fait qu'une détente de l'élan). Etre fini, pour l'élan, c'est donc être limité par soi-même, ou, pour le dire autrement, l'élan est constitué intérieurement par deux mouvements de sens contraire. Il ne nous revient pas de discuter ici cette question de l'élan². Nous avons seulement voulu montrer que cette irreprésentable image est bien au cœur du bergsonisme, que Bergson nous parle en partie de sa propre expérience lorsqu'il appelle « image » une

² Pour une discussion plus détaillée de ce point, cf. (Miquel 2007, 222-228).

telle « entité » apparemment irreprésentable comme le double mouvement unique. Au lieu de prendre cette expression pour un jeu de tours, nous allons donc essayer de la prendre au sérieux et de présenter brièvement deux tentatives divergentes de traiter ce « double mouvement unique », dont l'une part de Nietzsche et l'autre d'Edgar Allan Poe. Au terme de cette présentation, nous n'aurons probablement pas réussi à représenter ce double mouvement unique, mais nous aurons peut-être identifié deux attitudes générales à l'égard de l'image.

Prenons donc le premier exemple. Il s'agit d'une image qui se trouve dans le *Zarathoustra* de Nietzsche, où il y va, à un moment, d'une cascade qui, dans sa chute, « hésite encore et se retient » (Nietzsche 1974, *Ecce Homo*, « Ainsi parlait Zarathoustra », § 7)³. Tout comme dans le cas de l'élan vital envisagé plus haut, ce qui résiste à la chute de la cascade n'est pas extérieur à la cascade elle-même, mais lui est intérieur. La chute de la cascade serait ainsi composée en quelque sorte de deux mouvements de sens contraire, l'un de descente, et l'autre de montée. Mais, au fond, qu'est-ce qui arrive lorsque nous essayons de nous représenter cette image ? On imagine d'abord la chute d'une cascade et on ressent en même temps une sorte d'impondérabilité amorcée. A l'image visuelle de la chute d'une cascade s'ajoute donc quelque chose de plus. Mais qu'est-ce ? En effet, comment représenter une hésitation ou une résistance interne *sur* cette cascade visualisée ? Cela semblerait sans doute impossible. Mais si l'on pousse cette expérience imaginaire plus loin, on se rend compte qu'à l'image visuelle de la cascade qui tombe nous ajoutons nous-mêmes cette résistance ou cette hésitation sous la forme d'une sensation périphérique de notre corps, sous la forme d'un début de mouvement qui va contre la chute – nous ajoutons donc à l'image de la cascade un type de mouvement commencé comme cette sensation d'inertie que nous ressentons dans notre corps lors du départ d'un ascenseur. Pour nous représenter l'image de Nietzsche, nous combinons donc une représentation visuelle de la cascade et un type de sensation kinesthésique de notre corps. Mais comment arrivons-nous à mettre l'hésitation *dans* la cascade *elle-même* par une sensation kinesthésique de *notre* corps ? Il n'y a qu'une solution possible : c'est que, pour ce bref moment où nous arrivons à représenter l'image de Nietzsche, nous *sommes* cette cascade que pourtant nous voyons. Nous pouvons mettre l'hésitation sur l'image de la cascade, nous pouvons visualiser la cascade qui *se* retient ou qui résiste à sa propre chute seulement si nous nous identifions nous-mêmes, pour un bref et fuyant moment, à cette cascade, transformant ainsi

³ C'est un article d'Arnaud François qui a attiré notre attention sur cette image (François 2011, 11-12).

une sensation kinesthésique de notre corps en une résistance à elle-même de la cascade.⁴

La preuve pour cela est fournie précisément par le caractère évanouissant de cette expérience, elle est fournie par le fait que nous pouvons nous représenter cette image, mais nous ne pouvons pas la « fixer », à proprement parler. Nous avons dit que la sensation kinesthésique que nous ajoutons n'est pas en fait un mouvement, mais un début de mouvement, un mouvement seulement commencé. Essayons de le transformer en un mouvement complet, essayons de nous représenter un mouvement plein qui va à l'encontre de la chute de la cascade. Tout change, et ce que nous ressentons alors c'est *notre corps* qui avance contre le courant d'eau qui tombe. C'est *notre corps* qui tente de vaincre la résistance d'un courant contraire. Nous avons déjà affaire à deux mouvements séparés, le mouvement de l'eau et celui de *notre corps*. Nous ne pouvons plus représenter de cette manière la résistance à elle-même de la cascade, le « se retenir » de la cascade tout simplement parce que nous ne sommes plus cette cascade.⁵

Il est temps de passer à notre deuxième exemple. La représentation de ce « double mouvement unique » que donne Edgar Allan Poe est un peu plus élaborée que celle de Nietzsche, et il faut entrer un peu dans les détails de *l'Aventure sans pareil d'un certain Hans Pfaall* pour la présenter. Une très brève présentation générale de l'intrigue de cette histoire nous indiquera qu'elle se trouve peut-être toute entière sous le signe du double mouvement unique. Hans Pfaall, habitant de Rotterdam, a des dettes qu'il ne peut pas payer, et ses trois créateurs l'harcellent. Il songe au suicide, mais finalement il choisit une autre option : il tue ses créateurs à l'aide d'une explosion au moment

⁴ Qu'on nous permette d'introduire ici une distinction entre ce qu'est exprimé dans la formule de Nietzsche et ce qui motive cette formule. Nous avons détaillé ici seulement ce qui se trouve comme signification dans la « cascade qui hésite et se retient ». Mais ce qui motive cette expression dans l'esprit de Nietzsche est, à notre avis, autre chose, à savoir le jeu entre l'apparente immobilité d'une cascade et sa, tout aussi apparente, mobilité. Une cascade qui tombe, si elle est, comme il arrive d'habitude, toute entière composée d'eaux blanches, donne souvent l'impression qu'elle ne se meut pas, elle a souvent l'apparence d'une colonne immobile, semblables aux petites cascades glacées en hiver. En même temps, les gouttes qui se détachent de cette chute d'eau tombent visiblement, et l'effet que la chute d'eau a dans l'eau plus profonde qui se trouve à sa base indique bien que la « colonne » d'eau tombe véritablement. C'est ce jeu entre les apparences, cette apparente « mobilité immobile » – pour utiliser, dans un sens différent, une expression de Sartre – qui motive probablement l'expression de Nietzsche. Ajoutons que cette distinction entre une « mobilité immobile » et le « double mouvement unique » lui-même nous semble pertinente pour une discussion possible de l'élan vital chez Bergson : car, comme nous l'avons vu, d'un côté, l'élan est fini et, d'un autre côté, pour l'élan, toute interruption est une inversion.

⁵ Par ailleurs, dans ce deuxième cas, nous ne nous représentons plus *visuellement* la cascade elle-même, nous ne la voyons plus du dehors, mais nous avons seulement la représentation d'un courant d'eau dans lequel nous sommes immergés.

même ou il commence un long voyage en ballon vers la lune. En d'autres mots, Pfaall réagit *contre* la situation qui l'opprime et, au même moment, il *fuit* cette situation. Attitude paradoxale sans doute, celle de venir à l'encontre d'une situation et de s'éloigner d'elle en même temps ! Après avoir arrivé sur la lune, il envoie (bien entendu, en ballon) un habitant du satellite à Rotterdam pour délivrer une lettre racontant son voyage. Dans la lettre, Pfaall demande au bourgmestre de Rotterdam (qui était en même temps président du Collège astronomique de la même ville) le pardon pour son crime, pour qu'il puisse retourner à Rotterdam ; en échange, il s'engage à fournir au Collège astronomique de Rotterdam toutes les merveilleuses informations qu'il détient sur le satellite de la Terre et sur ses habitants. Le point intéressant, c'est que personne ne soupçonnait que le crime avait eu lieu (l'explosion en ayant effacé toutes les traces), et que Pfaall ne fait qu'avouer son crime au moment même où il veut rentrer chez lui. En d'autres termes, il rend impossible son retour (en tant que criminel, même pardonné) à Rotterdam par le geste même par lequel il l'assure. Il y a plus : son messager, qui aurait dû attendre la réponse du bourgmestre, s'enfuit⁶ après avoir laissé tomber du ballon la lettre ; et, quoique le pardon soit accordé à Pfaall, ce pardon ne peut plus lui être transmis. Pfaall est donc reçu, accueilli chez lui, mais il s'éloigne en même temps de cet accueil.⁷

Mais cette histoire ne tourne pas seulement autour de l'idée de ce « double mouvement unique », elle tourne aussi autour de l'*image* de ce double mouvement. Pour comprendre cela, il faut noter que, dans l'univers imaginaire de cette histoire – que Poe décrit à l'aide de beaucoup d'« explications » scientifiques – il y a de l'air entre la Terre et la lune. Seulement, plus on s'éloigne de la Terre, plus cet air est raréfié. Mais cette raréfaction n'affecte pas la montée du ballon de Pfaall, car il utilise un type de gaz extrêmement léger, le secret de la production de ce nouveau type de gaz ayant été confié à Pfaall avant que son inventeur rende son invention publique. Qui plus est, le ballon s'accélère pendant le voyage, car la décélération produite par l'atmosphère de plus en plus raréfiée est plus que contrebalancée par la réduction de la force de gravité qui découle de la distance croissante du ballon par rapport à la Terre. Pourtant, pendant la montée du ballon, le double mouvement unique fait son apparition. C'est, à notre avis, le centre de gravité de l'histoire, et il n'est pas surprenant que,

⁶ Il s'enfuit, dit Poe, car il est « terrifié sans doute jusqu'à la mort par la physionomie sauvage des bourgeois de Rotterdam » (Poe 2003, 93).

⁷ En effet, le bourgmestre et le vice-président du Collège astronomique se mettent rapidement d'accord qu'il est impossible de faire parvenir à Pfaall les nouvelles de son pardon, car ils décident, avec une expression d'une superbe et profonde ironie de la part de Poe, qu'il « n'y avait qu'un homme de la lune qui pût entreprendre un voyage aussi lointain » (Poe 2003, 93). Ajoutons que les dernières lignes de l'histoire indiquent, comme il arrive souvent chez Poe, que la lettre de Pfaall n'était qu'une farce.

dans le journal de voyage de Pfaall, il est écrit : « Cette matinée a fait époque dans mon voyage » (Poe 2003, 80). Un jour, lorsque Pfaall se réveille, il se rend compte que la Terre, qui était déjà très éloignée de lui et qu'il voyait donc très petite, occupait tout d'un coup une grande portion de son horizon. Il est convaincu qu'il est en train de tomber vers la Terre avec une formidable vitesse. Mais il se ressaisit assez rapidement et il se rend compte que la planète qu'il voit en dessous de son ballon et vers laquelle il avance n'est en fait pas la Terre, mais la lune. En fait, son ballon avait arrivé à un point où l'attraction de la lune était devenue plus forte que celle de la Terre, et le ballon avait graduellement basculé. De sa nacelle, Pfaall voyait maintenant la lune et non pas la Terre. Pourtant, il faut noter que le ballon continue d'avancer vers la lune parce qu'il est plus léger que l'atmosphère environnante. Mais, alors que jusqu'à ce point qui fait époque dans le voyage la force ascensionnelle devait vaincre la force d'attraction de la Terre, à partir de ce point de basculement la force ascensionnelle et celle de la gravité amènent toutes les deux le ballon plus proche de la lune. En d'autres mots, le ballon se trouve dans l'étrange situation de monter tout en descendant. Son ascension est une descente ou, inversement, sa descente est une ascension. La stupeur initiale de Pfaall était, en fait, l'impossibilité de croire que le ballon tombe sans avoir crevé, qu'il était effectivement en train de tomber tout en continuant de monter.⁸

Toute l'histoire du voyage de Pfaall tourne, à notre avis, autour de cette image du ballon qui descend en montant. Mais cette image reste étrange, dans la mesure où elle est déduite et non pas perçue par Pfaall lui-même. En effet, cette histoire de Poe pourrait bien être lue comme une étude sur la visibilité, et la plupart des observations du journal de voyage de Pfaall ne font que décrire les transformations de couleur et de dimension de la Terre en fonction de son éloignement progressif du ballon. C'est un point que nous pouvons seulement désigner ici, car, si on voulait en fournir des citations à l'appui, il faudrait citer le journal de voyage presque en entier. Ce sont, pour ainsi dire, les variations de l'apparence des objets en fonction du changement de perspective qui constituent la plupart du journal de voyage.⁹

⁸ L'importance de cette stupeur y est bien soulignée : « L'étonnement et la stupeur produits dans mon esprit par cet extraordinaire changement dans la situation des choses étaient peut-être, après tout, ce qu'il y a avait de plus étonnant et de moins explicable dans mon aventure » (Poe 2003, 82).

⁹ Nous nous permettons de donner une longue citation pour appuyer notre hypothèse. C'est peut-être l'explication la plus savante sur un aspect de la visibilité de la Terre que nous trouvons dans ce texte. A un moment de son ascension, Pfaall se demande pourquoi la Terre lui apparaît toujours concave, alors qu'il s'attendait à ce que sa convexité serait déjà devenue évidente. En voici l'explication : « Une ligne abaissée perpendiculairement sur la terre du point où je me trouvais aurait formé la perpendiculaire d'un triangle rectangle dont la base se serait étendue de l'angle droit à l'horizon, et l'hypoténuse de l'horizon au point occupé par mon ballon. Mais l'élévation où j'étais n'était rien ou presque rien

Et pourtant, au plein centre de cette étude sur la visibilité, il se trouve cet événement qui fait époque, un phénomène qui, justement, n'est pas visible mais déduit. Poe insiste bien sur l'impossibilité de saisir le basculement du ballon : « La révolution elle-même devait avoir eu lieu naturellement, de la manière la plus douce et la plus graduée, et il n'est pas le moins du monde certain que, lors même que j'eusse été éveillé au moment où elle s'opéra, j'eusse eu la conscience du sens dessus dessous, — que j'eusse perçu un symptôme *intérieur* quelconque de l'inversion, — c'est-à-dire une incommodité, un dérangement quelconque, soit dans ma personne, soit dans mon appareil » (Poe 2003, 82-83). C'est autour de ce noyau doublement caché (à la fois parce que le bouleversement du ballon est imperceptible et parce que, de fait, la conscience qui aurait pu le percevoir est endormie) que s'organise toute l'histoire de Pfaall.¹⁰

Mais, avec cette image du ballon qui monte en descendant, a-t-on vraiment représenté le double mouvement unique dont il est question ici ? Evidemment, non, dira-t-on. Tout ce que nous avons fait, c'est jouer sur les mots. On n'a en fait obtenu qu'un ballon qui se déplace vers la lune, il y a un seul mouvement là-dedans, quoiqu'il est obtenu par la conjonction de deux forces (l'attraction de la lune et le poids relativement plus petit du ballon par rapport à l'atmosphère environnante). Il faut adjoindre, dira-t-on, la notion de « descente » à l'attraction de la lune et celle de « montée » à la force qu'on appelle couramment « ascensionnelle » pour qu'on ait l'impression – et l'impression seulement – d'un mouvement unique qui va, en même temps, dans deux directions opposées. Vu du côté de la lune, le ballon n'est qu'un banal ballon qui descend ; en le voyant du côté de la Terre, tout ce que l'on obtient, c'est une sorte de paradoxe visuel d'un ballon qui monte sens dessous dessus, un ballon qui monte la tête en bas, pour ainsi dire. Cela

comparativement à l'étendue embrasée par mon regard ; en d'autres termes, la base et l'hypoténuse du triangle supposé étaient si longues, comparées à la perpendiculaire, qu'elles pouvaient être considérées comme deux lignes presque parallèles. De cette façon l'horizon de l'aéronaute lui apparaît toujours au niveau de sa nacelle. Mais comme le point situé immédiatement au-dessous de lui, lui paraît et est, en effet, à une immense distance, naturellement il lui paraît aussi à une immense distance au-dessous de l'horizon. De là l'impression de concavité ; et cette impression durera jusqu'à ce que l'élévation se trouve relativement à l'étendue de la perspective dans une proportion telle que le parallélisme apparent de la base et de l'hypoténuse disparaîsse » (Poe 2003, 54).

¹⁰ Ce type de centre de gravité est d'habitude représenté chez Poe par le pôle. Le pôle Nord apparaît en effet dans *Hans Pfaall* sous la forme d'une cavité obscure dans le glaces, une sorte de trou aux bords bien définis, « plus sombre qu'aucun point de l'hémisphère visible, et s'approfondissant quelquefois jusqu'au noir parfait » (Poe 2003, 75). Dans d'autres contextes, c'est le pôle Sud qui joue un rôle similaire, et il est représenté comme une cataracte blanche (*The narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym of Nantucket*) ou comme un énorme tourbillon (*Manuscript found in a bottle*). Il n'est pas inutile d'indiquer ici que ce que Bergson appelle « l'intuition » d'un auteur est présenté dans « L'intuition philosophique », à plusieurs reprises, comme un tourbillon (Bergson 1996, 123, 134).

est vrai. Mais il faut remarquer en même temps que, tout en renonçant à représenter à proprement parler ce double mouvement unique, Poe n'en a pas moins construit un monde qui *convienne* à cette image. En renonçant à représenter cette image, Poe a, en effet, construit un monde qui est tout entier « gonflé » autour de cette image. C'est, pour employer nous-mêmes une image, comme si le monde construit par Poe constituierait une sorte de doublure – *dans le sens que les tailleurs donnent au mot* – d'une image qui, elle-même, reste inaperçue. Les contours de l'image sont ainsi suivis aux moindres détails par cette doublure qui est dressée autour d'elle, mais les rapports entre les deux reste, si l'on peut dire, celui entre le creux et le plein. Voici un point que nous pouvons seulement indiquer ici sans pouvoir le développer davantage dans ce cadre, car il implique tout le rapport que le visible et l'invisible entretiennent chez Poe.

Mais cette description nous suffit peut-être pour identifier deux attitudes par rapport à l'image, celle de Bergson et celle de Sartre, respectivement. Pour mieux comprendre la différence entre les deux attitudes, mais aussi pour amorcer la discussion d'un rapprochement possibles entre les deux, il faudra passer par les différents sens que Bergson et Sartre accordent à une distinction qu'ils utilisent pourtant tous les deux, à savoir celle entre « s'installer » dans l'image et en « faire le tour ».

Nous allons d'abord indiquer d'une manière schématique le sens de cette distinction chez Bergson. Comme nous l'avons déjà vu, l'image médiatrice apparaît, selon Bergson, lorsque nous cessons de diviser en thèses, concepts, etc. la pensée du philosophe que nous étudions. Chaque thèse, chaque concept peut bien servir comme un point de vue sur le tout de la pensée de ce philosophe, mais mettre ensemble tous ces « points de vue » ne nous donnera jamais le tout sa philosophie. Pour la saisir comme un tout, il faut tout simplement « s'y installer ». Voici la remarque de Bergson : « à mesure que nous cherchons davantage à nous installer dans la pensée du philosophe au lieu d'en faire le tour, nous voyons sa doctrine se transfigurer. D'abord la complication diminue. Puis les parties entrent les unes dans les autres. Enfin, tout se ramasse en un point unique » (Bergson 1996, 119). Ce qui rend l'unité de cette philosophie ne peut évidemment se trouver dans aucune de ses parties. Etudier les parties, c'est « faire le tour » de cette philosophie, c'est en étudier la « complication extérieure » comme disait Bergson. Comprendre en profondeur une philosophie, c'est trouver un point unique – que Bergson nomme une image – d'où toutes les parties peuvent découler, d'où toutes les parties peuvent provenir.

Mais cette image dont parle Bergson n'est pas le genre d'image *arrêtée* que nous envisageons d'habitude. C'est une image qui est essentiellement « riche », car, comme nous l'avons vu, le philosophe n'a cessé de parler toute sa vie pour « décrire » cette image simple, cette intuition simple qu'il n'arrive pourtant jamais à exprimer. Pour au moins commencer la

clarification du statut d'une telle image qui n'est pas arrêté et qui est pourtant indéfiniment riche, il n'est pas inutile de se rappeler la théorie de la perception pure que Bergson dresse dans le premier chapitre de *Matière et mémoire*. Bergson part ici d'un univers composé tout entier d'images, c'est-à-dire d'entités qui sont à mi-chemin entre les représentations et les choses et qui ne cessent d'agir et de réagir les unes sur les autres. Mais, lorsque Bergson ajoute que chaque image agit par chacun de ses points sur tous les points des autres, on comprend bien que ces « images » ne sont donc pas isolées, qu'elles n'ont pas et ne peuvent pas avoir des contours définis. En effet, chaque image n'est qu'un « nœud » formé de toutes les actions des autres images et de toutes ses réactions aux autres images. De ce point de vue, une image est toujours une « impression » des actions de tous les autres images sur elles, et c'est en cela qu'elle est une image sur l'univers en sa totalité ; mais, inversement, en tant qu'elle ne peut pas ne pas réagir à toutes ces influences par tous ses points, l'image ne peut pas arrêter cette « impression », cette image sur le tout de l'univers que pourtant elle est. Chaque image comprend donc en elle-même le tout de l'univers, mais cette image du tout ne peut pas être arrêtée. Cet arrêt de l'image ne pourra se faire que par l'intermédiaire du corps vivant, capable de retarder sa réaction par rapport aux influences qu'il reçoit et de choisir les influences auxquelles il réagit. Le corps vivant sera ainsi vu comme une « image spéciale » qui a la capacité – ou, plus précisément, qui est cette capacité – de sélectionner les influences qui l'intéressent. Par cette sélection, on obtient la perception pure, c'est-à-dire une image arrêtée par un appauvrissement de l'image du tout. La perception est ainsi prélevée sur les choses elles-mêmes, mais elle s'obtient par soustraction : c'est en les coupant de leur capacité de « contenir » en elles-mêmes le tout de l'univers qu'on obtient une perception qui est pourtant prise sur les choses elles-mêmes. La perception est donc une image qui est par essence plus pauvre que l'image du tout qui est contenue dans les choses elles-mêmes sur lesquelles elle est prise. Les choses sont donc « du vu » (des vues du tout) – et c'est pourquoi Bergson les appelle des images –, mais pour qu'elles deviennent des images perçues il faudra les couper de ce « tout » qu'elles voient ou, plutôt, de ce tout dont elles sont des vues.

Pour Bergson il y aura donc toujours deux types d'images. D'un côté, il y aura des images arrêtées, des images dont les parties sont juxtaposées ; de l'autre côté, il y aura des images qui enveloppent un tout, des images-touts, pour ainsi dire, des images dynamiques et peut-être floues, mais dont la qualité essentielle est celle de présenter non pas des éléments, mais une multiplicité d'interpénétration, une multiplicité organisée en un tout indivisible. Dans le domaine de l'effort intellectuel – que cela soit l'effort de remémoration ou bien d'apprentissage ou de création intellectuelle – ce type d'images recevra chez Bergson le nom de « schéma dynamique ». Il n'est pas

le temps d'analyser en détail cette notion, d'ailleurs difficile à saisir, car cela impliquerait une discussion sur toute l'œuvre de Bergson, ce qui demanderait un cadre beaucoup plus large. Disons seulement ici que l'image « qui hante, inaperçue peut-être, l'esprit du philosophe » ou bien l'image médiatrice sont bien des « schémas dynamique » : ce sont des « vues » d'un tout, mais ce ne sont pas des images « fixées » ou arrêtées. La meilleure manière de rendre ces images, ce n'est pas en essayant de les approximer dans des images arrêtées à partir de plusieurs points de vue : cela ne signifierait que « faire le tour » de ces images ; il faut, au contraire, essayer de rendre le tout qu'elles contiennent en construisant un tout – la philosophie de Spinoza, ou bien l'histoire de Hans Pfaall – qui soit comparable au tout contenu dans l'image, qui en adopte la « forme ». S'installer dans une image signifie ainsi construire un monde qui lui convienne.

Les choses sont différentes pour Sartre – qui est par ailleurs très critique envers la notion bergsonienne de « schéma dynamique »¹¹ – et on pourrait tracer les différences par rapport à Bergson à partir de leurs divergences sur la perception. En effet, pour Sartre, c'est la perception qui est pourvue d'une richesse foncière. Lorsque je perçois un cube, par exemple, je ne peux pas percevoir toutes ses faces en même temps : pour savoir qu'il s'agit bien d'un cube, il faut, justement que j'en fasse le tour. C'est, dit Sartre, cette « nécessité de *faire le tour des objets* » (Sartre 1986, 23) qui distingue la perception de l'image mentale. Mais la perception n'est pas seulement un type d'attitude où l'on peut ou doit tourner autour des objets ; bien plus, perception n'est rien d'autre que ce « tourner autour ». Car, lorsque je perçois un objet, je perçois immédiatement, dans l'objet lui-même, le fait que je n'arriverais jamais à observer une infinité de détails qui lui appartiennent et une infinité de rapports qu'il entretient avec d'autres objets. De là, dit Sartre, « quelque chose de *débordant* dans le monde des 'choses' : il y a, à chaque instant, toujours infiniment *plus* que nous ne pouvons voir ; pour éprouver les richesses de ma perception actuelle, il faudrait un temps infini » (Sartre 1986, 25-26). On se trouve dans une attitude perceptive précisément en étant dans un tel type d'infériorité par rapport à l'objet, en étant débordé par lui : d'où la « passivité » de la perception. Mais cela signifie que la possibilité d'observer tous les détails infinis de l'objet, la possibilité d'en faire le tour indéfiniment se trouve inscrite dans la perception dès son premier moment, pour ainsi dire. Lorsque je me trouve dans une attitude perceptive, je ne perçois pas, bien entendu, ces détails infinis eux-mêmes, mais je perçois directement leur infinité. C'est pour cela que les objets de la perception sont toujours des objets avec « une individualité définie » (Sartre 1986, 26). L'infinité de détails et de rapports avec d'autres objets est dans l'objet lui-même ; mais en le percevant je me

¹¹ Cf., par exemple, Sartre 1986, 120-123 et Sartre 1997, 63-67.

trouve immédiatement dans cet état de débordement en face de l'objet dans la mesure où j'ai immédiatement accès à cette infinité de détails comme pouvant être indéfiniment parcourue. Percevoir est donc essentiellement *faire le tour*, se mettre dans la situation d'observateur d'un objet qui a son individualité – et donc son infinité de détails – en lui-même.

Au contraire, il y a, selon Sartre, une « pauvreté essentielle » de l'objet de l'image mentale. Si j'imagine, par exemple, mon ami Pierre, le visage imagé n'est pas le visage perçu de Pierre : toutes les aspérités de sa peau ne sont pas là, telle asymétrie de l'emplacement des oreilles n'y est pas présente, ses cheveux ne sont pas une somme de fils, mais plutôt une sorte de masse compacte brune. En d'autres mots, toute l'infinité des détails qui composent l'individualité du visage de Pierre-perçu n'est pas présente dans l'image. Et pourtant, je n'ai aucun doute que le visage que j'imagine est bien le visage de Pierre. Ce que je vise dans cette image, c'est Pierre lui-même, c'est, comme insiste à juste titre Sartre à plusieurs reprises, Pierre en chair et en os qui est atteint dans mon image. Comment est-ce possible ? C'est que je n'observe pas le visage imagé comme j'observe le visage perçu, je n'en fais pas le tour, je ne suis pas débordé par l'infinité de ses détails, mais je le « quasi observe », selon le terme de Sartre : dans l'image, « l'objet nous est présent du dehors et du dedans à la fois. Du dehors, car nous l'observons ; du dedans, car c'est *en lui* que nous percevons ce qu'il est » (Sartre 1986, 29). Dans l'image mentale, je ne dois pas faire le tour de l'objet pour savoir qu'il s'agit de Pierre : il est Pierre dès le début, pour ainsi dire, il est immédiatement et indubitablement Pierre, malgré la pauvreté des détails de son visage imagé, malgré le fait qu'à vrai dire l'individualité de l'objet n'est pas dans le visage lui-même. Dans l'image je ne dois pas inspecter le visage, je sais « du dedans » qu'il s'agit de Pierre, je suis déjà, pour ainsi dire, « dedans » ce visage pour savoir ce qu'il en est de ce visage sans que l'image elle-même m'offre ce renseignement. Prenons un exemple plus extrême : je fais un rêve où Pierre m'apparaît, mais sa tête est substituée par un chou ; pourtant, cette substitution n'a rien de choquant dans le rêve, et le moi du rêve continue de se comporter avec Pierre d'une manière habituelle, comme si rien n'était. Mais, justement, il n'y a rien de problématique là-dedans parce que je ne dois pas reconnaître Pierre dans le rêve, je ne vais jamais comparer ce chou avec le visage de Pierre que je connais. Au contraire, je *sais* tout simplement qu'il s'agit de Pierre, car ce n'est pas sur l'image que je le reconnais, mais c'est « du dedans », du dedans de ce personnage-chou qui m'apparaît que je sais qui il est.

Autrement dit, au lieu d'en faire le tour – même virtuellement – comme il arrive dans la perception, je m'installe dans l'objet lui-même pour en donner une représentation imagée. Je vois bien l'objet en image, mais ce qu'il est, je ne le sais pas en le lisant sur l'image, mais, au contraire, je suis déjà transporté en lui lorsque je le vois, je l'anime, pour ainsi dire. C'est pour

cela que Sartre indique, à plusieurs reprises, que l'attitude imageante est une affaire de « possession », dans le sens magique de ce terme.

On se trouve ainsi devant ce qui semblerait être deux attitudes différentes envers l'image. D'un côté, on s'installe dans l'image non pas pour la représenter en tant que telle, mais pour lui construire un monde. D'un autre côté, on s'installe dans l'objet de l'image pour en faire, tout simplement, une image mentale, pour arriver à le représenter en une image. Mais la grande différence entre les deux attitudes, ce qui, par ailleurs, constitue le point nodal de la dispute avec Bergson que Sartre entretient, c'est que l'image est essentiellement « riche » dans le cas de Bergson : toute la philosophie de Spinoza peut bien sortir d'une image. Inversement, l'image est essentiellement pauvre pour Sartre, car, dit-il, « l'image mentale n'apprend rien : c'est le principe de quasi-observation » (Sartre 1986, 167). L'image mentale ne nous apprend rien, car elle ne contient que ce que nous y avons mis. C'est en ce sens que Sartre présente l'image comme un « savoir dégradé ». Il serait difficile de faire sortir d'une image tout un monde, s'il n'y a rien dans cette image que ce que nous y avons mis. L'image deviendrait ainsi inutile : il n'y aurait aucun sens de passer par l'image si tous les éléments qui composent ce monde étaient déjà à notre disposition avant de passer à la représentation de l'image.

Et pourtant, il y a tout un glissement dans l'exposition de Sartre qui rapproche, de plus en plus, sa position par rapport à l'image de celle de Bergson. La difficulté vient, à notre avis, de la manière même de concevoir ce « s'installer » dans l'objet dont nous venons de parler. On sait « du dedans » que c'est Pierre que nous voyons dans l'image, et on le sait immédiatement, sans qu'il faille le reconnaître sur l'image. Mais lorsqu'il doit fournir une théorie sur notre manière de nous y installer, Sartre élabore la notion d'*analogon* affectif et moteur. Pour expliciter seulement l'analogon affectif et pour faire bref, disons que nous nous installons « dans » l'objet en reprenant notre attitude affective à l'égard de Pierre et en l'intégrant dans l'image, en la mettant, pour ainsi dire, au lieu où l'objet dans l'image se trouve : il s'agit bien de Pierre parce que j'ai mis en son intérieur mon attitude affective envers Pierre, c'est ainsi que Pierre peut être Pierre même si, dans le rêve, un chou lui tient place de tête.

Mais les conséquences théoriques ne tardent pas d'en suivre, et l'image sartrienne se rapproche de celle bergsonienne. Ainsi, sera obligé de dire Sartre, « comme savoir, une conscience imageante vise l'objet extérieur dans son extériorité, c'est-à-dire en tant qu'il est fait de parties juxtaposées ; mais en tant qu'affectivité, elle se donne l'objet comme un tout indifférencié [...] L'objet se donne donc, en images, à la fois comme une nature indivise dans laquelle chaque qualité s'étend de part en part à travers toutes les autres et, à la fois, comme un ensemble de propriétés distinctes, un système de vues fragmentaires sur cette indifférenciation primitive » (Sartre 1986, 174-175). Nous comprenons maintenant mieux ce que Sartre reproche en fait à Bergson. C'est que, selon Sartre, il n'y a pas d'image mentale qui ait des

parties juxtaposées, étalées dans l'espace ; toutes les images mentales impliquent des éléments distincts, mais ces éléments sont synthétiquement liés, fondus, pour ainsi dire, *en même temps*, dans un tout indifférencié. Il s'agit, dit Sartre, d'une « contradiction intime, un vice radical de constitution » (Sartre 1986, 175) de l'objet imagé. Ce sont, dira Sartre, les objets de la perception qui sont indéfiniment divisibles, mais non pas les objets de l'image mentale. Si, comme disait Alain, je peux me représenter le Panthéon sans pour autant pouvoir compter ses colonnes, ce n'est pas parce que je ne vois pas des colonnes dans mon image. J'en vois bien, et pourtant je n'arrive pas à les faire sortir, à les isoler du tout indifférencié auquel elles sont foncièrement liées et, par conséquent, je n'arrive pas à les compter.

L'objet de l'image est ainsi vu, mais en même temps il ne saurait être donné dans une perception, ce « vice radical » de constitution qui le caractérise ne le laissera jamais se présenter sous la forme « étalée » d'une perception, d'un objet perçu dont je pourrai « faire le tour ». Voici le point qui, à notre avis, rapproche le plus Sartre de Bergson. De l'image médiatrice, Bergson dit qu'elle est « une image qui est presque matière en ce qu'elle se laisse encore voir, et presque esprit en ce qu'elle ne se laisse plus toucher » (Bergson 1996, 130). Qu'elle ne se laisse pas toucher, cela signifie, toujours à la suite du premier chapitre de *Matière et mémoire*, qu'elle ne saurait être donnée dans une perception, qu'elle ne pourrait pas faire l'objet d'une perception. Je ne pourrais donc pas la reproduire dans une image qui soit accessible à la perception. De son côté, Sartre dira aussi que l'objet de l'image « est hors d'atteinte. Je ne puis le toucher » (Sartre 1986, 240). Et si je ne peux pas le faire, c'est parce qu'il y a, comme l'expliquera Sartre, une spatialité absolue de l'objet en image. Si je me représente mon ami Pierre (qui est petit), je peux bien me le représenter tout seul, coupé de tout décor possible, sans aucun autre objet auquel sa taille pourrait être comparée. Pourtant, ce Pierre-tout-seul ne m'apparaîtra pas moins comme petit, petit en soi pour ainsi dire, avec un « petitesse » absolue et non pas relative, une « petitesse » qui ne découle d'aucune comparaison. C'est en ce sens que, dira Sartre, « l'espace de l'objet irréel est sans parties » (Sartre 1986, 246). Comparer la taille de deux objets passe toujours par la division de l'espace en parties, mais c'est précisément cela que je ne dois pas et je ne peux pas faire avec l'espace des objets imagés. Cet espace absolu, cette spatialité absolue des objets imagés montre encore une fois pourquoi on ne peut pas compter les colonnes du Panthéon en image : c'est qu'il y est présent en lui-même, en entier, et essayer d'en compter les colonnes signifie dissoudre cet espace absolu et sans parties dans lequel – ou plutôt *avec* lequel – il se présente ; il disparaît donc au moment où on essaie d'en compter les colonnes, il n'est plus là.¹²

¹² Sartre confère aussi aux objets imagés une « temporalité absolue » inhérente, qu'il rattache – à tort, à notre avis – à ce que Bergson appelle « temps spatialisé » plutôt qu'à sa « durée pure » (cf. Sartre 1986, 248-253).

L'objection que Sartre fait à Bergson est peut-être juste, et elle touche probablement une partie du bergsonisme, mais non pas celle de « L'intuition philosophique » que nous discutons ici. Voilà ce que Bergson pourrait probablement dire à son propos. On se représente le Panthéon en image « d'une façon qui l'empêche par principe d'être perceptible » (Sartre 1986, 181) : cela, Bergson l'accorderait bien, car il ne dit pas autre chose. Et pourtant, dirait Bergson, à côté de cette image du Panthéon, je peux me mettre à faire des dessins du Panthéon, des différentes versions du Panthéon avec un nombre variable de colonnes. Lorsque j'arriverai, dans l'un de mes dessins, au nombre à peu près exact de colonnes, je pourrai reconnaître le Panthéon dans mon dessin. Ensuite, sur le dessin – c'est-à-dire sur un objet de la perception –, je pourrai compter les colonnes ; et me voilà arrivé à compter les colonnes du Panthéon en ayant, comme seul guide, son image mentale¹³. L'image mentale n'est donc pas inerte, elle n'est pas tout à fait improductive, elle ne s'épuise pas dans sa propre représentation : elle peut elle-même produire des « connaissances » qu'on n'avait pas. Même si je ne sais pas combien de colonnes le Panthéon a, même si je ne peux pas les compter sur l'image mentale que j'en ai, je peux tout de même apprendre le nombre de colonnes à partir de l'image mentale même. Sans doute, je dois passer par un détour, je dois produire, à partir de l'image mentale, plusieurs objets susceptibles d'être perçus – les dessins – et je dois ensuite reconnaître le dessin qui se rapproche le plus de l'image mentale, c'est-à-dire le dessin qui me fait voir – et c'est toujours d'une image mentale qu'il s'agit – à peu près le même Panthéon que je voyais dans mon image mentale initiale. Mais, par ce détour parfois pénible, qui peut me faire dessiner des dizaines de versions du Panthéon, j'aurais pourtant appris quelque chose, j'aurais trouvé, approximativement au moins, le nombre des colonnes du Panthéon. Selon une expression chère à Bergson, j'aurai tiré de l'image mentale plus qu'il n'y en avait, et pourtant je l'aurai fait en ayant comme seul guide l'image mentale elle-même. Il est donc strictement faux de dire que « l'image n'apprend rien », car c'est l'image qui, dans cet exemple du Panthéon, nous guide vers des nouvelles « connaissances ».

Il en va de même, pour Bergson, de l'image qu'il prête à Spinoza, et que nous avons prêtée ici à Poe. Il s'agit bien d'une image « fuyante et évanouissante », comme dit Bergson, et pourtant – Sartre nous l'aura déjà

¹³ Il est important de noter ici que, pour Sartre, regarder un dessin qui représente un objet et faire une image mentale de l'objet relèvent du même type d'intentionnalité, de même type de « conscience imageante », comme il l'appelle. Lorsque je regarde un dessin du Panthéon, je ne vois pas des lignes et des couleurs sur une toile, mais je vois bien le Panthéon, c'est-à-dire un objet absent. Même si le dessin est donné à la perception, le fait qu'il soit un dessin du Panthéon et que je le reconnaisse comme tel suppose un passage de la conscience perceptive à la conscience imageante.

bien appris – *toutes* les images mentales sont peut-être ainsi. Et pourtant, en faisant l'effort pour la faire passer sur un autre type de support – le dessin susceptible de perception dans l'exemple du Panthéon, les mots lisibles dans l'histoire de Poe ou dans la philosophie de Spinoza – on aura réussi à la fois à faire reconnaître cette image à travers cet autre support, et en même temps on aura appris des choses nouvelles, on aura tiré de cette image plus qu'on aurait obtenu en la contemplant seulement. Les deux attitudes à l'égard de l'image que nous avons isolées ici, celle de Bergson et celle de Sartre, ne semblent donc pas incompatibles.

Nous nous permettons d'ajouter, pour conclure, deux remarques. La première vise Bergson et elle est une conséquence de ce qui vient d'être dit, une conséquence que Bergson ne tire pas lui-même. Il est intéressant de noter qu'en effet, si un philosophe parle vraiment toute sa vie pour exprimer une intuition – qui prend, comme Bergson nous laisse comprendre, la forme d'une image mentale –, le philosophe se rapporte pourtant à sa propre philosophie écrite, étalée en concepts, de la même manière que nous, ses lecteurs. Autrement dit, il l'appréhende lui-même à travers une ou des images médiatrices. Il ne peut savoir s'il est sur la bonne route, s'il arrive vraiment à rendre son image initiale en concepts, qu'en « tirant » lui-même une image médiatrice de cette philosophie étalée en concepts et en vérifiant s'il y a une parenté, une affinité entre l'image initiale et l'image médiatrice qu'il obtient de ses théories formulées. Tout comme, sur le dessin du Panthéon, je dois reconnaître *le même* Panthéon que visait mon image mentale¹⁴, de même le philosophe ne peut pas savoir s'il approche son but de rendre son image initiale qu'en « comparant » mentalement celle-ci à l'image qui ressort de ses écrits.

La deuxième remarque concerne Sartre. Tout comme il confère une spatialité absolue et une temporalité absolue à l'objet de l'image mentale, il lui arrive aussi de conférer une « mondanité » inhérente aux objets imagés, mais il accorde cette propriété seulement aux objets des rêves. « Dans le rêve, chaque image s'entoure d'une atmosphère de monde » (Sartre 1986, 323) ; autrement dit, chaque objet survient avec son propre monde, il se présente lui-même comme *contenant* en lui les directions où il faudra trouver le monde d'où il est isolé. Tout comme l'objet en image avait des éléments distincts tout en étant aussi un objet « entier » et sans parties, l'objet des rêves peut apparaître à la fois comme objet *et comme monde pour cet objet*. Disons, pour conclure, que nous ne voyons pas pourquoi cette superbe propriété que Sartre indique ici serait confinée aux objets des rêves et ne pourrait pas appartenir à d'autres objets en image.

¹⁴ Voir la note précédente pour l'explication de cette affirmation.

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Eugen RĂCHITEANU*

Cappella de'Pazzi, architettura essenzialmente francescana: sacro, simbolo e decorazione

Abstract: The sacred, the decoration and symbols of the Cappella de' Pazzi bring in relief the concept of the internal structure of the universe. In the chapel it is not the concept of beauty without the sense of proportion but the beauty we can find within the measure and of the order. According to the culture of the philosophical-spiritual of the period of humanism, God is the Supreme Architect of the world, of creation. The mathematical structure of the universe, the laws of the ratio and the proportions makes conceive feelings of perfection and so to speak or a harmonious serenity. Brunelleschi considered that the measure makes everything beautiful and the beauty of the form prompts us to think right to the heavenly Jerusalem, of the interaction between the heaven and the earth.

Keywords: Sacred, Decoration, Symbols, Structure, Proportion

Riguardo la geometria sacra adoperata da Brunelleschi nella sua massima espressione, il Prof. Spike scrive: "... la geometria stessa era un dono di Dio, e come tale soggetta alle leggi di Dio. [...] Nuovi strumenti furono al servizio di valori tradizionali. Le nuove tecniche condussero presto a nuovi valori, come mostra con chiarezza lo sviluppo della cultura fiorentina nella seconda metà del Quattrocento"¹.

1. Geometria sacra: La natura teo-ontologica del simbolo nell'umanesimo francescano

Brunelleschi, architetto della Cappella de' Pazzi (Fig. 1) ha vissuto in uno dei più significativi periodi dello sviluppo culturale francescano. Dai vari studi siamo a conoscenza dell'elenco dei santi e dotti dediti alla cultura, all'arte e alla scienza, ma anche dei libri custoditi e studiati dai frati francescani e da ciò sappiamo che il mondo antico era presente alla loro mente non soltanto attraverso gli scritti e i poeti, ma anche attraverso l'unico trattatista di architettura. "Vitruvio era infatti tra le opere lette da San Bernardino da Siena che fu amico di Giannozzo Manetti; il santo, in una sua omelia di quaresima del 1425 in Santa Croce condanna con forza l'ignoranza, «quella

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¹ John T. Spike, *Masaccio*, Rizzoli libri illustrati, Milano 2002, p. 91.

cosa che è più contraria alla salute delle anime, che tutte le altre cose del mondo»².



Fig. 1

Per esempio, gli umanisti hanno fatto passi importanti in vari campi della scienza, avendo nella coscienza la convinzione che non possono *risuscitare* il passato greco-romano. Per di più rifiutavano di imitare l'antichità in modo servile, però cercavano di capirla e di ispirarvisi per arrivare pari alle sue altezze, anzi per superarla.

Per quel che riguarda la nostra ricerca, quando si parla di umanesimo francescano non ci sono dubbi sul fatto che l'Ordine Serafico abbia avuto una tematica ispiratrice diversa da quella delle altre scuole contemporanee. I temi sono stati certamente gli stessi di altre correnti di pensiero, ma ciò che contraddistingue i maestri francescani dagli altri è l'indole vitale e temperamentale, la intuizione e sensibilità che ha portato a una visione e interpretazione dell'uomo e dei suoi punti di riferimento molto particolari, compreso un modo particolare di essere se stessi, di trattare l'altro e di porsi di fronte alla vita.

² Giuseppe Zander, *Il luogo sacro brunelleschiano in Filippo Brunelleschi nella Firenze dell'3-'400*, Ed. Città di vita, Firenze 1977, pp. 98-99.

Nell'epoca dell'umanesimo anche il concetto simbolico all'interno della complessità architettonica aveva un'espressione d'alto livello biblico e teologico come ad esempio l'architettura dell'edificio sacro che veniva nominata *Corpus Misticum*: assemblea dei credenti, la Chiesa totale e il Tempio per eccellenza. La Bibbia riporta simboli molto forti come questi: «Non sapete che siete tempio di Dio e che lo Spirito di Dio abita in voi?» (1Cor 3, 16) e ancora «Noi siamo infatti il tempio del Dio vivente» (2Cor 6, 16). Però anche dal punto di visto teologico viene ripreso il pensiero di sant'Agostino:

“Nello stesso modo in cui questo edificio visibile è stato fatto per riunirci corporalmente, così quest'altro edificio che siamo noi stessi è stato costruito perché Dio vi abiti spiritualmente ... L'edificio visibile si trova oggi sotto i nostri occhi, l'altro lo sarà alla fine dei secoli, quando il Signore verrà, quando il nostro corpo corruttibile sarà rivestito dall'incorruttibilità”³.

Detto ciò, possiamo affermare subito che la mirabile realizzazione che rappresenta la chiesa dei tempi antichi e dei tempi nuovi non è un prodotto di un sentimento oppure di un'intuizione puramente estetica, ma è particolarmente ispirata dalla sacra teologia e sostenuta da una stabile e matura tradizione cristiana. In quest'ottica, il concetto di *spazio* si presentava come una condizione essenziale dello stato corporeo dell'uomo sulla terra.

Il pensiero dei maestri francescani godeva di una vera e piena garanzia per la elaborazione di una strutturazione di un sistema antropologico umanista perché l'anima e l'animatore del gruppo, lo aveva in precedenza vissuto e sperimentato in una straordinaria sintesi difficilmente uguagliabile. Il pensiero francescano contiene in sé una filosofia dell'uomo in contrapposizione a una filosofia delle cose e delle idee come mezzo per raggiungere la migliore comprensione possibile dell'uomo stesso. Si osserva bene che questo pensiero è superiore al pensiero oggettivista, modellato e forgiato sull'analisi delle cose e degli oggetti ed è pure superiore al pensiero soggettivista che è caratterizzato dal dominio della ragione e dell'intelligenza e che si è espresso in vari modi.

Da ricordare ancora come nel secolo XV si arriva alla convinzione che l'arte detiene le proprie leggi, in stretto legame con tutto ciò che ordina l'universo. Come i Greci e Romani hanno applicato le medesime leggi, così gli artisti del '400 utilizzano gli stessi motivi per l'approfondimento e la maturazione dell'architettura e dell'arte antica. Per di più essi stabiliscono un inventario di tutte le forme antiche e formano nuove regole che permettono una rappresentazione razionale dello spazio. Questi esperimenti aiutano Brunelleschi a scoprire la prospettiva che sarà decisiva per il futuro dell'arte. Il progresso congiunto della conoscenza e della ricerca, applicato sia in

³ Jean Hani, *Il simbolismo del tempio cristiano*, Ed. Arkeios, Città di Castello, 1996, p. 72.

ambito artistico che architettonico, viene magistralmente esplorato nelle sue opere.

Le opere architettoniche s'inseriscono nel numero dei veri miracoli della tecnica, riportando l'idea di un'unità delle misure, nel modo unico in cui si articola l'intero edificio⁴.

In questo clima di spiritualità e di cultura francescana, “Brunelleschi rappresentava una cultura fondata sul primato dell'architettura e che aspirava a rinnovare sempre più tutti gli aspetti dell'arte”⁵. Partendo da questo concetto, ci rendiamo conto come il simbolismo nell'umanesimo ha avuto una crescita notevole nell'ambito dell'architettura sacra e della geometria sacra. Gli architetti e gli artisti hanno armonizzato in modo quasi perfetto le leggi della fisica con la Sacra Scrittura, senza ignorare l'importanza dei simboli. Per questo si credeva veramente che “il tempio terrestre è realizzato conformemente ad un archetipo celeste comunicato agli uomini attraverso l'intermediazione di un profeta, e questo è ciò che fonda la legittima tradizione architettonica”⁶. La Sacra Scrittura fa un riferimento importantissimo a questo tema usando vari simboli e dicendo: «Li hai riempiti di sapienza, di intelligenza, di scienza per ogni sorta di opere, per inventare tutto quello che si può fare» (*Es 35, 31-32*) e ancora nello stesso libro dell'*Esodo* si dice: «Essi mi faranno un santuario e io abiterò in mezzo a loro. Essi lo faranno conformemente a ciò che mostrerò, secondo il modello del *tabernacolo*, e secondo il modello di tutti gli arredi ...» (*Es 25, 8-9*).

Nel nostro caso, i simboli della Cappella de' Pazzi portano in rilievo il concetto della struttura interna dell'universo (Fig. 2). All'interno della cappella non esiste il concetto di bello senza il senso della misura e il bello lo troviamo all'interno della misura e dell'ordine. Secondo la teologia cattolica del periodo dell'umanesimo, Dio è il Sommo Architetto di tutto il mondo, del creato. La struttura matematica dell'universo, le leggi del rapporto e le proporzioni, concepiscono sentimenti di perfezione e per così dire o una armoniosa serenità. Brunelleschi considerava che la misura fa bella ogni cosa e la bellezza della forma ci porta col pensiero proprio alla Gerusalemme celeste, all'interazione tra il cielo e la terra.

Secondo Brunelleschi il concetto di luogo sacro come forma riflette fedelmente i principi cosmici, divenendo parte integrante dell'universo, vibrando nella stessa armonia e in questa maniera beneficiando la presenza umana. Non a caso si dice che: *l'uomo si santifica nel luogo oppure l'uomo santifica il luogo*.

⁴ Cfr. AA.VV. *Istoria artei, pictura, sculptura, architectura*, Ed. Enciclopedia Rao, Bucuresti 1998, p. 117.

⁵ André Chastel, *Arte e umanesimo a Firenze al tempo di Lorenzo il Magnifico*, Ed. Einaudi, Torino 1964, p. 224.

⁶ Jean Hani, *Op. cit.*, p. 23.



Fig. 2

In altre parole, Brunelleschi riteneva che la Cappella de' Pazzi detenesse la chiave simbolica che congiunge l'uomo ai principi universali, quelli della sacralità e alla realtà cosmica. Ancora di più, le proporzioni e le misure della cappella si trovano alla base di ogni forma, e perciò l'armonia e la perfezione della forma, come riflesso della perfezione e della bellezza universale, portando il microcosmo umano in stretta armonia col macrocosmo.

Qual è il senso, il significato o l'essere che l'architettura di Brunelleschi autotrasmette? In questo caso la sua architettura non ha un solo significato; essa esprime e manifesta molteplici significati. Troviamo significati diversi tra di loro, per natura e per origine che vanno dalla motivazione funzionale del suo essere, al modo di utilizzare, mediante un sistema di comunicazioni e di segni.

Per Brunelleschi, fare architettura prima di tutto vuol dire organizzare lo spazio fisico per edificare a determinate funzioni religiose oppure sociali, o rappresentare il modo in cui quelle funzioni vengono espletate in un certo contesto culturale, cioè rappresentare il valore di quelle funzioni, il senso che esse rivestono al modo personale e per la comunità che doveva usarla.

Queste azioni sono compresenti nella Cappella de' Pazzi in quanto essa è gratificazione di una necessità spirituale, e quindi strumento e servizio sociale; per di più è anche modalità di fruizione, espressione di una conoscenza, comunicazione di una idea.

La Cappella de' Pazzi è quindi allo stesso tempo funzione liturgica e simbolo. La funzione ed il simbolo sono indissolubilmente legati l'uno all'altro. Questi due aspetti coesistono insieme. Gli antichi costruttori si ispiravano alla perfezione divina pure Brunelleschi affidava alla pietra il modello della creazione perfetta, della Gerusalemme celeste come descritta

nell'Apocalisse: «La città è cinta da un grande e alto muro come dodici porte [...] A Oriente tre porte, a Settentrione tre porte, a Mezzogiorno tre porte e a Occidente tre porte [...] La città è a forma di quadrato» (*Ap* 21, 12, 16). Nel libro dei Proverbi troviamo la seguente descrizione:

«Quando egli fissava i cieli, io ero là; quando tracciava un cerchio sull'abisso; quando condensava le nubi in alto, quando fissava le sorgenti dell'abisso; quando stabiliva al mare i suoi limiti, sicché le acque non ne oltrepassassero la spiaggia; quando disponeva le fondamenta della terra, allora io ero con lui come architetto ed ero la sua delizia ogni giorno ...» (*Prov* 8, 27-30).

L'antica sapienza recita in questa maniera: *come in alto così in basso*, e poi guarda le cose umane come proiezioni di un modello superiore, invisibile agli occhi ma ben presente perché altrimenti nulla potrebbe esistere. L'umanesimo comunicava una problematica importante, cioè, l'idea che l'arte della costruzione deve essere sacra in quanto in essa si trova l'opera creatrice di Dio: realizzare uno spazio sacro significa realizzare la manifestazione di qualcosa che ancora non è visibile, poi significa creare qualche cosa di nuovo considerando le leggi esistenti del cosmo, quelle stesse che fanno vedere l'armonia e l'ordine da far attirare nel movimento dei pianeti una danza divina ritmata della musica delle sfere⁷. In questo senso, l'umanesimo voleva sottolineare nelle tradizioni di vari popoli che vi è un linguaggio nascosto che narra ciò che nessuno può aver visto: come da niente sorge quel che ha portato a ciò che i nostri occhi svelano.

L'umanesimo era attento agli insegnamenti teologici e biblici e senz'altro Brunelleschi teneva presenti i vari passi biblici che raccontano la sapienza di Dio che istruisce e suggerisce il giusto modo di edificare.

In ciò che segue riporteremo vari passi biblici che dimostrano l'ispirazione divina per quanto concerne la costruzione dei templi sacri: «Davide diede a Salomone suo figlio il modello del vestibolo e degli edifici, delle stanze per i tesori, dei piani di sopra e delle camere interne e del luogo per il propiziatorio, inoltre la descrizione di quanto aveva in animo» (1Cor 28, 11-12).

È da notare il fatto che il libro della Sapienza fa parte di una lunga serie di testi che riportano più esplicitamente il discorso della costruzione secondo il suggerimento divino: «Mi hai detto di costruirti un tempio sul tuo santo monte [dice a Dio Salomone], un altare nella città della tua dimora, un'imitazione della tenda santa che ti eri preparata fin da principio» (*Sap* 9, 8). Riporteremo anche il testo dal libro di Ezechiele, che, in visione, descrive il tempio da costruire:

⁷ Cf. Maria Grazia Lopardi, *Architettura sacra medievale: mito e geometria degli archetipi*, Ed. Mediterranee, Roma 2009, p. 19.

«Tu, figlio dell'uomo, descrivi questo tempio alla casa d'Israele [...]. Ne misurino la pianta [...]. Manifesta loro la forma di questo tempio, la sua disposizione, le sue uscite, i suoi ingressi, tutti i suoi aspetti, tutti i suoi regolamenti, tutte le sue forme e tutte le sue leggi: mettili per iscritto davanti ai loro occhi, perché osservino tutte queste norme e tutti questi regolamenti e li mettano in pratica» (*Ez* 43, 10-11).

Dai testi riportati si può dedurre come l'edificio sacro costruito nell'epoca dell'umanesimo era carico di simboli biblici, simboli con un carattere teologicamente inspirati e carichi di significato. Sempre in quest'epoca lo spazio sacro era visto come il riflesso sulla terra di un archetipo celeste, la Gerusalemme dell'Apocalisse che è presentata da San Giovanni in maniera analoga a quella di Ezechiele. Perciò ogni edificio sacro è considerato cosmico e con tutto questo “il tempio non è solo un'immagine *realista* del mondo, è ancora di più un'immagine *strutturale*, che riproduce la struttura intima e matematica dell'universo. Qui si trova la fonte della sua bellezza sublime”⁸.

L'edificazione del tempio è di natura divina, e ispirata da Dio e per questo facciamo ancora appello alla Sacra Scrittura perché si deve ricordare anche la dimensione del tempio come corpo dell'uomo-Dio: «Rispose loro Gesù: *Distruggete questo tempio e in tre giorni lo farò risorgere*. Gli dissero allora i Giudei: *Questo tempio è stato costruito in quarantasei anni e tu in tre giorni lo fai risorgere?* Ma egli parlava del tempio del suo corpo» (*Gr* 2, 19-21).

Questo brano di San Giovanni fa comprendiamo un insegnamento di grande importanza perché in Gesù, Uomo-Dio e Uomo universale, il corpo è l'abitacolo della Divinità: «È in Cristo che abita corporalmente tutta la pienezza della divinità» (*Col* 2, 9) perché «il Verbo si fece carne e venne ad abitare in mezzo a noi» (*Gr* 1, 14), compiendo in tal modo ciò di cui il tempio mosaico non era che una figura: l'inabitazione di un Dio fra gli uomini ed anche negli uomini⁹.

Ritorniamo alla concezione della natura del simbolismo del tempio nel periodo dell'umanesimo e aggiungiamo ancora che lo spazio Sacro rappresenta per il popolo cristiano il Corpo di Cristo, ma anche l'assemblea è il Corpo di Cristo, questa ne costituisce il tempio spirituale, il Corpo mistico di Cristo. È da tener presente che l'edificio sacro era ed è tuttora considerato sotto triplice aspetto: in quanto Umanità di Cristo, in quanto Chiesa e in quanto anima di ogni fedele¹⁰. Come abbiamo detto, nell'umanesimo lo spazio sacro rappresenta prima di tutto il Corpo di Cristo e tale simbolo è stato evidenziato dalle varie forme architettoniche.

⁸ Jean Hani, *Op. cit.*, p. 29.

⁹ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 57.

¹⁰ Cfr. Jean Hani, *Op. cit.*, p. 57.

Ancora una volta ci viene in aiuto la Sacra Scrittura con un testo che ci fa comprendere maggiormente la dimensione sacrale dello spazio liturgico:

«Egli è l'Immagine del Dio invisibile, Primogenito di tutte le creature. Poiché per mezzo di lui sono state create tutte le cose che sono nei celi e sulla terra, quelle visibili e quelle invisibili: Troni, Dominazioni, Principati e Potestà. Tutte le cose sono state create per mezzo di Lui e in vista di Lui. Egli è prima di tutte le cose e tutte sussistono per Lui» (*Col 1, 15-17*).

A conclusione di questo ragionamento, visti anche i testi biblici e teologici che davano forza e autorità al simbolo nella geometria vivente nel periodo dell'umanesimo, e come Brunelleschi in persona sia riuscito a realizzare il suo progetto/programma architettonico di altissima qualità ed elevata espressione di genio, possiamo arrivare alla convinzione che come la chiesa corporale o materiale è eretta sulle pietre riunite assieme, così la chiesa spirituale forma un tutto composto da una moltitudine di gente.

Tutte le pietre che formano la costruzione ... rappresentano i santi, ovvero gli uomini puri che vengono disposti dalle mani del Creatore per rimanere con la chiesa per sempre. Si trovano in comunione come un medesimo cemento attraverso la carità fino a che, divenute nella celeste Sion, delle pietre vive, esse non vengano assemblate dai legami della pace.

Brunelleschi con il suo modo di sperimentare, ha creato l'architettura di una nuova era. Vi è riuscito, indubbiamente!

2. Spazio sacro fra sala capitolare e cappella: *Complexio* liturgico umano-divino

In questa parte della ricerca tratteremo lo spazio sacro in quanto utile sia alla Liturgia che alla Sala Capitolare. Qui si tratta di una realtà diversa rispetto alle altre cappelle, abbiamo un *complexio* dove si celebrava la divina liturgia e il raduno convenzionale: il Capitolo.

Per avere un riquadramento concreto della Cappella de' Pazzi nell'ambito concettuale della sua funzione, dobbiamo introdurre un argomento essenziale nell'insieme della sua complessa forma sacra.

“Basta un’occhiata per vedere quanto poco essa abbia in comune con i templi classici, ma ancora meno con le forme usate dagli architetti gotici. Brunelleschi combinò colonne, pilastri e archi secondo il suo stile personale, raggiungendo un effetto di leggerezza e grazia diverso da qualsiasi esempio precedente”¹¹.

Le forme dell’edificio – che si ammirano – mostrano come Brunelleschi avesse studiato molto attentamente le antiche rovine e costruzioni come il

¹¹ Ernst H. Gombrich, *La storia dell’arte*, Ed. Mondadori, Milano 1995, p. 226.

Pantheon. Si osserva quanto abbia guardato modelli architettonici Romani, in cui non c'è nulla che possa rievocare i tratti utilizzati dagli architetti gotici: non ci sono altissime finestre, né sottili pilastri, ma il muro bianco e una serie di pilastri di colore grigio la cui unica funzione è quella di richiamo all'idea di un ordine classico; mette i pilastri per dare un certo rilievo alla linea e alle proporzioni dell'interno¹².

Per essere ancora più chiari, Brunelleschi è stato solo l'iniziatore del Rinascimento nel campo architettonico, ma gli è attribuita anche un'importante scoperta nell'ambito dell'arte che è la *prospettiva*.

Detto ciò, ricordiamo che abbiamo accennato anche prima che la Cappella de' Pazzi aveva una duplice funzione: Cappella (spazio sacro per la celebrazione liturgica) e Sala Capitolare dei Frati Francescani Conventuali della Basilica di Santa Croce a Firenze. Per rinfrescare la memoria riprendiamo brevemente il passo citato di Renzo Chiarelli dal suo saggio: *Architettura del Brunelleschi e di Michelozzo in Primo Rinascimento in Santa Croce*:

“È ormai fuori dubbio che l'attuale edificio – destinato ad essere Cappella di famiglia e, insieme, aula capitolare del convento – sia sorto entro uno spazio, per così dire, obbligato, o, quanto meno, preconstituito, come attestano le preesistenti strutture che lo costringono da tre lati; è anzi pienamente accettabile l'idea che la fabbrica brunelleschiana fosse fatta sorgere sull'area d'una più antica sala capitolare”¹³.

A questo punto ci concentreremo sul concetto del *celebrare la divina liturgia* nella Cappella de' Pazzi. Come in molte altre chiese anche nella Cappella si celebrava la divina liturgia. Qui si tratta di una cappella di famiglia fiorentina, nobile e potente, che non trascurava affatto il discorso della celebrazione liturgica. La famiglia de' Pazzi – pur avendo anche decisivi avversari, come per esempio i Medici –, riteneva lo spazio sacro come il luogo dove ci si sentiva cristiani, luogo dove si sentiva il bisogno di riunirsi e di celebrare i sacramenti. Papa Benedetto XVI nel suo libro, *Teologia della liturgia*, esprime proprio questo concetto del desiderio di riunirsi e di celebrare la divina liturgia: “Questa è indiscutibilmente una funzione essenziale dell'edificio sacro, per la quale esso si differenzia anche dalla forma classica del tempio nella maggior parte delle religioni”¹⁴.

Nel nostro caso la Cappella de' Pazzi può essere nominata come *domus ecclesie* e lo spazio dell'assemblea del popolo di Dio, che veniva usata per definire il concetto della comunità vivente e soprattutto luogo di ospitalità del Capitolo francescano. Qui si coltivava un concetto sano: il *culto* che celebra Cristo stesso nel suo stare davanti al Padre, Egli stesso diventa il

¹² Cf. Ernst H. Gombrich, *Op. cit.*, p. 226.

¹³ Renzo Chiarelli, *Op. cit.*, p. 86.

¹⁴ Joseph Ratzinger, *Teologia della liturgia – Opera Omnia*, Vol. XI, Ed. Vaticana, 2010, p. 69.

culto dei suoi mediante il loro riunirsi con Lui ed intorno a Lui. Benedetto XVI dice che “il culto cristiano è, appunto una liturgia cosmica che abbraccia il cielo e la terra”¹⁵ e ancora

“L'eucarestia è un entrare nella liturgia celeste, un divenire contemporanei dell'atto di adorazione di Gesù Cristo, nel quale Egli, mediante il suo corpo, accoglie il tempo del mondo e, insieme, lo conduce continuamente al di là della propria dimensione, strappandolo, per così dire, fuori di sé, cioè fuori della cronologia, per introdurlo nella comunione dell'Amore eterno”¹⁶.

“Anche l'assoluto ha bisogno del relativo per manifestarsi, come il relativo ha bisogno dell'Assoluto di cui è immagine per poter esistere. Nella sfera infinita, Dio senza inizio né fine si contrae per vedere sé stesso, per divenire grembo”¹⁷. Per di più possiamo dire che “nello spazio è grembo, Dio si manifesta abbracciando altezza e profondità e ponendosi sulla croce dei punti cardinali”¹⁸. Anche i pensieri di Dio, essendo modelli di ogni cosa che si trovano nell'opera del luogo sacro che in realtà manifesta tutta la divinità, quella che nel mito della caverna l'uomo coglie come riflesso finché non si volta indietro e non si *converte* a guardare la forma dell'immagini che costituiscono il mondo sensibile, gli Archetipi che sono in eterno nel regno intelligibile. Per questo motivo nell'umanesimo è possibile che l'architettura si sia così avvicinata al Grande Mistero? Brunelleschi nella Cappella de' Pazzi ha fatto sì che l'architettura sacra custodisse il simbolo stesso del *Seno di Dio* da qui tutto emerge, della Matrice che custodisce il Verbo ordinatore di ogni cosa (Fig. 3). Per analogia possiamo dire ancora che è dal grembo materno che prende origine la manifestazione di tutte le opere. Anche la Bibbia esprime questo concetto con l'immagine delle acque su cui soffia lo Spirito, e il cristianesimo si riferisce al vergineo grembo di Maria.

Incontriamo varie terminologie al grembo come rete, vaso, ecc. Questi termini aiutano la persona ad avvicinarsi di più al mirabile mistero di Dio. I termini e immagini stanno alla base della conoscenza dei maestri architetti che hanno tramandato con gran responsabilità ai loro discepoli. La concezione corretta del sacro diventa fonte di ogni costruzione sacra che è tale, perché è conforme al modello divino suggerito dal Prologo nel vangelo di Giovanni. Nella lettera agli Ebrei troviamo scritto queste parole: “Per fede noi sappiamo che i mondi furono formati dalla Parola di Dio, sì che da cosa non visibile ha presso origine quello che si vede” (Eb. 11, 3) e nel libro della Sapienza leggiamo: “*Omnia in misura, numero et pondere dispositi* [Tutte le cose disponesti in misura, numero e peso]” (Sap. 11, 20). Dante Alighieri

¹⁵ Joseph Ratzinger, *Op. cit.*, p. 62.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

¹⁷ Maria Grazia Lopardi, *Op. cit.*, p. 22.

¹⁸ Idem.

scriveva: “Colui che volse il sesto [il compasso] all'estremo del mondo, e dentro ad esso distinse tanto occulto e manifesto”¹⁹. San Bonaventura nell’*Itinerarium mentis in Deo* descrive in modo mirabile la misura e la bellezza di Dio esistente nelle opere: “Poiché ogni bellezza e diletto non possono sussistere senza proporzione, e la proporzione sta principalmente nel numero, occorre che ogni cosa sia secondo numero e perciò il numero è l'esemplare precipuo dell'animo del creatore e nelle cose è il principale vestigio per condurle alla sapienza”²⁰. Ed anche Dante Alighieri: “Le cose tutte quante hanno ordine tra loro e questo è forma che l'universo a Dio fa somigliante. Quell'Uno e Due e Tre che sempre vive [...]”²¹.



Fig. 3

Per quanto abbiamo detto fin qui, non può esservi dubbio che anche lo spazio liturgico plasma la fede e che, attraverso la sua disposizione, la esprime²². La Chiesa come comunità del popolo di Dio vive la liturgica come celebrazione di tutta la comunità invece che la celebrazione per la comunità²³. Infatti, anche secondo la Costituzione sulla liturgia “ogni celebrazione liturgica è in forma eminenti azione sacra” (SC 7).

Per tanto possiamo dire che la Cappella de' Pazzi non è una massa omogenea e non è la somma di molte particelle spaziali; quello che è il

¹⁹ Dante Aligheri, *Divina commedia, Paradiso XIX*, 40-42.

²⁰ San Bonaventura, *Itinerarium mentis in Deo* in Maria Grazia Lopardi, *Op. cit.*, p. 41.

²¹ Dante Aligheri, *Divina commedia, Paradiso XIV*, 28.

²² Cf. Klemens Richter, *Spazio sacro e immagini di chiesa. L'importanza dello spazio liturgico per una comunità viva*, a cura di Iginio Rogger, Edizioni Dehoniane Bologna, 2002 Bologna, p. 11.

²³ Cf. Klemens Richter, *Op. cit.*, p. 12.

tempo rispetto alla durata, così è lo spazio rispetto all'estensione; per l'anima un luogo non è un punto qualsiasi dello spazio, ma è un *ubi consistam* nell'estensione del mondo, un posto che riconosce e vive.

Lo spazio sacro è una realtà che sta fra cielo e terra; vuole cioè significare il congiungimento della terra verso il cielo, nello sforzo umano di arrivare a Dio, e del cielo verso la terra, nella benevolenza divina che scende verso l'uomo. Tutto ciò che avviene nella liturgia avviene attraverso il mediatore tra Dio e l'uomo Gesù Cristo, e avviene in un incontro personale. Dio non è semplicemente davanti alla comunità che partecipa alla celebrazione, ma è presente in mezzo ad essa come titolare dell'agire liturgico. Lo spazio sacro acquisisce importanza da ciò che tra i fedeli si è svolto e si svolge, e in questo senso dovrebbe possedere qualità mistagogiche che facilitino i credenti a sperimentare la fede celebrata nella liturgia. Fin dall'antichità, il luogo nel quale si raduna la comunità ecclesiale era per l'ascolto della Parola di Dio, per la preghiera comunitaria, per ricevere i Sacramenti e celebrare l'Eucarestia.

Nel nostro caso, la Cappella si fonda sopra una rivelazione primordiale, che svelò l'archetipo dello spazio, ripetuto all'infinito per la costruzione di ciascun nuovo luogo sacro, e non per ultimo, poi è condensazione simbolica del cosmo, cioè, luogo d'incontro tra Dio e l'uomo, è centro del cosmo, dove tutta la realtà, umana e divina si concentrano nell'uno²⁴.

La Cappella de' Pazzi è uno spazio che deve venire plasmato in maniera primaria dell'agire liturgico e non soltanto *sfruttato* dal punto di vista turistico. I turisti che entrano in questo spazio sacro devono ricordarsi che ogni volta che si celebrava i sacri misteri Cristo era presente realmente nell'azione liturgica e nell'assemblea dei fedeli riuniti nel suo nome, nella persona del ministro, nella sua parola, in modo sostanziale e duraturo, sotto le specie eucaristiche.

Dobbiamo dire, a quanti entreranno nella Cappella, che la liturgia celebrata all'interno di essa è un'azione comunicativa nella quale si tratta da una parte della relazione tra Dio l'uomo e dall'altra tra uomo e uomo. Quanto è perfetto lo spazio sacro della Cappella tanto più la forma dà ordine alle diverse competenze, esprimendo una gerarchia nel senso della superiorità e dell'inferiorità o di una comunicazione tra uguali.

L'idea che Dio abita nell'edificio sacro e che si tratta di una casa di Dio è stata fino a tempi recentissimi fortemente contrassegnata dalla presenza del tabernacolo al centro dello spazio liturgico. È avvenuto in occidente lo sviluppo della fortissima pietà eucaristica ampiamente autonoma della celebrazione liturgica è un chiaro esempio di come un atteggiamento devozionale nuovo plasmi la forma dello spazio, e a sua volta questa forma

²⁴ Virginio Sanson, *L'Edificio sacro cristiano nella Bibbia*, in *Lo spazio Sacro* a cura di Virginio Sanson, Ed. Messaggero Padova, Padova 2002, p. 26.

aiuti la diffusione di una giusta esperienza dell'incontro con il sacro. E perciò, Egli abita nella sua comunità costruita come edificio vivente, avendo come pietra angolare Cristo nello Spirito Santo (Cfr. Ef 2, 20-22). Il popolo di Dio riunito per la celebrazione liturgica può essere definito come il vero e proprio tempio: «Non sapete che siete il tempio di Dio e che lo Spirito di Dio abita in voi? ... Santo è il tempio di Dio che siete voi (1Cor 3, 16s)». Nella prima lettera di san Petro si legge: «Anche voi venite impiegati come pietre vive per la costruzione di un edificio spirituale, per un sacerdozio santo ...» (1Pt 2, 5).

Klemens Richter nel suo libro *Spazio sacro e immagini di chiesa* scriveva riguardo al contenuto dell'edificio ecclesiale:

“Un edificio ecclesiale non può essere composto soltanto come casa di Dio. I pericoli che un certo dato spaziale comporta non possono essere sottovalutati: fin troppo facilmente ne consegue l’idea che nel luogo di culto Dio è a disposizione e può essere afferrato attraverso determinati riti. Dove l’edificio sacro promuove una tale idea si insinuerà una diversa concezione di fede, a differenza di dove questo spazio viene inteso prima di tutto come casa della comunità, dove Dio è presente non grazie al luogo, ma all’agire credente di questa comunità nel suo fare in *liturgia* e in *diaconia*”²⁵.

Se l'edificio realizzato da Brunelleschi serviva anche come Sala Capitolare (Fig. 4), a questo punto dobbiamo comprendere che importanza aveva lo spazio capitolare per la vita dei Frati Francescani Conventuali della Basilica Santa Croce a Firenze e qual era il senso della riunione capitolare per gli stessi frati.




Fig. 4

²⁵ Klemens Richter, *Op. cit.*, p. 38.

Tra le molteplici strutture che la vita religiosa comunitaria francescana ha creato e maturato per esprimere e per promuovere i valori spirituali del suo carisma, emerge con particolare rilievo quello che viene chiamato la riunione o l'assemblea della comunità e in termine proprio francescano «Capitolo». Proprio per questo nell'Ordine Francescano, fin dalle origini, ha denominato le sue assemblee con la terminologia «Capitoli», ma ha anche conferito ad esse particolari caratteristiche che sono conseguenti dal suo carisma di fraternità segnato nella forma di vita, nella denominazione stessa dell'Ordine espresso dai Capitoli a livello generale, provinciale e locale.

Nel momento in cui il primo sviluppo dei Francescani rese impossibile la frequenza iniziale degli incontri fraterni e suggerì l'opportunità di più precise norme organizzative, si avvertì subito l'esigenza di assemblee determinate a scadenze fisse e meglio articolate; l'incontro fraterno si trasformò in un vero e proprio Capitolo di Fraternità.

I frequenti Capitoli provvedevano a soddisfare il desiderio dell'incontro fraterno, comune a tutti i frati, e le esigenze fondamentali organizzative della fraternità.

Nel caso del Convento di Santa Croce, il Capitolo Conventuale veniva ad avvertire subito l'esigenza di un proprio ordinamento di vita comunitaria e conseguentemente di proprie strutture. Rispetto alla vita comunitaria benedettina, il Capitolo Francescano offriva modelli di esperienza religiosa del tutto spontanee. La legislazione dei Francescani codifica il Capitolo conventuale nelle Costituzioni del 1260 che probabilmente ripetono al riguardo le norme fisse nelle Costituzioni del 1239²⁶. Il Capitolo diventa una struttura della vita comunitaria non solo esistente ma anche praticamente articolata. La comunità Francescana di Santa Croce ha integrato il carisma della vita consacrata con un carisma di fraternità del tutto particolare, tale fraternità voleva e ricercava per se stessa come elemento fondamentale di guida e d'ispirazione e in base ad esso concepiva, organizzava e sviluppava tutta la vita dei membri, anche le riunioni comunitarie si dovevano rivelare come espressione diretta dello stesso carisma. Molto importante è capire che nel Capitolo si esprimeva in primo luogo il desiderio spontaneo che i frati sentivano e nutrivano di trovarsi insieme per sperimentare e comunicare vicendevolmente il senso intimo di una fraternità riunita nel nome del Signore.

L'aula capitolare di un convento rappresenta misticamente la sala del *cenacolo* nella casa dove erano riuniti gli Apostoli il giorno della Pentecoste, quando su di essi scese lo Spirito Santo (Cfr. *Att. Ap.* 1, 12). Nello stesso ambito ci ricordiamo delle parole: «Poiché dove sono due o tre persone radunate nel mio nome, io sono in mezzo a loro» (*Mt.* 18, 20).

²⁶ Cf. Ambrogio Sanna, *Capitoli in Dizionario Francescano*, Ed. Messaggero Padova, Padova 1984, pp. 138-140.

Partendo da questi concetti biblici ci rendiamo conto dell'importanza che i Capitoli hanno avuto sempre nella vita dell'Ordine Francescano e la necessità permanente di animarli con lo spirito originario, e inoltre l'importanza dei Capitoli stessi nella vita francescana.

Brunelleschi conosceva tutte queste realtà fondamentali per la vita francescana e in conformità a queste conoscenze, progettò la Cappella de' Pazzi, sia per la liturgia sia per il raduno in Capitolo dei Frati Francescani della Basilica di Santa Croce: "Costruì la cappella rispettando il suggerimento di una disposizione trasversale a lui offerto da tante sale capitolari"²⁷ della tradizione francescana.

Nelle aule capitolari di tradizione gotica, in vari casi, da un paio di sostegni intermedi si dispongono fasci di nervature acute a tramutare in cielistellati le volte, però nella Cappella de' Pazzi Brunelleschi preferisce esprimersi con archi a tutto sesto, con volte semicilindriche, con un'emergente cupola a coste e vele, il tutto unificato dal linguaggio espressivo dell'ordine; il tutto reso vivo dalla dicromia che distingue la bianca parete corrente dallo schema geometrico delle membrature architettoniche e delle dilatazioni trasversale, contro la frontale ostentazione della parete di fondo, la prevalente dall'alto e le finezze prospettiche²⁸.

3. Bellezza tra fascino e povertà: la geometria vivente

È doveroso fin dall'inizio porci una domanda che certifichi la validità del bello, in un abito di geometria vivente. Allora, come possiamo collocare il discorso della bellezza, come fascino e povertà, nell'ambito di un'architettura rinascimentale, viste le difficoltà politiche del committente e come possiamo articolare le caratteristiche della geometria vivente?

Prima di tutto dobbiamo dire che nell'architettura francescana della Cappella de' Pazzi il *fascino* e la *semplicità* esprimono la massima qualità. I concetti metafisici e realistici del titolo rivelano concretamente la bellezza che l'uomo cerca nell'intimo della sua esistenza. La bellezza, il fascino e la povertà suscitano nella persona umana sane aspirazioni per fare l'esperienza del sacro, dell'assoluto. Per questo, tutti quelli che credono in Gesù Cristo, sono detti pietre vive. La Scrittura afferma: «Voi pure siete pietre vive, edificate in tempio spirituale per un sacerdozio santo, per offrire vittime spirituali, gradite a Dio per mezzo di Gesù Cristo» (*1Pt 2, 5*).

Questa espressione biblica ci porta col pensiero all'esperienza fisica quando espressamente si tratta di pietre terrene, perché si ha cura di porre per prime – nelle fondamenta – le pietre più solide e resistenti, in modo da poter sovrapporre a queste, con sicurezza, il peso di tutto l'edificio: le pietre

²⁷ Giuseppe Zander, *Op. cit.*, p. 101.

²⁸ Cf. *Ibid.*

che seguono, un po' inferiori come qualità, vengono disposte vicino alle pietre che sono nelle fondamenta. Quelle che sono meno forti sono collocate di solito sopra alle pietre di fondazione e quelle sono di bassa qualità, sono disposte in alto, vicino al tetto. Veramente anche l'esempio delle pietre da costruzione, lo utilizziamo con le pietre vive, di cui alcune sono poste a fondamento di questo edificio spirituale²⁹. Origene si domandava: Chi sono dunque costoro che sono collocati nelle fondamenta? E la risposta viene dalla Sacra Scrittura: «Gli apostoli e i profeti». In modo eccezionale san Paolo afferma che noi siamo ... *edificati sopra il fondamento degli apostoli e dei profeti, essendo pietra angolare lo stesso Gesù Cristo Signore nostro*» (*Ef 2, 20*).

Per una preparazione giusta e in maniera più pronta all'edificazione di un edificio spirituale, per diventare una delle pietre scelte e più vicine alle fondamenta, dobbiamo essere a conoscenza che il fondamento dell'edificio qui presentato è Cristo stesso. Però si deve fare attenzione alle parole di san Paolo quando dice che: «Nessuno può porre altra base oltre quella che c'è già, che è Cristo Gesù» (*1 Cor 3,11*). Possiamo aggiungere che beati sono tutti quelli che hanno eretto edifici santi, belli e fascinanti sopra un così nobile *fondamento!*

Pensiamo veramente che fra le *pietre vive* ci sono tanti capaci e disposti a dedicarsi alla preghiera, a offrire a Dio implorazioni in modo continuo e a presentare le offerte delle suppliche che sono appunto quelli con cui Gesù edifica la Chiesa.

Ora dobbiamo anche considerare che la lode si attribuisce a queste pietre d'altare: “Edificò un luogo per presentare le offerte – leggiamo nella Sacra Scrittura – secondo la legge di Mosè; un altare fabbricato di pietre non levigate e non tocche dal ferro” (*Gs 8,31*). Ciascuno in coscienza è consapevole per sé stesso se è intatto, puro e senza macchia nella carne e nello spirito... Secondo il pensiero di Origene tutte le pietre integre e incontaminata possano essere i santi apostoli che formano tutti insieme un solo altare per l'unione dei loro cuori e delle loro anime³⁰. La Sacra Scrittura afferma proprio che *tutti perseveravano concordi nella preghiera* (*At 1,14*) e poi in seguito: *Tu, Signore, che conosci i cuori di tutti* (*At 1,24*).

Tutti quelli dunque che sono stati in grado di pregare unanimi a una sola voce e con un solo spirito, sono stati degni di essere scelti a costruire tutti insieme un solo luogo per presentare le offerte, luogo nel quale Gesù offre un sacrificio al Padre.

Tutte le membra della Chiesa devono sforzarsi di esprimere e di sentire allo stesso modo: non serve mai operando per spirito di rivalità o per vanagloria, ma restando saldi in un solo spirito e concordi negli stessi sentimenti (cfr. *1Cor 1,10*; *Fil 2,3*), per sperimentare ognuno la realtà delle

²⁹ Cf. Origene, *Omelia sul Lerritico* 9, 1, Ed. M. Borret, SC 287, Paris 1981, pp. 72-74.

³⁰ Cf. Ibid., pp. 72-74.

pietre vive e adatte alla costruzione dell'edificio sacro. In questo consiste dunque la natura architettonica sacra, che poi diventa edificatoria, costruttiva, e in fine diviene edificante, anche in senso morale. Allora in questa prospettiva, la persona umana viene impiegata come pietra viva per la costruzione di un edificio spirituale, luogo di culto.

La bellezza, la semplicità e il fascino dell'edificazione di uno spazio sacro che nel nostro caso è la Cappella de' Pazzi, trova i fondamenti proprio nei principi detti poco prima. In quest'ottica si può aggiungere che la Cappella de' Pazzi è luogo sacro, luogo che prende significato e forma dalle pietre spirituali e vive impiegate secondo un disegno non sempre comprensibile dal punto di vista umano³¹.

L'edificio sacro costruito con pietre rappresenta la Chiesa delle anime, il corpo mistico: le pietre dell'edificio rimandano, allegoricamente, alle *pietre vive* che sono i fedeli, e il tempio costruito da mani d'uomo evoca la Gerusalemme celeste.

A questo proposito San Bonaventura scriveva:

“Tutte le cose e ciascuna delle loro proprietà mostrano la Saggezza divina, e colui che conosce tutte le proprietà degli esseri vedrà chiaramente questa Saggezza. Tutte le creature del mondo sensibile ci conducano a Dio: perché sono le ombre, le descrizioni, le vestigia, le immagini, le rappresentazioni del Primo, del Saggissimo, dell'eccellente Principio di tutte le cose; esse sono le immagini della Fonte, della Luce; della Pienezza eterna, del sovrano Archetipo: sono dei segni che ci sono stati lasciati dal Signore stesso”³².

Da quanto detto il luogo sacro ha origini celesti perché è costruito conformemente ad un archetipo celeste comunicato agli uomini attraverso l'intermediazione di un *profeta*, e questo è ciò che fonda la legittima tradizione architettonica. La Sacra Scrittura dice: «Li ha riempiti di sapienza, d'intelligenza, di scienza di ogni sorta di opere, per inventare tutto quello che si può fare» (Es 35, 31-32) e ancora «Essi mi faranno un santuario e io abiterò in mezzo a loro. Essi lo faranno conformemente a ciò che mostrerò, secondo il modello del tabernacolo, e secondo il modello di tutti gli arredi...» (Es 25, 8-9).

Tali edifici costruiti secondo l'intelligente volontà del Creatore, sono per l'uso di una comunità; si trova il concetto di *domus ecclesiae*, casa dell'assemblea comunitaria e serve per tre compiti fondamentali della vita cristiana: la dimensione liturgica, dell'annuncio e della diaconia³³.

³¹ Cf. Pietro Nonis, *L'adesione a un progetto di fede*, in *Lo spazio sacro* a cura di Virginio Sanson, Ed Messaggero, Padova 2002, p. 19.

³² Jean Hani, *Op. cit.*, p. 20.

³³ Klemens Richter, *Op. cit.*, p. 47.

Se originariamente si sviluppava un certo discorso per trovare uno spazio adatto per la riunione comunitaria al cospetto di Dio che permetesse ciò che la celebrazione liturgica richiedeva, nel periodo di Brunelleschi s'incontrano significati simbolici della forma dello spazio che via via da ancora di più importanza e senso a quello che si celebra.

Nei nostri giorni questo senso viene capito più che mai, anzi viene espresso proprio in questi termini:

“Fra le più nobili attività dell’ingegno umano sono annoverate, a pieno diritto, le belle arti, soprattutto l’arte religiosa e il suo vertice, l’arte sacra. Esse, per loro natura, hanno relazione con l’infinita bellezza divina che deve essere in qualche modo espressa dalle opere dell’uomo, e sono tanto più orientate a Dio e all’incremento della sua lode e della sua gloria, in quanto nessun altro fine è stato loro assegnato se non quello di contribuire il più efficacemente possibile, con le loro opere, a indirizzare religiosamente le menti degli uomini a Dio” (*SC* 122).

E ancora la bellezza dell’opera che nasce dalla meditazione, dalla verità di una religione positiva e storica, ma con tali *dati anche oggettivi* può facilmente essere capita da chi conosce quella religione e ciò anche se domina un’interpretazione personale. Sotto questo titolo si possono mettere molte opere d’arte che sono nel servizio liturgico.

Joseph Ratzinger, parlando della concezione della Bellezza e del fascino dell’arte sacra nell’ambito dello spazio sacro, faceva queste considerazioni:

“Nell’arte sacra non c’è spazio per l’arbitrarietà pura. Le forme artistiche che negano la presenza del Logos nella realtà e fissano l’attenzione dell’uomo sull’apparenza sensibile, non sono conciliabili con il senso dell’immagine nella Chiesa. Dalla soggettività isolata non può venire alcuna arte sacra.... La libertà dell’arte, che deve esserci anche nell’ambito dell’imitatio dell’arte sacra, non coincide con l’arbitrarietà.... Senza fede non c’è arte adeguata alla liturgia”³⁴.

Detto ciò, la bellezza dell’arte svolge principalmente una funzione di culto. Il fascino dell’arte nasce, in modo particolare, solo quando è posta a servizio del culto divino. La chiesa ritiene che l’arte non è un elemento solamente d’ideazione estetica alla Liturgia e neppure è puramente decorativo; essa è parte integrante del culto, come mette in rilievo Benedetto XVI nella sua Esortazione Apostolica Post-Sinodale *Sacramentum Caritatis*:

“Il rapporto tra mistero creduto e celebrato si manifesta in modo peculiare nel valore teologico e liturgico della bellezza. La liturgia, infatti, come del resto la Rivelazione cristiana, ha un intrinseco legame con la bellezza: è *veritatis splendor*.

³⁴ Joseph Ratzinger, *Introduzione allo spirito della liturgia* trad. G. Reguzzoni, Cinisello Balsamo (Milano): Edizioni San Paolo, 2001, p. 130.

Nella liturgia rifulge il Mistero pasquale mediante il quale Cristo stesso ci attrae a sé e ci chiama alla comunione. In Gesù, come soleva dire san Bonaventura, contempliamo la bellezza e il fulgore delle origini. Tale attributo cui facciamo riferimento non è mero estetismo, ma modalità con cui la verità dell'amore di Dio in Cristo ci raggiunge, ci affascina e ci rapisce, facendoci uscire da noi stessi e attraendoci così verso la nostra vera vocazione: l'amore”³⁵.

La bellezza che si deve scoprire e soprattutto che deve apparire in un'opera d'arte è la visibilità del mistero, perché anche la liturgia è in sé un'opera, generatrice d'arte. Confermiamo ancora una volta che l'origine della bellezza dell'arte viene inequivocabilmente proposta come tale in funzione del culto divino.

Se la bellezza e il fascino stanno all'origine dell'arte sacra che è al servizio della divina liturgia, allora per fortificare il concetto appena espresso si deve aggiungere che «è giunto il momento, ed è giunto, in cui i veri adoratori adoreranno il Padre in spirito e verità; perché il Padre cerca tali adoratori» (*Gv* 4, 23). Ponendo l'accento sul discorso di Gesù, la bellezza incontrata nel culto cristiano si distingue nella *verità*, perché non è compromessa dagli errori d'idolatria e di sincretismo. Perciò la fede non deriva dalla bellezza, dal fascino, e neanche dalla liturgia, ma dal mistero celebrato con fede, com'è annunciato anche dai vangeli. La semplicità dell'arte, il fascino nel culto cristiano è espressione e testimonianza della fede infaticabile della Chiesa e dovrebbe aiutare a comprendere il senso sincero e maturo dei nostri desideri e delle nostre aspirazioni verso tutto quello che è buono, che è vero, che è bello e che nello stesso tempo è radicato ed esaudito nella realtà trascendente di Dio.

Ribadendo il discorso della bellezza tra fascino e povertà nell'ambito della geometria vivente, dobbiamo riportare brevemente qualche considerazione teologica e antropologica per rendere più chiara la concretezza dell'argomento.

La Chiesa è il corpo mistico di Cristo. Le chiese dove si celebra il sacro mistero sono l'immagine della Gerusalemme celeste. San Tommaso d'Aquino punta sul fatto che gli uomini devono rendere onore a Dio non sono in spirito. Quindi, come gli uomini sono creature corporee, i sensi sono continuamente coinvolti, perché, per esempio, la mente umana conosce l'invisibile per mezzo del visibile. San Tommaso d'Aquino dice: “nel culto divino è necessario usare le cose corporee, che la mente dell'uomo viene mossa dai segni a compiere quegli atti spirituali per mezzo dei quali si compie l'unione con Dio”³⁶.

³⁵ Benedetto XVI, *Esortazione Apostolica Post-Sinodale Sacramentum Caritatis*, 22 Febbraio 2007, p. 35.

³⁶ Tommaso D'Aquino, SS. Th. II-II, q. 81, a. 7.

Gli uomini sono fatti di anima e corpo, e quindi, per questo motivo hanno bisogno di segni sensibili per purificare il cuore e nutrire il desiderio di unione con Dio invisibile. San Tommaso d'Aquino ricorda ancora che la bellezza, la semplicità del fascino e “le cose esterne sono offerte a Dio, non come se avesse bisogno di esse ... ma come segni delle opere interne e spirituali, che sono accettabile a Dio”³⁷.

Per completare teoricamente il quadro della geometria vivente che serve per le celebrazioni del sacro mistero, aggiungeremo due citazioni del Concilio di Trento, risalenti proprio a pochi anni dal termine dei lavori concernenti la Cappella de' Pazzi. Il primo testo si presenta così:

“Cristo è Signore nostro ... nell'ultima Cena, la notte in cui fu tradito (1Cor 11, 23) volle lasciare alla Chiesa, un'amata Sposa, un sacrificio visibile, con cui venisse significato quello cruento che avrebbe offerto una volta per tutte sulla croce, prolungandone la memoria fino alla fine del mondo, applicando la sua efficacia salvifica alla remissione dei nostri peccati quotidiani”³⁸.

Il secondo testo del Concilio di Trento tratta le seguenti questioni:

“E perché la natura umana è tale, che non facilmente viene tratta alla meditazione delle cose divine senza accorgimenti esteriori, per questa ragione la Chiesa, pia madre, ha stabilito alcuni riti ... Ha stabilito, similmente, delle ceremonie, come le benedizioni mistiche; usa i lumi, gli incensi, le vesti e molto altri elementi trasmessi dall'insegnamento e dalla tradizione apostolica, con cui viene messa in evidenza la maestà di un sacrificio così grande, e le menti dei fedeli vengono attratte da questi segni visibili della religione e della pietà, alla contemplazione delle altissime cose, che sono nascoste in questo sacrificio”³⁹.

Considerato tutto questo, nel nostro caso l'architettura e il decoro della Cappella de' Pazzi non è un lusso, perché è stata rapportata sempre alla bellezza e alla semplicità essenziale.

Riguardo a questo tema, il Card. Mauro Piacenza esprime in una delle sue conferenze “Maestà e bellezza nel Suo santuario: L'arte a servizio della liturgia”, un'osservazione fondamentale per capire il senso e il rapporto tra bellezza, fascino e le dimensione della povertà serafica.

“Che sia un falso problema contrapporre il valore dello spirito di povertà alla preziosità degli arredi lo mostra, tra gli altri, San Francesco, il “poverello” di Assisi, che sempre raccomandò ai suoi frati il massimo rispetto della parola e del corpo del Signore, da esprimersi anche con l'utilizzo di vasi preziosi”⁴⁰.

³⁷ Tommaso D'Aquino, S.Th. II-II, q. 81, a. 7, ad 2.

³⁸ Concilio di Trento, Sessione XXII (1562), DS 1740; citato in *Catechismo della Chiesa Cattolica*, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Roma 1992, nr. 1366.

³⁹ Concilio di Trento, Sessione XXII (1562), DS 1746.

⁴⁰ Mauro Piacenza, *Maestà e bellezza nel Suo santuario: L'arte a servizio della liturgia* in <http://www.internetica.it/neocatumenali/ArteLiturgia-Piacenza.htm> (28.09.2014, ora 10,28).

Infatti, San Francesco sosteneva nel suo Testamento (1226): “E questi santissimi misteri sopra ogni cosa voglio che siano onorati, venerati e collocati in luoghi preziosi. E dovunque troverò i nomi santissimi e le sue parole scritte in luoghi indecenti, voglio raccoglierle, e prego che siano raccolte e collocate in luogo decoroso”⁴¹.

Lo stesso Card. Mauro Piacenza, riporta un riferimento della biografia su San Francesco che potrebbe fare più luce nell’ambito dello spazio liturgico, della bellezza e povertà serafica, tenendo conto che la Cappella de' Pazzi si trova in un convento francescano: “essendo colmo di reverenza per questo venerando sacramento [...] volle mandare i frati per il mondo con pissidi preziose, perché riponessero in luogo il più degno possibile il prezzo della redenzione, ovunque lo vedessero conservato con poco decoro”⁴².

Tenendosi conto che lo spazio sacro, realizzato da Brunelleschi si trova in un convento francescano, si parte subito con la certezza che quello che conta di più è lo spirito interiore con cui si usano le cose preziose e si deve capire che il decoro dev'essere un atteggiamento interiore e l'arte sacra rientra a pieno titolo in esso, perché attraverso la bellezza e il fascino si esprime la percezione della bellezza di Dio e nello stesso tempo è al servizio di quello che si celebra, e in più, il decoro sacro è concepito per facilitare la preghiera e lo stupore per il mistero contenuto, perciò dalla stessa fonte è nata la liturgia a cui i cristiani sono partecipi, e che scaturisce dal convito e, quindi, da un clima di festa e di meraviglia.

Arrivati alla conclusione, presenteremo una breve considerazione filosofico-spirituale che riguarda la concretezza e bellezza del simbolismo e decorazione all'interno della Cappella de' Pazzi.

Il discorso filosofico-spirituale deve rimanere nella prospettiva neotestamentaria nella misura in cui il messaggio spirituale non è solamente verbale perché «il Verbo si è fatto carne» (*Gv* 1, 14). L'intera Sacra Scrittura preannuncia che è «immagine del Dio invisibile» (*Col* 1, 15) «irradiazione della ... gloria [del Padre] e impronta della sua sostanza» (*Eb* 1,3). Nell'Incarnazione di Gesù, tutto quello che di Dio era invisibile si è fatto *visibile* agli occhi di quanti credono e crederanno in Lui, e possiamo affermare che è come risposta alle esigenze della natura umana. Joseph Ratzinger ha assolutamente compreso quanto espresso prima con queste parole: “Per accostarsi al mistero di Dio l'uomo ha bisogno di vedere, di fermarsi a vedere, e di fare sì che tale vedere divenga un toccare; Egli deve salire la *scala* del corpo, per trovare su di essa la strada alla quale la fede lo invita”⁴³.

⁴¹ *Fonti Francescane*, pp. 131-132.

⁴² Tommaso da Celano, *Vita seconda*, in *Fonti Francescane*, p. 713.

⁴³ Joseph Ratzinger, *Il Mistero pasquale. Contenuto e fondamento profondo della devozione al Sacro Cuore di Gesù*, in Id., *Guardare al Crocifisso. Fondazione teologica di una cristologia spirituale*, Milano 1992, pp. 43-61, part. p. 49 (Conferenza al Congresso sul Sacro Cuore di Gesù, Toulouse, 24-28 luglio 1981).

Florin CRÎŞMĂREANU *

Gottlob Frege et la distinction entre *conceptus formalis* et *conceptus obiectivus*

Résumé: L'intention qui nous a animé dans la rédaction de la présente étude se réduit à argumenter la thèse suivante: la sémantique de Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) apparaît comme très proche par rapport à celle des scolastiques, ce qui signifie que la distinction frégéenne entre *sens* (Sinn) et *dénotation* (Bedeutung)¹ n'est rien d'autre qu'un «prolongement» de la distinction scolaire entre *concept formel* et *concept objectif*.

Dans une première étape de notre essai nous allons présenter la conception du logicien allemand sur *le sens* et *la dénotation* (référence); de deuxièmement, nous allons résumer ce que les scolastiques comprenaient par la distinction: *concept formel* – *concept objectuel*. Dans la troisième section de la section, en guise de conclusion, nous allons essayer de mettre en évidence tant les similitudes que les différences qui existent entre la conception de G. Frege et celle de certains scolastiques.

Mots-clés: G. Frege, Sémantique, Sens, Dénotation, Scolastique, *Conceptus Formalis*, *Conceptus Obiectivus*.

I. En 1892, G. Frege publie l'article «Über Sinn und Bedeutung»² qui, dans l'opinion des spécialistes, représente une contribution majeure à l'élaboration de la sémantique logique. À ce propos, notre intérêt porte exclusivement sur ce que G. Frege comprend, premièrement, par la dénotation et le sens d'un nom propre; et, deuxièmement, par la dénotation et le sens d'un énoncé complexe.

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¹ Selon certains exégètes, la traduction en roumain du terme allemand *Bedeutung* par *signification* conduit à une situation tautologique: *les énoncés ont une signification parce qu'ils... signifient*. C'est pourquoi on préfère le terme *dénotation*, qui représente une propriété sémantique, parmi d'autres, qui détermine la signification d'une expression. Le traducteur Claude Imbert choisit d'équivaloir en français le terme *Bedeutung* par dénotation (*vide infra*).

² Cf. Gottlob Frege, «Über Sinn und Bedeutung», dans *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*, 100 (1892), pp. 22-50 (trad. fr. par Claude Imbert: «Sens et dénotation», dans *Ecrits logiques et philosophiques*, Paris, Seuil, 1971, pp. 102-126; trad. roum.: «Sens și semnificație», dans M. Tîrnoveanu et Gh. Enescu (coord.), *Logica și filosofie. Orientări în logica modernă și fundamentele matematicii*, București, Editura Politică, 1966, pp. 54-79). À ce point, une mention s'impose: antérieurement à la rédaction de l'article «Über Sinn und Bedeutung», les écrits de G. Frege n'attestent que la distinction entre *signe* (Zeichen) et *contenu* (Inhalt).

Dans l'article cité, le logicien allemand associe à un *signe* (nom, mot composé, signe écrit) non seulement un désigné qu'il appelle sa *dénotation*, mais aussi bien ce qu'il comprend par *le sens* du signe, à savoir la manière dont l'objet est donné. Par *signe* (nom), G. Frege comprend un désignant quelconque remplaçant un nom propre qui a la dénotation d'un objet déterminé. Pour être plus précis, il va appeler tout pareil désignant un *nom propre*. Entre le signe, son sens et sa dénotation une telle *liaison* s'institue qu'au signe il correspond un sens déterminé et à ce dernier, à son tour, une dénotation déterminée, tandis qu'à une dénotation (à un objet) il correspond plus qu'un signe. Tandis que la relation de signification entre le nom et l'objet est *d'extériorité*, la relation d'expression entre le nom et le sens est *d'inhérence*.

La dénotation d'un nom propre consiste donc en *l'objet* auquel il se réfère, ou que le nom désigne – appelé également *le référent* du nom.

Ce que G. Frege comprend par *le sens* d'un nom propre est quand même moins précis. Conformément au texte frégéen, celui-ci peut être défini comme *ce que exprime* un nom (propre) et qui inclut *une manière d'être donnée du désigné* (*die Art des Gegebenseins des Bezeichneten*). Puisque de nature non-linguistique, le sens revêt la couverture matérielle du langage. Et vu que le sens contient une manière donnée d'être de l'objet désigné, il n'est que naturel que par rapport au même objet il y ait plusieurs sens (et autant de noms), c'est-à-dire plusieurs perspectives dont on peut envisager la dénotation³.

Donc, en plus de la dénotation, le sens d'une expression (dans ce cas, le nom propre) est déterminé également par une autre propriété sémantique, que G. Frege appelle *sinn* (sens). Ce qui signifie qu'un nom a un *référent* (l'objet qu'il désigne), mais aussi bien un *sens*, qui est la propriété déterminant le référent.

Le sens en tant que manière de présenter la dénotation a un caractère objectif, il n'étant pas une *représentation* (*Vorstellung*) d'une conscience individuelle. Dans ce sens, G. Frege affirme: «Si la dénotation d'un objet est

³ Le sens, affirme G. Frege, éclairent partiellement la dénotation. Nous reprenons ici les exemples qu'il donne: la dénotation des mots composés «Étoile du soir» et «Étoile du matin» est la même (la planète Vénus), mais le sens est différent. Il en est de même pour un nom propre en tant que tel, comme par exemple «Aristote», où les opinions à propos du sens peuvent ne pas coïncider. On peut accepter comme sens: le disciple de Platon et le maître d'Alexandre le Grand. Aussi longtemps que la dénotation reste la même, les oscillations du sens sont admissibles; bien que le sens n'offre pas nulle connaissance proprement-dite sur la dénotation, ni la certitude de son existence, il est suffisant pour préciser l'identité de la dénotation. Voir aussi l'analyse dressée par Călin Candiescu, «Predicăție și cunoaștere la Gottlob Frege (kantianism și platonism)», dans *Revista de filosofie*, 12 (1973), pp. 1521-1535.

un objet qu'on peut percevoir par les sens, alors ma représentation de lui est une image intérieure»⁴.

G. Frege ne se contente pas d'analyser le sens et la dénotation des expressions, des mots et des signes qu'il a appelés des noms propres, mais il s'intéresse également au sens et à la dénotation d'une proposition assertorique considérée dans son ensemble. Dans son ensemble, une proposition *exprime quelque chose*, et c'est pourquoi il faut faire la différence entre *expression propositionnelle* et *contenu propositionnel*, et si l'on tient compte du fait que la proposition a une valeur de vérité, l'on peut distinguer entre sa dénotation (le vrai ou le faux) et son sens qui est *une pensée* (*Gedanke*)⁵. Ce qui signifie que le sens d'un énoncé, c'est le contenu de la pensée que l'énoncé formule. Conformément à la théorie de G. Frege, les valeurs de vérité sont des objets (abstraits), et les propositions sont des noms propres de ceux-ci, de sorte que les pensées exprimées sont autant de manières données d'être du vrai ou du faux⁶; c'est-à-dire, la pensée est la condition de vérité d'un énoncé.

La dénotation d'un énoncé sera donc, justement, l'une des valeurs de vérité (rai ou faux), parce qu'un énoncé composé dépend, du point de vue de la valeur de vérité, du vrai ou du faux des expressions composantes⁷. Selon la même structure, le sens d'une expression composée est déterminé par les sens des expressions qui la composent.

⁴ Selon G. Frege, la dénotation d'un nom propre est l'objet même que nous désignons par son intermédiaire; la représentation que nous avons sur la dénotation est absolument subjective; c'est à mi-chemin entre elles (dénotation – représentation) que se trouve le sens. Celui-ci, il est vrai, n'est pas subjectif comme la représentation, mais il n'est non plus l'objet lui-même.

⁵ Par *pensée*, G. Frege ne comprend pas l'activité subjective de la pensée, mais son contenu objectif, qui peut être une propriété commune à plusieurs individus. Contrairement à ses précurseurs, qu'ils soient scolastiques ou modernes (John Locke), G. Frege affirme que le sens doit être conçu comme étant objectif et non-psychologique. Contre cette objectivité du sens, désirée par Frege, on peut formuler deux objections: 1. si le sens est donné par une description associée – dans le cas des noms propres, – alors on ne peut pas connaître toutes les descriptions possibles ; 2. la notion de sens proposée par G. Frege n'arrive pas à éviter le scepticisme dérivant de notre incapacité de connaître les états mentaux des autres.

⁶ Selon l'opinion de Călin Candiescu, *Gottlob Frege și filosofia analitică a limbajului* (thèse de doctorat), București, 1980, la terminologie de G. Frege est déficiente pour avoir confondu la propriété d'être vraie ou fausse avec sa valeur de vérité, et la bizarrerie de sa thèse consiste également en cela que les propositions ne désignent ni peuvent désigner leurs propriétés (comme quelque chose d'extérieur). La propriété d'être vraie ou fausse est une métapropriété sémantique (A. Tarski) et elle exprime le fait qu'une pensée propositionnelle détermine une chose vraie ou fausse.

⁷ G. Frege a conçu toute une théorie de la signification selon le modèle de la relation de référence: «tout énoncé assertorique [...] doit être considéré comme un nom propre, et sa dénotation, s'il en a une, est soit le Vrai, soit le Faux».

En guise de conclusion, très générale, de la conception de G. Frege on pourrait dire que jamais nous ne pouvons nous intéresser seulement à *la dénotation* d'une proposition (identifier la signification avec la dénotation seule conduirait à l'impossibilité d'expliquer des situations souvent rencontrées dans le langage commun: par exemple, les noms sans référent) ou seulement *au sens* (la pensée) seul, qui isolément ne serait pas connaissance, mais tous les deux (le sens et sa dénotation), considérés ensemble, comme acte unique, constituerait la connaissance⁸. On rencontre, sans doute, dans des situations fréquentes dans le langage commun, des noms sans référent (par exemple, l'unicorn), qui n'ont pas de valeur de vérité mais qui possèdent un sens. Chose possible dans la mesure où l'on peut lui associer une condition descriptive *qui pourrait* être remplie de façon unique par un *objet*, sans être remplie par *le fait*. Cet aspect nuance les implications du «couple» sens-dénotation vu comme acte unique, que, pour des raisons d'économie du texte, nous n'allons plus développer ici.

II. La distinction scolaire entre *le concept formel* et *le concept objectuel*⁹ a été imposée par le dominicain Jean Capréolus (1380-1444)¹⁰, afin de contrecarrer l'univocité scotiste, qui affirmait qu'à l'univocité du concept d'être il

⁸ On peut entrevoir ici une autre distinction réalisée par G. Frege, à savoir celle entre *pensée* et *Jugement*. Ce dernier peut être vu comme «ce qui évolue» (*fortsebreiten*) de la pensée à la valeur de vérité.

⁹ Le syntagme *conceptu objectali* a été traduit du latin par des exégètes par *concept objectif* (Ion Tănasescu (coord.), *Conceptul de intenționalitate la Breatano: origini și interpretări*, București, Paideia, 2002). Nous considérons quand même la traduction du syntagme *objectali* par *concept objectuel* (bien que ce soit une malheureuse expression) plus proche du sens scolaire. Les scolastiques utilisaient souvent l'expression «objectuel» (qu'on peut aussi bien voir comme un prolongement du *lekton* stoïcien) en tant que synonyme du mot «intentio». La première utilisation attestée par des documents du terme *obiective* est à trouver chez Henri de Gand, qui rapporte le concept au statut de la chose connue (*res cognita ut obiective existens in cognoscente*). Cette tradition est continuée par Petrus Aureolus, Durand de Saint-Porçain, Duns Scotus, F. Suárez, et dans la modernité on la rencontre chez R. Descartes et Franz Brentano. Le syntagme *concept objectuel* apparaît déjà chez Petrus Aureolus, *Scriptum*, d. 2, sect. 9, C, no. 48, p. 483: le concept «potest accipi vel pro actu intellectus realiter intellectui inhaerente, vel pro *conceptu objectali*». Chez lui, pourtant, le concept formel est un acte, et non, comme chez Capréolus, une forme représentative (Serge-Thomas Bonino, «Conceptul de ființă și cunoașterea lui Dumnezeu la Capréolus», dans Bogdan Tătaru-Cazaban (coord.), *Pluralitatea metafizicii medievale. Istorie și structuri*, Iași, Polirom, 2005, pp. 267-300, surtout pp. 276-278). Pour tous les scolastiques, même pour ceux ayant repris la terminologie scolaire, et un exemple en est F. Brentano, l'expression *obiective* ne doit pas être comprise dans l'acception moderne du terme, et c'est pour cela que nous avons évité de la traduire par «objectifs».

¹⁰ Cf. Jean Capréolus, *Defensiones theologicae divi Thomae Aquinatis*, C. Paban et T. Pegues (éds.), Tours, 1900- 1908, *Def.* I, dist. VIII, qu. 2, a. 2 B (t.1, 362 a).

correspond l'unité d'une entité réelle, commune aux étants¹¹. Avant d'expliquer ce qu'il comprend par *concept formel* et *concept objectuel*, Capréolus définit ce qu'il comprend par *concept* ou *ratio* ou *intentio*, des termes apparaissant dans ses ouvrages comme synonymes. À cet effet, il cite deux textes de Saint Thomas – *Contra Gentiles* I, c. 53, et *In Sent.* I, d. 2, q. 1, a. 3 – d'où il résulte qu'on comprend par concept la forme intelligible que l'intellect, actualisé et informé par la forme présentative (*species*)¹² de l'objet, conçoit en lui-même.

Pour Capréolus, « le *concept formel* est une réalité noétique intramentale, une forme produite par l'intellect dans l'acte de l'intellection. Du point de vue subjectif, le concept formel est un accident, une forme – qualité subjectivée dans l'intellect. Du point de vue objectif, il représente et il exprime de manière intelligible l'objet connu. Le terme – trop polyvalent – *ratio* peut exprimer ce dernier aspect du concept formel. Quant au *concept objectuel* – expression évidemment mal choisie, parce que vu que ce concept n'a rien d'un concept au sens habituel du terme –, il n'est autre que l'intelligible situé devant l'intellect qui forme le concept (formel). Par exemple, la nature humaine est le concept objectuel de l'intellection par laquelle on comprend l'homme en tant que tel. Dans cette perspective, il est le fondement de la vérité du concept formel»¹³.

Par la critique qu'il adresse au scotisme, Capréolus veut mettre en relief le fait que le problème de l'unité d'un concept – celui d'être en l'occurrence – exige une réponse différente selon qu'il s'agisse du *concept formel* (dans sa dimension objective, bien sûr) ou du *concept objectuel*. Par cette distinction fondamentale, qui interdit de traiter la question de l'unité de l'être au plan

¹¹ M. Forlivesi considère que «cette distinction revêt, dans l'histoire de la philosophie, un rôle décisif; elle constitue en particulier le nœud de la transition et de la continuité entre scolastique et philosophie moderne» (Marco Forlivesi, «La Distinction entre concept formel et concept objectif. Suárez, Pasqualigo, Mastri», dans *Les études philosophiques*, 60 (2002), pp. 3-30).

¹² L'*espèce* joue un rôle majeur dans la noétique scolaire. Elle n'est pas *ce qui est* (de façon directe) connu, mais ce quelque chose-là *par l'intermédiaire* duquel l'objet extra-mental est connu. L'*espèce* représente « le véhicule » qui transporte la référence vers l'objet extra-mental. Thomas d'Aquin l'appelle, dans *De Veritate*, IV, 1, *verbum interius*, à savoir ce que l'objet extérieur forme à l'intérieur. Pour les scolastiques, l'*espèce* est considérée comme une représentation de l'objet qui implique une référence à un objet. La dimension de l'intentionnalité est-elle ici bien évidente, car représenter signifie toujours représenter quelque chose. Une représentation est sans faute une représentation d'un objet par un sujet (Ausonio Marras, «Originile scolastice ale concepției lui Brentano despre intenționalitate», dans I. Tănăsescu (coord.), op. cit., pp. 121-142). Il n'est pas impropre d'assimiler l'*espèce* des scolastiques, qui, en définitive, n'est rien d'autre que *l'intermédiaire* entre l'objet et le sujet, c'est-à-dire le *concept formel*, à la *noemata* de E. Husserl (qui, dans *Ideen*, introduit le terme *noématicque* pour *intentionnel* et le terme *noétique* pour *reell*), et, par extension analogique, avec le terme *sinn* proposé par G. Frege. Nous allons quand même voir ci-dessus dans quelle manière G. Frege s'éloigne-t-il de cette dimension représentationnelle de l'*espèce*.

¹³ Cf. Jean Capréolus, op. cit., 375a; voir aussi S.-T. Bonino, art. cit., p. 277.

noétique, Capréolus «transfère la discussion dans le domaine métaphysique propre à Saint-Thomas»¹⁴.

La même terminologie (et les exemples même) de Jean Capréolus sont à retrouver également dans les *Disputationes Metaphysicae* de Francisco Suárez (1548-1617)¹⁵. À la fin du XVI^e siècle, F. Suárez présente la distinction entre *concept formel* et *concept objectif* comme une *vulgaris distinctio*¹⁶. Tout comme Capréolus, le jésuite rejette, à une première étape, l'univocité scotiste, en faisant recours à la même distinction entre *le concept formel* et *le concept objectuel*. Pour lui, *le concept formel* c'est l'acte de l'intellect par lequel celui-ci arrive à connaître une chose ou une *ratio commune*; *le concept objectuel* est la chose ou *ratio commune*, qui est perçu de manière (in)directe par l'intermédiaire du concept formel¹⁷. F. Suárez est tellement «scolastique» qu'il reprend même l'exemple donné par Capréolus: *le concept d'homme* (*D.M.*, II, §1). L'acte de représentation de l'homme par notre intellect, s'identifie au concept formel, alors que l'homme connu et conçu au moyen de cet acte a pour corrélat le concept objectif¹⁸.

F. Suárez introduit, pour la première fois dans *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, la notion *conceptus objectivus entis* lorsqu'il analyse une thèse attribuée, prudemment, à Buridan, qui considérait *la substance* comme l'objet adéquat et propre de la métaphysique (*D.M.*, I, § 21: «*sexta opinio, quae Buridani esse dicitur, est objectum adaequatum hujus scientiae esse substantiam*»). Dans la conception de F. Suárez, l'objet adéquat de la métaphysique est *ens inquantum ens reale*, qui ne s'identifie ni à l'être au sens abstrait, ni à l'étant dans son ensemble, mais au: *concept objectuel de l'étant*, l'élément le plus général qui peut être pensé comme étant dans les choses, à savoir, selon une formule bien connue dans *Schulmetaphysik*: *l'objectivité des choses* (*D.M.*, I, 1, § 26; I, 5, §15).

¹⁴ Cf. Bernard Montagnes, *La doctrine de l'analogie de l'être d'après Saint Thomas d'Aquin*, Louvain-Paris, Nauwelaerts, 1963, p. 125.

¹⁵ Cf. M. Forlivesi, art. cit., et en particulier la section de l'article: «*La pensée de Francisco Suárez: un aperçu*».

¹⁶ Cf. F. Suárez, *Disputationes Metaphysicae* (*D.M.*), II, sec. 1, § 1: «*Supponenda imprimis est vulgaris distinctio conceptus formalis et obiectivi*».

¹⁷ Cf. *Ibid.*, II, § 1; voir aussi J.-P. Coujou, *Suárez et la refondation de la métaphysique comme ontologie*. Étude et traduction de l'*Index détaillé de la Métaphysique d'Aristote* de F. Suárez, Louvain-Paris, Éditions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1999, pp. 14-15.

¹⁸ En fait, l'origine éloignée de la distinction entre *le concept formel* et *le concept objectuel* des concepts (F. Suárez) ou des idées (R. Descartes), se trouve dans la théorie averroïste des deux sujets de *intentio intellecta*, un qui la rend «chose mondaine/de ce monde» ou «existant véritable», l'autre qui en fait un être «véritable». Chez F. Suárez, le concept formel c'est l'acte d'intellection, le concept objectuel, l'objet connu et représenté par cet acte (Alain de Libera, *Cerata universalior*, trad. roum. par Ilie Gyurcsik et Margareta Gyurcsik, Timișoara, Amarcord, 1998, pp. 214-215).

Pour la plupart des exégètes de la période scolaire, le *concept objectuel* n'est pas pour F. Suárez, comme ne l'est non plus pour les autres scolastiques, *esse subjective*, mais il n'est ni la chose en tant que telle, individuelle et concrète, parce qu'il ne renvoie pas nécessairement à quelque chose d'extérieur. Le *concept objectuel* permet que quelque chose soit objectivé par la pensée, une sorte d'*objet intentionnel*¹⁹.

Bien que cette distinction, entre *le concept formel* et *le concept objectuel*, soit noétique,²⁰ F. Suárez laisse pourtant l'impression (*D.M.*, II, 1, § 1), que ce *concept objectuel* est à même de s'identifier, occasionnellement, il est vrai, avec la chose singulière et individuelle. J.-F. Courtine semble avoir saisi cet aspect lorsqu'il affirme: «le concept objectuel n'est pas seulement le substitut des choses individuelles et concrètes, mais ce qui constitue leur essence même»²¹. Donc, on peut affirmer: le concept objectuel s'identifie avec l'objet. Il faut mentionner ici une nuance (souvent évitée) qui tient à la dimension subjective ou objective de ce type de concept. Dans ce contexte,

¹⁹ Le terme *intention intellectuelle* (*D.M.*, II, 1, §2) invoqué par F. Suárez, emprunté de Averroès, est identifié au *concept objectuel*, et il formule, précisément, le problème de l'unité du sujet et de l'objet dans l'acte de connaître (cf. J.-P. Coujou, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-16).

²⁰ Dans la culture européenne, la métaphysique noétique semble être inaugurée par Al-Farabi, dans son ouvrage *De intellectu*. Il distingue entre les formes intelligibles en elles-mêmes (l'intellect premier, les intelligences séparées) et les formes intelligibles par abstraction (les formes qui existent dans la matière) (cf. B. Tătaru-Cazaban (coord.), *op. cit.*, p. 26). À notre avis, F. Suárez n'élabore pas une pareille métaphysique, comme semble l'affirmer, parmi d'autres, É. Gilson. La métaphysique de F. Suárez, nous la voyons comme basée sur un réalisme modéré, similaire à celui adopté par Saint Thomas. Ceux qui trouvent chez F. Suárez une métaphysique noétique ont comme point de départ *la théorie de la représentation de l'objet qui fait abstraction de l'objet* (J.-P. Coujou, *op. cit.*, p. 67). On a, sans doute, affaire dans *Disputationes* à une construction intellectuelle (noétique) réalisée par le jésuite, qui est ainsi vu comme un précurseur des ontologies noétiques modernes. Un exemple dans ce sens est, à notre avis, G. Frege lui-même. «Si la logique de Frege, comprise comme ontologie, est incomplète et schématique, ces caractères viennent justement répondre à sa fonction noétique» (G. Frege, *Scrieri logico-filosofice I, Étude introductive* réalisée par Sorin Vieru, Bucureşti, Editura Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, 1977, p. XLII). A l'avavis de S. Vieru, «Însemnări despre ontologia lui Frege», dans *Revista de filosofie*, 1 (1968), pp. 55-67, la conception de G. Frege relative à l'objet d'étude de la logique formelle acquiert un caractère philosophique, ontologique pour la raison suivante: la théorie sur fonctions et objets est comprise comme théorie qui se réfère à la réalité entière, et non à un domaine particulier de la réalité. Mais cette ontologie que G. Frege propose a la signification d'une «ontologie formelle», pareille à celle de Husserl (qui ne représente pas, en définitive, rien d'autre que *Mathesis Universalis* de Descartes) car fondée par la présupposition que «il n'y a dans l'univers que des objets et des fonctions». M. Dummett (*Les origines de la Philosophie Analytique*, Paris, Gallimard, 1991), interprète autorisé de la conception frégienne, affirme qu'il n'existe pas une métaphysique, voir ontologie, chez G. Frege, sa pensée étant, essentiellement, une combinaison entre la philosophie du langage et les mathématiques. Pour d'autres exégètes, comme par exemple R. Grossmann (1968), G. Bergmann (1968), Kluge (1980), au contraire, non seulement qu'il existe une métaphysique chez G. Frege, mais elle a la primauté par rapport à la philosophie du langage et à la philosophie des mathématiques (cf. F. Nef, *L'objet quelconque. Recherches sur l'ontologie de l'objet*, Paris, J. Vrin, 1998, pp. 117-127: «L'ontologie formelle de Bolzano à Husserl»).

²¹ Cf. J.-F. Courtine, *Suárez et le système de la métaphysique*, Paris, Puf, 1990, p. 193.

il est juste de dire que F. Suárez «subit» l'influence de Capréolus ici également: «l'unité du concept objectuel peut être de deux types. On obtient une première forme d'unité par la participation des diverses réalités subsumées par le concept à une forme ou nature indivise. Celle-ci est univoque du genre ou de l'espèce. La deuxième forme d'unité c'est l'unité d'attribution : plusieurs qui se rapportent à quelque chose d'unique sont appelés un par attribution. Cette unité, tient à préciser Capréolus, est bien plus faible que la précédente. Elle peut toutefois être suffisante pour fonder la vérité d'un concept formel unitaire au plan noétique»²².

Une conclusion générale valable pour les scolastiques en ce qui concerne la distinction *concept objectuel – concept formel* pourrait être la suivante: dans l'acte de la connaissance il est impossible que l'accent tombe sur une seule dimension, qu'elle soit objectuelle ou conceptuelle, car ce sont les deux, ensemble, qui forment l'acte de la connaissance.

III. À notre avis, et conformément à ce qui a été présenté ci-dessus, G. Frege superpose à la distinction scolaire entre *concept formel* et *concept objectuel*, la distinction entre *sens* et *dénomination*. Ce qui signifie que, pour Frege, le *concept objectuel* serait *le dénoté*, qui ne doit pas avoir nécessairement une existence concrète ; et le *concept formel* serait *le sens*, qui peut être multiple, tout comme les actes par lesquels nous saisissions les objets. Pour une meilleure compréhension, comparons deux exemples: celui donné par F. Suárez et celui donné par G. Frege. Pour le premier, l'acte de *représentation* de l'homme par notre intellect s'identifie au *concept formel*, tandis que l'homme connu par l'intermédiaire de ces actes peut être corrélé au *concept objectuel*. Pour le logicien allemand, la Lune représente l'objet de l'observation, à savoir *le référent*, qui est moyennée par l'image réelle qui prend naissance à l'aide de l'objectif à l'intérieur du binocle et à l'aide de la rétine de l'observateur. L'une (l'image de la Lune vue par le binocle), G. Frege la compare avec son sens, l'autre, il la compare avec la représentation ou l'image. Jusqu'à un certain point, les deux exemples semblent aller de pair: *l'objet* de l'observation s'identifie, pour l'un aussi bien que pour l'autre, avec *le référent*. En ce qui concerne *le sens* (ou son équivalent scolaire: *le concept formel*), G. Frege introduit une nuance: il ne se résume non plus à *l'acte de la représentation*²³, comme le faisaient les

²² Cf. S.-T. Bonino, art. cit., pp. 278-279.

²³ Mentionnons de nouveau, à cette occasion, que pour les scolastiques, «obiective» signifie «conformément à la représentation», c'est-à-dire subjectif, et non «conformément à la chose», c'est-à-dire objectif, comme dans le cas, par exemple, de G. Frege. Les scolastiques et ceux qui ont repris leurs conceptions (nous parlons ici de F. Brentano et, par son intermédiaire, de E. Husserl), faisaient la distinction entre *chose* qui est extra-mental et *objet* qui est présent lui-même dans la conscience: il est une entité constituée dans l'esprit, par l'esprit. Cette distinction semble ne plus fonctionner chez G. Frege. La dimension intérieure, représentationnelle, de l'objet, est totalement absente de la conception du logicien allemand.

scolastiques²⁴, qui implique une dimension subjective, mais à sa dimension objective: *le sens* (Gedanke) qui est le même pour plusieurs observateurs²⁵.

Chez G. Frege, à la différence des scolastiques, la distinction de domaine entre les objets matériels, qui ont une réalité et les objets *idéaux*, tels les nombres, les points géométriques, les valeurs de vérité, les extensions des concepts, ne fonctionne pas. Ils appartiennent au même domaine. Le caractère de l'objet est d'être «complet», «saturé»; à la différence du caractère «non-saturé» du concept²⁶. Sous cet aspect, le platonisme de G. Frege se différencie nettement par rapport à l'aristotélisme des scolastiques.

Une autre différence entre G. Frege et les scolastiques est la suivante: tandis que les scolastiques semblent limiter la distinction *concept formel-concept objectuel* aux noms propres, le logicien allemand va plus loin en l'appliquant également aux propositions assertoriques considérées dans leur totalité (qui, en définitive, fonctionne selon la même structure que les noms propres).

²⁴ C'est dans la même catégorie qu'on pourrait inclure aussi F. Brentano, qui dans son ouvrage de 1874: *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, affirme que le phénomène psychique est constitué de deux moments qu'on ne peut pas concevoir séparément: *l'objet* de l'acte psychique et *la relation* ou *l'orientation* de l'acte vers cet objet-là. À notre avis, cette paire de corrélats intentionnels ne représente autre chose que la paire scolaistique: *concept objectuel - concept formel*. Frege réagit contre ce courant psychologiste, qui ne mettait l'accent que sur la dimension subjective, en instituant la distinction entre sens et dénotation, qui veut être une distinction objective. L'une des racines de ce courant psychologiste est à trouver chez Thomas aussi, *De Veritate I*, 9, où il fait la distinction entre le sujet connaissant, l'acte de la connaissance et l'objet de la connaissance. Cette distinction apparaît chez G. Frege également dans l'exemple même donné ci-dessus, avec la différence qu'il ne met plus l'accent sur le sujet connaissant, qui ne «produit» que des représentations, mais seulement sur *l'acte* et *l'objet*, c'est-à-dire sur *le sens* et *la dénotation*. Par cet «abandon» du sujet on arrive à une dimension impersonnelle de l'acte de la connaissance, typiquement logique. Chose explicable, parce que pour G. Frege, la logique représente par excellence une investigation de l'objectif, tandis que la psychologie s'intéresse au côté subjectif. À cette distinction il correspond une autre, entre le concept et l'objet d'une part, et la représentation d'autre part.

²⁵ Les implications platoniciennes de la conception frégéenne sont ici évidentes. Selon Călin Candiescu, *Gottlob Frege și filosofia analitică a limbajului* (thèse de doctorat), București, 1980, chapitre «Platonism și obiectivitate», G. Frege n'est pas un platonicien, comme on l'affirme souvent, mais un conceptualiste. Son platonisme se manifeste surtout dans ses écrits tardifs et ne vise pas que les objets abstraits (nombres, classes etc.). Dans l'acception de l'auteur mentionné ci-dessus, le platonisme ne représente qu'un aspect secondaire de la conception de Frege, étant considéré comme un prolongement de son antipsychologisme. La préoccupation de Frege était de sauver l'objectivité des entités logico-mathématiques: «tandis que quelqu'un ne peut sentir que sa propre douleur, son propre plaisir ou sa propre faim... les nombres peuvent être des objets communs pour plusieurs, à savoir ils sont les mêmes pour tous» (G. Frege, *Fundamentele aritmeticii*, § 93, dans *Scrieri...*, p. 141). Cette objectivité dont parle G. Frege a deux acceptations: 1. indépendante de la conscience humaine (*esse extra animam*) et 2. avoir une validité intersubjective (conscience générique). Platonisme signifie attribuer aux idées ou aux entités abstraites objectivées au sens 1. Si dans ses écrits de maturité l'accent tombe sur l'acception kantienne, dans ses écrits tardifs, G. Frege arrive à parler d'un «tiers monde» (voir la conception ultérieure élaborée par K. Popper).

²⁶ Cf. G. Frege, „Despre concept și obiect”, dans *Scrieri...*, pp. 289-306.

De notre point de vue, en résumant les idées ci-dessus, la conception de G. Frege relative au sens et à la dénotation ne fait qu'éliminer l'élément psychologique, c'est-à-dire la représentation, de la conception des scolastiques qui distinguent entre *le concept formel* et *le concept objectuel*²⁷. La différence entre les scolastiques et les logiciens contemporains consiste en définitive dans un problème de langage: tandis que les premiers traitent la logique dans le langage quotidien, les logiciens du XX^e siècle construisent un langage artificiel, culminant par le métalangage proposé par A. Tarski. Ce qui signifie qu'on peut avoir affaire à la même problématique, et que seule la terminologie diffère.

Enfin, nous considérons que l'attaque de G. Frege pourrait viser, en plus de la théorie de la subjectivité du sens proposée par John Locke dans son ouvrage *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690), les racines scolastiques de cette dimension subjective du sens.

²⁷ Cette distinction entre psychologique (subjectif) et logique (objectif) représente l'un des «principes fondamentaux» que G. Frege propose dans *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik*.

Dana TABREA *

Practical Past and re-enactment vs. edification in the Romanian trauma of communism

Abstract: Starting from Oakeshott's separation of the three attitudes towards the world, and trying to attribute them to the idea of history and the idea of past, I acknowledge that Oakeshott's project misses something: the aesthetical history, in connection with the practical past, but completing his critique of Collingwood's idea of re-enactment. The aesthetical history is a virgin field that no one has talked of. Not even Hayden White who remains to a superfluous idea of historically relative narrative. Besides words, I am interested in facts. But purely historical facts are an illusion since we may reconstruct the historical reality in a multitude of ways. The idea of practical past is very important because it addresses questions such as how can I lead a better life in the present, dealing with my past historical trauma. But it doesn't offer a solution. Changing the self, edification is the only solution that I can think of, and it can be obtained through authentic historical aesthetics. I offer the example of a play directed by the Romanian directress Gianina Carbunariu. Although the play is an excellent illustration of how re-enactment works, it is not relevant for the case of edification.

Keywords: Practical Past, Michael Oakeshott, Hayden White, Edification, Historical Aesthetics, Gianina Carbunariu.

1. Three Ways of Understanding the World: Michael Oakeshott

In his essay on „The Activity of Being an Historian” (1958), Michael Oakeshott distinguishes three attitudes or responses towards the world: 1. The practical attitude, 2. The scientific attitude, and 3. The attitude of contemplation, namely the aesthetical response. These are the main modes of interpretation by which we perceive and understand the world. I will review them in a short description of Oakeshott's ideas.

The first and perhaps most elementary response toward the world is given by the practical attitude. Within this way of understanding the world, our relations to the environmental surroundings and happenings are of primordial importance. We reveal ourselves as willing, active creatures, under the good or bad fortunes of our times. We are interested in feeling as

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comfortable and safe in the world as possible. And we recognize the world in terms of its *habitableness*, a term by which Oakeshott understands the „friendliness or hostility [of the world] to our desires and enterprises”¹.

Within the practical world we make use of our sense of anticipation. Not only do we distinguish an event that takes place in the world of practice as being friendly or hostile, but we also anticipate other events to follow as effects of the former event, takes as their cause. And we do not anticipate only events, but also their possible impact upon ourselves. For instance, if we understand an event as being friendly, it also means that we expect it to be followed by other future friendly events.

The practical attitude bears in Michael Oakeshott's view the mark of the moral realm: we judge the world and its things/events/situations, and the others in terms of our approving or disapproving with them. Within the practical response, we formulate judgements in terms of *moral appraisals* and *imputations*, by using the categories of good/bad, right/wrong, just/unjust etc. Within the world of practical discourse, we create our images of *hero* and *villain*, by condemning or applauding actual human conduct, and by expressing our consent or disapproval of human character. Given shape in fairy tales and myths, such images of good and evil in human character and conduct are also historically employed.

The second response towards the world, namely the scientific, is considered by Oakeshott merely a *partner* and an *alternative* to the practical attitude. The scientific attitude strives at objectivity. The world and its happenings are interpreted in their purity within the scientific attitude. This meaning that things/events are not to be considered from the perspective of their relation to ourselves and our interests, but independently. The relationship between cause and effect is employed in the scientific attitude as it was in the practical one, but starting from different premises: we no longer anticipate moral consequences of events, but establish necessary and sufficient conditions for hypothetical situations. Oakeshott makes use of an example so that he may explain the differences between the practical and the scientific attitudes. He observes that within the practical discourse we talk of seeing and hearing, when we say, for instance, that „It is a greater handicap to be blind than to be deaf”, so that we may express the common view that seeing is more important than hearing. Whereas within the scientific attitude, we speak of speed and sound, as in a relation of independence to ourselves, we say that „the speed of light is greater than the speed of sound”².

¹ “The Activity of Being a Historian”, in *What is History? and other essays*, Imprint Academic, 2004, p. 158.

² *Ibidem*, p. 160.

Oakeshott's example, though handy in making the point that he has in mind, is not a very happy one. His mentioning that we notice that seeing puts things at a greater distance from us than hearing doesn't ring the bell to me. The common view that the handicap of not seeing is greater than that of not hearing is indeed most common. Nowadays, multimodal art theories and experiences, especially the cases of art beyond sight show us not only that blindness is not a greater handicap than any other handicap, e.g. hearing, but also that it is no longer a handicap when it comes to the art of painting.

When one sense is missing, all the other senses are proved to develop considerably, so that they cover the missing sense. It is the case of the painter John Bramblitt³. John Bramblitt lost his sight in his early twenties. The fact that he can no longer see hasn't prevented him from painting. Instead of pencils or oils, he uses puffy paint, a special type of paint that leaves a thin raised line that he can follow by touch with his left hand, while he is painting with his right. He can also tell the difference among the colours of the paint that he uses, by feeling the difference of texture among them. He uses his other senses, especially touch so that he may compensate for his lost visual sense. Touching something stirs in him mental images. His well-developed sense of touch supplies the gap of not being able to see. He uses his memory, too. He retains in memory what he has already put in the painting. He also recollects visual images that he had until the age of 25, while he could longer see. He can tell when a painting is ready, and when it corresponds to the mental image that he has made of it, because he just „feels” it.

However, the third and final attitude that Oakeshott discusses in the essay I am referring to is the contemplative or aesthetical response towards the world. Oakeshott distinguishes the attitude of contemplation from both the practical and the scientific attitudes. The world as it is revealed within the aesthetical attitude is a *world of mere images* that are object of *delight* and *contemplation*⁴. The distinction between fact and non-fact images that apply to the other two realms (practice and science) do not have anything to say here. Therefore, the categories that seem correct when speaking of objects in practice or science, such as possibility, probability, cause-effect, means-ends, reality, or truth are irrelevant to aesthetics. The only characteristic that artistic images possess is their being present, and they stir our contemplating with delight, but do not lead to any argumentation or inquiry. Under the sole category of the present, they have no history, they are impermanent and unique. In conversation with practice, poetry often finds

³ <http://bramblitt.net/>

⁴ Michael Oakeshott “The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind”, in *What is History? and other essays*, Imprint Academic, 2004, p. 217.

disagreement as the image in contemplation can never be pleasurable or painful, and it cannot be morally judged⁵.

2. Three Possible Ways of Understanding History

I wonder what is the place of history in the conversation of the human world, a conversation made up of let us say just the three responses reviewed up here (the practical, the scientific, and the aesthetical attitudes).

Michael Oakeshott's answer to my question above would be that there is a *specifically historical attitude*. And its distinctiveness is given by the fact that it is concerned with the past. The historian is interested in the world around him (**present**) as *evidence* for a world that is no longer present (**past**). His job is to inquire into the past and make statements about it. Since not only historians inquire into the past, but men of science as well as men in the world of practice may also inquire into the past. Then the subject-matter of history, Oakeshott notices, cannot be distinctive and characteristic of the historical attitude. His preoccupation focuses on differentiating what distinguishes history from practice or science⁶.

Oakeshott suggests that we can ask different kinds of questions about the past: „What must have happened?” (practical past), „What might have happened?” (hypothetical past), „What did happen?” (historical past)⁷. In his opinion, history *proper* and the historian are concerned with answering this third question, and finding out what actually happened, what really took place in the past. It is assumed that there is an objective past, and history's main concern is with the past, and with finding out what really happened there. This view makes an independent manner of understanding out of history, which is seen as standing upon its own feet. From this perspective, there is an autonomous historical inquiry, employing its own concepts, formulating specific statements, reaching at its own conclusions, and a specific activity of the historian within this mode of understanding⁸.

Out of Oakeshott's intention to defend the autonomy of the historical mode of understanding emerges a view upon the past that can be believed to plead against positivism and empiricism employed within the historical inquiry in an almost postmodernist way. While, on the contrary, far from being an authentic constructionist and a narrativist in his opinions about historical past, Oakeshott is just the opposite: a defender of the idea of past

⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 218.

⁶ “The Activity of Being a Historian”, in *What is History? and other essays*, Imprint Academic, 2004, p. 153.

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 155.

⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 156.

in its own sake⁹. This confusion may appear because Oakeshott addresses his claims in terms of defining the past as „a construction we make for themselves out of the events which take place before our eyes”¹⁰. Just as the future comes into existence as we understand the present events as evidence for what is about to happen, to Oakeshott, *the past appears when we understand present happenings as evidence for what has already happened*¹¹. The past exists, Oakeshott tells us, only as a reading or an understanding of the present. And what we have in the present (a book, a building, a painting, a document etc.) is but *evidence* to the past that we construct by means of and starting from the particular pieces of evidence.

However, I completely endorse Oakeshott’s idea that our reading of the past can be done from several perspectives, given by three different attitudes towards the past. The three different attitudes are exactly the three attitudes reviewed here, but this time throwing light on the idea of history and our possible ways of understanding the past: the practical, the scientific, and the contemplative perspectives. No more. No less.

Consequently, three types of past and three attitudes towards history can be differentiated: 1. The practical past, and the practical attitude towards history; 2. The scientific past, and the scientific attitude towards history; and 3. The contemplative (aesthetical) past, and the aesthetical attitude towards history. If the past is understood in relation to the present, to our present interests, desires, and activities, then we are dealing with an understanding of the past from the practical standpoint. If our interest is with the past for its own sake, and in independence to our interests, then we are dealing with the past from the standpoint of scientific/pure/autonomous history. And, finally, if the past is considered neither a practical, nor a scientifical fact, but a *storehouse of mere images*, we embrace the attitude of contemplation towards the past¹². Oakeshott’s tendency is to leave behind the *reading of the past backwards* from the standpoint of the present interests with the past, and to focus on the scientific attitude towards the past, aiming at saving the autonomy of the history from being assimilated to either practice or aesthetics.

To me history seems a little a topical in the conversation of the human world when facing Oakehsott’s view. In *Experience and its Modes* history was one of the independent modes of thinking, together with science and practice. But now there is no special place for history among the other

⁹ For the contradiction between what can be found in Oakeshott and what he really states, see Efraim Podoksik, *In Defence of Modernity. Vision and Philosophy in Michael Oakeshott*, Imprint Academic, 2003, p. 102.

¹⁰ “The Activity of Being a Historian”, in *What is History? and other essays*, Imprint Academic, 2004, p. 161.

¹¹ *Ibidem*.

¹² *Ibidem*, pp. 162-165.

voices in conversation since the historical mode is distributed among the three attitudes of practice, science, and contemplation.

Therefore, Oakeshott's early strong pretensions are left behind if not left to fall altogether. He even meets with two objections of his own the claim of the autonomy of history as an historical attitude. His first objection warns us against the positivistic understanding of history in case we understand the meaning of the term 'science' too strictly. In this case, history becomes a scientific approach with a scientific method of its own, explaining events causally, and by subsuming them to general laws¹³. Oakeshott's second objection, taking the term 'science' in an even more restrictive sense, denies the possibility of a scientifically historical attitude towards the past as the world created in the scientifically historical perspective is not real, made of actual events but of hypothetical timeless situations¹⁴. Only if we take the term 'science' and 'scientific' in a general and leisurely manner, as meaning to study the past for its own sake, without having any subjective interest or relation to the past events that we reveal, a scientific attitude towards the past becomes possible in Oakeshott's opinion.

It didn't even occur to Oakeshott that even more serious objections to his theory of the autonomy of scientific historical attitude are possible, starting from the premises that both the idea of the past as such and the idea of the past studied for its own sake are deeply rotten. In this sense, I find Hayden White's criticism of the cliché of the past for its own sake most relevant: „Who studies the past for its own sake is either an antiquarian, fleeing from the problems of the present into a purely personal past or a kind of a cultural necrophile, one who finds in the dead and dying a value he can never find in the living”¹⁵.

3. The Triplicity of the Past

In Michael Oakeshott's opinion, the past is only a reading of the present. But not only one interpretation of the present (evidence) is possible, but, naturally, three (as many as the attitudes towards history and the past): 1. The past from the standpoint of practice (the *practical past*); 2. The past from the standpoint of scientific history (the *historical past*), and 3. The past from the standpoint of aesthetics (the past of *contemplation* and edification).

My present question is: What happens to the idea of the past in each of the three distinct attitudes? How is it defined from the three distinct

¹³ *Ibidem*, p. 164.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

¹⁵ Hayden White, "The Burden of History", in *History and Theory*, vol. 5, no. 2, Blackwell Publishing, 1966, p. 125.

perspectives? Moreover, how are the past, the present, and the future to be understood within each of the three attitudes upon history: the practical, the scientific, and the aesthetical?

In the first essay published in *On History*, „Present, Future, and Past” (1979), which is a lecture that Oakeshott delivered in the seminar on the history of political thought at LSE, he shares the same preoccupation of his earlier writings with establishing the autonomy of history, and consequently is eager to dissociate the historical past from the practical past, but has nothing to say regarding a third possible type of past, that of contemplation.

Each type of past is defined in Oakeshott's incomplete theory by its relation to a certain type of present. And pure historical past depends upon being evoked starting from the evidence we have in the present (documents, historical objects etc.). But if the past is called upon the necessities of the present, meaning that we do not start from present evidence so that we discover the past, but look for solutions to our present problems and dilemmas into the past, then, in Oakeshott's view, the past becomes tainted by practice; this is the negative side of Oakeshott's idea of practical past, in favouring the pure historical past or the past in itself and for its own sake as the object of the historical study.

The marks of the historical past in Oakeshott are non-surviving (the historical past is a dead past), and uselessness for present purposes. While the practical past is exactly the opposite: it is made of artefacts and utterances that survived from the past, and which are useful for our present engagements. To Oakeshott the practical past is not even a past at all, but „the present contents of a vast storehouse into which time continuously empties the lives, the utterances, the achievements, and the suffering of mankind”¹⁶. And there are three processes („detachment”, „shrinkage”, and „desiccation”), by which the contents of the practical past are turned into iconic situations and characters.

However, when it comes to the disentangling of the idea of the practical past into a countable and describable multitude of types of (practical) past, I am not sure if Oakeshott is aware of the truly positive sense that this idea of practical past gets. Especially if the different sorts of (practical) past there enumerated and metaphorically explored are not thought of as types, but as levels of the practical past. The practical past is not unique, but various¹⁷, and what is more important, I would add, it unravels itself progressively by its multiple neither kinds, nor degrees, but better said levels.

First, Oakeshott identifies the *encapsulated past*¹⁸. The past leaves physical and emotional traces in people (the trauma). It is in Oakeshott's view the

¹⁶ Michael Oakeshott, *On History And Other Essays*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1983, p. 39.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 14.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 15.

level of practical past where traces and residues of all that has happened to us and all that we have suffered are (both physical and psychological scars). But also remains of what we used to think, imagine, believe, feel, hope, as well as of habits, practices, skills, are part of this first layer of practical past.

What we are is but a shadow of what has happened to us: „Real isn't how you were made, it's the thing that happens to you” (*The Night Listener*). The encapsulated past is itself made of multiple layers that come one over the other, most of the time beyond recall, but never in the position of being erased. Oakeshott names this first level of the practical past encapsulated, because this term expresses the fact that the past is locked within the present, and most probably never to be unlocked. But I think that its marks upon us are real, our actions are guided in accordance to it, and it actually defines who we are and where we are heading at.

The second level of the practical past is called the *remembered past*¹⁹. This time we are speaking of the past that can be recollected in memory. Memory awards us the awareness of the past together with our self-awareness. We become conscious of our own identity, a line that links our past actions to actual consequences, and we recognize ourselves in terms of the decisions that we take and the engagements that we make²⁰.

The third level of the practical past is named by Oakeshott *recollected* or *consulted past*²¹. The difference between the second and the third levels is that the third is no longer a personally remembered past, but it consists of itemized experiences that are recollected or consulted because they represent useful pieces of information for our present²². We access past experience to find advice for our present decisions to be made and it is not just for us individually but for the society they we are part of.

The fourth level of the practical past is a *deposit of voices from the past*, survivals from the past, that speak to us about our current situation²³. In Oakeshott's opinion, the fourth level of past is made of models, exemplar stories and exemplar characters. This fourth level is the core of the practical past. It is the „*living past*”, survivals from the past that carry „messages in a bottle” for the present. Oakeshott speaks of the „*living past*” as peculiar voice in the conversation of mankind: „These message-bearing survivals may speak to us artlessly, in parables or in riddles; their voices may be clear, ambiguous or discrepant. They may purport to communicate useful information, advice or an effective image in which to express what we wish to say or wish to do. We may attribute authority to them or merely sagacity.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*.

²⁰ *Ibidem*. p. 16.

²¹ *Ibidem*, p. 15.

²² *Ibidem*.

²³ *Ibidem*.

They may be listened to, consulted, used, neglected or ignored”²⁴. The practical past in its fourth level is not a voice of its own, but collections of exemplarities (exemplar persons and situations) that can be interpreted: „what they mean to us is whatever they may be made to mean”. Every society disposes of such an archive, an inheritance of survivals from the past taken over into its common vocabulary of practical discourse, and used for the benefit of the present.

The symbolic vocabulary of practical discourse is a construction in accordance to a certain *approved* practical present. Oakeshott speaks of extreme situations when the practical past may be considered to contain worthless or injurious items, and these items are removed from the practical past of a certain society. The symbolic vocabulary of practical discourse is emptied of icons that are considered useless for the present or which are incommoding.

It makes me wonder. Who does these operations? Those who repeatedly write and rewrite history? Who decides on the value of the collection of symbols contained by the practical past? Who pronounces the desirability or non-desirability of the exemplarities of the practical past for our present practical engagements? Whose work is the editing of the symbolic vocabulary of practical discourse within a given society?

Hayden White proposes the following desideratum on the activity of the historian today: „The contemporary historian has to establish the value of the study of the past, not as an end in itself, but as a way of providing perspectives on the present that contribute to the solution of problems peculiar to our own time”²⁵. Though it is a good replica to Oakeshott’s ideal of the historian interested in the past for its own sake, it doesn’t addresses any of my questions and they are doomed, I am afraid, to remain rhetorical. In between the complete positivisation of the idea of the practical past as the messenger from the past addressing present problems, and the narrativisation of history, Haydon White avoids asking the question: If history is a story, who is the narrator? May it be the historian himself? Or is it someone else?

4. „History is a fable”

All I did for my present essay was to read Oakeshott backwards instead of chronologically. Starting with „The activity of Being an Historian” (1958) and *On History* (1979), and continuing with „History is a fable”, an essay that he wrote at a very early age, in 1923. And I cannot help the remark: how

²⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 17.

²⁵ Hayden White, “The Burden of History”, in *History and Theory*, vol. 5, no. 2, Blackwell Publishing, 1966, p. 125.

strangely can Oakeshott be read in post-modern terms when read backwards, only when arriving at this early essay.

History is a construction of the historian. He constructs the line of events in time, after recollecting them in his own mind, starting from the records found in the present, and turning events into historical events²⁶. So far I do not see many differences between what Oakeshott says and Collingwood's theory of re-actualization. The historical understanding means to Collingwood the (re)construction of the historical fact in imagination, starting from the interpretation of the available historical sources. We can understand re-enactment in a psychological and empathical way (Schleiermacher) or in a more elaborate way, as a fusion of the horizons of past and present (Gadamer).

Oakeshott didn't agree with the first interpretation of the theory of re-enactment as a reconstruction of the past thoughts, intentions and motives of the historical actors. As he considered that to speak of the past in terms of intentions is but a present interference of the historian's own thinking in history, from the standpoint of his present preoccupations and needs of interpretation. To him historical sentences such as „The king died too soon” or „The Pope's intervention changed the course of events” represent but an illicit interposing of the realm of practice in the historical field. Neither moral considerations formulated from the standpoint of practice nor causal relations created in the present for the facts of the past are accepted by Oakeshott to ever construct an historical inquiry.

There is nothing more ambiguous in Collingwood's *The Idea of History* than his pages on how re-enactment operates and what it means²⁷. If not the actual thought of the historical agent/author is re-enacted, but the logics of the thought, then I wonder what is there to be understood? Do we get access through history to the initial thought? Or is it just a representation of the former thought? Could two persons from two completely different historical times reconstruct the same thought? Do the historical actor/author and the historian think the same thought or is it just a resemblance that unites two distinct thoughts?

Against the representational theory, Collingwood doesn't seem to accept the hypothesis of resemblance. He seems to accept instead the identity

²⁶ Michael Oakeshott, “History is a fable”, in *What is History and other essays*, Imprint Academic, 2004, p. 32.

²⁷ See R. G. Collingwood, „History as Re-enactment of Past Thought” (1936), pp. 282-302 din IH, cît și alte referințe la doctrina în discuție din „Lectures on the Philosophy of History” (1926), p. 406 și din „Outlines of a Philosophy of History” (1928), pp. 440-441 și 447, published in the expanded edition of *The Idea of History*, revised edition with ”Lectures 1926-1928”, edited with an Introduction by Jan Van Der Dussen, Oxford University Press, 1994.

between the re-actualized thought and the initial thought²⁸. Yet, the two thoughts aren't completely identical, there is a difference between the two, a difference of context, and it is this difference in context that we cannot ignore²⁹. The context is created by the particular set of questions and answers within two different universes of discourse: of the historical agent/author, and of the historian. It may be that the same thought is re-enacted, but the whole context is different. So it isn't exactly the same thought! The context confers the standpoint from which the historian understands the past. It is Collingwood's idea that thinking can be placed into different contexts without losing its identity, but isn't it the context itself what gives thinking its identity? And to place a piece of thinking in the past within a different context in the present isn't it to radically change it? Here is the main idea that separates Oakeshott from Collingwood. The reconstruction of the past is in fact a recreation of the past. And we are not allowed to jumble with past thoughts within the practical context of the present if we are historians. But if we are not, we can use and abuse history, not as we please, but as the current practical necessities and needs dictate us to. However, this is no longer history, but politics.

Once more the logic of question and answer got a pivotal role in Collingwood, this time not for the metaphysics of presuppositions, but for the philosophy of historical re-enactment. The past is deducted; I would better say diged, through a process of successive questions and answers, out of the historical evidence. Not the individual actual process of thinking is re-enacted, but the past thought which is in fact encapsulated in the present. Collingwood's theory of encapsulation, different from Oakeshott's, sustains that the traces left by the past in the present hide and may reveal by reconstruction some initial thinking. Collingwood's encapsulated past³⁰ travels beyond time, and it is eternally present in the same universal way as Hegel's spirit through the spirals of its manifestation and dematerializing.

It is better to say that history is being written, than that past historical thinking is revealed in the present that contains the past. And that the multiplicity of historical reconstructions is relative to the finite number of historians and interprets of the past, relevant for certain historical periods. Oakeshott will describe the practical attitude towards history as it follows: *we only look at the past through the spectacles of the present*. The historian looks at evidence, examines documents, and orders historical facts from the standpoint of his present. Therefore historiography is but a succession of

²⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 284.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 108, 245, 248, 297, 301, 303.

³⁰ For Oakeshott's critique to Collingwood, though Collingwood's name is not mentioned, see, for instance, *On History*, cited edition, p. 10.

writings and rewritings of stories, and the philosophy of history is but a critical review of all these stories. Practical history is a fable.

5. Aesthetical history and edification

In his early essay, „History is a fable”, Oakeshott mentions *edification* in a completely limited and unsatisfactory way. He distinguishes two main orientations of history. On the one hand, writing history can be directed towards searching for solutions to present problems. And this is practical history. On the other hand, history can be studied for its own sake, in search for *edification*. By *edification* Oakeshott means disinterested knowledge (of the past). But scientific history is dismissed by Oakeshott in this early essay. He reaches at very post-modern conclusions: „There can never be a science of history”. In history we are dealing with theories, and not with facts. There are no historical facts to be captured in history because as we proceed to (re)construct the historical fact, the actual historical fact is nowhere to be found³¹.

Oakeshott considers that the idea of re-enactment isn’t going to help our better understanding of the past. What counts from Oakeshott’s point of view are not the intentions of the historical actors, but the events themselves³². What matters is that something did happen, even if we cannot determine what exactly did happen. But what Oakeshott really misses is the valorification of *edification* as changing of the self within an aesthetical history. If history is recreated (instead of re-enacted) artistically, then it is possible for the public to attain *edification*.

„How is it possible to survive the monstrous traumas of the past?” is the key question that Hayden White asks. Such traumas are Auschwitz, Hiroshima, and communism. It is most imperative today to address the same question. How can we lead a normal life, followed by the shadows of the past, carrying our traumas within ourselves? How can we be and what should we do so that to avoid in a morally responsible way that the past may ever repeat itself, and that horrors as those in scripted in our traumas of our mind may never occur again? Adept of a liberal and liberating historiography, Hayden White believes that it is possible to free from the „unsolicited heritages, false traditions, and repressive ,burdens of history”, and the struggle is attributed to the practical past, or the past approached in the right way, as a real source of „meaning, inspiration, and direction” for the present.

³¹ See Michael Oakeshott, “History is a fable”, in *What is History and other essays*, Imprint Academic, 2004, p. 30.

³² Michael Oakeshott, *Rationalism in Politics and other essays*, Liberty Fund, 1991, p. 179.

I think the solution may come only from an aesthetical project aiming at edification here and now, that is the concrete equivalent of the Christian redemption. Through art we can reconstruct the past creatively, giving it a multitude of shapes, and we can hope to change ourselves. I mean change should come from the inside and not from the outside. It is not a cathartically emptying of the soul by purification, but a changing of the mind. We simply become different, better in character. And we become those who would never repeat the mistakes of our semblables in the past.

6. Re-enactment of the Romanian trauma of communism

As a case study and application I will consider the case of theatrical performance and the play „x mm out of y km”, done by the Romanian director Gianina Carbunariu, an independent project of *Colectiv A* Association, in Cluj-Napoca, Romania, performed by four actors (Madalina Ghitescu, Paula Gherghe, Rolando Matzangos, Toma Danila), who continuously change the characters they perform (Dorin Tudoran, the main character, dissident during the communist regime, Dorin Radu Popescu, President of the Writers’ Union in Romania, Nicolae Croitoru, in charge of the propaganda sector of The Municipal Committee of The Romanian Communist Party in Bucharest, and the character TO, who is filming and transmitting live on two screens, representing the awaken eye of the Security)³³.

The play was never written, because it doesn’t have a script. We are told this explicitly at the beginning of the performance. It doesn’t have an author either. Just three characters, who pick their roles randomly and change them with just two words: “Cut and again”. The only available historical sources are the security files, the most important of which the writer Dorin Tudoran published in his book *Eu, fiul lor. Dosar de securitate (I Am Their Son: Security File)*, Polirom, Iasi, 2010. The volume is a selection of more than five hundred out of the ten thousand pages found in the archives of the Security about Dorin Tudoran. The play of Gianina Carbunariu focuses on just one document of the presented evidence. Out of the five hundred pages of security files about Dorin Tudoran, the directress picks a transcript of a discussion that took place in March 1985, in which the three characters are involved, concerning Dorin Tudoran’s situation in communist Romania, and trying to convince him into giving up his plans and beliefs.

The main events around which the play gravitates are: Dorin Tudoran resigned from the Communist Party in 1982, and asked in 1984 to emigrate to the USA. Denied a response, on the 1st of August 1984 he wrote a letter

³³ <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ol2cEMtFQTM>

to Nicolae Ceausescu. After threatenings with legal repercussions to be taken against him, on the 25th of April 1985, Dorin Tudoran started a hunger strike, asking for an appointment with an official of The American Embassy in Bucharest. The hunger strike lasted for 42 days. Thanks to pleas from human rights' groups and the intervention of the American officials, he was permitted to leave the country on the 24th of July, 1985.

In an explaining article about her show, Gianina Carbunariu, identifies several questions searching answers regarding the relationship between document and fact, between our present trauma and the past, also regarding the possibility of knowing historically a recent past, that is still alive in our trauma left by the communism: “Are the Security files documents that may help us understand the past?”, “How do we relate today to this burden of the past?”, “How present is this recent past?”³⁴.

As the directress confesses, the aim of the play was not to attain pure historical knowledge of the recent past in question here, not to reach the fact in the past, as it really happened, but to reconstruct the past through the instruments provided by drama. Gianina Carbunariu's theatrical inquiry is not made from the standpoint of the scientific attitude towards history and the past, but from the practical one and, as I will show, contributes to aesthetical edification.

The inquiry has to do with the idea of the practical past because it has to do with the problems of the present: the trauma left by communism and how it affects our lives and our decisions today, 23 years after The Romania Revolution against communism in 1989. Also, it may be considered to aim at ameliorating, if not dissolving this trauma through the means of art. And it is certainly directed towards the changing of ourselves. By the communist trauma I identify negative emotions, bad reactions and attitudes, wrong decisions. Among the negative emotions part of the trauma of the communism are those felt by Dorin Tudoran during the discussion and the preceding months, and that are emanated by the arid, but not dry enough, pages of the security files, such as: fear, frightening, nightmare, anxiety, indecision, anxiety, insomnia, despair etc.

Technically, the play intends to construct several multiple historical realities by repeating over and over again the same scenario. Cut and reload is the principle of the organizing of the play, just as cut and update was the principle by which the security files were written, while following “the objective Tudoran”. In this way, the directress gives shape to plural historical realities, because the main sources that she has, the transcript of the security files, indicate this approach. As she confesses in her article

³⁴ <http://www.revistascena.ro/performing-arts/eseu/x-mm-din-y-km-despre-o-posibila-arhiva-performativa>

about the play, the text of the security files suffered multiple corrections and changes of the so called facts. The security files are ambiguous technically as well as in their content. Among the examples offered by Gianina Carbunariu I enumerate: the use different verbs for the very same action, so that the tone and actual expression could never be reproduced; real facts are recorded into inverted commas, and erroneous indications are made, a letter that is a fact that was sent is spoken of as the “so called letter” etc. As a consequence, the actors perform the same but changing the meanings of the situations they construct through their performance. Their voices become higher or lower in pronouncing the same words, they whisper or shout the same thing, their intonation vary from one episode to another, they facial expression. And what is most important: not only one actor plays Dorin Tudoran, but all of the in turns leave their role with the line: “That’s enough. I cannot go any further”, and pick up another character and so on.

I think that the repetition is used for the purpose of provoking a certain reaction in the audience. It looks like boredom, but it isn’t it. It is a feeling of satiety that translates an irritation. The public gets irritated, enervated, in the sense that re-enactment produces. The trauma of the communism is awoken in the spectator. And the first step towards any healing is to find the disease. If we can admit that there is something wrong with us, then maybe we may have a chance to change ourselves.

7. Practical past and edification

Evidently, the re-enactment I am talking of is in psychological in not in logical terms. Is it a return to Scheleiermacher or Dilthey? If the past is still present within us, it is useless to stress upon its being present in the shape of an abstract thinking traveling through the contextual cloaks from one time to another. Moreover, it is the case of the recent past, and Collingwood would not even think of attributing his theory of re-enactment to recent past³⁵. Still, with or without Collingwood’s approval to award the theoretical context of the re-enactment to the play, it is an excellent example of how words become facts, a true and relevant performative act, in various repetitions, that are meant to re-enact the trauma of the communism into the Romanian public. And the trauma of the communism is mostly emotional affecting our present decisions. There is no question of guaranteeing a proper historical fact. The play is a multiple reconstruction of the past, from the standpoint of the practical past. But as an artistic experience it can aspire to be more, it can aim at edifying the public.

³⁵ If we are to give credit to what Oakeshott says in “The Activity of Being a Historian”, in *What is History? and other essays*, Imprint Academic, 2004, p. 155.

At the end everyone is invited to complete a sentence written in white chalk on the wall: “I admit and I am sorry that I collaborated with the security...”. All the characters involved in the play are alive. But the sentence doesn’t address them; it addresses us. We all collaborated in a way or another, and our trauma is our witness. In the present we make wrong political decisions. It is a consequence of this trauma of the communism. To free from it would mean to become able to take morally responsible and correct decisions involving our society and our semblables. But the question how we can heal this trauma remains open. At the end of the performance re-enactment of the recent past is stirred. Still, I am uncertain any edification produces. Did the spectators went home and felt that their life needed a change? Will they be different tomorrow? Will they live the present in a way to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past? Are they changed in any way? The only art I can believe in is an art capable of changing ourselves and the world. Not as a social weapon, but as the transubstantiating power that turns dust into gold and the tax man into a writer of history, who heals the suffering, and makes the blind see again. I believe in an historical aesthetics, empowered in this way by either God or the Devil.

Marius L. CIURARU *

L'immagine della tradizione cristiana nella sfera pubblica europea secolarizzata **

Abstract: La tradizione religiosa cristiana non si oppone alla modernità politica, possedendo un tesoro di simboli che potrebbe arricchire la sfera pubblica contemporanea. La religione cristiana ha un'identità storica e la sua ideologia fa parte della sfera pubblica, avendo una ragione pubblica. L'obiettivo dello studio è di presentare un'ermeneutica della secolarizzazione e della tradizione religiosa cristiana che si trova oggi di fronte alla possibilità di giocare un ruolo creativo dentro una sfera pubblica permeabile ai valori e ai diritti fondamentali dell'uomo.

Keywords: Secularism, Religion, Democracy, Public sphere, European Union

1. Fenomenologia della secolarizzazione

Uno dei fenomeni culturali di Europa di oggi è il ritorno del sacro in un contesto apparente secolarizzato e laicizzato.¹ La dimensione religiosa dell'esistenza umana non ha perso il suo significato sociale e la sua forza culturale. Una caratteristica della democrazia è l'esistenza di un pluralismo risonabile. Democrazia permette in maniera più ampia ai suoi attori di esprimere la loro identità dentro la sfera pubblica. La religione è una ragione pubblica. Una ragione è pubblica quando è la ragione dei cittadini liberi e uguali, il suo oggetto è il bene pubblico, la natura e il suo contenuto sono espressi attraverso un ragionamento pubblico.² Lo stesso Rawls considerava che questa sfera sia definita nelle società democratiche dalle domande politiche fondamentali, dai politici, dalle concezioni politiche e la loro applicabilità, e dal concetto di reciprocità.³ Il rapporto fra la sfera pubblica e la tradizione religiosa è sottoposto a un radicale cambiamento, che porterà

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¹ Cfr Teofil Tia, *Reîncreștinarea Europei? Teologia religiei în teologia și misiologia occidentală contemporană*, (Alba Iulia: Editura Reîntregirea, 2003), 12ss.

² La sua ragione è pubblica in tre modi: come ragione dei cittadini liberi e uguali, il suo oggetto e il bene pubblico, la sua natura e il suo contenuto sono espressi attraverso una ragione pubblica. Cfr John Rawls, *Ideea de rațiune publică reconsiderată*, In Camil Ungureanu (ed.), *Religia în democrație*, (Iași: Polirom, 2011), 27.

³ *Ibidem*, 27.

all'apparizione di una ultra modernità, vista come la demitologizzazione della modernità.⁴ Il ruolo delle tradizioni religiose nello spazio pubblico è spogliato dal loro contenuto sacro e dogmatico, ed è esposto alla giurisdizione nella sua dimensione pubblica. Pertanto, la religione rimane un elemento primario dello spazio pubblico europeo e di ogni nazione, perché la sua fenomenologia è pure una comunitaria,⁵ anche se la contemporaneità la interpreta come una scelta individuale, personale e privata. Come possono coesistere le due prospettive? La definizione di un modello di coabitazione la deve suggerire la sfera pubblica della società democratica.⁶

La religione non può essere ridotta a essere un oppONENTE della modernità della politica, avendo un tesoro di risorse simboliche che non appartiene in totalità alla politica. La diversità della tradizione religiose cristiane in un'Europa unita può giocare un ruolo importante nella sfera pubblica nella misura in quale le tradizioni sono riconosciute come *partner* nella messa in pratica di alcuni progetti pubblici. La sussidiarietà è una forma di *public partnership*, e questa non può negare il ruolo e l'attività delle tradizioni religiose.

Ogni individuo concepisce al livello personale un modello esistenziale morale o spirituale che lo ispira e lo motiva. Ogni persona vive in conformità con una concezione privata sulla prosperità umana definita dalle interrogazioni fondamentali della razione: che cosa è una vita piena? Che cosa fa una vita degna di essere vissuta?

Le risposte a queste domande hanno avuto fin alla modernità come fonte le tradizioni religiose. La secolarizzazione non deve essere vista come una negazione del divino, ma come un periodo nel quale sono indagati i documenti della sua identità. Taylor⁷ propone tre significati per la secolarizzazione: la delimitazione della fede alla sfera dell'individualità, una pratica religiosa debole e la possibilità di assumere o rifiutare una credenza religiosa.⁸ L'ultimo significato può essere considerato il più sviluppato. Le cause di questa deviazione intellettuale sono state provocate dai cambiamenti concettuali all'interno dei gruppi elitisti e dalla riforma protestante, che hanno fatto nascere una visione antropocentrica dell'ordine morale fondata sulla disciplina e il beneficio reciproco.⁹

⁴ Cfr Jean Paul Willaime, *Europe et religions. Les enjeux de XXI siècle*, (Paris: Fayard, 2004), 11ss.

⁵ Horia Roman Patapievici, *Despre politică, religie și naționalism*, Idei în dialog 10/13 (octombrie 2005): “O veritabilă religie, chiar dacă este exercitată numai privat, nu poate fi doar privată.”

⁶ Un modello è il Preambolo della Costituzione della Polonia. Cfr Joseph Weiler, *Un Europa Cristiana – un saggio esplorativo*, (Milano: Marsilio 2003).

⁷ Cfr Charles Taylor, *The Secular Age*, (Cambridge: Universit Press, 2007).

⁸ Nella antica Grecia l'individuo che non credeva in divinità era cacciato fuori dalla città, essendo visto come un pericolo per i giovani. Cfr Anton Adamuț, *Fenomenologia celuilalt*, (București: Academia Română, 2011), 152-153.

⁹ Cfr Charles Taylor, *op. cit.*

La trasformazione dell'epoca moderna e contemporanea è stata definita come la tappa del disincantessimo del mondo.¹⁰ L'ordine morale moderno ha come sorgente le teorie del diritto naturale del XII-simo secolo.¹¹ L'idea di questo paradigma propone il rispetto e il servizio reciproco fra i singoli della società. Taylor identifica tre tratti di questa società: la società politica è uno strumento per assicurare la qualità della vita degli individui, la stessa società permette agli individui di farsi dei servizi liberi, e la finalità della società politica sono i diritti individuali. Questa visione dell'ordine morale ha prodotto una profonda trasformazione dell'imaginario sociale.¹² Le dimensioni che hanno subito trasformazioni sono: la economia, la sfera pubblica, e la sovranità popolare. La sfera pubblica si definisce come lo spazio comunitario, dove i membri della società s'incontrano per discutere i problemi d'interesse comune. Questa sfera implica tutti gli individui della comunità e qui la società può elaborare una teoria abbracciata dalla maggioranza. A causa della sua riflessività e criticità, la sfera pubblica ha ricevuto un valore normativo per le azioni politiche. Questa relazione di dipendenza, tra azione politica e sfera pubblica appare sempre di più come un tratto costitutivo della società libera.

La modernità significa *l'uscita dalla religione*,¹³ cioè l'abbandono di un modello nel quale la religione era strutturante. Il nuovo ruolo della religione nelle società moderne non è definito di concetti come laicizzazione o secolarizzazione. Per lo stesso Gauchet, il primo termine descrive l'evoluzione della relazione tra Chiesa cattolica e Stato, mentre il secondo presenta il ruolo che la chiesa ha nei paesi protestanti nella sfera pubblica.¹⁴ Interpretando Gauchet, Manet considera che la separazione tra la Chiesa e lo Stato è lo stampo della democrazia moderna,¹⁵ dimostrando che la storia europea gravita intorno alla relazione difficile, spesso conflittuale, fra l'istanza politica e religiosa.¹⁶ Il culmine della separazione tra le due entità è stato il Concilio Vaticano secondo, quando la religione incomincia di lasciarsi assorbita dalla democrazia e smette di essere istanza di una verità oggettiva al quale i credenti dovevano obbedire.

¹⁰ Cfr Marcel Gauchet, *Ieșirea din religie*, (București: Humanitas, 2006).

¹¹ Cfr Ugo Grozio, *Il diritto della guerra e della pace. Prolegomeni e Libro primo*, (Padova: Wolters Kluwer, 2010); Samuel von Pufendorf, *Of the Law of Nature and Nations: Eight Books*. (New York: Aris, 2008); John Locke, *Questions Concerning the Law of Nature*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).

¹² Immaginario collettivo è tutto quello che fa possibile le pratiche comune in contesto riconosciuto e accettato.

¹³ Cfr Marcel Gauchet, *op. cit.*, 5ss.

¹⁴ Cfr *Ibidem*, 11-12.

¹⁵ Manent P. Identifica sei separazioni: delle professioni, del potere, della Chiesa dalla Stato, della società dallo Stato, del reprezentante, della scinza dai valori. Cfr Pierre Manent, *O filosofie politică pentru cetățean*, București: Humanitas 2003, 36.

¹⁶ Cfr *Ibidem*, p. 25.

Il ruolo della religione è stato diminuito dalla visione razionale sul mondo.¹⁷ Durkheim credeva che la religione non sia solo un sistema d'idee e credenze, ma anche un sistema di azione che implica riti simbolici con la funzione di mantenere la coesione sociale. Una volta con l'apparizione delle società industriale diverse persone o organizzazioni lavorano nei campi che appartenevano una volta alla chiesa (salute, educazione o politica). Weber, come Durkheim, ha costruito profezie di secolarismo, che avevano come culmine la sparizione della religione dal spazio pubblico. Mills ha accreditato pure questo itinerario: il sacro sparirà dappertutto, con l'eccezione dello spazio privato.¹⁸ Una reinterpretazione del ruolo della secolarizzazione l'hanno fatta Inglehart și Norris. Essi, in seguito ai dati statistici, considerano che le persone che vivono in medi vulnerabili abbiano più considerazione per i valori religiosi, mentre nelle società con un grado alto di sicurezza il sacro non è valorizzato. Cosicché, come il numero delle persone che credono sono più numerose, si può concludere che la secolarizzazione è in regresso.¹⁹

La secolarizzazione come fenomeno autonomo nello spazio politico o sociale è stata focalizzata anche da altre teorie. Luckman considerava la secolarizzazione come un effetto di alcuni cambiamenti ampi e non come un declino del sentimento religioso. Indipendente dal *seculum* esiste una religione invisibile, situata nel privato, motivata di esperienze oggettive.²⁰ La religione per Wilson, tranne la finalità salvifica, ha anche altre funzioni che purtroppo sotto la pressione della modernità svaniscono. Così la religione non è più un fattore d'integrazione sociale delle comunità, e il potere o la giustizia si autolegittima. Comunque la secolarizzazione si presenta come un fenomeno evolutivo che razionalizza progressivamente alcune dimensioni della vita.²¹

Berger considerava che la secolarizzazione consista nella sottrazione di alcune parti sociali dall'autorità dei simboli religiosi. La soggettività della secolarizzazione è data dal regresso della sua autorità nella sfera dell'individualità, mentre la sua oggettività consiste nella riduzione della radicalizzazione delle identità religiose.²² La diminuzione quantitativa della partecipazione alle pratiche religiose pubbliche fu l'argomento per quale

¹⁷ Cfr Max Weber, *Etica protestantă și spiritul capitalismului*, București 1993.

¹⁸ Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination*, (Oxford: University Press, 1959), 33.

¹⁹ Cfr Ingleahrt Ronald-Norris Pippa, *Sacred and Secular. Religion and Politics Worldwide*, (Cambridge: University Press, 2004), 5.

²⁰ Cfr Theodor Luckman, *The Invisible Religion*, (London: MacMillan Publishing, 1967).

²¹ Cfr Bryan Ronald Wilson, *Religion in Secular Society. A Sociological Comment*, (London: Penguin Books, 1966).

²² Cfr Peter Berger, *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion*, (New York: Garden City, 1967).

Acquaviva ha considerato la secolarizzazione essendo come una perdita dei significati sacri solo della sfera pubblica.²³

2. La sfera pubblica europea e le tradizioni religiose cristiane

La relazione tra le tradizioni religiose e la sfera pubblica ha una forma quasi uniforme. Ferrari²⁴ identifica i seguenti tratti di questo pattern: la neutralità dello stato verso la religiosità dell'individuo, liberalismo delle attività pubbliche fatte delle istituzioni religiose e la giurisdizione laica sopra la religione. Questo modello può essere identificato non solo nella cultura politica, ma anche al livello nazionale o sovra nazionale.²⁵

Creare una definizione dell'Unione Europea che tenga conto di tutte le identità nazionali, regionale, religiose e linguistiche e molto difficile, a causa delle pluralità religiose e del rispetto dell'alterità. Un simile modello dovrebbe certamente definire quei valori che potrebbero esser assumiate da ogni tradizione. Una prova è stata articoli due del *Trattato d'istituzione una costituzione per Europa*; essa proponeva i seguenti valori: dignità umana, libertà, democrazia, ugualità. Questi valori sono comuni agli stati membri in una società caratterizzata di pluralismo, tolleranza,²⁶ giustizia e mancanza di discriminazione. Quest'articolo menziona valori universali, specifici per ogni tradizione religiosa nello spazio nazionale.

Europa del XX-simo secolo è stata marcata profondamente sia dalla costruzione dell'istituzione europea incominciando da 1957, sia dall'identità dei due blocchi ideologici. Dopo la caduta del comunismo, gli effetti della schisma di 1054 si sono fatti presenti, perché l'appartenenza confessionale rappresenta un elemento d'identità. L'entrata degli stati ortodossi nell'UE è stata la fonte dell'apparizione di alcune soluzioni momentanee per superare le dissonanze confessionale. Così si è messo l'accento sul primo millennio cristiano, privo di identità istituzionale; Giovanni Paolo II nella enciclica *Slavorum apostoli* sottolineava la qualità di protettore di Europa anche dei santi Cirillo e Metodio.²⁷ L'evidenza dell'importanza di questa eredità non nega il ruolo del rinascimento, della riforma o dell'illuminismo. Forse per

²³ Cfr Sabino Acquaviva, *L'eclissi del sacro nella civiltà industriale. Dissacrazione e secolarizzazione nella società industriale e postindustriale*, (Milano: Mondadori, 1991).

²⁴ Cfr Silvio Ferarri, *The New Wine and the Old Cask: Tolerance, Religion, and the Law in Contemporary Europe*, in Sajo Andras – Avineri Shlomo, *The Law of Religious Identity: Models for Post-Communism*, (The Hague: Springer, 1999).

²⁵ *Carte Universale dei Diritti dell'Uomo*, 1948: <http://www.ohchr.org>.

²⁶ Habermas considera che il sostantivo tedesco *Toleranz* sia stato preso dalle lingue latina e francese nel secolo XVI-simo, in un periodo di quere religiose. Nei secoli XVII-XVIII, il concetto di tolleranza acquisisce una connotazione giuridica. Cfr Jurgen Habermas, *Intolerance and Discrimination*, in International Journal of Constitutional Law, 1, 1.1.2003, 2-12.

²⁷ Per il ruolo delle due tradizione religiose cristiane cfr Christoph Von Schonbrun, *Oamenii, Biserică, țara. Creștinismul ca provocare socială*. (București: Anastasia, 2000).

questa razione il Preambolo del Trattato è rimasto neutra ed è stata scrutata dall'impregnazione di alcuni termini, come eredità cristiana, rinascita, riforma o illuminismo.

Nella costruzione europea ecumenismo cristiano ha avuto un ruolo importante. Le tradizioni religiose sono state dei fattori favorevoli all'integrazione europea. Europa d'oggi non può essere identificata solo con il cristianesimo e per quest'argomento sociologico deviene importante anche l'eredità non cristiana, per esempio quella musulmana.²⁸ Articolo 152 del *Trattato d'istituzione di una costituzione per Europa* riguardando il dialogo con le religioni prevede che questo deve essere aperto, trasparente e costante, anche se queste tradizioni mancano di uno statuto consultativo. Ogni tradizione attualizza la sua presenza sia attraverso i propri membri appartenenti alle strutture, sia attraverso varie istituzioni, tipo *Ufficio Cattolico d'Informazione e Iniziativa per Europa*.

Incominciando con l'ultima decade del secolo scorso il dialogo con le principali tradizioni, è stato promosso dai precedenti della *Commissione Europea*. Nel 1989 è stata fondata *Cellula di Prospettiva*, un servizio che si trova sotto la coordinazione del presidente, e aveva come scopo l'informazione delle chiese riguardando gli aspetti dell'integrazione europea. Un'altra perspettiva l'ha definita A. Delors attraverso un discorso fatto in 14 aprile 1992, considerando che se Europa non ottiene uno spirito e una spiritualità, l'unificazione sarà impossibile. Questa posizione è diventata ulteriormente le fondamenta dell'associazione *Un'anima per Europa*, che promuove i legami con le istituzioni europee e un forum di discussioni interconfessionale in uno spirito di tolleranza, apertura e rispetto reciproco. Da quest'associazione fanno parte *Commissio Episcopatum Communis Europei*, *Commissione Chiesa e società della Conferenza delle Chiese Europee*, *Conferenza dei Rabbini Europei*, *Federazione Umanista Europea*, *Consilio Musulmano di Cooperazione*, e *Ufficio della Patriarcato Ecumenico*. Ogni pensiero filosofico o religioso rappresentato istituzionalmente può diventare parte dell'associazione.

Romano Prodi ha trasformato *Cellula de Prospettiva* in *Gruppo dei Consiglieri Politici*, con lo scopo di aver in tempo reale informazioni chiare sulle implicazioni religiose delle attività politiche di UE. Il *Gruppo dei Consiglieri Politici* è formata dalle rappresentanze diplomatiche, associazioni ecumeniche e di convinzioni. I suoi gruppi di lavoro sono organizzati sulle specialità: economia, scienza, società, affari esterni, dialogo con religioni, chiese e organizzazioni umaniste.

Le attribuzioni delle organizzazioni religiose presenti vicino alle istituzioni UE sono: la sviluppo del dialogo fra fede e politica, la partecipazione al processo di definizione e l'applicazione delle politiche UE e li

²⁸ Jean Paul Willaime, *op. cit.*, 40.

informazione delle comunità religiose della situazione UE.²⁹ Per lo più, lo scopo non è solo la difesa degli interessi, ma l'implicazione ideatici nelle discussioni politiche. Incominciando con i dibattiti sull'istituzione di una costituzione per Europa di 2002, le tradizioni religiose cristiane hanno creato uno spazio di dialogo informale con le istituzioni europee.³⁰

3. L'attività di lobby delle tradizioni religiose cristiane

Di fronte agli effetti della secolarizzazione e delle sfide che porta il pluralismo religioso di Unione Europea, le chiese cristiane hanno fondato diverse istituzioni per fare azioni di lobby per i propri valori. Prima istituzione di questo tipo, *Conferenza delle Chiese Europee*, ha riunito gli ortodossi, anglicani e protestanti. I suoi obiettivi sono: l'eliminazione delle incriminazioni religiose, il riconoscimento dei diritti fondamentali, promozione dell'ugualità fra credenti e non credenti, promozione del dialogo inter religioso. Uno dei documenti più conosciuti della CCE è apparso in 2004, intitolato *La relazione di Unione Europea con Turchia*, considerava l'integrazione di questo paese musulmano come un processo d'armonizzazione dei valori delle due parti.

Consilio delle Conferenze dei Vescovi d'Europa è l'espressione di volontà della chiesa cattolica. Si è notato una collaborazione con la Conferenza delle Chiese Europee. Nel 1997 è stato un incontro sul tema Riconciliazione, dono di Dio e fonte di una nuova vita che ha implicato le Chiese nell'elaborazione di una dichiarazione che proibisce ogni forma di violenza e discriminazione, e invitava al riconoscimento dei diritti fondamentali. L'incontro di Strasburgo dal 2001 nasce la *Carta Ecumenica. Direttive per una collaborazione più forte tra Chiesa ed Europa*. Il documento non aveva un carattere legale o dogmatico, descriveva solo i compiti ecumenici e le direttive adiacenti. La Carta ha rilevato l'unità di fede delle chiese europee fondata sul credo di Nizza.³¹ In più, le chiese s'impegnavano a rispettare i diritti delle minoranze, allo sviluppo dell'educazione cristiana, alla rimozione del nazionalismo, di coltivare un impegno più forte nelle relazioni con i musulmani, di evitare la concorrenza e nazionalismo, e di diminuire le differenze tra Est e Ovest.

La *Commissione delle Diocesi di Comunità Europea* è nata per coltivare la relazione tra *Consiglio delle Conferenze dei Vescovi Cattolici* con la *Comunità*

²⁹ Cfr Noel Treanor, *Dieu et l'Europe, un heritage fondateur. Liberte religieuse et liberte politiquye dans les traites fondateur de la novelle Europe*, Colloque au Parlament Europeen, Bruxelle, 3 aprilie 2003.

³⁰ Sono stati organizzati seminari con temi di attualità. In più, sono state presentate al presidente Romani Prodi due proposte: costituzione di un dialogo strutturato e la creazione di un ufficio che faciliti la consultazione con le comunità religiose.

³¹ www.cec-kek.org.

europea. Nata in 1980 è stata preceduta dal Servizio cattolico europeo d'informazione pastorale. I suoi obiettivi sono: analisi del processo politico di UE, informazione della Chiesa Cattolica sulla politica dell'Unione e la crescita dell'impegno nel riflettere sopra le sfide dell'Europa unita.³² Nel 2002 questa istituzione ha pubblicato un documento con le proposte per il *Trattato d'istituzione di una costituzione per Europa*. Le proposte integrate sono state le seguenti: UE riconosce e rispetta il diritto delle chiese di organizzarsi in sintonia con il diritto nazionale e le proprie convinzioni; valida l'identità e la contribuzione alla vita pubblica delle tradizioni religiose con quali porterà un dialogo costante. Per lo più, la stessa istituzione alle elezioni di 2004, ha esortato i fedeli attraverso il documento *Una occasione unica che i nostri valori diventino realtà* di votare quelli che rispettano la vita e l'ambiente, l'unità della diversità, la famiglia e il dialogo con le tradizioni religiose. E prima del summit di Consilio Europeo dal 2005 ha elaborato il documento denominato Il rinforzo del modello sociale europeo con lo scopo di rinsaldare gli obiettivi della *Strategia di Lisbona*. Qui sì è posto l'accento sul ruolo della scienza per una vita migliore, ma anche della dignità della persona umana. Adesso si è accennata la coltivazione della cultura dell'ospitalità in contesto della migrazione e l'appoggio per l'integrazione della Turchia in UE. La prova del riconoscimento per gli sforzi di questa istituzione è stata data dall'incontro con presidente della commissione europea, Jean Claude Junker, nel maggio 2005.

La *Rappresentanza delle Chiese Evangeliche di Germania* contiene 24 chiese di Germania. Nata in 1990 ha una missione diplomatica e un obiettivo pastorale. Manifesta un approccio pragmatico verso istituzioni di ogni stato dell'UE. Spesso ha appoggiato le azioni della *Commissione delle Diocesi di Comunità Europea*.

Le rappresentanze delle Chiese Ortodosse a Bruxelles hanno come obiettivo la promozione degli interessi presso le istituzioni europei. Prima rappresentanza apparsa è stata quella della Patriarchia Ecumenica nel 1995 e ha lottato per la creazione di una commissione europea delle chiese ortodosse. Nell'1998 è nata la rappresentanza della chiesa greca, e nel 2002 di quella russa. La rappresentanza greca ha lavorato per il riconoscimento delle radici cristiane di Europa. La chiesa ortodossa rumena e quella bulgara non hanno una rappresentanza presso UE.

L'attività di lobby delle chiese al livello europeo è fatta in modo sistematico da *Conferenza delle Chiese Europee* e da *Consiglio delle Conferenze dei Vescovi d'Europa*. Le altre organizzazioni che sono in Bruxelles fanno un'attività di lobby senza avere uno statuto ben definito.³³

³² Cfr www.comece.org.

³³ Cfr Ramona Coman, *România și integrarea europeană*, (Iași: Institutul european, 2005), 155ss.

In conclusione, al fine di questo percorso si può vedere che l'attività di lobby è stata la principale risposta delle tradizioni religiose cristiane di fronte alle sfide dell'Europa unita. Anche se la secolarizzazione contemporanea nega il ruolo pubblico e storico della religione cristiana, essa rappresenta una fonte della democrazia europea essendo parte della razione pubblica.

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Liviu URSACHE *

Origen's interpretational framework **

Abstract: Hermeneutics is not only a science, detached from the personal life of the interpreter, but is, actually, the basis for one's own development. This is Origen's main argument. Although his genius was never question either by his contemporaries or throughout centuries, the focus of his interpretation was not an intellectual but a spiritual one. He believed the interpreter needs to find the transformational truth that lies behind the concepts of the text. Origen was all in favor for the exegesis, for the grammatical-historical approach to the text, and this constitute the basis for his exegesis. However, he would press the interpretation a step further, as he was looking for principles that would benefit the interpreter. Henri de Lubac named this approach an ontological hermeneutic. I will refer to the work of this French philosopher and theologian, as an authoritative figure in the interpretation of the alexandrine writer.

Keywords: Literal, Spiritual, Understanding, Interpretation, Framework, Concept, Image

Speaking of Origen's writings, Renosaid that it is like staying under a waterfall¹. This refers to the vastness of his works as well as to the difficulty one finds in discovering a model of interpretation within the books he wrote. Origen was quite a controversial personality, most of the times the accusations against him are based on false assumptions in regarding to what he wrote or how he lived. Origen's genius could only be observed only if the context of his writings is taken in consideration. Henri de Lubac said „It is useless to wonder what exactly one of the ancients would do if he were suddenly transported among us, in totally different conditions, discovering curiosities that his era did not know [...] There is no way to respond to such question.”² The French theologian commented further on this issue:

Aside from other considerations, the number of centuries that separates us from his work should warn us sufficiently that, in order to conserve or to rediscover the spirit in it, we must consent to drop much of what he says

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¹ Reno R. Russell, „Origen and spiritual interpretation”, in *Pro ecclesia* 15, 2006, p. 108.

² Henri de Lubac, *History and Spirit*, San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2007, pp. 429-30.

literally, that is, much of all of this appearance on the basis of which we are first tempted to judge it and without which we could most certainly not define it.³

Even though the reconstruction of the original situation is a utopia, the interpreter still needs to do his part in understanding it, so that he could be nearly as close to what Origen thought. Henri de Lubac was fascinated by Origen and by his writings that he spent nearly 20 years in understanding his approach to interpretation. In his book *History and Spirit*, De Lubac defends the alexandrine writer and provides the reader a framework to understand the interpretation of Origen.

1. Origen's interpretative paradigms

John Mckenzie said that Origen's approach to interpretation is not find only in his two main books on interpretation, namely, *Peri Archon* and *Contra Celsus*, but also in his homilies.⁴ Henri de Lubac agrees with Mckenzie and believes that the interpreter needs to also approach Origen's homilies in order to understand his interpretational framework. The reason why is that these are exegetical applications for the principles mentioned in the books above.⁵

Henri de Lubac provides three paradigms to understand Origen. The interpreter needs to dig in deeply in the work of Origen in order to discover his system of interpretation as this is not very obvious. He labeled these paradigms, but he was not very concerned about the form as for the content. De Lubac even said that „for he who is the concerned with the truth names and terminologies are less important”⁶ (Origen 1885, 376). He understood, however, the need for systematization and these three schemes that would be presented below try to capture Origen's interpretational system. The first one is known, being specifically mentioned by Origen but the other two are deduced by Henri de Lubac.

First system is mentioned in both *Peri Archon*⁷ (Origen 1885, 359) and Origen's homilies. It takes the form of “historical-moral-mystical”:

By itself, the historical sense has a limited usage and, sometimes, it does not nourish the soul; the moral sense is like milk, very useful for children, and the mystical sense is the food for the mature, for the one who is grown up. First —

³ *Ibidem*, p. 427.

⁴ John L. McKenzie, „A Chapter in the History of Spiritual Exegesis: De Lubac's *Histoire et Esprit*”, in *Theological Studies*, 11, 1950, p. 365.

⁵ Henri de Lubac, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-38.

⁶ Origen, *Peri Archon*, 4.27. Edited by Philip Schaff, Grand Rapids: Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 1885, p. 376.

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 359.

moralis locus (moral lesson) – is proper for the Christians from Corinth; the second– *misticus intellectus* (mystical lessons) – for those of Ephesus.⁸

The second, “historical-mystical-moral”, even though is terminological similar to the first paradigm, it is conceptually different. It appeared as a necessity in the interpretation of the Old Testament. The first element, historical, is mutual to the first scheme. The difference comes with the other two components. Thus, the “mystical” element implies a typology, while “moral” would take the same element from the first paradigm but at a different level, that of typology. In dealing with Gospels, Origen thought that the same interpretation needs to be sought out as with Old Testament. The most important component is the spiritual one. Even if in the New Testament the things are much clearer the meaning is deep,,some passages are simple and easy to understand but in reality they are profound and mysterious”⁹.

Henri de Lubac identifies one more interpretation trichotomy: „shadow-image-truth” or „past-present-future”. This is absolute necessary, especially in the interpretation of the New Testament, as the fulfillment of what is written is a future event and expresses the Christian’s hope.

Origen thought that these three interpretational paradigms do not necessarily corresponds, as they were thought for long, to the structure of human constitution: body, soul and spirit but rather a pedagogical end:

Each one, then, ought to describe in his own mind, in a threefold manner, the understanding of the divine letters,—that is, in order that all the more simple individuals may be edified, so to speak, by the very body of Scripture; for such we term that common and historical sense: while, if some have commenced to make considerable progress, and are able to see something more (than that), they may be edified by the very soul of Scripture. Those, again, who are perfect, and who resemble those of whom the apostle says, “We speak wisdom among themhat are perfect, but not the wisdom of this world, nor of the princes of this world, who will be brought to nought; but we speak the wisdom of God, hidden in a mystery, which God hath decreed before the ages unto our glory”¹⁰.

⁸ Origen, *Homilies 1-14 on Ezekiel*. Edited and translated by Thomas Scheck, New Jersey: Newman Press, 2010, p. 108. Christians from Corinth were known to be the most immature of Apostle Paul’s epistles recipients, while those from Ephesus could be entrusted with a more substantial message.

⁹ Origen, *Commentary on Matthew*. Edited by Thomas P. Scheck, Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2008, p. 124.

¹⁰ Origen, *Peri Arbon*, ed. cit., p. 359.

2. Origen and his Christological interpretation

Origen's threefold interpretation paradigm is a theology rather than an exegesis, in the way we understand this term today. He is likely to take the Scripture as a whole rather than to exegete each individual passage. He thought that the exegetical idea cannot be separated from the overview.¹¹ Origen tends to ignore the human author of the Scripture. He thought that, even though the prophets or the patriarch had the knowledge of the revelation, they could not express it in words, but rather through symbols and typologies.¹² Origen believed that people the authors express themselves through concept but it takes personal discipline, and in the case of Scripture personal devotion, in order to understand the spirit behind the words.

The literalness of the Scripture seems irreconcilable with the abstracts of Origen's theological system and it is easy to presuppose that the unity of the two things in Origen's conception force him into arbitrary interpretation.

Let us not fear to affirm that Origen is in fact a moralist, whose exegesis is constantly oriented toward morality. For what is important in his eyes is, not to speculate on the profound meaning of the Bible, but to receive it with a living faith and to "adapt one's conduct to the words of truth" it contains.¹³

Everything in Scripture is prophetic because it reveals Jesus. In a way, every saint in the Old Testament is a typology for Him. His preoccupation for theophany determines him to make unusual interpretations.¹⁴ Our Lord, one in nature, appears everywhere in the Scripture in different angles, every person or prophetic event showing one of His traits.¹⁵ Spiritual interpretation is necessary especially in dealing with the Old Testament, although here and there, this is true with the New Testament also. With Origen there is no exegesis but rather a Christology. This is more obvious as he lived in the early days of the church. Consequently the Christian tradition, in which he is an authentic link, owes to him more than to any other of its other doctors the forms in which it has been perpetuated down to our times.¹⁶

Henri de Lubac considers that Origen's master is not Philo but rather Christ Jesus himself, who is the key for the interpretation of Old Testament. All mysteries of Old Testament are hidden in Him.

¹¹ Origen, *Commentary on John*, Books 1-10, 1.15. Edited by Ronald E. Heine, Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1989, p. 33.

¹² Henri de Lubac, *op. cit.*, pp. 258-59.

¹³ *Ibidem*, p. 211.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 197-201.

¹⁵ Origen, *Homilies on Genesis and Exodus*. Edited by Ronald E. Heine, Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2002, p. 196.

¹⁶ Henri de Lubac, *op. cit.*, p. 204.

He is looking for this unique, general, essential relationship, then, and naturally he finds symbols of it everywhere in the Holy Books. In this, his ingenuity is at its greatest, and we would often like it to be less subtle. But his creative virtuosity of which he gives proofs and which, in most cases, can seem to us as gratuitous as it is personal, is always exercised in a more or less direct way, at the service of the same profound intuition, of the same great fundamental truth received from tradition and perpetually deepened.¹⁷

3. Origen and the relationship between his historical and spiritual interpretations

Origen is best known for his allegorical interpretation. However, he was not the pioneer of this method. It has its origins in the Alexandrian Jewish community, who tried to reconcile the mosaic writings with the Greek philosophy. It was natural that the Christian interpretation would be influenced by the interpretation of the day, namely, the allegory. This would allow the interpreters to make the Old Testament a Christian book. This is the more important as the church was made up not only of Jews but of non-Jews also. Old Testament would have been useless if it had been only a Jewish book. Clement, before Origen, is the first who would give a scientific form to the allegorical interpretation.

For Henri de Lubac, Origen's interpretation was a response to the tendency of exegesis in his time. He pleaded for the traditional way of interpretation. He thought that both rationalism and liberal Protestantism have brought a new emphasis in the biblical exegesis, a component that is interested more in the mechanics of the exegesis.¹⁸

Origen identified two attitudes in interpretation: one objective but impersonal, whom he calls correct, but incomplete and the other, dynamic, which considers that Scripture has an alive message. This second approach is dangerous if not based on the former.¹⁹ Both approaches are present in the work of Origen and, for this reason, Henri de Lubac considers him a model one could follow in the interpretation in a time in which biblical exegesis had to suffer as it became a pure scientific exegesis, separated from the personal life of the interpreter and of the community. It is important to notice that one interpretation does not rule out the other, as wisdom could be acquired through different ways of interpretation.²⁰

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 195.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 432.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 436.

²⁰ Origen, *Homilies on Joshua*. Edited by Cynthia White, Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2002, p. 90.

4. Origen defends the literal sense

It is imperative to state that Origen was not against the literal or historical sense. On the contrary, he considered that we „first need to show the literal meaning of it and then strive to lift the mystical veils from it.”²¹ Henri de Lubac believed that Origen’s exegesis was as literal as it could be because it agreed with rabbinical interpretation, which considered that no word is randomly placed in a text; even the word order is essential. Everything that was written, all little details are important, although it is pointless to find meaning in all the details.

I understand this saying to mean that histories are indeed recounted but that the point is not to tell the story but to devise mysteries. In other words, the sacred author or the Holy Spirit himself does not recount these events for the empty pleasure of recounting.²²

Although Origen pleads for the spiritual sense, as we could see in the following section, he always tried to tie it to the literal sense. He said that the texts: „all contain divine depths, but, the majority also keep their literal sense. Thus, even the text of the story edifies as all.”²³ Only after we have said that we could ask what hidden truths are there in the text “what allegory could be deduced from the passage.”²⁴

Origen questioned the literal sense of less passages than it was believed to, and even less than it seems to show: “very far from eliminating or scorning history, Origen is content to maintain it intact and to defend it, so to speak, in its raw state. He seeks to ‘understand’ it, as he himself says to us. He seeks the ‘truth’ of it.”²⁵

For Origen, the historical truth of the incarnated Logos is the fundamental presupposition, even though he does not say it very often. He defends the historical truth, a fundamental antithesis with Philo, and with Greeks, in general. A huge difference between the two interpreters from Alexandria is that for Philo history does not make sense, especially in the Jewish practices as he did not believe in a Messiah. Things are different with Origene.

²¹ Henri de Lubac, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

²² *Ibidem*, p. 133.

²³ Origen, *Homilies on Numbers*. Edited by Thomas P. Scheck, Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2009, p. 122.

²⁴ Origen, *Homilies on Genesis and Exodus*, ed. cit., pp. 57-69

²⁵ Henri de Lubac, *op. cit.*, p. 317.

5. Origen pleads for the spiritual sense.

Moving from concept to image

Even though he defended the historical sense, Origen believed that scientific exegesis cannot reveal all the aspects of the text, even though the interpreter exercises faith. Spiritual interpretation is the most important and is also for those who are mature because it reveals mysteries. It is the “breath of Christian life as it translates its rhythm”.²⁶ The development of the spiritual sense is “more important in his work than the mystical sense, which serve as its basis.”²⁷

This reasoning, in substance, goes as follows: If there had not been beneath the letter, a hidden intention of the Holy Spirit that goes beyond what it says, this letter itself would often be unbelievable, whether because what it offers is sometimes shocking or because of its banality. We would then be dealing with a mere fable, a bit of gossip. But – and this is the second point of reasoning, which more than one has failed to note – the spiritual sense, which gives the text its true value, justifies the letter of it in its very literalness.²⁸

Origen affirms in *Homilies on Leviticus*: „I believe that the greatness of mysteries exceeds our capacity of explain it. However, even if we are not able to explain all things, we believe that all things are full of mysteries.”²⁹ He agrees that this characteristic of the text cannot count against its historicity: the Spirit cannot destroy the letter.

Henri de Lubac said about Origen’s way of viewing allegory:

When he seeks something spiritual beneath an event or a perceptible reality, it is not at all for him the question of substituting a metaphor for the literal sense, an arbitrary accommodation for the natural sense. It is solely a question of discovering the meaning of this event or this thing, the final reason this event took place, the final reality of which this thing is the anticipated symbol.³⁰

This was Origen’s presupposition: „the Scriptures were written by the Spirit of God, and have ameaning, not such only as is apparent at first sight, but also another, which escapes the noticeof most. For those (words) which are written are the forms of certain mysteries, and the images of divine things.”³¹

²⁶ *Ibidem*, 240.

²⁷ *Ibidem*, 247.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, 121.

²⁹ Origen, *Homilies on Leviticus*, Edited by Gary Wayne Barkley, Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1990, p. 66.

³⁰ Henri de Lubac, *op. cit.*, p. 413.

³¹ Origen, *Peri Archan*, ed. cit., p. 241.

Origen believed in the teaching of the Scripture concerned the spiritual interpretation: „how would it be possible to accept his Letters as inspries if one claimed to hold to the letter of Scripture, despite their very clear teaching?”³² He draws a parallel between the historical and spiritual sense, on one hand and the two natures of Christ on the other hand: human and divine. The Logos of Philo, just as that of the stoics, penetrates as a sharp sword in the amorphous substance, where things are mixed up, in order to organize it and give it an intelligible appearance.³³

For Origen, the spiritual sense was not just a method of interpretation but a way of thinking. Soul and Scripture inform mutually. I would be a mistake to study one without the other; they are like two books that need to be read together. Not only the soul, but the entire universe needs to be interpreted spiritually, as there is a fundamental connection between universe and Scripture. Thus, Henri de Lubac sees the interpretation of Origen in harmony with the tradition of church in interpretation. De Lubac draws a correspondence between Origen's allegory and that of Apostle Paul in order to rule out any doubt in fitting the former's interpretation within the Christian boundaries.

De Lubac admits that sometimes Origen denies the historicity of the things described in Scripture. He believed that not everything that is in it could be taken literally; some passages, not many, have a solely spiritual sense.³⁴ These are either more difficult to interpret or contain some historical discrepancies. Origen believed that when there are such things the spiritual sense can solve the dilemma. Celsie comments: „due to his method of interpretation, Origen ruled out the implausible and the contradictions of the literal sense.”³⁵

Origen, however, would appeal to the spiritual sense at last.³⁶ He believed that some events have a strict mystical goal. What is the use of the cruel wars if there would be no mystical sense? Or what is the point of the genealogies, if they don't help out the reader? Origen believed that he who studies the Scripture needs to abandon the objective point of view, which is quite impersonal and too intellectual. Scripture is not a document given to a historian or a thinker, even though he is a believer. It is a word that presupposes the beginning of a dialogue. More precisely, it is God who offers Himself through it and in return He expects more just a simple response, He looks for a change in the attitude.

³² Henri de Lubac, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

³³ Origen, *Homilies on Leviticus*, ed. cit., p. 29.

³⁴ Henri de Lubac, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

³⁵ George Celsie, *Gândirea creștin – filosofică a lui Origen în De Principiis și urmările ei până la jumătatea secolului al vi-lea*, Cluj-Napoca: Editura Limes, 2002, p. 37.

³⁶ Origene, *Homilies on Ezekiel 1-14*. Edited by Thomas Scheck, New Jersey: The Newman Press, 2010, pp. 55-56.

6. Conclusion

Origen believed that interpretation is a spiritual exercise. The literal interpretation would be the first step one needs to take in order to understand a text. But the interpreter needs not stop at this level. Even if one examines the letter in the best way possible, he still needs to implore the spirit to understand the mysteries contained in them. Spiritual exegesis is the next step, and the last, in interpretation. The exegete would need to ask God to help him out “to understand the sense of the Scripture.”³⁷

Origen’s exegesis is a relational process. The most important relation is with the author, which is Christ, in the case of Scripture. Origen believed that understanding is not a problem of the intelligence of mind but a problem of the purity of heart, of integrity and simplicity. A materialistic loaded heart is incapable of discerning Scripture and the mystery of salvation: “The ambition, spiritual hunger, laborious research and prayers should have priority in the preparation of the soul to receive spiritual nourishment from God that gives it at the right time.”³⁸ Thus, for Origen, exegesis is not only an exercise to understand the concepts in the text but a discipline in conforming to the image of Christ.

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Frăguța ZAHARIA *

From individual to the Human being, On Dignity and Love in the vision of Constantin Micu Stavila **

Abstract: The claim of philosophical thinking to tackle the problem of human dignity and, in general, of human instilling in the order and harmony with itself, with the world and with the divine is a nucleus question for the present reflection, too. In the globalizing context with its obvious crisis of identity and self, no less with the loss of moral reference, there is a valuable content to be emphasized by reading the work of the Romanian philosopher Constantin Micu Stavila. Developing his career especially in France, this author of the 20th century offers a pathway to overcoming the moral deadlock and to move on toward the self-accomplishment: the real discovering of the personal life, finally. Starting from the human condition's diagnosis like „internal emptiness”, „negation spectrum”, and „mental ruin”, Constantin Micu Stavila realizes a critique of the contemporary technical civilization and of the humanity crisis, which facilitated a sort of renunciation to the metaphysical value of reason. In this paper I try to expose and to argue the point of view of Micu Stavila upon dignity, by an analysis of the relation between individuality and love that marks the noncontradictory identity and the development of the person. Love represents the key access to the affirmation of dignity, and to the dynamics of personal life within the intersection of faith élan and metaphysics” passion.

Keywords: Constantin Micu Stavila, Self-Conscience, Dignity, Faith, Love, Individual and Collective, Freedom

The pretence of philosophical thinking regarding the possibility to render the dignity of the human being, man's instauration in order, in harmony to himself, the world and divinity remains the core of current issues. The circumstances which led to the identity crisis and self-defining, the loss of traces regarding life phenomena and moral deeds are the premises of this study which brings to attention the reflections of Constantin Micu Stavila¹.

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¹ Constantin Micu Stavila (1914, Moinești – 2003, București), *Magna cum laude* PhD in philosophy (București, 1942), was educated in the spirit of German thinking and accomplished himself in the French, always reporting to Orthodox Christianity. He published by 1945:

The Romanian-French philosopher reveals a way of overcoming the moral deterrent towards self-accomplishment in dignity – the genuine discovery of personal life. *Man's dignity lies in the exercise of freedom, which guarantees his disengagement from the conditioning of the environment and necessities* (Micu Stavila 1943, 14).

We will try to depict and fend for Constantin Micu Stavila's view on dignity in an analysis of the relationship between individuality and the love which highlights *the non-contradictory identity and the person's evolution*. The most complex act of knowledge and existence, love gives access to *the irreducible dynamics of personal life whose description intersects the zeal of faith to the passion for metaphysics* (Micu Stavila 2006, 111). Without love, namely the wish for goodness, truth, beauty – ultimate essence of it, God's mere power of being and creating would be completely worthless. The Christian meaning of the concept of love will make clear the character of dignity, written in the positive area of human feature.

1. Faith and Science

The phenomenological research on personal life undertaken by Constantin Micu Stavila has brought to our attention the fact that love is above any other manifestation. By its special quality of including all the possible ways of expressing the original ability to transcend and feel devotion, it unveils the human being able to assert himself in the very unit of consciousness, as a principle of relating and harmony, as consciousness of the world. The whole beauty and perfection of the climactic phenomenon of universal existence, love derives from the materialization of personal life. Indissolubly related to the human fate, it helps the human being to find his plenitude and

Sosirea Lavelor and *Psyche* (poems), *Die Relativität der Erkenntnis und das Suchen des Absoluten și Bibliographie der rumänischen Philosophie* (Leipzig), *Finalitatea ideală a existenței umane* (PhD thesis), *Homo ludens sau funcțiunea ideală a jocului și rolul lui în nașterea culturii*, *Problema umanismului din punct de vedere al spiritualității românești*, *Relația om-natură în concepția românească asupra lumii*, *Concepția poporului român despre dragoste*, *Originea creștină a problematicei filosofice moderne*, *Existența și adevăr*, *Valoarea ontologică a cunoașterii*. The university career stops at the position of lecturer (Faculty of Philosophy and Theology – București), as he was arrested. Between 1970 – 1975, cultural advisor for Société de l'Histoire du Protestantisme Français, he gives the lecture on General and Apologetic Philosophy at Faculté de Théologie Protestante (Paris); he organizes conferences at Centre Culturel Américain, together with: Paul Ricoeur, Gabriel Marcel, Jean Brun, André Dumas, Octavian Vuia, Pierre Emmanuel, Jacques Ellul, Hans-Georg Gadamer. He is a member of the Philosophy Committee at Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (1975-1980) and he publishes: *La Crise de l'idéologie industrielle de la Science*, *L'Appel Libérateur de l'Espace*, *La Revolte contre la nouvelle trahison des Ceres du XX-e siècle*, *Trente ans après Yalta*, *Un coup de théâtre philosophique*, *Le droit à la différence*, *Vers un nouvel art de penser et de vivre*, *Le Manifeste Poétique de l'Humanisme Roumain*, *L'avenir de la Roumanie à l'avant-garde de l'histoire* (Paris), *Descoperirea vieții personale* (posthumous, București).

accomplishment where the consciousness of individual uniqueness relishes in infinite appreciation. The acknowledgement of the accordance between individuality and love depends on the fact that we can only speak about love where we are able to create the most lively and genuine relationship, from one person to another, from soul to soul. Shown towards the self and the other humans, towards God and nature; physical, platonical, profane or divine is the love for something personal and alive which turns like that under the influence of love. Just like God-as-sum, impersonal or proven in a more-geometrical way cannot become an object of love, so humanity generally speaking – a collective, abstract and dead – opposes love.

The fundamental rapport of love, supposed to be present where this synthesizing power of existence is the Me – You relationship. The clue to the artificial character of situations, mechanisms, phenomena and general concepts in the economy of life is the inability to inspire love, as the ability to favour it shows the guarantee of a huge reserve of existential value. For example: the immense role played in the spiritual and mental life of the human being, the lively and personal relationship initiated by the changes in the metaphysical, religious, artistical sensitivity in comparison to the very feeble emotional response induced by the scientific discoveries. The former truths form roots and engage the soul in whatever it has more profound and intimate and they might turn into a long-lasting relationship, unlike the latter who remain at the periphery of spiritual life, keeping, as fatality, the punishment of not bearing fruit to any durable feeling. The zeal of great devotion and passion inspired by the beliefs and convictions coming from the soul is due to the fact that the heart is more personal than reason and the genuine personal emotion is almost all the time accompanied by sympathy and love. We do not refer to objective laws and phenomena, subject to quantitative and numerical grounds in the life attitude of that person who is aspiring towards beauty, philosophical wisdom or God, but to a subjective feeling, sensitive to the unique case. If the scientific world ignores the emotional and personal character of love, the philosophers, the enlightened ones in religious experience, the poets refer to it as “the main event of existence and the central planet of the world”. Real life sends us directly to deeds, individual cases and situations in which the importance of love increases – a sort of acknowledgement of the fact that it is an “attribute of the personal life, a part of it, a privilege of its free choice and consciousness” (Micu Stavila 2006, 143). It applies only to living creatures ables to find an attraction and exclusive value in sharing it by the most profound and sincere devotion and sympathy. As a first law of love, it is possible only when life ascends to the consciousness of its individual value. The moment we love, we are suddenly filled by an infinite personal, absolute and exclusive significance whereas losing it, felt as irremediable, shows the universal and infallible character of this law. In other words, the

main characteristic of love is treating the loved one with the whole attention and care, as if that person had a secret which entrals and subdues by exclusiveness and singularity. Consequently, love will never risk to lose its reason of being in order to change into a feeling of indifference and apathy, a state of collective leveling: concoction and confusion without awareness and decision. An intuition which calls for the individual, whose contrary is the situation described above, hatred excluded. The particular features of love are the ones which allow the exclusion of impersonal interpretations of love: the exclusiveness of the feeling and the uniqueness of the subject. Its origin cannot be an impersonally collective one as it develops only under conditions of individual choice and selection, repudiating repetition, generality and uniformity. All the attempts to give it an impersonal-collective function have proved to be absurd based on the metaphysical, sociological or biological considerations.

2. Against the biological theory of love

Constantin Micu Stavila brings at least two arguments to prove the falsity of the biological theory of love which searches to find in the general interest of the species which guides the individual and imposes the whole attitude towards life by the sexual instinct the origin of all the acts of enthusiasm and attachment in love. Firstly, as the genetical function does not seem to be closely related, is neither an exclusive appanage nor a servitude of the species which could not be carried out by the individual on his own. Secondly, the sexual behaviour represents only an inferior feature of love which does not deplete its true essence whose optimum expression takes the form of passion and spiritual life. This last fundamental error of confusing love in itself and sexual love would be enough to dismiss the idea of biological origin. Leaving aside the fact that love takes form in the supra-biological field and that the sexual instincts cannot determine its direction and reason, we nevertheless notice that its very form is not purely biological, reduced to the mechanism of an anonymous and impersonal function. The nuptial ceremonies represent different ways of showing to the individual off to his advantage in the most important moment of his life and monogamy illustrates in an excellent manner the independence of a person from the impersonal manners of the sexual instinct. The crucial role played by the biological manifestation of love is enhanced by the importance of the individual responsibility held in the reproduction act. The care and solicitude shown by the animals towards their offspring are like a measuring device for the increased manifestations of the genetical instinct seen in the act of individual responsibility. The great spiritual power of creation and devotion shown by love proves that the role played by the individual is not secondary and subsidiary, but a central role which includes both the choice

and preference, as well as responsibility and compliance. The people mostly endowed with concentration power and will, sagacity, detached from the system of collective relationships stand out due to their attachment and sacrifice abilities present in greater measure than for the ones with a regular behaviour. The creature of most individualised form, the man has proved to be the one mostly preoccupied with the huge responsibility of procreation which he has changed “out of momentary act of the individual into one that engages him for the rest of his life.”

A number of conditions as well as means by which the individual exteriorizes responsibility towards his offspring, such as family, property or education determines the creation of moral values together with the metamorphosis of the physical act of procreation into a “spiritual act of love and devotion” (Micu Stavila 2006, 148). Exerting the genetical function depending on man’s willingness and will highlights the role of the individual decision. Unlike the other necessary biological functions, it is not compulsory, it belongs to another category which is closer to duty than constraint. As procreation conveys a personal mission, it can be considered that it generates feelings related to love, in contradiction to the mission and function of the species which forces the individual to renounce grace, beauty, intelligence. In the chapter entitled “Metaphysics of love”, Schopenhauer argues in defence of the inutility and absurdity of tender feelings, denying any trace of decision, choice and responsibility in the satisfying of the instinct for procreation. The denial of personal value postulated by the thesis of impersonalism simultaneously leads to the denial of love and all the values of human existence. The most serious error in the supposition of the biological origin is giving love an impersonal origin and finality and confusing it for sexuality. The pretence of an exhaustive identification is not justified: although it might be said that both postulate the Me-You rapport as a condition of their accomplishment, from one person to another. If the erotic attention depends on the physical attraction, then “love is an homage to the person loved as a whole, regardless of age and sex” (Micu Stavila 2006, 150-151). Totally free and costless, love differs from the limited and subordinate sexuality. The relationship of attachment and exclusiveness, which is not based on an act of possession, as in sexuality, reflects the purity of the homage brought by love to the person and it eliminates the risk of any relationship of reciprocal domination and subjugation, incompatible with “the dignity of a free personality”. Its purpose being “the moral certainty of devotion” (Micu Stavila 2006, 151), not the illusion of material possessions, love will not be threatened by the loss of one self in the other. What ensures its independence from sexuality is the possibility to precede as well as to subsist sexuality and the inhibition of the latter underlines the free character of the former and it explains why the love free of jealousy and selfishness is the basis of sociability.

3. Against the social theory of love

As long as society constrains on collective and impartial relationships, love will not demand the individual to previously consent to any general and objective condition. The intelligence, merit, virtue, beauty, values which require it are its effects rather than its causes. As the value of the beloved object is forged by the lover in the very act of loving, this confirms that the love relationship is not conditioned by something objective or subjective. Being an independent and free act, a love relationship is more and more clear than a social one – a long conflict between the social mentality and the purity of the purposes of love is the history of the latter. In opposition to society, which reduces the meaning of free personality almost all the time, the drama of love comes from the persistent request for the absolute value of the appreciated person. Society rarely succeeds in “widening the social consciousness”, “agreeing to love and ascending to the height of its purposes”. It always seems that whatever is good and noble in a unitary group of people is only the consequence of gradual contamination with the spirit of love. Due to the fact that it engages the whole being, love scrutinizes deeper than society. Love is something “which is added by a sort of luxury and refinement to the social life and which does not take form necessarily from its essence” (Micu Stavila 2006, 153), since love precedes or springs from a more genuine and lively relationship than social life. To put it differently, the first addresses the individual, discovered in the plenitude of his personal life, the second aims at a disfigured individual, deprived of many features of his personal dignity. A love conceived by the needs or evolution of the social life would be one of the individual generally speaking, impersonal, abstract, hence social life owes to it all its great progress.

4. Opposition to the metaphysical impersonalism

Understanding the personal essence of love proves unable as well for the metaphysical impersonal theories. They see it as “a phenomenon which dissolves personality in the anonymity of a collective substance” (Micu Stavila 2006, 154). A drawback found in religion, too, in the Asian doctrines which gave “the most popular and depressing expression of lack of reality and value to the individual existence” (Micu Stavila 2006, 154-155). A fatal ignorance which goes even to claiming that the whole world, the total knowledge, even our own self are only deceit and illusion. A sort of blindness which places us in an “eternal state of enmity and struggle, effort and desire, fear and hope”, a source of despair, pain and humility. The individual personality is practically left aside, as separate and of its own, drowned in the nothingness of collective irresponsibility, refusing even the

slightest shade of human dignity. A gloomy accordance to the mentality of the adept of materialism and modern economical determinism, which is unable to accomplish himself as a free being and be responsible for his own deeds, to deepen the virtue and increase personal merit, to assume the risks of independent and creative life but is content to comply with the collective social conditions. An abusive, tiring, oppressive, exploiting and leveling system will make the decisions and think for him. Schopenhauer plays a decisive role in replacing the Christian individuality with the Buddhist impersonal manner. In *The World as Will and Representation* he reprimands the efforts made by Christianity to put the basis of “a moral of universal love and sympathy” on the principle of individuality, engaged in “overcoming the moral solipsism and acknowledging the value of the personality of the other as basis for his own personality” (Micu Stavila 2006, 155). Asked to fraternize in love as free, different people, with a real private life, the love lesson coming from Christianity in *You shall love your neighbour as yourself* relies on the personal differentiation between beings. Christianity does not diminish individuality, but it confirms it as the source of generous feelings and it plays a central part in the course of love. It postulates, in the name of personal value, the love for the other, but not in a principle of identity and confusion. “All the humans in the world, coexisting or successive (...), are nevertheless one and the same being which takes form in each of them and is identical everywhere” (Schopenhauer 1879, 185), it is Schopenhauer’s denial of the role of individuality as a decisive and self-reliant factor in the world which continues in stating that error and evil originate in the act of individual diversity. As a consequence, the ego can be recognized in a non-differentiated entity, it is discovered as identical to another and it might be capable of a moral life only if the effect of sympathy destroys any “form of consciousness left as personal independence” (Micu Stavila 2006, 157). If the sacrifice of freedom and own existence is the condition for the accomplishment of the moral ideal, then the principle of differentiation and individual variation is compromised for good, at the same time with undermining the personal basis of Christian civilization. Eduard von Hartmann, Wundt, Bourgeois, Secrétan, André Lalande², Emile Lasbax³ are only a few thinkers who have been quoted here and who do not see any other source of the moral life than the instincts of association and imitation, being seriously influenced by the Buddhist and Schopenhauer’s error.

Once the common feature of the impersonalist theories on love is known, we will study how they fall apart from the real understanding of

² The author states that the ultimate purpose of moral life is the path to identity and uniformity, by casting aside and denying individuality.

³ In *Le problème du mal*, Paris, 1919, declares that individuality is a source of the struggle, discord, evil and suffering in the world.

love and what is their common drawback. As long as the individual is deprived of reality and autonomy, as all the impersonalist theories on love (biological, sociological or falsely metaphysical) state, love cannot grow and sustain itself. As previously mentioned, it is a matter of “choice and preference”, “an homage brought to the person”, not a blind or indifferent act addressed to an impersonal, abstract being, generally “personified by the vague and anonymous notion of species, social group or metaphysical substance” (Micu Stavila 2006, 160). True love is veiled by a mystery of freedom, of personal will which gives charm to its surprising preferences, an impossible mystery should it be enlivened by the anonymous power of the species, of the society or of the law of identity or collective unity. Love draws force from variety and diversity. It is fulfilled in close connection to the development of the feelings of the exceptional, uniqueness, individual singularity and it no longer plays a role in the acts led by contamination and imitation. The rebellion of the masses, the anger, the wrath will not alternate with love, but only with cowardly servitude and fear. The crowd will be carried on by identity and confusion; it will become complacent in disarray and promiscuity, never in intimacy and trust, communion and sympathy. The regression of the individual to the herd state makes his pride grow, pluming itself with the vanity of a borrowed power to the detriment of being capable of showing esteem and sympathy for the other. As a means of relating from one person to another, love does not subsist where this oath is eluded by the decadence of consciousness to the stage of collective irresponsibility. The incompatibility of love to the phenomenon of alteration and diminishing of the personality under the influence of the specific ideas of mass psychology is propagated in any system of reduction to processes of collective identity and confusion. In a completely depersonalised pattern, we will meet it in a psychopath or selfish person who “lost the notion of personal dignity for all things” (Micu Stavila 2006, 161). The hidden vice and the extreme risk which threaten the monistic-collectivist systems dwell in the confusion between selfishness and love. The disguised selfishness could never be overcome by sympathy, but it will be generalised to a fatal limit of the being. Hence, this type of individual will never be able to love his neighbour. It is the same as the one who does not have a reality of its own and will confound the neighbour for an illusion, the one identical to another will be condemned to love only himself, without any possibility of escaping beyond himself. Therefore, if the essence of love lay in the accomplishment of an absolute identity, “it would change selfishness from an exception and fatality into a rule and an ideal” (Micu Stavila 2006, 162).

5. The Christian vision – a way of rendering the human dignity

Annulling the individuality as a consequence of mystical union, monism and pantheism were suspected at the beginning of Christianity as immoral since they suppressed the minimum distance between the creation and the Creator, and lacking this distance, the transcending required by the true love would no longer be possible. “A God who would love his creation only if it was mistaken for it, who would refuse the possibility and right of being something else than Himself, to exist as a distinct reality, to contradict the idea of divine goodness, that would be a selfish God” (Micu Stavila 2006, 163). As the value of individuality cannot be nullified or diminished without destroying the basis of any love or creation, it becomes obvious how their conditions become similar. The possibility to surmount selfishness by discovering the supreme value of individuality not by suppressing it denotes the sinister character of collective selfishness, which could be compared to the individual one. Since Christianity has not made use of an abstract entity to lay the groundwork of love, it has not used the Good, but the love for the living being, “the individual and the personal God of poets and prophets”, this means that it foresaw the danger of the collective selfishness. Solemnly announced by the Christian paradigm, love “agrees to have limits and be specific”, always in contact with whatever is more profound, singular and unique in life, it “postulates preference and choice”, never the passivity and indifference of an affection which does not address anyone in the end. “Something more” can also be understood from the words said by Jesus to Saint Peter in Gethsemane to question his faith, to see if he loved Him more than the other apostles. The clearest proof that what Jesus intended does not represent a levelling and egalitarian feeling, but one which should “particularise and individualise at maximum, involving preference and choice” (Micu Stavila 2006, 163-164). The Christian love for the neighbour, remaining individual, succeeds in moving to the universal at the same time and bearing all the spiritual values.

All the virtues – love, respect for faith and property, politeness – are spirited by the respect given by Christianity to the sanctity of the individual being. The ensemble of interpersonal relationship will remain under the veil of coldness, hostility, violence where at the dawn of existence, the principle of individual life is refused. “Deprived by the dignity of its subjectivity by treating things in blocks, as a line of products, as a moment in a collective period, the individual suddenly stops inspiring love and being capable of love, being wrecked in a state of spiritual freezing, apathy and indifference towards the self and the others, when he does not risk to change into a rapacious and selfish beast” (Micu Stavila 2006, 165). The life experience of the mistakes made by the impersonal formula confirms the evilness of love, generally speaking, and abstract, of humanity. The materialism repressing

the authority and the political power has proven how the replacement of Christian love for the neighbour, by the ideas of collective love and happiness have changed the real, living being into a public good, stealing at the same time his dignity, holiness, the very miracle of his existence. Starting from the suppression of spiritual freedom and ending with the loss of physical freedom, of trust in the mission of personal life, these are the terrifying effects of the practice of materialist mentality – a real work of spiritual depersonalization, crimes against freedom and life under the pretext of mutual love and happiness. Suffocated, the man defends himself wearing a permanent mask of artificial equity: he locks and deprives his own spiritual life. Unable to love, he ends up with nothing to give and all his deeds lack personality and originality and they will show the total defeat of human dignity. The greatest enemy of love and dignity is the “automatic pseudo-individuality”, unable a humiliated, in a “collective struggle of repulsion and fear” (Micu Stavila 2006, 169) where everyone is estranged from the others, a picture of an unhuman humanity. We can conclude once again that the origin of love lies in existence, not in the negation of personal life and the same existence leaves place for the understanding of Immanuel Kant’s conceited pretense of making the criterion of truth out of something objective and generally applied. The subjectivity of love preferences discovers the error which is present where logical thinking operates with abstract ideas and notions, not the uniqueness, the personal value of the loved one which follows and is born out of its abundance, he does not precede it, as a condition. Jaspers and Scheller have the merit of noticing and stating that we love someone as they are (Jaspers 1919, 170).

The unconditioning of love grounded in the mystery of individual uniqueness makes it similar to grace and free of any rational and causal finding. This phenomenon shows the asymmetry between the sum of values belonging to the beloved person and the love for her; there is always an “unnoticeable rest”, “an unexplainable plus”, “an impenetrable something” (Micu Stavila 2006, 171-172). The basis of the evangelical notion of love is the very homage brought to the person as individual. Jesus does no task Mary Magdalene to promise that she will not sin any more, but he gives her first the proof of love and forgiveness; he does not condition Peter to become someone else, but he loves him as he is. The amazing freedom and spontaneity of fatherly love is the one which miraculously frees the source of his son’s repentance; the appearance of the latter is not the cause and condition of forgiveness and the special welcome from his father. In Christianity, perfection is not inspired by it, but it derives from the power of love. And should a merit be required as a condition of love, Jesus “would have never succeeded in loving anyone, as where could he have met the perfect being?” (Kierkegaard 1952, 190).

The person loved as an individual, as a unique being, as what is more personal is ennobled with an infinite self-esteem. It makes him aware of the value and responsibility of his life, of his mission in the world. In a word, of his real personal dignity which once discovered by love will no longer allow any humiliation and disgrace. Thus taken into consideration as a person, the individual is placed in a rapport of familiarity and trust and he is helped to discover whatever is most noble in him, namely his spiritual being, the ultimate essence of his individuality and dignity. To directly accede to the individual's heart, to support him in finding a real knowledge on the excellence of his personal life, it is the amazing power of love to bring change. "As soon as I know I am loved, it seems I value more" (Goethe 1960, 29). There is no other way, a more appropriate way to know someone as a person and another way to the deepest mystery of a human being apart from this surplus of overflowing value given by it. Brought closer by love, the person will gain depth and transparency without altering his identity in any way, due to attention, to the intention to individualize and make unique, the loved person holds "the whole universe of the spirit" (Micu Stavila 2006, 174).

By its power to individualize, the only genuine knowledge of reality inspired by love is the divine and Christian knowledge. Instead of reducing the mystery of existence, the individualizing knowledge increases it, as "the awareness of the mystery" does not represent the feeling of resignation, indifference to understanding, but its highest form. A science based on the respect for individuality as the creative power for everything that exists, "would give back the self-esteem" at the same time with "the love for the neighbour". Replacing the gravity of science – from the general to the individual – it would produce a radical renewal of the whole issue; consequently, the person conceived as a unique being, would enjoy more sympathy and solicitude. Modern humanity, subdued by the technical and material civilization, "hostile to life and personality, to spiritual freedom", not only that it appointed a radical opposition between knowledge and love, but it deprived the man of "living the inner life" and of "its consciousness and nostalgia" (Micu Stavila 2006, 176). In order to stop the mental ruin, to give back the dignity received by the individual, he should go back to the sources of Christian spirituality and find "new ways for holiness and love, together with new ways of interiorisation and personal feeling" (Micu Stavila 2006, 176). To the extent it takes us further away from nature, the objective and the general takes us further away from God. In the religious experience, that relationship from one person to another which implies the liveliest, the real presence, the knowledge of general laws and concepts becomes insufficient and it demands its abandonment in favour of love. The most limited sphere of the action of love is seen in the relationship of the soul with God. Nowhere else is the relationship of love more

profoundly and fully personal and real than in the presence of a being. God, the Person by excellence is the origin “of love by excellence and he demands to be known by love”, namely the only knowledge coming from the nature of individuality in agreement with the personal essence of the divine nature. The discursive and conceptual means change God from a living being into an abstract entity; approaching Him as an object of demonstration and rational deduction and not by an act of personal living – faith and prayer – we miss the presence and getting closer to Him. In agreement with Gabriel Marcel’s thoughts, Constantin Micu Stavilă ponders: “If we can say about the world that it exists, we could never refer to God in an impersonal way, but only if we saw him in front of our eyes and we had a personal and lively relationship with Him, could we say: «God, you exist! »” (Micu Stavila 2006,178). Stating that the world itself will perish, apart from love, Apostle Paul expressed a preference, he made a hierarchy of values. A vocation of the personal life, love is “the lever of the upper regions of the whole existence and its metaphysical axis” (Micu Stavila 2006, 179). The indestructible relationship between the destiny of personal life and love pleads for the hope for immortality, hence its major significance.

6. Final considerations or from the individual to the Human Being

The analysis of the relationship between individuality and love has introduced us into the field of accomplishing humanity, in other words, of redefining the individual as a person placed in his dignity as a Human Being. Part of humanity, dignity appears as a manifestation of individual consciousness under double relationship of three parts: on one side, awareness of the self, of the other and of God and on another part as an inner part, activity and creative freedom. The inner part gives the unique character, what is personal to the individual and the creative activity allows him to continuously discover and accomplish the self. Freedom – in a moment of decision and engagement – by the paradox of being infinite and limited at the same time, introduces us in the sphere of the mystery of life. The reflection of the Romanian-French philosopher conceives the following ideas in order to explain the concept of dignity. The discovery of the self takes place in a leap or in a projection beyond itself, and it is only the condition, not the fact of the given or of the existence. This gap between the possible and the real, the systematic non-coincidence between the human being and thought, an act and power of the inner part of consciousness is not a weakness, but a trait of efficiency and value. The lively, dynamic, fundamental relationship of self awareness highlights the fact that nature and the function of thinking and of the being is their dignity and value. It is an existential oath of coexistence and simultaneity which allows modelling and enriching the individual.

Is it possible for the individual being to ensure and motivate its existence staying outside the world of values? Can it aspire to the rank of dignity without depleting the possibility to accomplish the goodness and the love and to be the source of any value? The indispensable conditions for personal life, the inner part, the creative activity and freedom changed into value under the effect of love represent the personal essence and at the same time universal essence of Beauty, Truth and Goodness. The mere fact of being does not complete the notion of value. Spontaneity and originary ascendancy, namely the victory of good over evil, together with the appeal to the moral of "I can" as opposed to "You must", not only that bring the individual in agreement with himself, but do not require anything fake, forced, only what the awareness of dignity and responsibility indicates for the accomplishment of Goodness.

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Diana-Lavinia BUMBARU *

The Devil's Imagine in Giovanni Papini's Works **

Abstract: Giovanni Papini's works have always been remarkable and surprising. Controversy could easily be found in his texts. His focus did not dwell on just one theme for too long; he had the ability to write about philosophy and religion or about good and evil at the same time. Papini's personal struggle was related to his faith. First an atheist, focused especially on philosophical themes; then a converted to Catholicism, combining philosophy and religion in his writings: this is Giovanni Papini's personality.

This article will focus on one of the main figures that come from religion: the Devil. The Italian philosopher has the courage to approach from different and surprising angles the story of Evil. He has tried to find new ways in shaping the image of the Devil in both the Catholic religion, as well as in Islamism.

Keywords: Devil, Giovanni Papini, Iblis, Religion, Image

Giovanni Papini's works have always been remarkable and surprising. Controversy could easily be found in his texts, regarding the period they were written. His focus did not dwell on just one theme for too long; he had the ability to write about philosophy and religion or about good and evil at the same time. Papini's personal struggle was related to his faith. First an atheist, focused especially on philosophical themes; then a converted to Catholicism, combining philosophy and religion in his writings: this is Giovanni Papini's personality.

This article will focus on one of the main and dominant figures that come from the field of religion: the Devil. The Italian philosopher has the courage to approach from different and surprising angles the story of Evil. He has tried to find new ways in shaping the image of the Devil in both the Catholic religion, as well as in Islamism. Even the way of describing the Devil is not so tough, the author rather using the terminology *Fallen Angel* for the force of evil, instead of the common Devil or Satan.

Papini's turning point in life is represented by the event that took place in year 1921, when he decided to return to Catholicism. Although he has

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been baptized in the Catholic religion as an infant, due to different factors, he became an atheist. The family, especially his father, played an important part in this aspect; as a child, G. Papini did not have the permission to attend the classes of religion at school, therefore, the lack of information had its influence.

However, the Italian's interest in religion in general was very much present; that is why he was opened to all the situations he was exposed regarding religion. His attention, throughout the years, did not turn only towards the Catholic Bible, but also towards other religions. We can discover, by means of his works, his interest in closely studying the Koran, as well as several mythologies that included deities (from Egypt or Greece).

His first attempt to present Evil goes back in 1912, when he published an article entitled *Il demonio mussulmano*. Even from here we can start seeing his interest in religion, an interest that was reflected a lot in his writings.

The *Fallen Angel* appears for the first time, both in the Bible, as well as in the Koran, in the episode that narrates the creation of the world. Giovanni Papini considers that both the angels, as well as their Creator, prove to be selfish when man was created: "On this point, the angels have been wiser than their Master. But God was stubborn, as all conceited persons are: in order to prove His power in general and especially His superiority in front of the angels" (Papini 2009, 65). The author of the article does support his opinion and explains to the readers the fact that the real reason behind Satan's rebellion is his refuse to worship the new creation, i.e. man.

Giovanni Papini tries, in an eccentric and surprising manner, to create a new image for the Devil; a new image that would help him be less blamed and more understood by humans.

Therefore, in the year of 1953 he comes back to this subject, having Iblis – the Devil from Islamism – present in his study entitled *The Devil: Notes for a Future Diabology*. As he approached this issue of the demon from Islamism, the Italian stated: "the Muslim demon Iblis has been convicted – according to the theologians of Islamism – because of his exclusive love for the pure idea of Divinity" (Papini 2013, 125).

Again in this volume, he brings up the idea of Iblis' rebellion and he tries to focus on the reasons that determined Allah's favorite angel to become the excluded one: "therefore, according to Mohamed, the banishing of the angel Iblis would be due to insubordination, jealousy and self-pride. Iblis does not rebel against Allah because he wants to be his rival, but only because he does not want to kneel down in front of the first man, which he considers an inferior being [...]. However, Allah, although furious because of Iblis' insubordination, He does not despise him: *he was not among those that threw with their face to earth*, says the Koran, and these words can be

understood in two ways: he was to proud to prostrate himself or the conscience of his superior dignity made him incapable of such a humiliating homage" (Papini 2013, 163-164). The Muslim Devil is here seen as making a simple mistake, a mistake that was not caused by hate towards the Divinity, but by his refuse to share Allah's love with another being – although one created by the same Force that created him.

On the other hand, Giovanni Papini concentrates a lot of his attention also on the Devil from the Catholic Bible; his intentions when shaping the image he has on evil are clear from the very beginning, since the language he uses in presenting the Devil is not as harsh as one would expect it to be. And this image – although a little difficult to accept at first – is motivated by the fact that any Christian should consider seeing something good even where one least expects to find. That is why, we will see G. Papini affirming: "this infamous and yet famous being, invisible and yet ubiquitous, either denied, either adored, either feared, either defamed, that had its own priests and poets, its courtiers and its martyrs, is still more popular than understood, more described than analyzed. We must see the Devil with new eyes and to approach him in a new spirit. Not with the servility of the wizard who wants to take advantage of him or with the fear of the believer who wants to protect himself from him, but with the eyes and the spirit of the Christian who wants to be a Christian until the last consequences – even the most daring ones – of Christianity" (Papini 2013, 15).

The author's intentions are clear, and not too far away into the volume we will discover Papini's version of the evil's image. He also wanted to try something new, and one must admire in him the detailed documentation from different religions that he has made before creating the Devil's new profile. Papini thus tried to understand the Devil in his profoundness and to explain all his actions, as well as their causes.

The main idea from the volume *The Devil: Notes for a Future Diabology* is focused on the fact that Hell will end at some point, since everything has a beginning and an ending, and the punishments for the condemned ones will no longer exist. Giovanni Papini "liked to emphasize on the infinite and forgiving love of God, which he could not form with the punishments of an eternal conviction" (Di Felice 1993, 136). Which is in fact the author's main intention? Papini strongly believes that the great love God has for all the beings He created will determine Him to find, in one way or another, an answer for this problem. Satan will thus be forgiven for what Papini considers to be a mistake based on a great love for Divinity.

Most people, Christians or not, see Satan as a being with very scary features, very big and powerful, usually with physical characteristics that are meant to determine people to avoid even speaking his name out loud.

Giovanni Papini studied this aspect as well. His focus for this issue did not remain a limited one, as he approached several other researchers, from different periods of time.

Starting from the fundamental text of the Bible, the Italian philosopher discovers the fact that even Messiah is described to be, from a physical point of view, an ugly person: “this resemblance that one did not think of between Christ and Satan is, as all others, very mysterious and maybe inexplicable. But from the words of Isaiah, we are allowed to draw only one conclusion: the ugliness of a being is not always a sign and an argument in favor of his malice” (Papini 2013, 167). The author tries here, once again, to point out the fact that the *Fallen Angel*’s physical description should not always reflect the behavior or his personal thinking. This image of the scary being seems to have been created by humans, thus reflecting their fear of eternal punishments in case of wrong behavior in life.

From a visual point of view, we all know that all drawings and paintings depicting the Devil – from any religion – have tried, throughout time, to present him in the most frightening possible way.

Giovanni Papini does not forget to mention one of Italy’s favorite poets – Dante. In his works, Dante too shows interest in religion and also in the *Fallen Angel*. In his masterpiece *Divina Commedia*, the Devil is present in all three books. However, Papini notices the fact that Dante preferred depicting Satan as he has been at the beginning, in all his glory, and not necessarily his deformed physical appearance. And for this, Papini will state: “even from Dante’s masterpiece, no matter how Christian and medieval he has been, it stands out that sympathy, because in his poem he tends to mention his first condition, his splendor and his nobility more than his dreadful aspect from nowadays” (Papini 2013, 167).

Giovanni Papini goes even further and does not forget to also remind us of one of his short-stories from 1904 – *Il demonio mi disse* – where his vision for the Devil goes beyond borders and evil takes here a human form. Not long before the Italian philosopher, the Russian writer Fyodor Dostoyevsky had the same point of view regarding the Devil being described as a human being. In 1953, Papini will come back to this idea, and in the study *The Devil: Notes for a Future Diabolology* he thinks mostly at different persons throughout history that had a character and a behavior that could easily be considered evil beyond the normal level from a human being.

He thus tried to highlight the level of evil that can be found right here on earth, among human beings: “they were considered incarnations or sons of Satan those princes or state leaders that have committed bloody crimes against their subjects and who were adversaries and persecutors of the Church and of Christ. Anyone who orders, in a ruthless manner, massacres

is, in the eyes of the people, an incarnation of the Devil" (Papini 2013, 109-110).

In conclusion, Giovanni Papini's ideas regarding the presentation of Satan's image in his works are maybe, at a first glance, a little bit rebellious; however, at a closer look, all these ideas are not necessarily wrong, but only a little bit extravagant and different from some points of view.

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Oana-Andreea LARION*

Reality or Deception: The Differences between Writing about It and Taking Pictures of It: Paul Strand and Virginia Woolf

Abstract: The interesting thing about modernism is that, while the other aesthetic trends were born out of a dire need for opposition – meaning that, once a certain form of artistic manifestation had “oversaturated the market”, a new one would emerge only to take things in the completely opposite direction. From this point of view, modernism becomes an abrupt break with all tradition and reality as it was understood, the result, as far as individual artists are concerned, being a “high degree of self-signature” in the sense that each work was to have “a structure appropriate only to that work”. In other words, it is impossible to speak about a style for the age; instead, discussions can and should be made only about the style of specific works of art. My purpose in this article is to achieve a proper understanding about what can stand more authentically as being real in the fields of Literature and Photography through the works of Paul Strand and Virginia Woolf.

Keywords: Photography, Literature, Paul Strand, Virginia Woolf, Aesthetics

1. The Nature of Modernism

Taking into consideration the fact that both Paul Strand and Virginia Woolf are powerful representatives of modernism, it is essential that, before we are to discuss these two individual artistic figures and the aesthetic relationship that exists between them, we analyze the hallmarks of modernism as a new form of understanding and interpreting both reality and the arts.

In “The Name and Nature of Modernism” (1976, pp. 19-55), Malcolm Bradbury and James McFarlane speak about the fact that “the twentieth century brought us a new art” and about the fact that modernism was born out of “the historicist feeling that we live in totally novel times, that contemporary history is the source of our significance, that we are derivates not of the past but of the surrounding and enfolding environment or scenario”.

Indeed, the First World War, Marx’s, Freud’s and Darwin’s theories, as well as capitalism and the constant industrial acceleration have all led to what Malcolm Bradbury and James McFarlane call “the scenario of our chaos”, the purpose of modernism thus being to respond to all of these changes taking place in reality and in society.

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The interesting thing about modernism is that, while the other aesthetic trends were born out of a dire need for opposition – meaning that, once a certain form of artistic manifestation had “oversaturated the market”, a new one would emerge only to take things in the completely opposite direction – this particular cultural movement, as Herbert Read (1933, pp. 58-59, 67) points out, was “not so much a revolution, which implies a turning over, even a turning back, but rather a break-up, a devolution, some would say a dissolution”.

From this point of view, modernism becomes an abrupt break with all tradition, the result, as far as individual artists are concerned, being a “high degree of self-signature” in the sense that each work was to have “a structure appropriate only to that work”. In other words, it is impossible to speak about a style for the age; instead, discussions can and should be made only about the style of specific works of art.

As Malcolm Bradbury and James McFarlane point out, “modernism was in most countries an extraordinary compound of the futuristic and the nihilistic, the revolutionary and the conservative, the naturalistic and the symbolistic, the romantic and the classical. It was a celebration of a technological age and a condemnation of it; an excited acceptance of the belief that the old régimes of culture were over, and a deep despairing in the face of that fear; a mixture of convictions that the new forms were escapes from historicism and the pressures of the time with convictions that they were precisely the living expressions of these things”.

According to Roland Barthes, the fact that modernist art is the conflicting space of so many trends, discourses, voices, styles, devices, cultures and so on is the reason why its artistic products, taken as a whole, might seem fragmentary, illogical, inchoate and sometimes unfocused.

The fact that modernism is to set the foundations for a break with tradition by rejecting its authority, norms and conventions, and by turning to experimentalism is also discussed by Liz Wells in “Photography: A Critical Introduction” (2004, p. 19), her view being that modernism wanted to produce “a new kind of world” and “new kinds of human beings to people it”.

Last, but not least, reference must be made to Jürgen Habermas’ opinion, expressed in “Modernity – An Incomplete Project” (1998, p. 5), that “modernity lives on the experience of rebelling against all that is normative” and that the unique trait of modernism consists in its decision “to revolt against the normalizing functions of tradition”.

As far as the relationship between the creator of art and the receiver of art is concerned, is it mandatory to point out that modernism brought about the so-called “death of the author” and “birth of the reader”, meaning that a considerable amount of attention and great importance is given to the process of receiving and understanding art. The creator tends to fade into

the background, while the beholder is left alone to make sense of the world in and beyond the artistic creation he is faced with.

2. Photography as an Art-Form Takes the Stage

If it is to be properly understood, the art of photography must be traced back to its origins and discussed within the general context in which it emerged and grew.

Keeping this in mind, Paul Valéry's essay, "The Centenary of Photography" (1980, pp. 191-198), gains a considerable amount of importance for our discussion. In it, it is said that "when photography first made its appearance, the descriptive genre in Letters was becoming an all-invading fashion" and that, because of this, "the background and outward aspects of life figured almost disproportionately in works of verse and prose alike".

In the same essay, Paul Valéry points out that it was with Daguerre that "the photographic vision was born and it spread by singular leaps and bounds throughout the world".

The status of photography as a form of art has long been questioned, ever since this new type of artistic manifestation emerged: according to Paul Weiss (1961, pp. 216-218) "they [photographers] have little and sometimes even no appreciation of the aesthetic values of experience. And when they do have such appreciation it is rarely relevant to their purposes. One need not be an artist to use a camera with brilliance" and, as far as Charles Baudelaire is concerned (1980, pp. 83-89), "the photographic industry" is nothing more than "the refuge of all failed painters with too little talent, or too lazy to complete their studies".

It was Alfred Stieglitz who introduced photography as a form of art and who tried to free photography from the hallmarks of painting; in order to achieve this, he encouraged photographers to make the most of what the medium of photography had to offer (the ability to create clear contours and well-differentiated textures, something which was impossible to do when painting).

In "Pictorial Photography" (1980, pp. 115-123), Alfred Stieglitz speaks about photography as an art-form and about its ability to convey various ideas and emotions: his claim is that, before being fully understood, photography "was looked upon as the bastard of science and art, hampered and held back by the one, denied and ridiculed by the other" and that it was quite a while before photography "took a definite shape in which it could be pursued as such by those who loved art and sought some medium other than brush or pencil through which to give expression to their ideas".

In his attempt to establish photography as a form of art, Alfred Stieglitz also speaks about three-types of photographers: "the ignorant, the purely

technical and the artistic”. From his point of view, photography as art can only be created by those photographers belonging to the third class, the ones who “devote the best part of their lives to the work”. For them, “lens, camera, plate, developing-baths, printing process, and the like” are “tools for the elaboration of their ideas” and not “tyrants to enslave and dwarf them”.


Therefore, we can conclude that, in the course of the process of establishing itself as a righteous self-standing form of art, the greatest threat that photography had to face – but that it eventually surpassed – was its comparison to painting, and that the solution found in order to deal with this issue consisted in making the most of what photography could do and that painting was unable to perform: create clear lines and textures, and focus on shape rather than on color.

3. Reality or Deception: The Differences between Writing about It and Taking Pictures of It

When it comes to discussing the relationship between reality and literature or photography as ways of relating to it, the distinction that Roland Barthes makes between “distributional” and “integrational” narrative functions proves to be a worthy starting-point, even though this classification is mostly used when discussing literary works of art and their on-screen adaptations.

Also called “functions proper”, the distributional functions refer to actions and events, in other words to the physical-*what* that happens to be in the spotlight at a certain moment. In contrast, the integrational functions – also called “indices” – refer to the psychological-*what*, meaning notations of atmosphere and of what is actually going on inside a character’s mind.

For a better understanding of the way in which the functions proper and the indices work, the following scheme is to be considered:



In our opinion, the indices function as a “halo” surrounding the functions proper, their purpose being to add meaning and substance to the physical elements that the artist decides to deal with.

When it comes to literature and photography, and the way in which they deal with reality, it is obvious that the main difference between them comes from the way in which they deal with the integrational functions: a modernism writer deals with the inner workings of the character quite easily (techniques such as that of free indirect speech or that of stream of consciousness are the ones most commonly used), and powerful descriptions can always be introduced as a way to convey the general atmosphere, while the photographer sometimes has to exaggerate certain features, such as character apparel and face expression by means of color, texture or clarity of line in order to reach the same result.

If literature, when recording reality, can choose to focus on specific details and leave out the aspects that it deems irrelevant and unnecessary, photography, as Edward Weston (1980, pp. 169-175) points out, has the benefit of an “amazing precision of definition, especially in the recording of fine detail”, being “entirely made out of tiny particles” that give “a special tension to the image”.

Thus, as Liz Wells (2004, p. 20) states, photography “undermines the structure of conventional narrative” by recording and conveying a multitude of visual details concerting reality all in the same time.

This difference between photographic and literary approaches towards reality is also noted by Susan Sontag (2008, pp. 3-16, 22-24, 54-55), who speaks about the fact that literary descriptions are usually subjective, while photography leans more towards objectivity: “while a painting or a prose description can never be other than a narrowly selective interpretation, a photograph can be treated as a narrowly selective transparency”.

It is Roland Barthes (2000, pp. 3-6, 63-64, 67-70, 73-77) who will introduce the concept of “photographic referent”, as opposed to what it usually understood through the concept of “referent” in the field of linguistics; the “photographic referent” is to be defined as follows: “not the optionally real thing to which an image or a sign refers but the necessarily real thing which has been placed before the lens, without which there would be no photograph”.

Last, but not least, reference must be made to Paul Valéry’s opinion (“The Centenary of Photography”) that photography can “prompt us to revive, if not rejuvenate, the ancient and difficult problem of objectivity” and that “the snapshot has rectified our errors both of deficiency and of excess”, showing us “what we would see if we were uniformly sensitive to everything that light imprints upon our retinas”.

4. Paul Strand and Virginia Woolf – Aesthetic Points of Convergence and of Divergence

In discussing the aesthetic relationship existing between Paul Strand and Virginia Woolf as representatives of modernism, one must first analyze what each of them understood through modernism and what each considered that their role was within this new cultural context. Therefore, reference must be made to the way in which Paul Strand and Virginia Woolf viewed the artistic manifestations existing before them (the so-called photographic and literary tradition, respectively) and the art that they themselves were to create, based on the principles that they were to set for themselves.

As we have already discussed in the first part of this paper – “The Nature of Modernism” – the defining hallmarks of modernism as an aesthetic trend consist in the break with tradition and in the increase of individual artistic stand-points, meaning that no well-established aesthetic set of rules and regulations is to be followed in the process of creating art.

Keeping this in mind, let us now analyze the general aesthetic principles that guided Paul Strand and Virginia Woolf in their work, seeking to point out the ways in which they are similar and the ways in which they differ.

In Paul Strand’s case, the issue of breaking with tradition takes an interesting turn, meaning that, since photography is a relatively new form of art, there was no photographic tradition previously established which they could turn from or turn against. As Liz Wells points out in the book we have already mentioned, the photographers in Paul Strand’s circle were but a group of people who “worked with honest and sincere purpose, some instinctively and a few consciously, but without any background of photographic or graphic formulae, much less any cut and dried ideas of what is art and what isn’t”, this “innocence”, as she calls it, being “their real strength”.

However, as Paul Strand points out in two of his essays, “Photography” and “Photography and the New God” (1980, pp. 141-151), there is one well-established tradition, that of painting, from which all true photographers should keep away. Paul Strand’s belief that photography is, and must therefore be treated as, a new artistic manifestation (“photography is only a new road from a different direction, but moving toward the common goal, which is life”), led to his developing of the following artistic principles concerning photography: solidity of forms, differentiation of textures, no use of color and focus on both the individual and his world. According to Paul Strand, “the full potential power of every medium is dependent upon the purity of its use”, and therefore “the introduction of handwork and manipulation is merely the expression of an impotent desire to paint”.

If Paul Strand's aesthetic principles, deriving from his need to make a clear distinction between photography and painting, take him towards clear-cut contours, lines and shapes, with special attention given to texture ("if he [the photographer] includes in his space a strip of grass, it must be felt like the living differentiated thing it is, and so recorded. It must take its proper but no less important place as a shape and a texture, in relationship to the mountain, tree or whatnot, which are included"), Virginia Woolf's views on literature, being faced with the tradition of literary realism – which she whishes to overcome and, even more, deny –, take her towards a manner of writing very much similar to the impressionistic style of painting.

In two of her essays, "Modern Fiction" (1992, p. 289) and "Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown" (1967, p. 320), Virginia Woolf argues that the realist method of her predecessors is faithful to the perceived, objective world at the expense of the process of perception itself and the perceiver engaged in it. Therefore, her literature is to focus on the "myriads of irrelevant and incongruous ideas" crowding "into one's head" in various moments of the day: "Examine for a moment an ordinary mind on an ordinary day. The mind receives a myriad impressions – trivial, fantastic, evanescent, or engraved with the sharpness of steel. From all sides they come, an incessant shower of innumerable atoms, composing in their sum what we might venture to call life itself".

Since the chief task of the novelist is "to convey this incessantly varying spirit" with "as little admixture of the alien and external as possible", the impressionistic way of capturing reality becomes, from her point of view, the proper method. As a consequence, her literary experiments are to be highly visual, relying on effects of chiaroscuro and blurring contours, suggesting shadows and shifting, melting form to support the uncertainty and relativity of everything, and above all the limitations of knowledge by reason. By breaking the confining frames of shape, clear contour and outline, Virginia Woolf moves towards breaking the frames of reason to pieces.

As James McFarlane points out in "The Mind of Modernism" (1976, p. 68), Virginia Woolf, like many other modernist novelists, is to focus on "secret stirrings that go unnoticed in the remote parts of the mind, the incalculable chaos of impressions, the delicate life of the imagination seen under the magnifying glass; the random progress of these thoughts and feelings; untrodden, trackless journeyings by brain and heart, strange workings of the nerves, the whisper of the blood, the entreaty of the bone, all the unconscious life of the mind".

However different Paul Strand and Virginia Woolf are when it comes to their aesthetic principles and techniques, the first turning towards clear lines which do not "vibrate laterally but back, in a third dimension" (Paul Strand, 1923, p. 613) and the latter deciding that is it to be her goal as a writer to

“record the atoms as they fall upon the mind in the order in which they fall” and to “trace the pattern, however disconnected and incoherent in appearance, which each sight or incident scores upon the consciousness”, it is clear that both of them wish to break with some form or another of artistic tradition, which they disapprove of, and to record Life as genuinely as possible, even though the paths they choose in order to achieve this goal are quite different.

Therefore, we can conclude that Paul Strand and Virginia Woolf share a strong desire to establish and cultivate a new approach towards the inner reality of the individual and towards the reality of the world in which the individual in question is forced to live. For both of them, it is mandatory that this new approach records the above mentioned aspects as genuinely as possible, with outside interference reduced to a minimum.

Conclusions

The representatives of the modernist movement, were faced with the imperative of establishing new aesthetics for the artistic domains in which they were to function, photographs having to separate the art of photography from the art of painting, and writers having to overcome the classical manner of writing novels.

Both categories succeeded in what they set out to do, yet, as different as their domains are, they could not fight the inevitable: having certain points of convergence in their approach towards reality and in the subjects they chose to bring forth to the public.

It is our belief that our study has somewhat managed to demonstrate that, as diverse as modernist works of art are, there is unity amongst them, and that this unity comes from the relationship that modernist artists have with tradition and from the way in which they relate to the world and wish to represent it, with as little interference as possible.

In the end, it all comes down to being faced with a new society and a new essence of the individual, and knowing what to do with them so as to identify the new Life within them and show it to the world.

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Gabriela MUNTEANU*

Représentations de l'euthanasie dans la cinématographie. Images et concepts de la souffrance, de la dignité et de la mort

Abstract: The debate concerning euthanasia has become more and more popular in the Western world, the fact that it has been chosen by many directors as a subject for films being a proof for this statement. What we would like to do in this paper is analyze three movies that focus on the problem of euthanasia – *Mar adentro* (Alejandro Amenábar, Spain, 2004), *Tot altijd* (Nic Balthazar, Belgium, 2012) and *Quelques heures de printemps* (Stéphane Brizé, France, 2012) – not as much from an aesthetical point of view, but rather from a social and philosophical one. Presuming that films are among the most powerful ways in which our time expresses its views, we will try to see in this analysis how human dignity, suffering and death are perceived in the contemporary world in relation to euthanasia. We would also like to question the adequacy of the direction in which the Western mentality seems to be heading, trying to avoid relying on metaphysical or religious presuppositions, but keeping a critical perspective when it comes to the assumptions made by the contemporary world as well.

Keywords: Euthanasia, Cinematography, Dignity, Suffering, Death, Despiritualisation

Comme chaque problème que fait le sujet des disputes publiques, l'euthanasie est devenue un thème bien exploré par la cinématographie contemporaine. Deux films apparus en 2012 – *Tot altijd* (Nic Balthazar, Belgique) et *Quelques heures de printemps* (Stéphane Brizé, France) – et le gagneur d'Oscar du « Meilleur film étranger » lancé en 2004 – *Mar adentro* (Alejandro Amenábar, Espagne) – sont seulement quelques exemples d'œuvres cinématographiques contemporaines traitant des problèmes concernant l'euthanasie. Ce n'est pas surprenant, mais peut-être inquiétant, ces films représentent une position plus ou moins ferme pro l'euthanasie, en identifiant, au même temps, les opposants de l'euthanasie avec les fervents chrétiens, qui ne peuvent pas comprendre le point de vu rationnel et humanitaire des militants pour la liberté de choisir, pour la dignité humaine, pour le droit de mourir. Ce qu'on veut suivre dans ce papier est justement la manière dans laquelle l'euthanasie est conceptualisée parmi certaines images représentant la mort, la souffrance, la dignité de l'homme, aussi que la

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position des certains groupes sociaux sur cette option. Ce n'est pas les points de vu des théories de l'art cinématographique que nous intéressent, mais plutôt la mentalité présentée dans ces films. On va faire quelques remarques à partir de certaines séquences des films mentionnées, sans faire une critique esthétique, mais essayant d'analyser ce que on peut comprendre de ces images en relation avec le concept actuel d'euthanasie.

Deux des exemples choisis sont créés à partir des cas réels : *Mar adentro* (*La mer intérieure*) présente l'histoire de Ramón Sampedro Cameán, un pêcheur espagnol qui, après un terrible accident, est devenu quadriplégique à l'âge de 25 ans. Il a lutté pour 29 ans pour être assisté pour se suicider légalement, sans obtenir ce qu'il voulait. Finalement, il a été aidé par plusieurs amis, chaque d'eux contribuant avec des tâches bien partagées, sans pouvoir être condamnés. Aussi, *Tot altijd* (*Au revoir pour toujours*), est sur l'histoire de Mario Verstraete, un patient souffrant de sclérose en plaques, qui a profité de la loi permettant l'euthanasie une semaine après qu'elle a été adoptée en Belgique. Quand même, le dernier film qu'on va discuter ne raconte pas un exemple réel, mais propose une situation dans laquelle beaucoup des gens se peuvent identifier : la relation entre un fil est sa mère, qui souffre d'une maladie intraitable et qui décide de mourir avant qu'elle devienne trop malade, appelant à une organisation en Suisse pour assistance.

1. La souffrance et la dignité

On a résumé très courtement les quatre films proposés pour l'analyse. Une raconte plus détaillée n'est pas nécessaire, on va suivre seulement les séquences que nous intéressent. L'objectif principal est, comme on a déjà dit, d'observer quelles sont les idées exprimées parmi des images dans ces films regardant la souffrance, la dignité humaine et la mort, aussi que les positions des groupes sociaux vers l'euthanasie. On doit souligner que chaque problème touchée est bien liée aux autres. Premièrement, la souffrance et la manque de dignité sont inséparables. Il ne s'agit pas seulement d'une souffrance physique, mais surtout d'une souffrance psychique. Le tourment des caractères principales de *Mar adentro* et *Tot altijd* est déclenché notamment par la dépendance d'un autre, par la manque d'autonomie ou par le peur de manque d'autonomie et de la liberté – en *Quelques heures de printemps*. Il y a des scènes qui indiquent directement cette idée, aussi que des scènes symbolique. La mer, par exemple, est clairement un symbole important dans *Mar adentro*, aussi que dans *Tot altijd*.

Ramon Sampedro, le personnage principal de *Mar andetro*, est un ancien marin, qui a voyagé le monde entier sur la mer. La mer était son liberté, sa vie, jusqu'au moment où la même mer lui a transformé dans une personne incapable de se bouger. Comme il même le dit dans le film, la mer lui a donné la vie et puis la lui a prit. Mais la mer reste le symbole de son liberté :

quand il rêve d'être libre, il rêve de voler jusqu'à la mer, quand il se rappelle de sa jeunesse et de sa vigueur, il se rappelle de la mer. L'image de la mer représente la force physique, que paraît être synonyme avec la dignité humaine, et la joie de vivre. La même symbolique est utilisé dans *Tot altijd* : la première fois que Mario – le personnage principal – parle dans le film de son désir d'être assisté pour se suicider, il est au bord de la mer avec ses amis et sa famille ; il vient de regarder ses amies réjouir dans les vagues et d'être pousser dans son fauteuil roulant dans l'eau pour réjouir un peu lui aussi, et ensuite il profite de la conversation ouverte par son ami sur l'impuissance de l'homme au début de la vie pour parler de sa propre impuissance et de son désir de finir cette situation un jour pas loin.

Le concept de la dignité humaine ou plutôt de l'indignité est représenté par des images assez suggestives dans les deux films. La scène de *Tot altijd* où Mario, un homme de 39 ans, est baigné par sa mère est très forte et mérite être évoquée ici : son corps, apparemment sain, complètement grandit, mais incapable de fonctionner normalement à cause de la terrible maladie, est dénudé dans les bras de sa mère, qui est déjà vieille, mais continue de faire tout ce qu'elle peut pour son fils. Dans le décor froid et triste de la salle de baigne, Mario pleure en temps que sa mère lui soigne en le regardant avec amour et essaye de lui faire se sentir mieux. On voit plusieurs scènes similaires dans *Mar adentro*. Le discours final de Ramon est accompagné par des images que le montrent étant baigné par Rosa juste quand il demande son audience qu'est-ce que la dignité. L'incapacité de contrôler son propre corps, de se soigner soi-même, la dépendance d'un autre pour les plus simples tâches, ces sont les conditions que définissent la manque de dignité dans ces films. C'est justement de ce point de vu que la direction dans laquelle la mentalité occidentale, exprimé dans ces deux films, marche devient inquiétante. L'aspect problématique dans ce contexte est, comme l'auteur grec Hierotheos Vlachos souligne, que si on cultive l'idée que la valeur de la vie dépende de la santé et de la vigueur physique, on ouvre le chemin vers une société basé sur des principes eugéniques (Vlachos, 2013, 279). Du point de vu social et pratique, cela peut devenir un problème assez grave, peut conduire à une attitude beaucoup moins ferme en ce que concerne la violation des droits de l'homme.

Ramon Sampedro déclare au début de film, il est vrais, qu'il ne juge pas les quadriplégiques qui veulent vivre, que cette vie est indigne pour lui, personnellement, et pas pour tout les gens. Et, d'une part, la situation relève ici le problème de la liberté de choisir de chaque individu. D'autre part, quand même, il s'agit d'une certaine manière de concevoir la dignité et la valeur de la vie. Ni la dignité de l'homme, ni la valeur de la vie ne sont plus intrinsèque, mais dépendent de ses capacité et de certain conditions. Les mots de Ramon peuvent être entendues comme une réaction à l'argument de la pente glissante, fréquemment soutenu contre l'euthanasie. Cet

argument est souvent attaqué par les militants pro l'euthanasie avec des données statistiques qui démontrent que l'acceptation légal de suicide assisté et de l'euthanasie contribue à la diminution de l'euthanasie involontaire (Smith, 2005, 17-44). Pourtant, il y a aussi de spécialistes qui affirment que les statistiques démontrent, au contraire, que la pente glissante est bien un danger réel (Mathiesen, 2013). Même s'il y a des préopinants qui croît que les réglementations strictes peuvent empêcher les risques d'abuse, une question que paraît rester sans réponse dans ces conditions est justement comment on peut respecter ce droit de choisir librement sans risquer faire le pas vers la pente glissante.

On ne peut pas nier l'importance de la capacité physique de chaque personne pour soi-même, on ne peut pas nier que c'est un élément déterminant pour pouvoir avoir la joie de vivre. Le plus ferme opposant à l'euthanasie va être impressionné, par exemple, par les observations faite par Ramon dans une des premières scènes de *Mar adentro* : quand Julia, l'avocat qui essaye lui aider, lui demande pourquoi il ne veut pas accepter des aides comme le fauteuil roulant et continuer sa vie amélioré par cette sorte d'outils, Ramon explique qu'il ne peut pas accepter des morceaux de la liberté qu'il avait quand la distance insignifiante pour n'importe qui autre entre sa mains et celle de Julia est, pour lui, insurmontable. Le cadre focalisé sur leurs mains assez proche l'un de l'autre, encore sans se toucher, sans que celle de Ramon puisse s'approcher et toucher celle de Julia, est une image émouvant, que invite à réfléchir. La main devient une fois de plus un motif suggestif dans la scène où Ramon songe voler jusqu'au bord de la mer, où il se rencontre avec Julia : ils s'approchent l'un de l'autre et touchent leurs visages avec leur mains, se caressent, se montrent leur amour, se connaissent. Ces images mettent l'accent sur la simplicité et, au même temps, la profondeur des gestes devenus impossible pour le quadriplégiques. Pour une personne comme Ramon, la main, que d'habitude on prend pour acquis, ne peut plus être ni l'outil des outils, à laquelle l'intelligence peut assigner des tâches – comme la définit Aristote (Aristote, 687b), ni le moyenne par lequel on peut toucher, par lequel on peut « être-au-monde » – comme définit Derrida le « toucher » (Marin, 2003, 99-112), mais simplement une partie d'un corps que lui sert à rien. Le tragique de la situation est encore plus accentué dans la scène où le quadriplégique raconte le moment de l'accident : le déroulement rapide des photos de Ramon en différent parties du monde, à des fêtes, avec beaucoup de gens, faisant tout sorte d'activités, photo qui raconte sa vie avant d'être immobilisé, une vie très active et heureuse, contraste fortement avec son état ultérieur.

On peut voir que les deux films inspiré des cas réelle mettent l'accent sur l'incapacité physique des personnages principaux, incapacité que font leurs vies insupportables et indignes pour eux-même. La scène dans laquelle Ramon finalement s'ôte la vie est, peut-être la plus suggestive de ce point de

vu. Pendant qu'il boit la substance létale et commence de sentir ses effets, les séquences surprenant l'accident de Ramon sont déroulé en parallèle : sa mort s'était, en fait, déjà produit à ce moment là ; sa mort est l'effet retardé de cet événement passé presque 30 ans avant – c'est ça le message qu'on reçoit. L'idée d'une vie que, à partir de ce moment, ne mérite plus être vécue est ainsi suggérée par les images du film.

2. La décision de mourir entre rationalité et émotivité

Ce n'est pas seulement un certain concept de la dignité qu'est représenté dans cette scène, mais aussi un certain concept de la mort ou, plutôt, de la manière dans laquelle la mort devrait survenir. La séquence finale de la vie du Ramon est dominé d'une chromatique froide, correspondant au discours du quadriplégique, qui reproche aux autorités ne l'avoir pas laissé mourir avec dignité, l'avoir obligé ôter sa vie clandestinement, comme un criminel. Le message de cette scène est assez clair : Ramon devait avoir le droit de recevoir aide pour se suicider légalement. Le refus de la société d'accepter son droit d'être assisté ou euthanasié l'a obligé pas seulement à une vie mauvaise, qu'il de voulait pas vivre, mais aussi à une mort moins digne. On peut identifier une idée similaire en *Tot alijd*, même si dans ce film l'action se passe en Belgique, pendant l'année que l'euthanasie est légalisée. Il y a deux scènes que, regardées en parallèle, relève le contraste entre un suicide fait en secret et la mort assisté. Accablé par son impuissance physique, Mario décide à un certain moment de se suicider sans attendre plus la légalisation de l'euthanasie. Il va dans son fauteuil roulant jusqu'au bord de la rivière pour se noyer, tout seul. Il s'approche du bord et essaye de se jeter à l'eau, mais il ne réussit pas rassembler son courage. La scène se passe pendant la nuit, le décor est assez sombre et froide, au même temps impressionnant. Plusieurs cadres sont focalisés sur le visage de Mario, tourmenté par le conflit intérieur entre la peur, la frustration et la détermination de ne continuer pas sa vie comme ça. Vaincu par ses émotions, pourtant restant rationnel, lucide, il décide que ça ce n'est pas la manière dans laquelle il veut mourir. Ce qu'il veut est être assisté par un médecin, dans la tranquillité de sa maison, entouré par ses amis et sa famille. Et c'est justement ça que se passe finalement. La loi est adoptée par le Parlement belge et Mario établi avec son médecin la date quand il veut mourir. Après une belle soirée avec ses amies et un jour émotionnant avec ses proches, Mario boit la substance létale donné par le docteur et meurt dans les bras de sa mère, entouré par tous ceux qu'il aime et qui l'aiment. Le moment se passe dans le confort de sa maison, dans un décor chaleureux, agréable. La scène est triste, mais plus digne, plus calme que celle où il presque s'ôte sa vie tout seul, dans la rivière. Il n'y a pas de joie, bien entendu, mais la peur est remplacé par une sorte de sérénité, de tranquillité.

C'est ça l'euthanasie, nous disent ces films : la possibilité de mourir tranquillement quand on veut plus vivre une vie trop difficile, en souffrance, sans dignité. La mort, acceptée par soi-même et aussi par les autres, est la mieux solution quand la souffrance n'a plus de sens, quand il n'y a pas des espoirs, pas de possibilité d'amélioration, mais seulement une perspective mauvaise, insupportable. On trouve le même raisonnement dans le film français *Quelques heures de printemps*. On ne peut pas voir encore les effets de la maladie de Yvette Evrard – le personnage principale–, mais ils sont certains et imminents. Pendant la scène dans laquelle la docteure annonce que la situation médicale de Madame Evrard ne se va pas améliorer, mais, au contraire, il va devenir pire, le personnage réagisse d'une manière calme et très rationnelle : elle ne veut pas arriver à cette stade où elle ne peut plus faire ce qu'elle veut. Elle préfère aller en Suisse pour être assisté par l'association que s'occupe de ce sorte de cas. Son attitude est calme, son visage est presque inerte, son regard lucide, certainement décidé. La même attitude réservée et rationnelle ne cesse pas frapper le spectateur quand Madame Evrard est visité par les représentants de l'association suisse. Elle est demandé sur sa vie, elle reste réservée ; ils lui racontent ce que se va passer avant est après son décès et elle écoute comme s'elle était informé sur n'importe quoi. Tout est claire, certain, pas trop émouvant. Les sourire polis des gens de l'association sont encore plus étranges. Chaque image, chaque geste révèle une sérénité un peu bizarre.

Il y a, quand même, une certaine tension. La scène suivant le rencontre avec la docteure montre l'autre face de la situation. On voit une personne effrayée, désespérée, mais qui pleure avec son visage caché dans l'oreiller, pendant la nuit, loin de la regarde des autres. Ce manière d'exprimer ses émotions seulement pendant la nuit, en secret et solitude est aussi identifiable en *Mar adentro* et *Tot altijd*. Toutes les trois personnages – Ramon, Mario et Yvette – ne montrent pas leurs émotions aux autres, mais affichent seulement rationalité et détermination. Ils sont décidés de mourir, pas à cause d'une crise émotionnelle, mais parce qu'ils savent ce que se passe et ce que va se passer, parce que, d'un point de vu rationnel, c'est la mieux décision. Les yeux claires, la regarde sérieuse et perçant semblent vouloir renforcer ce caractère rationnel. D'ailleurs, la rationalité est une des plus importantes conditions exigées par les lois européennes qui admettent l'euthanasie ou le suicide assisté. Pour quoi ? Parce-que la capacité de prendre une décision rationnellement est une condition nécessaire pour pouvoir prendre une décision autonome, par contraste avec les décisions pris à cause de l'ignorance, de la peur etc. (Savulescu, 1994, 191-200). L'autonomie est une des questions plus importantes dans le débat regardant l'euthanasie. En Suisse, pour exemple, même les demandes fait par personnes diagnostiquées avec une maladie psychique sont acceptées si après un examen psychiatrique il est conclut que sa décision n'est pas du

moment, mais certaine et indépendante, que tout les facteurs ont été attentivement considérés et que les motifs déterminant sont rationnels (Griffiths, Weyers, Adams, 2008, 473). Comment on décide sur le caractère rationnel d'une décision? Généralement, une décision rationnelle est mise en opposition avec une décision irrationnelle, basé sur une compréhension inadéquate et insuffisante de la réalité, sur une manque d'information ou sur des réactions émotionnelles aux certaines événements. Dans les cas raconté dans les films analysés, Ramon, Mario et Yvette connaissent très bien les conséquences de leurs maladies, aussi bien que leurs alternatives et ils prennent leurs décision d'une manière calme, pas à cause du crainte ou d'une dépression.

Mais on peut biens se demander s'il est vraiment possible de prendre ce sorte de décision sans être influencé par l'état émotionnel. En plus, est qu'on peut réellement établir objectivement et certainement si une décision est rationnel ou pas ? Les spécialistes reconnaissent qu'il est difficile de diagnostiquer la dépression, pour exemple, dans les cas des personnes affectées par des maladies en dernière étape (Galbraith, Dobson, 2000, 176-178). Cette rationalité sur laquelle les trois films insistent à travers les personnages principaux est bien discutable. La priorité qu'on donne à la rationalité en générale dans notre époque devrait être plus souvent soumis au débat. Il semble qu'on a oublié que l'homme n'a pas toujours accentué sa rationalité, comme on le fait aujourd'hui, et que le présent est seulement un autre moment dans l'histoire, pas pire que le passé, mais pas absolument mieux non plus.

3. La mort – images et concepts

Ce caractère rationnel, prédominé par objectivité et factualité, marque aussi l'image de la mort dans les trois films proposés. Dans *Quelques heures de printemps*, la préparation minutieuse de Madame Evrard, le voyage tranquille vers la Suisse, la rencontre avec l'assistante qui lui donne la dose létale, tout est assez simple, dépourvu de tragism ou de grandeur. Quand elle prend les médicaments, qui ressemble à un verre de jus d'orange, rien d'important semble se passer. Seulement dans le moment finale Yvette va montrer ses sentiments pour son fils. *Mar adentro* présente la même image froid est despiritualisée : Ramon dit son discours final est boit la cyanure de potassium, préparée étape par étape par ses amies, selon le plan minutieusement établi par Ramon lui-même, ses yeux éteints roulement dans sa tête et son corps devient inerte. Seulement la séquence finale de *Tot altijd* est plus émotionnelle, Mario prenant la poison entouré par ses proches.

La mort est désacralisée, dépourvue de toute signification spirituelle. Les protagonistes sont tous réservés quand il s'agit d'une existence après la mort, préférant se concentrer sur le monde qu'on connaît. Cela est, en fait,

l'orientation du monde contemporaine : l'homme retire son attention de l'autre monde et se concentre sur celle-ci et sur le temps présent (Zabala, 2006, 27). Même si le dernière jour de chaque personnage est romancé – Ramon fait la fête avec plusieurs personnes et puis passe la soirée avec Rosa devant la fenêtre, regardent un coucher de soleil impressionnant ; Mario va à un pique-nique avec ses meilleures amies et puis passe une belle journée avec sa famille ; Yvette Evrard prend plaisir de quelques superbe heures de printemps jusqu'elle arrive en Suisse avec son fils –, le moment final ne laisse pas des espoirs, mais seulement une silence et une tranquillité qui suggère le fin de leur souffrance. Les séquences suivant surprennent clairement leur absence. Dans *Tot altijd*, pour exemple, les cendres de Mario sont répandu à coté d'un lac et puis il n'y est plus de tout, peut-être seulement dans la mémoire de ses amies et sa famille. Le souvenir de Ramon de *Mar adentro* rappelle à ses amies pas seulement qu'il n'existe plus, mais aussi qu'il ne souffre plus : quand Gené va à visiter Julia – l'avocate – quelques années après la mort de Ramon et voit les conséquences de sa maladie, elle est vraiment touchée par sa condition, presque pire que celle de Ramon, qui était déjà libéré. La solitude d'Alain – le fils de Madame Evrard – est aussi assez suggestive : après les pompes funèbres prend le corps de sa mère, il reste seul, fumant une cigarette à coté de la forêt près de laquelle était la maison où sa mère venait de recevoir assistance pour se suicider.

D'ailleurs, du point de vu sociologique, c'est juste ce changement de la mort, qui perd son caractère sacre et devient profane, que a permis l'apparition des lois permettant l'euthanasie (Weyers, 2006, 810-811). La mort est encore chargé des émotions pour les moribonds assez que pour ceux autours d'eux, mais devient plus accessible à l'homme, dans le sens qu'elle n'est plus seulement un événement dominé par l'indéfini et l'inattendu, mais peut être un choix. Si pour l'homme ancien ou pour le chrétien la mort donnent un sens à la vie, si la vie est pour eux une préparation à la mort (Platon, 81a ; Botoșaneanu, 1999, 94-95), l'homme contemporaine veut donner lui-même un sens à sa vie et il veut décider aussi quand et comment il va mourir.

Ce qu'on peut remarquer à la fin de notre analyse est que le monde contemporain se dirige vers une direction anthropocentrique, pragmatiste et individualiste extrême. La dignité humaine devient dépendante de la capacité physique, la vie perd son sens et sa valeur s'elle n'est pas vécue en confort et sans souffrance, la mort devient un fait simple, une imminence dépourvue de grandeur ou de sens. Tout jugement doit être pragmatique, chaque décision rationnelle, la spiritualité n'a plus d'espace, les émotions doivent être contrôlées. Ce que semble nous échapper est que c'est rationalité que nous promouvons n'est pas absolue, que si l'homme refus d'accepter une sorte de principe supérieur à lui-même, il risque tomber dans un relativisme extrême, dans une forme de nihilisme, que la vie ne doit pas

être facile ou confortable pour être valeureuse. Même si nous ne pouvons pas nier que chaque personne a le droit de décider pour soi-même même mourir, même si la liberté et l'autodétermination de chacun sont fondamentales pour une société civilisée, on devrait se demander deux fois si on a raison avant d'accepter ou encourager le choix de mourir.

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Ion VRABIE *

The Reality of Myth and the Myth of Reality in Russian Philosophy **

Abstract: The issue of myth has enjoyed a special attention in the twentieth century. In the vision of the new researchers, the myth ceases to be a simple fiction, invention or fable characteristic for primitive nations. There is a reconsideration of the signification that the myth has. It is no longer seen as an invented reality that doubles the real world. Myth does not open towards a new world, but towards a new way of being into world. The human being relates to its fellows and reacts to the circumstances of life by virtue of some common beliefs of its time. Our myths are the premises of our actions to the extent that they are not subjected to some critical exams on behalf of our conscience. The myths of our ancestors are no longer valid for us. However, they were seen as undeniable realities. Thus, our time has its own myths, which work for us in the same way. The possibility of talking about the myths of each age appears. By means of re-understanding myth in its living aspect, it justifies and fundaments the human behavior and activity. It is enough to ask ourselves which are the criteria according to which we make the decisions and the preconceived ideas that guide our thinking in order to reach the issue of our myths.

In this respect have the western researchers guided themselves in anthropology (Cl. Levi-Strauss, L. Levy-Bruhl, E.B. Tylor, Mircea Eliade), but also the followers of Russian symbolism (V. Ivanov, N. Berdiaev, V. Solovyov, A. Belyi, P. Florensky, A.F. Losev). Influenced by the Christian tradition, Russian thinkers will state the necessity to see the world by means of symbols. Following this branch, their studies on myth will develop in a different horizon from the Occidental one. Thus, for most of them, the world brings to the forefront symbols, and the myth is their living form becoming attitude and way of seeing the world. How they have tried to accomplish a perspective on myth to the extent that it works in our conscience as a reality or as a law is the stake of this study. The starting point of this demarche will be to resume the conversations on language and symbol from the beginning of the twentieth century.

Keywords: Myth, Reality, Mythical Perception, Symbolism, Consciousness, Language

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1. The context of a research on myth

What do we think about when we speak in the 21st century about myth? Can a discussion that has myth as subject be taken seriously? Can the mythical discourse be considered a scientific one? Myths from two thousand years ago are no longer valid for us, but does this mean that we do not have ours? The reality from two thousand years ago was different from the contemporary one, does this mean that it has changed or that our instruments of perception have changed? If there is a reality per se that cannot be known by man and yet he manifests and lives in a reality that he considers true, we can state that man develops his existence at the crossing of at least two worlds: of the possible and of the impossible, of credibility and of improbability, finally, of appearance, of occurrence and of imaginary?

Before becoming a history, a cosmogony, the myth is preceded by a perception of reality. The perception is not a simple data reception, but, in man's case, it is doubled by an act of understanding. The man wants to understand the world. By means of this fact, man not only perceives reality, but he also makes it. He gives meaning to reality. But does this observation offer us enough justification to speak of a mythical thinking not just with reference to archaic societies, but also to the essential human constitution?

Myth has been treated from the beginning as something personal of archaic societies – stories, histories, beliefs of ancient times which, for a contemporary society, are nothing but fictions and legends. In the 20th century takes place, however, a change of perspective. Myth becomes a form of perception and even a form of thinking. It is tried to research myth from the perspective of mythical individual, of the one who lives inside myth and who builds his existence according to myth. Thus seen, myth becomes a true reality. This observation is mentioned by Mircea Eliade as well, but only in the second half of the 20th century. Myth is no longer researched as in the normal acceptance as fable or legend, but “as it was understood in archaic societies, where myth designates, on the contrary, a true history and, even more, very precious since it is sacred, exemplary and significant” (Eliade 1998, 1). Although researches in this direction produced certain ambiguities regarding the use of the notion of myth, they brought interesting contributions by means of opening new approaches in the field of anthropology and history of religion. Until then, myth has been analyzed from the point of view of its content, as founding history by means of which the appearance of something is explained. The new perspectives insist more on the functional aspect of myth, explaining its role and opens towards a formal analysis, after which one could research the conditions of possibility of myth.

In the societies where myth is lived, it does not designate just a sacred history that took place in a primordial time, but offers real models of

behavior. Myth is the one that offers meaning and value to human existence. "The dominant function of myth is that of presenting exemplary models of all rites and of all significant human activities: both nourishment or marriage, as well as labor, education, art or wisdom" (Eliade 1978, 8). It is useless to notice here that all human activities, always, have been and are made by virtue of some models, of some purposes that have become purposes precisely because of models that work in its times, even when this is not acknowledged. The intention that is intended to be followed hereinafter is the argumentation of the idea that myth is far from being removed by the contemporary society. The relation that myth has with reality implies a distance, of course flexible, at the same time, myth is a reality with a degree of value permanently active and with nothing inferior to other realities (ex. scientific). Myth represents a form of thinking and, at the same time, a way of exposure of reality, because myth is possible through man in the same way man is updated, is defined, by means of myth.

2. Mythical thinking in E. Cassirer's vision

Researches on myth have known several directions. In Occident, they have oriented more towards contents, based on data collection and classifications. In this respect, ethnology and history of religions have developed. The few archaic societies that survived until the 20th century have been followed, supervised, analyzed with the purpose of being able to define a pre-logical or pre-historical state of man. The archaic societies were seen as a historical confession of a phase through which man has passed in his progressing development. Thus, by means of their research, of life, beliefs, myths, it was believed that it can be reestablished a forgotten step from the history of human development. Their contemporary existence was seen as accidental and the ethnologists seen in the characteristics of tribal life some archeological traces and through their interpretation it was tried to reestablish an archaic past. Their realities, myths, represented for the contemporary man only some invented stories by the naivety specific for a pre-scientific stage of man, comparable to the one of the child.

The issue of myth also enters in the cultural space from Eastern Europe at the beginning of the 20th century, then in the territory of Russian Empire. The reception of ethnological researches in a different context, with different problems led also to a specific interpretation of these realities. Influenced by a strong feeling of religiosity, a part of the social and human sciences (one must take into consideration a Christian philosophy) from this cultural space was developed on the branch of a symbolism more or less poetic. This is due, on the one hand, to a great philosophical and religious personality Vladimir Soloviov, whose influence is at the base of a religious revival right in the first years of the past century, and on the other hand, of

a reception sensible enough of the German philosophy, most of the professors from the Academy from Kiev or from Moscow being intellectually formed at the universities from Germany. In what concerns me, I will highlight the receiving of E. Cassirer's works.

If Cassirer's studies from the field of the theory of knowledge or of scientific methodology do not interest much, instead those that deal with the problems of religion and of myth cause numerous echoes. The publication of the second volume from *Philosophie der Symbolischer Formen* gave birth also to some reviews, some favorable, other critical. The critical reviews come especially from religious thinkers. E. Cassirer remained for them a Neo-Kantian, which meant the follower of a formal thinking or, to talk about the essence of religion in the terms of some categories, trying to fit religion between the limits of reason, as S. Frank said, reflects, first of all, an act without faith and, secondly, a methodological error, because the world of faith is different from the one of knowledge. The world of absolute truth cannot be explained by means of scientific relativism. In the same context, S. Frank argues that exactly as "a blind man cannot know painting and a deaf man or one lacking musical hearing – the music, the same way the man who does not have openness towards religious life cannot surprise the essence of this world" (Франк 1926, 190).

The main assumption from which E. Cassirer starts defines man as being a symbolic being. Man does not simply live in a physical universe. He gives meaning to it. The things around him are bearers of meaning. In this way, he lives in a symbolic universe where myth, language, religion and even art form reality. On the one hand, they are realities, and on the other hand, they are means through which reality reveals itself to man.

"Thus the objectivity of myth consists primarily in that wherein it seems farthest removed from the reality of things – from the reality of naive realism and dogmatism – this objectivity is not the reproduction of a material datum but is a specific and typical mode of formation, in which consciousness disengages itself from and confronts the mere receptivity of the sensory impression" (Cassirer 1955, 15).

Mythical perception materializes through a creative act. The mythical subject does not receive in a passive way the sensations, but it takes part at their arrangement. For this reason, one cannot claim that myth simply represents a product of imagination, it contains in native mode also an intuition of reality. It is being configured at the crossroad of these two dimensions. At this level, however, it confronts "the force of the impression with an active force of expression" (Cassirer 1955, 23), says E. Cassirer, we do not deal yet with a free and conscious process, but determined in a psychological manner. The person is not self-conscious and free in his

actions. Facing the delimitation between I and world, reality reveals itself to conscience by means of the objective force of sign. The distinction between significance and thing is not valid, it presents itself to conscience in an absolute unit. Thus, even if in a first phase, the mythical conscience goes through a differentiation in comparison with reality, i.e. through distancing, it falls back in a unique plan of existence once it places instead of reality the mythical images and signs. E. Cassirer's main thesis is built on this idea that the mythical subject lives only in one plan of existence.

"Here there are no different degrees of reality, no contrasting degrees of objective certainty. The resultant picture of reality lacks the dimension of depth – the differentiation of foreground and background so characteristically effected in the scientific concept with its distinction between "the ground" and that which is founded on it" (Cassirer 1955, 36).

From this point of view, mythical conscience, at this level, is deprived from the critical faculty. It does not have the possibility to judge what has been given to it to establish the boundaries such as those of objectivity, reality, falsity. The myth, from the perspective of the contemporary researcher, does not know and does not work with the distinction between ideal and real, between image and thing. To the extent that myth contains a certain dose of fiction, the fictional quality remains unknown to mythical subject, it is unconscious of its own creations. In this respect, characteristic for myth is always an act of faith. I wonder to what extent the contemporary man analyzes, critically or at least logically, the quality of his knowledge, the more so as to a very large percentage what we know is established by the information that we are told, that intervene through different mass-media ways. The role of mass-media in the life of contemporary man is, probably, greater than the one of reality as such. It became a virtual space, of images and information, which, practically, interferes between us and reality. Is there such a great difference between myth and mass-media, seeing things from the perspective of the accomplished function?

Another point upon which E. Cassirer insists is represented by the difference and even opposition between scientific thinking and mythical thinking. Following the issue through the light of the notion of causality, one can notice an inability from the mythical subject to conceive something as contingent. The mythical conception on world does not accept any event that is under the sign of accident. Each particular case is seen in the light of a cause as particular. The way in which the causal influence is explained, although the concept of causality is a modern one, forms the difference between scientific and mythical thinking. For the first one, it is enough arranging the singular event on the base of a universal law. Contingent is not something that escapes the universality of law, but something that does

not obey the inference at that time. “For scientific thought, to „understand” an event means nothing else than to reduce it to certain universal conditions, to subordinate it to that universal complex of conditions which we call nature” (Cassirer 1955, 49).

In E. Cassirer’s point of view, mythical thinking represents a precursory stage to the scientific-empirical one. Empirical conscience is compared to the naive stage of the child through which one goes in a necessary manner in order to access maturity. In mythical world, each concept achieves a personal customization, the mythical perception is directed towards individual objects, without dividing them into species and genders. The laws and formal relations lack in mythical thinking, which turns out to be a concrete one and which refers directly to each object.

3. Ernst Cassirer and the philosophy of myth in Russian thinking

Olga Freidenberg, one of the pioneers of symbolic anthropology and of cultural studies in Russia, believes that we owe Cassirer the identification of the specific character of pre-logical thinking. She considers that, before Levy-Bruhl, Cassirer gets closer to the particularities of mythical thinking as to a form of conscience with specific characteristics. Kantian as training, Cassirer aims to prove the a priori existence of certain categories of intellect. This intention is justified also through the new discoveries of anthropology and ethnology in what regards the primitive people.

Kant differentiated between the origin of the logical sense and the psychological one. He was interested in forming the logical categories, which had to be a priori, while the premises of psychologism are obtained after experience. Cassirer’s error consists, however, according to Olga Freidenberg, in the distinction that he enforces between the logical and the pre-logical thinking, refusing by means of it to understand the unity of the logical process. “Cassirer’s conclusion ends in the idea that the mythical world is an unique world, accessible to pre-historical conscience, and the creation of language or of myth represents only a part of the common process of awareness of the world” (Фрейденберг 1997, 31).

Cassirer has been read in a careful and creative manner by A. Losev. The latter one came close to the thinking of the German philosopher, trying to understand it and even to continue it in an original form. The intuitions of the Russian philosopher seem to surpass the intentions presumed in Cassirer’s writings. For example, sending to the way in which time is analyzed in the perception of mythical conscience in the second volume of *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, A. Losev observes that

“the object of study of Cassirer’s Neo-Kantian philosophy is not reality in itself, which cannot be known, but the ways through which is revealed to us –

thinking by means of language, mythical-religious thinking – the artistic perspective does not just reflect the world, but it forms it, by means of a sensitive relation and an objective overview” (Aoceb 1977, 216).

Since the ‘20 of the past century, A. Losev’s philosophical conception is formed under the influence of ancient philosophy and of Platonism. In that time, concerned also with the issue of myth, in *The Dialectics of Artistic Form*, he speaks about three types in which myth has been systematized, by: Proclus, Schelling and Cassirer (Aoceb 1995, 184-185). Cassirer, in agreement with Husserl, A. Losev considers, tries to offer myth a meaning starting from its function and logic.

One of the subtle observations of A. Losev highlights the fact that realism and objectivism followed by science does not represent the results of an accurate description of nature, but after establishing a correspondence between formulas and abstract laws and the course of empirical occurrences. Scientific thinking wants to be indifferent to any emotion and feeling, personal and essential qualities of mythical subject. The relation between world and mythical subject is always full of sensibility, feeling and sentiment. As a matter of fact, this is reported also by E. Cassirer: “Here we cannot speak of things as a dead or indifferent staff. All objects are benignant or malignant, friendly or inimical, familiar or uncanny, alluring and fascinating or repellent and threatening” (Cassirer 1944, 103).

However, while E. Cassirer gives a hint that there is a continuity between the mythical thinking and the scientific one, as it is between two stages of human development, A. Losev tries to avoid such an idea. For the latter one, one cannot claim that myth is previous to science and, as previous stage, it makes possible scientific thinking, which, subsequently, enforces its perspectives. Scientific knowledge, after all, does not stand against the direct character of mythical perception. One does not either look for arguments against the fact that myth offers raw matter from which scientific thinking develops its reflections and obtains its abstraction. A. Losev is against the idea that science comes after mythology in the sense that it is built on its ruins. He considers that myth is always present in scientific thinking, it is next to this, and contributes to its development. He offers the example of Descartes, which can be placed at the base of European rationalism, of mechanism and even of positivism:

“Descartes begins his philosophy by means of radical doubt. Even in what God is concerned, he wonders whether He is a manipulator or not. And where does he find support in his philosophy, his indubitable base? He finds it in *I*, in subject, in thinking, in conscience, in *ego*, in *cogito*. Why? Why are things less real? Why is God less real, about who Descartes states that is the clearest evidence and simplest idea? Why not something else as well? Because this is his

unconscious faith, this is his mythology and thus, in general, appears the mythology of individuality and subjectivity, which is at the base of the new European culture and philosophy” (Лоцев 2001, 34).

The relation between scientific and mythical knowledge, in conclusion, cannot be characterized as a diachronic one, in the sense that the first one continues the second one in a progressive manner. The two forms of knowledge not only they do not exclude each other, as A. Losev also tries to tell us, but, on the contrary, they intertwine and determine each other. Moreover, often, at the base of a scientific discovery we find a myth. Through this, science does not surpass or replace the myth. We speak of two different dimensions of reality, where the scientific truth forms its value in its field of operation, and the mythical truth remains truthful in its own, thus one does not diminish with anything the other one’s character.

Taken in its pure form, A. Losev considers, science is formed only from logical and numerical systems. It has an abstract form; it does not operate with objects, but with laws. Therefore, science in its pure state would not have any point of intersection with mythology, but, when it starts to be applied, becomes mythical. “Euclid’s geometry in itself is not mythological, but when it becomes certainty that there are no other dimensions but the one of Euclidean geometry, then it becomes mythical, because the position of this type of geometry does not tell us anything about the possibility of other forms of spatiality” (Лоцев 2001, 40-41). The mythical vision is totalizing, and any kind of knowledge, which tends to generalize itself and to offer a fundamental truth, in virtue of this character of generalization becomes mythical.

Losev is not against the character of demystification that the scientific knowledge has. Indeed, science has disassembled many prejudgetments, beliefs and myths, for A. Losev, but that does not mean that a truth has replaced a lie or that a reality took the place of a fiction. “When science tends to expose myth, enforcing its own truth, this means, states A. Losev, that a mythology is fighting against another one” (Лоцев 2001, 41). The example offered by the Russian philosopher is the following: archaic people believed that man can take the form of other animals; science has fought and has “proven” the impossibility of this. Modern physics and mechanics do not have such categories that would explain a transformation of this type. Newton’s theory of unilateral and three-dimensional space excludes this possibility. Subsequently, for example through the formulas of the mathematician Lorenz, who precedes Einstein, it is noticed that a body can be thought in a change of shape if it is put in correlation with the volume and speed of its movement. If we assume that a thing could move with the speed of light, then it would not only change its shape, but its weight would become equal with zero. It follows after these ideas the theory on space

relativity of Einstein, which tends to replace the Newtonian perspective, and, to these, one could also add the new studies from the field of quantum physics that are about to change, again, our perception on time and space.

4. Final considerations

The conclusion that can be inferred here is that in the history of the development of human conscience it would be wrong to assume that there has been a period of *pre-logical* thinking, where people lived the reality of myth and that has been surpassed by a logical conscience that provides through arguments only truths. What we could claim, however, consists of the idea that myth, as any truth, represents an instrument of knowledge of the world. In time, some instruments wear out, become no longer productive, then appear the periods of transition, of crises and revolutions, when some myths are replaced by others, and the new ones declare the old ones not valid anymore and fake. After all, the issue is not at all in the terms of truth and falsity. As a historic event must be researched in the context in which it developed, the same way mythical reality can and must be analyzed through mythical thinking, internal coherence and the influence that it has upon human behavior.

This discussion about myth, as it has received form from the beginning of the 20th century and, moreover, as it has been confirmed by the ethnological discoveries throughout the entire century, it opens towards new philosophical interrogations and questioning. First of all, urging towards a critical analyses of contemporary perspectives. Myths are not only of archaic societies. Each period of time and culture have their own myths. The mythological analysis implies an archeological research that, however, does not take place in ancient times, but in the depths of the categories through which we receive the world nowadays. As modernity created a myth of progress and of evolution, and postmodernism of deterritorialization and of difference, the same way the present times create their own myths (of the virtual world, for example). Man is a mythical subject and a creator of myths. Myth is a form by means of which he gets closer to reality.

One cannot deny a certain distance that is imposed in the perceptive relation with reality. Myth interferes between man and world, and its position in this interval is flexible. Thus, together with Gilbert Durand we can claim that there is a “parameter of distance” (Durand 2004, 160) in regards to the real one, which is calculated according to the characteristics of each period of time and each culture.

Another observation for this idea is that time is not necessarily a guarantor of the removal from fiction. The fact that a myth has been annihilated through the journey to the Moon does not lead to a complete

demythisation, but it causes the creation of new myths (about spacemen and about the Moon it self). Therefore, by means of the evolution in time, even if it seems that some myths become realities and by means of this the distance to real is suppressed, in fact each period of time is also creator of myths through the removal of older ones, in compensation for or recovering that difference. It would be difficult to support the fact that man imagines or feels less in the contemporary world than in the traditional one.

Finally, in order to make some conclusive statements, I consider that, generally, myth can be subjected to analysis of two forms: 1. as object or 2. as method. The first one is personal more to the history of religions and to the ethnologist, the second one serves both to the anthropologist as well as to the phenomenologist and philosophy in general.

If one starts from the idea that myth represents a way of reference to the world, even a cognitive act, then mythology can claim a certain scientific strictness. To the extent that mythology wants to take into account the irrational acts of human conscience, which is made through the faculty of imagination in the process of interaction with the world, it can lay the foundation of a field of research at least as truthful as the one of the anthropology, phenomenology (which through Husserl wanted to be of a scientific strictness) and even of science itself.

Unlike science, that wants an objective and complete access to the world, without involving the subject, that would like to be (in a naive way) a simple impartial coordinator of the researches (an establisher of discourse as M. Foucault claimed at a certain point), mythological research not only ignores human conscience, but wants to understand what is going on with it and how does it behave in the process of interaction with the object; a process that, as a matter of fact, is creator. The myth aims at an act of creation. Thus, while scientific research follows the removal of the distance between subject and object, between human conscience and reality, for the mythological research precisely this distance is indispensable.

From this point of view, for myth it is absolutely inconceivable the elimination of one of the two elements. The mythical subject gets reality closer, on the one hand due to the object's donation, and on the other hand to the perception of subject. We are talking of an act that takes place simultaneously from two different parts. The human subject does not passively receive the way in which object gives itself to us, but it perceives accompanied by his states of mind, feelings and images. Under this aspect, mythical thinking cannot be suppressed but together with human emotions, and the reality of myth is indubitable (one can be uncertain of a thing, but you cannot be uncertain of your own uncertainty). On the other hand, reality, to the extent that it implies the characteristic of exteriority, transcendent or immanent, reveals to us in myth (as symbol, image, discourse or history).

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Valentin COZMESCU*

The Iconography of Nothingness in Noica's Philosophy **

Abstract: This paper has two main aims. The first is to show how Constantin Noica approached the inevitable problem of nothingness in his ontology. For this we had to mainly focus on two books of Romanian philosopher: *The Becoming unto Being* and *The Romanian Spirit in the Balance of Time. Six Maladies of the Contemporary Spirit*. Noica uses five words when addressing the issue of nothingness: *void (overvoid)*, *nothingness*, *non-being*, *vacuum*, *nothing*. Beyond this terminological inconsistency, one can identify three major meanings of *the nothing*: 1) non-being as a void of being inscribed in things; 2) the nothing as secondary non-being in the guise of ontological morbidity and contingency; 3) the nothing as a sense of emptiness. The second aim is to achieve a critical analysis on the manner in which Noica addressed the issue of nothingness, using as methodological (and suppositional) framework the metaphysical platform of Martin Heidegger. The conclusion of our analysis is that Noica, despite a genuine sense of being, committed a metaphysical evasion, deviating from the requirements of metaphysics.

Keywords: Nothingness, Constantin Noica, Ontology, Being, Spiritual Maladies, Sense of Emptiness

1. A brief introduction to Noica's ontology

Constantin Noica (1909-1987) represents a major milestone in Romanian culture and philosophy¹, often regarded as "the most important Romanian thinker". His philosophical interests encompassed the entire field of philosophy, from gnoseology, the philosophy of culture, axiology and philosophical anthropology to ontology and logic, from the history of philosophy to semantic philosophy, from ancient to contemporary

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¹ Along with other Romanian thinkers, such as Vasile Conta, Nae Ionescu, Emil Cioran, Mircea Eliade, Mircea Vulcănescu, Lucian Blaga, Mihai Şora, Mircea Florian.

philosophy, from editions, translations or interpretations to criticism and original philosophical work².

The ontology developed by Noica, and presented in *Devenirea întru ființă* (*The Becoming unto Being*), could be summarized as follows³: 1) being is not a plenitude in things, but a void; 2) being is not a stable and immutable instance, it pre-eminently presupposes motion, dynamism, process; 3) being is not an eternal presence, residing in a dimension parallel to the world of things and animals, but a presence which is embedded in the latter, a presence, however, which initially becomes manifest as absence; 4) being is not simple, it has a structure; 5) that which exists in a thing is not being, but an aperture towards being. More precisely, the aperture towards being is given by being's absence from the object, an ontological absence which could be defined as "shaping nothingness". This nothingness shapes the thing with a view to its own annulment, therefore, the thing is shaped at the same pace that nothingness is ontologically "filled". 6) "Ontological (ful)filling" implies checking the ontological model, that is, the emergence of the three fundamental terms in the structure of being: the individual, the general and determinations (named "the IDG [Individual-determinations-general] ontological model").

The IDG ontological model is active in things and never can become saturated. Therefore, we cannot speak about an absolute being, consummate and stable. The deviations from this pattern give the measure of the real. Thus, any of the three terms can be absent, the other two coupling up in turn. Through excess or absence of a term, there emerge six "precariousnesses" that represent as many "degrees of being" or "stairs to coming unto being" of things. This ontological model with the being far from absolute and incorruptible, accepts precariousness and evinces two-

² We mention some of the most important books of Noica: *Mathesis sau bucuriile simple* (*Mathesis, or: The Simple Joys*), Fundația pentru Literatură și Artă, Bucharest, 1934; *Schiță pentru istoria lui "Cum e cu puință cera nou?"* (*A Sketchy Historical Endeavor on the Question: "How Is It Possible Something New?"*), Bucovina Publishing House, Bucharest, 1940; *Jurnal filosofic* (*A Philosophical Diary*), Publicom Publishing House, Bucharest, 1944; *27 trepte ale realului* (*27 Stairs of the Real*), Științifică Publishing House, Bucharest, 1969; *Rostirea filosofică românească* (*The Romanian Philosophical Apophantics*), Științifică Publishing House, Bucharest 1970; *Sentimentul românesc al ființei* (*The Romanian Feeling of Being*), Eminescu Publishing House, Bucharest, 1978; *Spiritul românesc în cumpăratul vremii. Șase maladii ale spiritului contemporan* (*The Romanian Spirit in the Balance of Time. Six Maladies of the Contemporary Spirit*), Univers Publishing House, Bucharest, 1978; *Povestiri despre om, după o carte de G.W.F. Hegel* (*Stories About Man: After a Book by Hegel*), Cartea Românească Publishing House, Bucharest, 1980; *Devenirea întru ființă. I. Încercare asupra filosofiei tradiționale II. Tratat de ontologie* (*The Becoming unto Being. 1. Essay on Traditional Philosophy, 2. Treatise of Ontology*), Enciclopedică și Științifică Publishing House, Bucharest, 1981; *Scrisori despre logica lui Hermes* (*Letters on the Logic of Hermes*), Eminescu Publishing House, Bucharest, 1986;

³ This brief overview of Noica's ontology belongs to Sorin Lavric (see http://romanian-philosophy.ro/en/index.php?title=Constantin_Noica)

pronged structures, doubled according to an ontological or ontic plan: *becoming unto being* and *becoming unto becoming*, regulating time and rotating time, the infinite of reason and the infinite of the intellect, truth and exactness, maladies of the spirit and maladies of the soul, second-instance being and first-instance being, structure naught and first-instance naught, the individual turned holomer (an I-D, a part that rises to the power of the entire) and a void individual (things in Parmenides' view, an uninformed real content), essence determinations and empty determinations, general turned unto concrete universal and void general (for example, Parmenides' absolute being, uncovered by a real content).

To build an ontology model based on these ideas, Noica recovered philosophies of "German spiritualism", especially the philosophy of Kant and Hegel. Moreover, the Noica's dialectic is built step by step as a response to the Hegelian dialectic, by an attempt to overcome it. He wants to establish need to move from the famous Hegelian route – thesis-antithesis-synthesis (considered to be linear), to a circular moving: theme-antitheme-thesis-theme. And this change should be able to describe undulatory motion of being.

2. Methodological assumptions

Any critical approach inevitably requires some assumptions (sometimes explicitly announced, but more often implicitly) that guide the encounter with the object investigated. So our critical research will be held under this exigency. In this regard, we announce that for the establishment and planning the suppositional framework we appeal to Martin Heidegger, whose metaphysical platform we use foothold to explore the problem of nothingness in Noica's ontology. There are two main reasons why we assume and instruments (on methodological level) Heideggerian metaphysics platform. First, because Noica makes many references to the German philosopher, constantly trying to separate from him, although there are many similarities between the two thinkers. Secondly, which is even more important, because Martin Heidegger, by his metaphysical excellency, is undoubtedly one of the few philosophers who can provide relevant and even inevitable benchmark in any research concerning the ontology.

Above all, Martin Heidegger argues strongly that "being is the *only* and the *authentic* theme of philosophy"⁴. "This is not our invention, because putting this issue occurred with the beginning of philosophy in Antiquity and acquired the grandest form in Hegel's logic. [...] In a negative sense, this means: philosophy is not the *science about* of beings, but about *being*, or, using

⁴ Martin Heidegger, *Problemele fundamentale ale fenomenologiei / Fundamental problems of phenomenology*, translated from German by Bogdan Mincă and Sorin Lavric, Humanitas, Bucharest, 2006, p. 36.

the Greek word, it is *ontology*⁵. In line with this, it can be stated even a "ethical" corollary which to complete somehow the Heideggerian sentence: "metaphysics (ontology) can never be a means, but always only purpose".

Once announced and defined by such an axiomatic formulation (as *the science of being*⁶, which has the being as single and authentic theme – the question "What is being?"), does not mean that metaphysics is a closed chapter, a common good that to have free and possibly effective. And even less, does not mean that metaphysics forgets or neglects its own essence, like an "irrefutable" principle which is only foothold without himself to find the fulcrum. In contrast, once announced and defined in this way, metaphysics finds one appropriate horizon in order to find (or not find) any essence: horizon of being, and only of being.

Saying that "philosophy is not the *science about* of beings, but about *being*", Heidegger claim a ontological difference between beings (*das Seiende*) and being (*das Sein*). He proposes to understand being itself, as distinguished from any specific entities (beings). Being is what determines beings as beings, that in terms of which beings are already understood. Even if the philosophy is responsible for the meaning of being, Heidegger argues initially that there is no access to being other than via beings themselves, that a true understanding of being (*Seinsverständnis*) can only proceed by referring to particular beings, and that the best method of pursuing being must inevitably involve a kind of hermeneutic circle. A such particular beings which provides privileged access to the meaning of being is *Dasein* (which means not human being, but is nothing other than human being).

After Heidegger makes a comprehensive analysis on ontological structures of *Dasein*, he realizes that this beings is incapable to proving any metaphysical privilege inside of ontological difference. And because of this "anthropological" failure, ontological difference is forced to recoil upon itself, (re)focusing on the being (on the meaning of being). By this radical (re)orientation (*Kehre*) makes its way another requirement that metaphysics (thought) has honored: austerity of fact-of-a-leave-to-be. In this sense, metaphysics has its rigor in the way required to submit to herself: "a stagnating". Therefore, phenomenology is not, in essence, a dispensable and occasionally accessory of thinking. And the less, it can not be an excuse for any intellectual fashion or philosophical enthusiasm. Phenomenology is thinking itself, that strives to recognize themselves as thinking.

When trying to achieve this *Kehre*, thinking realizes that the ontological difference is sabotaged by the difference. Difference which, in turn, is

⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁶ Defined as "the science of being" it is obvious that metaphysics is a task of thinking. Moreover, just by trying to cope with this task, thinking it can recognize themselves as thinking, can meet its own essence.

sabotaged also by itself. And so the thinking must "to make place" for *nothing*, just because it might be capable of such a persistent and devastating sabotage. Therefore, it must be another requirement: *the recognition of metaphysical vocation of nothing* (that *along* with being). Recognition that actually means "to encounter" with nothing. Just nothing (disclosed in anguish – *Angst*) can testify being. Just silent word of being can speak about being, but without invoking some occasional smart, subtle, wise or pious silence. Heidegger is so overwhelmed by a single and simple revelation: only nothingness can make place for being. In this way, the *science of being* is also *science of nothing*.

But thinking which is in charge of the science of nothing is unable to account for nothing (that *along* with being). Because nothing is revealed as nothing (as full concealment being) only in the horizon of a *affective disposition* (non-thinking, especially pre-thinking). The nothing is therefore provided (and accessible) only by that affective disposition (*Angst*), it must attempt *to think the being without recourse to beings*, especially to thinking. In other words, it requires a *overcoming of metaphysics*. But this can be done only within metaphysics, and only through it. Overcoming of metaphysics are actually a *metaphysical overcoming of metaphysics*. Therefore, thinking that thinks the nothing, thus acting against its own essence, it actually reveals its essence.

Once made visible our methodological (and suppositional) framework, we will continue to show how Constantin Noica approached the inevitable problem of nothingness in his ontology. Following in the end to achieve a critical analysis on this issue.

3. The Iconography of Nothingness in Noica's Philosophy

Compared with M. Heidegger, the problem of nothingness (non-being) is for Constantin Noica somewhat a second matter, being approached more often indirectly and quite unsystematic. Therefore, in his philosophical work, it is quite difficult to identify a clear and unitary perspective about nothingness. On the contrary, there is a confusing terminology and conceptual inconsistency. For example, in *Tratat de ontologie* (*Treatise of Ontology*) speaks about an "Overvoid" inscribed into things (unlike Plotinus "Overflow") and a "shaping nothiness", while in *Sase maladii ale spiritului contemporan* (*Six Maladies of the Contemporary Spirit*), where Noica lies its typology of maladies "in the edge of a work about being", it is argued that there is no void, but really just a "sense of emptiness" that manifests as four types of nothingness corresponding to the spiritual maladies: the nothingness of disintegration (in *catholitis* malady), the nothingness of suspension (in *todetitis* malady), the nothingness of culture (in *atodetitis*

malady), the nothingness of extinction (in *acatholitis* malady)⁷. So, in Noica's philosophy, nothing (non-being) has several shapes, faces, that could even talk about a real iconography of nothingness.

3.1. The Void into Things and the Shaping Nothingness

In the "Introduction" to *Treatise of Ontology*, Noica says that being itself should be revised, whereas traditional ontology has been perhaps what has been wrongly attributed to Plato: *the world has doubled with one incorruptible*. The being can no longer be one of parmenidian type, endowed with all the attributes of perfection (unborn, eternal, complete, unwavering, uninterrupted), one of calmness and peace, but none one in heraclitean meaning, one of the empty conflict. "It is instead one of *tension*, due to its terms, which are in the act and in pre-equipoise or weakening."⁸

For Noica, only being *wrapped* may be a model of being, present and active in all that is reality. This model operates everywhere and is the truth of philosophy. "With this truth have nurtured all philosophies. Some have started from *general*, the other from *individual*, the other from *determinations* (phenomena, manifestations); because there are epochs or situations of thinking what advertisement to put into light a term or another. Some philosophers have redone the *entire* model (but in one way, as Hegel himself, with the structure: general-determinations-individual); other philosophers have remained uncovered, through the failure of one of the entities, but that's exactly why open and stimulating. If saturation of model leads to accomplished being, that we understand as «the becoming unto being» and where start the dialectic proces, instead the *tendency* towards saturation is the catalyst of the world and the spiritual life itself"⁹. Therefore, Noica asserts that ontology based not only all philosophical disciplines, with all three terms of them and with their exercise, but expresses in her essence the spiritual life, with its meanings manifested, signifying whatever is real or ideal procesuality.

Assuming that the being has two meanings – the being in general and the being of each thing –, Noica divides his ontology into two parts: the first examines the being of things (which means being of an atom, of a

⁷ Cf. Laura Pamfil, "Noica, a Thinker in a Time of Need and the Philosophy of Becoming unto Being", in *Romanian Philosophical Culture, Globalization, and Education. Romanian philosophical studies VI*, edited by Alin Tat, Stefan Popencu, The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, Washington D.C., 2008, pp. 53-84. This study of Laura Pamfil is for us a very effective guide for the research that we undertake.

⁸ Constantin Noica, *Devenirea întru ființă. vol. II. Tratat de ontologie* (*The Becoming unto Being, vol. II. Treatise of Ontology*), Humanitas, Bucharest, 1998, p. 193.

⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 191-192.

substance, of a tree, of a man, of a thought); the second examines the being itself, which relies on first.

Even at the beginning of the first part of its ontology, that in which examines the being of things, Noica announces a fundamental assumption: "anything that is not expressed the being". At first, any ontology has to confront the *nothing*. And always, nothing is nothing to *something*. When it starts from the being, it said "being is not this, nor it", immediately reach Hegel's claim that the being is permanent passage to nothing, and that it is nothing, a *void of things*. When it starts from things, then that to say that things are not being also lead to void, but at a *void of being*. There is a difference between the two types of voids: void of things is "logical" – ontology passing suddenly in logic –, while void of being is ontological, and if it leads to becoming, will make it to the end and keeping an ontological sense. When it says that "the being is not that, nor that", being increasingly hides in her incomprehensibility. But if it says that "neither this, nor that it's not being", a horizon of being or even a question on them becomes possible¹⁰.

Because anything that is not expressed the being, means that the being is an absence in things. And is not an some absence, but one *in* them. Other absences are *around* thing, not in it, being outside thing that it is not something else, for instance, that the tree is not the river. Conversely, the absence of being is in thing. It's not enough being in it, or it's not really being. Being consequently made it a "possible place" of her. The being is distributed everywhere, in any thing, but nowhere did not appear as such. Every thing is a Monad which could reflect the whole being. Things are not the being, and nor all things at one place are not the being. All things together are in parentheses, as *not being the being*¹¹.

In the privacy of each thing is a void of being. Analyzing the condition of this void, Noica says that he can have a positive effect. Although things can contradict the being, however the being does not contradict the things. To define this situation, Romanian philosopher invokes the principle of *unilateral contradiction*, principle that will be instrumented in the entire his ontological building.

Developing the idea that "single the being is not, the rest is part of being", Noica claims that the periphery of being is everywhere and its center nowhere. By the lack of the centre, the world is not des-centered, but finds balance by something that "is", or is otherwise in it. So, lack of the center means: 1. the disappearance of the fullness of being (it is, in things at least, a void); 2. the disappearance of the fixity of being (it is not immobility, but action); 3. the disappearance of permanence of being (it is not a

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 197.

¹¹ Cf. *Ibidem*, p. 198.

co-eternal presence, but a intimate presence (absence), fleeting with the thing); 4. the disappearance of the simplicity of being (it has a structure)¹².

1. By the disappearance of the fullness of being, but being a *inner void*, the being is part of a *nihil privativum* – it is an absence in all things, and is a kantian "nothing" as *ens intelligibile*, one inscribed in all things and, to the extent that emerges as nothingness, a *shaping nothingness*.

2. By the disappearance of the fixity of being, the void is not only in the consciousness that it is seeking, but also in things. Noica argues that the void of being becomes active, meaning that the things seek an access to being. So it is no longer an *lazy nothingness*, but it passes as *ens intelligibile*, or as the archetypal pattern, in a *shaping nothingness*. Being distributed everywhere, the being generates and regenerates constantly the reality. It has to be seen in things and working, instead of being left in her inertia.

3. By the disappearance of permanence of being, and the void being active *inside*, then it is a form of intimacy, not a permanent presence and existence, i.e. a co-eternal presence. All the attributes previously granted it and detached from the real (unity, permanence, eternity) fall from the vantage of the being into things; the only one attribute that is recovered is that constantly refused by philosophical tradition: *co-naturalness of being with things*.

4. By the disappearance of the simplicity of being, it is not only formative intimacy of things, it is also their measure. In an ontology attached to reality, judgment criteria may depend on a true structure of being and on the measure to which the structure was achieved. There may incompleteness of being, but may occur precariousness of its; can be partial sustainable fulfillment, or sometimes temporary total fulfillment; also the precarious are sometimes doomed to accelerate and assets reality, sometimes to lead to disintegration and extinction.

All those presented in this section were meant to outline an image of the ontological structure that Noica assigned to the *void of being* (to the *nothing*, the *non-being*). Otherwise, this image of nothing configured by Romanian philosopher has the highest ontological consistency of all those that can be identified in his philosophy. Because, as I have already stated, there are a kind of "*anthropological*" *nothing* (*secondary non-being*), whose species are exhibited in *Six Maladies of the Contemporary Spirit*. In the case of human, where the being is the inner most active than elsewhere, since he has spirit, so extra responsiveness ontological, the precariousness of being manifested in the form of "*spiritual maladies*", that give or refuse ontological achievement.

¹² Cf. *Ibidem*, p. 206.

3.2. The Secondary Non-being and the Spiritual Maladies

The IDG ontological model accepts precariousnesses by the absence or refusal of one of the terms of being. These, on the one hand play a positive role as they get the world out of chaos, and, on the other, play a negative role for they lack the strength of elevating it unto becoming. They offer the first and the most extended ontological level, embodying stunted becoming, a level where the biggest part of the uncreated material world as well as the vastness of the unfulfilled human world dwell, both individually and socially¹³. “The world can be full of this secondary non-being. And if in the world of lifeless matter it is not striking, since here secondary non-being is the rule and being the exception, in exchange in the world of life and man (...) non-being and non-fulfillment are, in a way, a truly cosmic failure. This means only that the conversion has not occurred”¹⁴.

Another secondary non-being is pure and simple contingency which gets stuck in statistic and also the so-called *ontological morbidity* that exudes the exclusiveness of a single ontological term. Ontological morbidities can be represented either only by void individual (which is an ontological futility, and with man a spiritual one, too), or by void determinations (that bring ontological disorder into the real), or by the general void (which, for all the prestige of its possibility by itself alone is not capable of expressing being). All this is called morbidity because “in fact, the world *is not*, in the absence of exclusiveness of an ontological term”¹⁵. It shuts down access to being, while the precariousness already mentioned are not morbid since they couple two terms and can open up to a third.

As we stated at the beginning of this section, in *Six Maladies of the Contemporary Spirit*, where Noica lies its typology of maladies ”in the edge of a work about being”, it is argued that there is no void, but really just a ”sense of emptiness” that manifests as four types of nothingness corresponding to the spiritual maladies: the nothingness of disintegration (in *catholitis* malady), the nothingness of suspension (in *todetitis* malady), the nothingness of culture (in *atodetitis* malady), the nothingness of extinction (in *acatholitis* malady). In the following we present these four types of nothingness.

1. *The nothingness of disintegration* is characteristic of the second form of *catholitis*, a malady of the one who is aware that he lacks the general sense that could fulfill him. To illustrate this type of nothingness, Noica refers to existentialism, considering that it has an inadequate understanding of “nothingness” (the anguish represents the best example for this type of

¹³ Cf. Laura Pamfil, loc. cit., pp. 61-62.

¹⁴ C. Noica, *Sentimentul românesc al ființei* (*The Romanian Feeling of Being*), ed. cit., p. 92.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

misunderstanding of nothingness). There are thinkers, like Søren Kierkegaard, who get stuck in the individual and in determinations, not able to find a way of access to the general (in this case, God) of whom they are, nonetheless, aware. With French existentialism, through Sartre, things are even clearer, since existence determinations go explicitly before those of essence. “The movement, through determinations, from general, so harmonious with Plato, becomes tortuous here, since the individual eventually gets buried in determinations instead of opening up through them; the very meeting with the general, if it happens, «turns into a tremor», as the Danish philosopher puts it, not a coming to order”¹⁶.

What existentialism fails to understand is the very fact that “nothingness is not annoying in a certain field of reality”¹⁷, as in various fields of research, chemistry, biology, etc, it has been proved that a void, an empty space can very well coexist with solids. What existentialism ignores is that it stumbled upon a certain naught, not an absolute nothingness. The void of being with its blocks can give sentiment of nothingness, and this is an unreality subtler than the void. “Consequently, there is no void but there can be nothingness (i.e. the sentiment of emptiness) when conversion to a general sense that gives consistency to determinations is absent; [...] in the middle of an apparent solid it can prompt you to say: «There is nothing here, in fact.»”¹⁸.

2. *The nothingness of suspension* appears within *todetitis* malady, which represents the absence of the individual and the excess of the general. It is a malady of perfection that characterizes, among others, the theoretical disposition of man, confiscated by a general sense that prevents access to the individual. Noica says that this is the case of the great general entities and of their logical reflections. This nothingness of the suspension of things in the sensible world is more subtle than the rupture, and it is not by accident that it is a feature specific for Parmenides’ being, “perfection stricken” and lacking in individual. It is the same with absolute space and time, the same with the principle of identity in logic¹⁹.

3. *The nothingness of culture* is generated by *atodetitis*, a malady of lucid refusal of the individual. It remains to be seen whether this type of naught is not the same with suspension naught for as that culture can lead, as Romanian philosopher puts it, to “a musical sense of existence” and a suspension above all individual realities²⁰. The nothingness of culture is one of the *daemonia* of determinations with no anchor in the individual, which leads to a sentiment of loss when faced with the multitude of information

¹⁶ C. Noica, *The Romanian Spirit in the Balance of Time. Six Maladies of Contemporary Spirit*, ed. cit., p. 47.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 48.

¹⁹ Cf. *Ibidem*, p. 50.

²⁰ Cf. *Ibidem*, p. 108.

we have to acquire. Noica remarks that “the more we explore and learn, the more our ignorance grows instead of diminishing”²¹. So far nothing negative, yet the evil (and here the term has no negative connotation) arises only when we note that the accumulation of knowledge, be it for nothing, has not been accompanied by one of meanings. This explains why there are big cultural trends, general orientations, knowledge techniques that, no matter how refined, say nothing at all or make room for this saying of nothing²².

4. *The nothingness of extinction* characterizes contingent reality to the limit. It is generated by *acatholitis*, a malady of civilization that misses the ontological balance offered by the general sense. This is the case when the individuals that demand to be fixed by certain free determinations end up in the instability of particular cases that proliferate *ad infinitum*, trying to give a quantitative answer to the fundamental absence of sense. ”Where is not even a trace of a general sense, everything succumbs to the bad infinity of particular cases.”²³ Instead of doing justice to the humble real – a lifelong obsession with Constantin Noica – the result is a true sentiment of nothingness; this is how extinction naught emerges at the very core of the real, like a vast nothingness or a crude experience of nothing. But even when we do not attain the feeling of nothingness, at play is a universal contingency that can no longer be the sign of the positive, but at best of the “positivism” so detested by Noica. The negative sense of the contingent springs from the fact that it concentrates certain determinations on an individual situation, closing access to the being while the possible gives itself new determinations opening up to being. Thus the contingency of a situation becomes the extinction of its very possibility²⁴.

4. Conclusions

First, we try to synthesize those exposed before about the iconography of nothingness in Noica's philosophy. As could see, Romanian thinker uses five words when addressing the problem of nothingness: *void (overvoid)*, *nothingness*, *non-being*, *vacuum*, *nothing*. Beyond this terminological inconsistency, one can identify three major meanings of nothing: a) non-being as a void of being inscribed in things; b) the nothing as secondary non-being in the guise of reject being, of ontological morbidity and contingency; c) the nothing as a sense of emptiness: disintegration, suspension, culture, and extinction.

²¹ *Ibidem*, p. 121.

²² Cf. Laura Pamfil, loc. cit., p. 64.

²³ C. Noica, *The Romanian Spirit in the Balance of Time. Six Maladies of Contemporary Spirit*, ed. cit., p. 18.

²⁴ Cf. Laura Pamfil, loc. cit., p. 64.

To perform a critical analysis, we identify those ontological assumptions which were assumed and operationalized by Noica. First of all, is at stake the assumption of *ontological difference between being and things* (objects, world, reality, human being). Based on this assumption, Noica takes another fundamental idea for his ontology: *the being is not a plenitude in things, but is a void*. Along with this assumption, Romanian philosopher takes a further three: *the being is not a stable and immutable instance* (it pre-eminently presupposes motion, dynamism, process); *the being is not an eternal presence* (residing in a dimension parallel to the world of things and animals, but a presence which is embedded in the latter, a presence, however, which initially becomes manifest as absence); *the being is not simple, it has a structure*. Another important assumption assumed is the idea of *possibility of a ontological fulfillment (enrichment)*, which implies checking the ontological model – the emergence of the three fundamental terms in the structure of being: the Individual, the General and the Determinations ("the IDG ontological model").

Along with this fundamental assumptions, should briefly mention a few more important ideas of Noica's ontology: 1) *the being is distributed everywhere, in any thing*, in the sense that *things are open to being* (but the opening to being is not done without a closure); 2) *the closure that opens is the original situation involving: tension, distention, field*; 3) *the being of things is a limitation, but one that does not limit*.

No doubt, Constantin Noica was very well informed (with full lucidity) on requirements and inevitable challenges of metaphysics. But, despite a certain metaphysical disposition (that *Romanian feeling of being*), we consider that his ontological project contains several metaphysical delicts (which can be defined as an *metaphysical evasion* – deviation from the requirements of metaphysics²⁵). Through careful analysis, can be seen that the Romanian philosopher not insisted enough on these requirements, thus failing to honor them. Therefore, the foundation of his ontological edifice seems to be arranged (and even improvised) just to make possible the edifice itself, one that turns out to have, in addition, a great ambition for originality²⁶. Thus neglecting the foundation, the essential requirements of metaphysics.

By placing metaphysics under a *foreign* imperative, other than that required by the meaning of being ("what is being?"), Noica not only

²⁵ As already mentioned, for our critical analysis we appeal to Martin Heidegger, whose metaphysical platform and route we use foothold to explore the problem of nothingness in Noica's ontology.

²⁶ In all the details of ontology developed by Noica is clear thinker's ongoing effort to delineate all other ontological construction of the history of philosophy. Risking therefore to sacrifice the profoundness of thought for originality. There are even a passion for originality, pathos which often makes Noica to force some distinctions, to innovate somewhat abusive many linguistic constructions without a solid semantic consistency.

circumvent but somehow even overturn the essential task of metaphysics: to be, first and ultimately, *science of being*. And not *science of constructive ability of being*. Noica seems was not especially interested in the "what is being?", but rather "what can be done with the being?" or "at what is good the being?". Otherwise, it can be relatively easy to observe that the *Treatise of Ontology*, written in the late period of the life of the philosopher, rather has been developed to provide a foundation and a ontological legitimacy of those ideas about anthropology, axiology and culture, ideas assumed and developed in the previous period to the *Treaty*, starting with youth. By committing this evasion of the essential requirement of metaphysics (exclusive care for the meaning of being), Noica also commits other two metaphysical delicts which eludes those landmarks that guides strongly metaphysics on the road towards itself.

It is, first, *the maintenance of ontological difference between being and things* (using the services of becoming unto being), to provide a space of "game" for things, especially for human being. With the main stake ontological rehabilitation of precarious world of things (by uplifting Individuals with excellence of General), Noica not give up ontological difference even when, in the latter part of the *Treatise of Ontology*, reflects on being itself. Although this meditation would be supposed to be the occasion of a radical (re)orientation on being. Or at least it would have been the occasion a reassessment of ontological difference as such.

The second metaphysical delict, as "grave" as very essential evasion, is that Noica *does not recognize metaphysical vocation of the nothing*. Moreover, Romanian philosopher commits a premeditated denigration of metaphysical dignity of nothing, precisely because the nothing would devastate radically the entire ontological construction planned by Noica. He claims that *the nothing* (as *non-being*) does not have the consistency of an entity which radically delimiting the being (or consistency of an entity which is identical to being). Even when states that in things there is a void of being, however this does not lead to the abolition of the things. On the contrary, the total absence of being in things, *non-being* inscribed in things makes them to be called towards being, to be open to being. Make them *become unto being*, in order to achieve ontological consistency and fulfillment. In this way, the non-being inscribed in things is actually a "shaping nothingness". This nothingness shapes the thing with a view to its own annulment, therefore, the thing is shaped at the same pace that nothingness is ontologically "filled".

Although the nothing (as void of being in things) is the spark that ignites the engine that provides the whole dynamic of ontological system, however it does not have the same metaphysical dignity as the being. Noica did not

argue how is it possible that the *void of being* in things (namely *non-being*) to be the source (cause) of proces of an ontological enrichment? Why has non-being a deficit of being? Moreover, the Romanian philosopher asserts that is no need to look for an explanation of these questions, because, for him, becoming unto being is a certainty beyond doubt. In other words, is an metaphysical option that cannot be debated or amended. But we say that, in fact, is an metaphysical evasion²⁷.

²⁷ In her study on condition of nothingness in the Noica's philosophy, Laura Pamfil make also some critical remarks: "We end here the brief excursion into man's constitutive maladies and possible nullifications, to mention, though, that this does not represent a negative sign either, being «an ontological stimulus», as Noica put it. Sickness in a «bad» sense is only the consciousness of the fleeting, of the perishable and of the futility of any fact, and Noica admits it noncommittally without stressing the fact. «In exchange, the maladies of being, in other words of the spiritual being, have or can have something of a human positive in their deregulation. Man's disorder is his source of creation». Unfortunately, at the height of metaphysical optimism, Noica rapidly expedites the question of the nothingness and of real sickness in human being" (Laura Pamfil, loc. cit., p. 65).

La conscience orthodoxe et la pensée pragmatique

(Entretien avec le Professeur Jean-Claude Polet* et réalisée par Tudor Petcu**)

Avant d'aborder les différentes questions, il me paraît nécessaire de vous donner, en quelques points, certaines des positions de base qui vont fonder mes réponses, sachant qu'il s'agit ici de se placer du point de vue de la compatibilité entre les spécificités du christianisme et l'ordre établi du monde moderne.

1. Le christianisme n'est ni essentiellement, ni d'abord une religion.

a. *Essentiellement*, il a renversé l'ordre du religieux, des catégories, des hiérarchies et des discriminations que cet ordre, fondateur de tous les autres, avait mises en place. Mieux que de les renverser, il les a inversées. La pyramide, désormais, repose sur la pointe, le Christ-Dieu serviteur, descendu aux Enfers pour ressusciter et fonder, avec l'humanité et pour le monde entier, un nouvel ordre, celui d'un amour ontologique, non circonstanciel, où chacun fait en soi, intérieurement de manière absolue et extérieurement autant que possible, toute la place à l'autre. Folie pour les Juifs, scandale pour les Grecs, c'est-à-dire, paradigmatiquement, pour toutes les espèces de religions et de sagesses de fondement transcendant, spéculatif et métaphysique, et de logique déductive. Les Juifs, les plus religieux des hommes, ne s'y sont pas trompés, qui, en crucifiant le Christ, ont entendu rétablir l'ordre sacré et remettre l'homme et Dieu à leur place. Et l'Histoire, les sociétés, les royaumes, les empires et toutes les cohérences d'ordre inhérentes à la nature humaine et à la condition terrestre des hommes n'ont jamais fait, fatallement, autre chose, plus, ou moins. Le compromis historique le plus abouti, entre la Norme religieuse et l'évangile fut réalisé, avec plus ou moins de succès, et souvent très laborieusement, au cours des deux premiers millénaires de l'ère chrétienne dans ce qu'il est convenu d'appeler la chrétienté, c'est-à-dire ce qui, plus ou moins sécularisé, demeure aux fondements de ce qu'on appelle aujourd'hui la civilisation occidentale¹. La chrétienté a investi l'autorité et du pouvoir et de l'obligation de servir, à

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¹ L'amalgame que font les islamistes entre christianisme et civilisation occidentale moderne, désacralisée et sécularisée, montre bien que, vu de l'extérieur, cette association, voire cette assimilation est, pour eux, "naturelle", voire "évidente".

l'imitation du Christ, sans renoncer à la nécessité de sévir, ainsi que l'impose l'ordre et ses lois.

b. *D'abord*, donc, les chrétiens sont apparus comme des dissidents du judaïsme, fauteurs de troubles et donc répréhensibles comme tels, mais susceptibles aussi, et dangereux dans cette mesure, de rassembler, par leur évangile, tout homme et toute femme, de quelque condition raciale, politique, sociale, économique et culturelle qu'ils soient, dans une solidarité et une fraternité sans frontières. Cet horizon anthropologique, considéré longtemps comme perturbateur, a été jusqu'à convaincre finalement les rassembleurs de peuples, qui ont fondé, sur ce nouvel idéal d'harmonie sociale et politique, une nouvelle conscience universelle, bientôt transformée, en passant de Constantin à Théodose, en religion d'Etat. Cette nouvelle religion prétendit pouvoir concilier les nécessités absolues de l'ordre, ses articulations hiérarchiques et mécaniques, avec la recherche, tout intérieure aux consciences, de la sainteté, cet état de l'être personnel de l'homme pénétré par l'énergie que le Christ a répandue par son Esprit. Ce compromis historique, celui de la *chrétienté*, sous forme d'empires, de royaumes ou d'Etats chrétiens, a duré et s'est maintenu, vaille que vaille, ici et là, jusqu'à la fin du deuxième millénaire de l'ère chrétienne, non sans subir, à l'extérieur comme à l'intérieur, de violentes attaques, de cruelles défaites, d'heureuses rémissions, de tragiques démissions, de médiocres corruptions et, finalement, au terme de quelques révolutions, une progressive transformation qu'il est convenu, aujourd'hui, d'appeler l'humanisme démocratique.

2. Cet humanisme, officiellement post-chrétien, réalise un nouveau compromis historique entre la sacralité de l'*Ordre* et la « liberté des enfants de Dieu », et cela selon de nouveaux points d'appui et de nouveaux équilibres². En politique, cet humanisme a repris au christianisme son idéal de non-discrimination anthropologique et a fondé le pouvoir, en défiance de toute transcendance *ex machina*, sur la loi du Nombre (le suffrage universel), la délégation représentative (le régime parlementaire, idéalement républicain) et l'accord majoritaire de représentants (les gouvernements) qui ont, en raison de l'absolu théorique de la souveraineté populaire, la confiance de tous. L'intériorité de la conscience, tout intime, est devenue, dans ce nouvel ordre, libre de toute appartenance à quelque religion instituée que ce soit. Les religions, tolérées, n'y sont rien de plus que le résultat de la liberté d'association et reconnues comme telles. La « liberté des enfants de Dieu » y est devenue « liberté de la conscience individuelle ». Pareil humanisme entendra préconiser l'abandon de toute référence religieuse, estimant que l'ensemble des valeurs démocratiques suffit à

² Inutile de dire que ce «nouveau compromis» n'évite, pas plus que le précédent, les violences et qu'il est, lui aussi, bancal.

l'harmonie du vivre ensemble³. Dans le cadre d'un tel humanisme, l'existence des religions, quel qu'en soit le nombre, ne saurait être que tolérée, car les religions, qui sont, historiquement, à l'origine même de tous les ordres possibles, représentent, en soi, une concurrence permanente de la légitimité de l'Ordre abstrait, mobile, de l'Etat humaniste et de l'anthropologie qu'il implique, une anthropologie d'ailleurs variable, aussi instable que la majorité politique et sociale. Car l'Ordre, tout aussi abstrait que le concept d'Etat, est, dans cette logique, régulièrement remis en question, avec ses normes et ses valeurs, par les élections, et se trouve donc, désacralisé, tributaire, lui aussi, de la logique du Nombre et de la primauté de la majorité.

3. Parallèlement à cette progressive instauration de l'humanisme « moderne », la souveraineté absolue de la loi du Nombre s'est progressivement installée dans l'ordre économique et commercial, puis, progressivement, social, selon ses modalités propres : pour l'activité économique, la rentabilité à tout prix, culminant dans l'industrialisation et les performances technologiques ; pour le dynamisme commercial, la performance du marché, culminant dans la Bourse et les marchés financiers ; pour la société, le plein emploi de tous, tout au long de la vie. Plus que jamais dans pareille dominance de l'ordre économique, l'origine comme la fin de l'activité économique et de son dynamisme se sont finalement dévoilées et on a reconnu, avec crainte, tremblement et contestation, la finance comme instance souveraine de l'ordre économique, commercial, social et, ainsi, politique. La finance, décidément, gouvernera de plus en plus visiblement l'ordre économique et social « moderne » et, ainsi, aussi, fût-ce discrètement et indirectement, l'ordre politique⁴.

4. Désormais immanents l'un et l'autre à la transcendence financière, soumis, par la théorie démocratique, au partage des responsabilités, des échecs et des succès, l'ordre politique et l'ordre économique se sont peu à peu trouvés en concurrence, condamnés à choisir entre coopération et compétition. Dans ce coude-à-coude, le politique, investi du symbolique de la condition humaine et de l'absolu de la liberté individuelle, céda de plus en plus de terrain à l'économique, où s'obtenait, en plus du bien-être dans la vie,— la santé sans pauvreté —, l'accès individuel au pouvoir souverain de la

³ L'humanisme matérialiste que les régimes communistes ont préconisé n'a pas, théoriquement du moins, envisagé les choses autrement, même si, en pratique, ils ont été plus que jamais exclusivement fanatiques de leur religion de l'Ordre, un Ordre partisan allant jusqu'à exclure et supprimer tout exercice et toute expression de la liberté personnelle, y compris la liberté d'association.

⁴ Nul ne peut servir deux maîtres, Dieu et l'Argent (Luc 16,13). En renonçant au service du premier, l'histoire ne pouvait qu'aller dans le sens de la dépendance à l'égard du second.

finance, par l'épargne et l'investissement. L'équilibre relatif du politique et de l'économique a ainsi penché, de plus en plus, du côté de l'économique. On a ainsi vu les positions politiques et les programmes de partis concurrencés par les positions sur les marchés financiers et par les situations économiques des Etats. De plus en plus, s'est produite la fusion du politique, de l'idéologique et de l'économique, d'une part, et, d'autre part, l'absorption de plus en plus grande de l'économique par le financier⁵. A la mondialisation du politique et de l'idéologique (les normes démocratiques et leurs déclinaisons juridiques) a répondu la mondialisation de l'économique et du financier (les monnaies de référence et les produits financiers attachés aux entreprises, et objets de spéculations). Mais, là encore, l'algébrisation naturelle à l'argent, – sa tension vers l'infini –, a pris le pas sur l'harmonisation universelle du droit. Les sociétés humanistes actuelles peinent à démêler les interactions contradictoires du politique et de l'économique, même si la création d'espaces politiques et économiques de plus en plus vastes (Etats-Unis, Russie, Europe, Chine, Inde, Brésil)⁶ et de mieux en mieux unis semblent sinon faciliter les solutions, du moins diminuer les difficultés inhérentes aux conflits d'intérêt entre le politique et l'économique et, surtout, entre le politique et le financier, l'un titulaire de la souveraineté symbolique de la condition humaine, l'autre titulaire de la souveraineté symbolique de la nature des choses (la quantité). Le problème majeur auquel le monde « moderne » est confronté et qui n'a toujours pas trouvé sa solution, – mais y en a-t-il une et la loi du Nombre n'est-elle pas, en soi, impossible à s'autolimiter, même si la quantité est, par définition, finie ? –, c'est celui d'un Ordre économique et financier mondial accordé à un Ordre politique et idéologique mondial. Finalement, l'utopie.

5. L'Eglise orthodoxe, jusqu'à présent, alors même que le monde « moderne » en est à l'ère historique postérieure à la *chrétienté*, demeure, avec l'Eglise catholique, la dernière institution de la « civilisation occidentale » aujourd'hui mondialisée, à avoir maintenu, formellement, avec ses aspects juridiques mais aussi, potentiellement politiques, sociaux et économiques, une structure plus, – c'est le cléricalisme –, ou moins, – c'est le christianisme

⁵ L'échec du communisme tient à son refus de considérer l'autonomie intrinsèque, voire l'indépendance du financier à l'égard de l'économique et du politique. Le conservatisme idéologique du communisme, qui a toujours fait passer l'Ordre politique avant toute autre chose, n'a pas pu résister au triomphe, dans les Etats modernes, de la nouvelle transcendance du financier.

⁶ Le repli identitaire et protectionniste des Etats ou des Régions est une régression sans issue, dès lors que ce repli va à la recherche d'un Ordre aujourd'hui aboli, que la politique est incapable de restaurer et qui ne pourrait se faire qu'en contradiction avec les normes de l'économie, aujourd'hui définitivement mondialisées.

politique et social –, conforme au compromis historique ancien de la religion d'Etat, qui liait la nécessité spirituelle de la conscience intérieure aux nécessités extérieures d'un Ordre hiérarchique, de référence transcendante. Et l'on constate que divers mouvements ou régimes politiques d'aujourd'hui, nostalgiques de la primauté du politique, font alliance objective avec ces Eglises pour contrer la menace de la primauté de l'économique et du financier. Soucieuses de fidélité à leur histoire et à la symbolique royale, inscrite dans la dévolution messianique, ces Eglises, l'Orthodoxe plus encore que la Catholique, redoutent aussi, en concédant quelque part de souveraineté à l'économique, de dériver vers le protestantisme⁷ et de voir s'effondrer, sous la loi du Nombre et le règne de la quantité, les piliers spirituels d'une transcendance spécifique, établie sur l'équilibre, métaphysiquement très instable⁸, du mystère de la divino-humanité d'un Christ Pantocrator mort sur la Croix.

6. La question se pose donc de savoir si l'Eglise orthodoxe est en mesure de survivre, telle qu'elle se présente encore assez largement aujourd'hui, nostalgique de la *chrétienté* ancienne. La vraie question est de savoir si l'Eglise orthodoxe est disposée à prendre, à nouveaux frais, une position qui lui permette, dans le monde irréversiblement « moderne », de revivre et de faire vivre l'incessante nouveauté de l'évangile du Christ, et comment y parvenir. La nature transcendante de ses références théologiques ne lui permet pas d'abandonner le principe d'ordre religieux, – monarchique et hiérarchique –, qui caractérise l'Eglise une, sainte, catholique et apostolique. Cependant, pour éviter les dérives cléricales, autoritaires et politiques, que comporte cette référence essentielle, il lui faut incarner, formellement et visiblement, la

⁷ Ce n'est pas un hasard, – plusieurs études d'histoire économique l'ont montré –, si ce sont les sociétés protestantes qui, soucieuses de promotion du travail rentable, ont été déterminantes dans le triomphe de l'économique sur le politique. Ce sont d'ailleurs les Etats protestants qui sont les initiateurs de l'Etat-providence et qui sont à la pointe des avancées socio-économiques des Etats. Ces sociales-démocraties, après avoir réalisé la fusion du politique et de l'économique, sont allées jusqu'à la sujexion symbolique du politique à l'économique. C'est ainsi que, dans les Etats d'Europe du Nord, les représentants du pouvoir politique, très économies des symboliques de leur souveraineté, en sacrifient souvent les attributs à la souveraineté de l'économique : ils ont, comme le plus grand nombre, un salaire modéré, vont au bureau à vélo, voyagent en deuxième classe, paient leurs transports et leurs repas de leur poche, etc.

⁸ L'incompatibilité théologique foncière entre le judaïsme et l'islam, d'une part, et le christianisme, d'autre part, et la simple énumération des hérésies christologiques montrent à suffisance combien le mystère chrétien n'est, ni essentiellement ni d'abord, du ressort de la spéculation métaphysique, même si les admirables constructions théologiques, trinitaire et christologique, élaborées par les Pères de l'Eglise ont donné à la théologie mystique chrétienne une élévation que peinent à atteindre les spéculations des autres religions et des sagesses les plus élées.

pyramide inversée instaurée par la souveraineté du Christ, où la grandeur et l'autorité se mesurent à l'humilité personnelle et au service du prochain, donc de Dieu/de Dieu, donc du prochain⁹. Et, bien que les Etats modernes aient repris les missions de service du prochain à leur compte, dans le cadre de l'Ordre qu'ils maîtrisent, il faut évidemment que les chrétiens, individuellement et collectivement, continuent cette mission qu'ils n'ont cessé d'accomplir au cours de l'ère chrétienne, à savoir assumer, toujours avec générosité, la charge de la pauvreté et de la maladie. Dans un monde où la pauvreté et la maladie, – imputées à l'économique, c'est-à-dire à la nature des choses créées –, plus encore que la guerre, – imputable aux conflits de souveraineté politique –, sont devenues « démocratiquement » scandaleuses, l'Eglise, dans sa visibilité politique, c'est-à-dire l'Eglise hiérarchique, ne peut rester sans réaction. Sans préjudice de son action caritative traditionnelle, l'Eglise doit proposer d'introduire dans le monde « moderne » le dynamisme de son anthropologie de la personne, – divino-humaine –, et appuyer, à chaque fois, les mesures modernes qui vont dans ce sens, et alerter sur les mesures qui en dévient.

7. Il est cependant clair que, indépendamment de son ordre proprement religieux, intrinsèquement hiérarchique, mais en concordance explicite avec les contenus évangéliques qui ont conduit les chrétiens à prendre en compte les réalités économiques, l'Eglise doit, – les chrétiens personnellement et l'institution ecclésiastique collectivement –, montrer, en tout et pour tout, que la théologie chrétienne et l'évangile du Christ, équivalement, sont habités par un propos qui concerne les transcendances conjointes que la modernité a fait émerger : la transcendance du pouvoir politique, universellement et démocratiquement partagé, sans exclusive¹⁰, et celle du pouvoir économique, théoriquement partageable, mais intrinsèquement soumis, par la nature mathématique de l'argent, aux tendances à l'infini de la finance, tendances naturellement exclusives de tout principe de partage¹¹. Ce partage de l'Avoir entraîne, pareillement, le partage du bien-être et de sa condition première de possibilité, la santé, ce qui s'est traduit, dans le monde « moderne » par l'établissement de la sécurité sociale, par la promotion du progrès médical et par l'universelle accessibilité aux soins.

⁹ Un des aspects les plus révolutionnaires du message et de l'exemple du Christ est d'avoir énoncer l'équivalence et la réciprocité absolue des deux commandements.

¹⁰ C'est ce qui motive la nécessaire périodicité des élections.

¹¹ L'excès de richesse et de pouvoir financier, potentiellement infini, ne peut être endigué que par le pouvoir démocratique, – la loi du Nombre humanisée –, exercé en l'occurrence par le pouvoir politique, qui doit exiger une division de l'Avoir par le Nombre de personnes. C'est ce vers quoi tend, moyennant plusieurs modalités correctrices (compétences, mérites, responsabilités, indigences diverses), l'idéal de la sociale-démocratie moderne, héritier profane de l'idéal de fraternité inhérent au principe même de la communauté chrétienne.

8. L'Eglise, dans le monde occidental « moderne » du moins¹² et partiellement, se trouve donc, dans la situation que l'Epître de saint Jacques envisage *après* que les hommes ont obtenu le bien-être. Et cette situation est de nature à favoriser, aujourd'hui, plus encore et mieux sans doute que les situations d'Ancien régime de *chrétienté*, la perméabilité, voire la compréhension du message évangélique. Car l'économie est loin d'être ostracisée par les évangiles. L'économie, le commerce et la finance, tout comme l'action thérapeutique et les références médicales sont omniprésents dans l'œuvre du Christ, comme dans le discours que tiennent les évangiles et que les Pères ont tenu ensuite pour les faire connaître¹³. Dans le monde « moderne », qui s'emploie à arbitrer les équilibres fragiles que suscitent les contradictions entre, d'une part, la souveraineté du politique et du juridique, fondée sur l'anthropologie démocratique moderne, et, d'autre part, la souveraineté économique et financière, fondée sur la nature quantitative des choses créées, l'Eglise du Christ a un message à faire passer, un nouvel éthos à préconiser, fondé sur le partage sous tous rapports, un partage fondé objectivement, intimement et spirituellement sur la notion et la pratique de la communion. Le lien intrinsèque et immédiat de cette communion intégrale (dont la communion eucharistique est le point d'appui et de diffusion) et de l'anthropologie chrétienne doit être mis constamment et universellement en évidence, afin que l'humanisme démocratique moderne puisse, – ses structures, ses valeurs et ses références le montrent – en être touché, animé, pénétré jusqu'à en envisager les dimensions spirituelles. Stimuler et obtenir la divinisation de l'Homme par la puissance transfigurante de la divino-humanité du Fils de l'Homme, cela ne peut se faire à contre-courant des tendances du monde « moderne ». Au contraire, providentiellement, cela doit se faire dans l'accomplissement spirituel des évidences, des cohérences et des références qui sont présentes et prégnantes dans le monde d'aujourd'hui et qui régissent le message évangélique. Ainsi, pour que l'évangile soit entendu, le respect de la loi du Nombre et des valeurs démocratiques, la sobriété, la modération, le partage du bien-être économique doivent devenir une priorité individuelle des chrétiens et collective de l'institution ecclésiastique. L'organisation du partage du pouvoir politique et des richesses économiques doit se faire dans le cadre de préoccupations éthiques fondées sur les valeurs évangéliques, sources

¹² Il n'est que trop évident qu'une grande part de l'humanité nécessite encore et nécessitera toujours, indépendamment du progrès des Etats, – « Des pauvres, vous en aurez toujours » (Jean 12, 8) – l'assistance économique et de santé de l'institution ecclésiastique et de chaque chrétien.

¹³ Sans parler des guérisons et des retours à la vie opérés par le Christ, on ne peut oublier que la métaphore médicale est, comme les références économiques, commerciales et financières, à la base de nombreuses paraboles et que le mot même de Rédemption signifie “rachat”.

premières de l'humanisme « moderne », qu'il faut faire remonter vers l'anthropologie chrétienne par la prédication, la discussion, le débat, l'exemple.

S'il faut, impérativement, partir, aujourd'hui plus que jamais, de l'anthropologie chrétienne, c'est parce qu'elle est le seul point de rencontre potentiellement universel entre les « hommes de bonne volonté », et parce que le christianisme est la seule « philosophie » à proposer une anthropologie fondée sur l'absolu de la personne, entendue non seulement du point de vue spirituel et psychologique, mais du point de vue social et politique. Reste, à l'horizon du règne de l'économie, la notion de bonheur et de bien-être, dont l'accomplissement de la personne est la clé, dans l'amour et le partage (valeurs de peu de poids dans un monde purement politique ou dans une religion essentiellement hiérarchique).

Question : Discuter de la conscience orthodoxe est plus qu'intéressant, mais délicat face aux exigences de la pensée contemporaine aux yeux de laquelle les démarches spirituelle ou métaphysique ne sont plus une nécessité. Ne faudrait-il pas que les défenseurs des valeurs traditionnelles et surtout l'Eglise assument les nouveaux termes d'une vraie conscience chrétienne ? Croyez-vous que cela soit possible dans la situation morale de la société contemporaine ?

Réponse :

La mise au point que je vous ai donnée pour commencer répond, en termes généraux, aux fondements de cette préoccupation. Si l'Orthodoxie, qui, malgré les pesanteurs de sa propre histoire, n'a rien abandonné de fondamental à l'essence du christianisme, a encore, comme toujours, un rôle à jouer dans les sociétés modernes, c'est d'abord en raison de son anthropologie, qui demeure, qu'on le veuille ou non, la matrice de l'anthropologie dominante défendue par le « monde occidental », quels que soient les renoncements, voire l'opposition que le monde moderne manifeste à l'égard de cet héritage. L'anthropologie philosophique du monde moderne parle volontiers de l'irréductibilité de la liberté individuelle, une irréductibilité directement héritée de l'irréductibilité et de l'absolu de la personne, que la théologie chrétienne a constamment, théoriquement et pratiquement soutenus. Je n'en tiens pour preuve que cet apophtegme du P. Sophrony, affirmant : « tout acte spirituel qui n'est pas libre est sans valeur ». La conscience moderne, qui a perdu le « lieu du cœur » et l'a remplacé par le « fonctionnement du cerveau » et qui a, parallèlement, remplacé la personne humaine faite à l'image et à la ressemblance de la personne divino-humaine du Christ, par l'individu façonné par le libre-arbitre subjectif, demeure imbue de cette liberté qui, dans cette mutation, a seulement perdu, sinon quitté, la sphère spirituelle, celle où la métaphysique

trouve son point d'appui dans la rationalité, celle où se produit, parallèlement, l'appel à la théologie.

L'Orthodoxie doit donc mettre, aujourd'hui, son anthropologie au premier plan, car elle permet de questionner les fondements de l'individualisme libertaire et d'entretenir, avec les hommes de bonne volonté, un débat qui puisse faire sortir le monde moderne de sa résignation au relatif et au fonctionnel et, ainsi, à mettre en cause sa soumission aux cycles de mort qui régissent la Nature.

Question : En Europe, et pas seulement dans la sphère politique où la question des « racines chrétiennes de l'Europe » fait problème, les « idées chrétiennes » et la manière chrétienne de vivre et d'aborder la vie font l'objet d'un rejet, voire d'une répulsion, proches parfois de l'ostracisme, comme s'il y avait incompatibilité radicale entre les évidences moyennes de la conscience contemporaine et les valeurs pratiquées par les chrétiens. A quoi attribuer ce conflit ?

Réponse :

Il ne fait pas de doute, à mes yeux, que ce qui crée ce conflit, voire cette hostilité déclarée, réside dans le refus ou l'ignorance, implicite ou explicite, de la divino-humanité du Christ. Ce refus est explicite aussi bien chez les tenants d'un athéisme militant que chez les partisans du radicalisme religieux (où Dieu est Dieu et l'homme, homme), notamment dans ses dérives violentes et fanatiques. Ce conflit, aigu dans certaines de ses manifestations et terrible parfois dans ses conséquences, est cependant le plus souvent implicite, recouvert dans les sociétés du bien-être par une lourde chape d'ignorance et d'indifférence. Ce qui gêne et offusque dans le Christ, ce ne sont pas les préceptes vertueux et humanitaires dont son action et son enseignement témoignent. Bien au contraire, ils sont, assez souvent, considérés comme s'emboîtant objectivement dans les principes de la solidarité, naturelle au genre humain et, potentiellement, à toute espèce animale évoluée. Ce qui irrite jusqu'à la détestation, c'est l'Espérance de la Résurrection que le Christ porte, c'est la foi dans la Résurrection qu'il entraîne, la foi en une vie qui, loin de se résorber dans les cycles de mort de la Nature, s'en échappe, leur échappe, en délivre, absolument, en même temps, donc, qu'elle délivre des limites de l'identité individuelle en ouvrant à l'infini divino-humain la destinée de chacun. En effet, dépasser les limites de l'individualité, c'est exiger de chacun qu'il *se dépasse*, dès ici, dès maintenant, et franchisse les horizons de l'histoire et du monde où il est situé. Cette nécessité du dépassement, cet accès à la mutation ontologique où l'amour de Dieu et du prochain opère le changement, ne correspond nullement à la définition du bonheur et du bien-être tels qu'ils sont attendus par la vie biologique où entend camper la conscience moyenne de l'humanisme démocratique, résignée à la mort. Quoi qu'il en soit, il est important que la

générosité, le dévouement, le désintéressement, la solidarité soient non seulement pratiqués par les chrétiens, mais accordés, autant que possible, aux partenariats de la société civile, qui mettent en avant les mêmes vertus de sacrifice. Du sacrifice humanitaire au sacrifice de charité, au sens chrétien du terme, la contamination, voire le passage, qui s'opère par l'expérience de la coopération, se fait par le témoignage. A défaut du message évangélique accompli, le message angélique de « paix aux hommes de bonne volonté » trouve là un point d'appui salutaire. Souvent aussi s'éprouve là, concrètement, le renoncement à l'hédonisme de l'immédiat.

Question : *La dimension philosophique de la spiritualité orthodoxe ne devrait-elle pas trouver, aujourd'hui, un nouveau registre d'expression, un nouveau mode de traduction, adapté aux évidences, aux cohérences et aux références de l'esprit moderne ? Il semble en effet que l'essentiel de l'évangile du Christ, en l'occurrence ce qui concerne sa personne et, à partir d'elle, l'anthropologie chrétienne ait quelque difficulté à entrer en dialogue direct avec ce qui préoccupe et mobilise la conscience contemporaine.*

Réponse :

C'est clair, évidemment. Mais, pour cela, il faut non seulement que l'Eglise soit à l'écoute de ce que le monde moderne entend, mais qu'elle renonce à ce qui, en elle, appartient aux régimes abolis de sa situation dans le monde. Et cela passe, sur le plan intellectuel, par un renouvellement du mode de proposition des vérités chrétiennes. Il faut partir de l'anthropologie, j'y reviens, et de ce qu'elle implique dans les domaines de l'économie et du droit, en particulier tout ce qui relève de la justice économique et sociale et de la maîtrise de la finance. Cela implique, certes, une réelle connaissance de ces matières, mais surtout un travail d'appropriation des enjeux anthropologiques et sociaux qui s'y élaborent, et un éclairage adéquatement chrétien du jeu que les puissances de toute espèce y jouent. Il faut que les chrétiens, pour le monde moderne, arrivent à formuler et à actualiser, – et l'Eglise institutionnelle doit favoriser la diffusion de ces nouvelles formulations et la mise en œuvre de ces nouvelles pratiques –, les ressources de son anthropologie révolutionnaire. Il leur faut construire un discours, une pratique et une action missionnaires qui puissent toucher le cœur et l'esprit des hommes de bonne volonté, dont beaucoup sont lassés, déçus, désespérés du sans issue et du sans horizon où les maintiennent asservis l'hédonisme, le relativisme, le fonctionnalisme et le cynisme de l'« idéal » consumériste.

Question : *Être chrétien orthodoxe pourrait donc signifier demeurer dans la joie du « royaume de l'enfance ». A l'inverse, ce qu'on appelle de nos jours le « pragmatisme » considère avec ironie tout comportement moral, quelles qu'en soient les références. Amoral, ce type de comportement est sans bagages, sans tenants ni aboutissants. Vivre en chrétien*

orthodoxe et propager les valeurs chrétiennes, serait-ce donc une autre nouvelle manière de « vivre dangereusement », ce qui est, aussi, la nouvelle manière de vivre dans la nouvelle société ?

Réponse : Cette manière chrétienne de « vivre dangereusement » en privilégiant l'« esprit d'enfance » présente, en effet, plus d'une analogie avec la nouvelle manière, assez nietzschéenne, de vivre dans le monde d'aujourd'hui. Pour se sentir doté de toutes les libertés, l'homme « pragmatique » n'a pas besoin de plus que de se sentir parfaitement soi, « bien dans son corps et bien dans sa tête », « en pleine forme », dans le parfait accomplissement des possibilités de son individualité, limitée certes, mais maximisée¹⁴ par tous les moyens. La différence, radicale, entre ces deux manières, tient, précisément, à la définition de soi. Du côté chrétien, c'est la personne, être en relation ontologique et spirituelle avec les autres ; du côté du pragmatisme opportuniste, c'est l'individu, être en relations biologiques, nécessairement inégalitaires et égotistes (« seul » est le mot clé de l'individu)¹⁵. On le voit bien, par exemple, dans la manière dont les couples sont vécus. Dans le mariage chrétien consciemment assumé, la communion et l'union se fondent sur une alliance spirituelle de fondement ontologique, et, au surplus, biologique, psychologique, économique et social, alors que les seuls fondements individuels peinent à résister aux vicissitudes et aux fluctuations multiples qui sont propres aux circonstances de la vie.

Question : *La conscience des gens, aujourd'hui, ne me semble, assez souvent, ni suffisamment alertée, ni suffisamment avertie de ce que signifient, pour la condition humaine, ce que j'appellerais les « trous de l'histoire », par exemple l'Holocauste ou le Goulag. Or, ces réalités interrogent clairement l'anthropologie, jusque dans ses racines. Les Orthodoxes ne devraient-ils pas creuser davantage ces questions et en faire connaître les implications, ce qui ne saurait manquer d'interpeller la conscience morale, en général, et d'ébranler, peut-être, les indécentes sérénité du « pragmatisme » ?*

Réponse :

Comme les quelques propositions initiales que j'ai données le laissent entendre, les Orthodoxes doivent agir et réagir positivement, à chaque fois

¹⁴ Le succès de tout ce qu'on appelle, – abusivement si on prend en considération l'acception chrétienne de la personne –, le « développement personnel » n'est que la manière de préconiser cet accomplissement de soi par soi et, le plus souvent (les individus nietzschéens étant rares et rarement endurants jusqu'à la mort, si ce n'est le suicide), de donner à croire que l'on peut combler les abîmes du vide de soi, en soi, par soi et pour soi, vide que toute individualité, par définition vouée à la mort, comporte.

¹⁵ « Seul » est aussi le mot clé de nos sociétés de la communication universelle, une communication sans autre conscience ni intention de communion que de partager l'avoir, en désespérance absolue, par impossible, de partager l'être.

que la conscience de l'humanisme démocratique se trouve d'accord avec tel ou tel aspect de l'anthropologie chrétienne, quelles que soient les divergences d'origine ou de finalité qu'impliqueraient apparemment ces moments de compatibilité. Selon le conseil évangélique, il faut faire cent ou deux cents pas avec qui le propose, non certes en cachant ou en déguisant ce qui sépare, mais en acceptant ce qui unit. Certes aussi, il ne s'agit pas de « prendre tous les trains en marche » ni de dénaturer ce qui fait la spécificité chrétienne, mais de faire valoir ce qui rassemble et de faire découvrir ce qui, au-delà du commun, peut susciter l'approfondissement des engagements. Cette démarche d'ouverture, cette reconnaissance de la « bonne volonté » de l'autre est, en effet, de nature à produire des fruits, car signifier le consensus, même limité, vaut mieux que de s'enfermer dans l'intransigence des principes et de constater les incompatibilités qu'elle provoque. C'est évidemment à propos des « trous de l'histoire » que la concertation et le dialogue de tous avec tous doit se faire et se faire encore. Ces grands retours de la conscience universelle sur elle-même, cette conversion permanente des esprits et des consciences est, évidemment, nécessaire non seulement parce qu'elle est de nature à éviter la répétition des horreurs où l'humanité s'est engouffrée, mais parce qu'elle sonne, contre le « pragmatisme » amoral, individuel et collectif, comme l'alarme d'une mise en garde et qu'elle leur donne publiquement, universellement, une des meilleures leçons d'humanité qu'on puisse attendre.

Dragoș MÎRȘANU

Despre contemplarea lui Dumnezeu

(Guillaume de Saint-Thierry, *Despre contemplarea lui Dumnezeu – De contemplando Deo*, bilingual edition, translation, introduction and notes by Florin Crișmăreanu; Bucharest: Ars Docendi, 2014)

The present translation of William of Saint-Thierry's *De contemplando Deo* is a welcome surprise for the Romanian reader, who, while regularly expecting to receive news of translations made from the patristic literature, is less accustomed to be treated to a text from the Medieval Christian West.

The author of this first translation of one of William's works into Romanian, Dr. Florin Crișmăreanu, offers a comprehensive 'Introduction,' from which we are able to gain considerable insight. As it is often done in the studies dedicated to William's personality and works, he starts by making his author stand next to the giant Bernard of Clairvaux, to whom he was a friend and a follower. Rather than continuing to present William as overshadowed by the latter, as he was for centuries, the translator proceeds to demonstrate why he is to be considered nowadays, in light of the recent scholarly advance, one of the truly original minds of the twelfth century.

In the first part of the 'Introduction,' we are offered a sketch of William's life, in which, notably, the author sides with J.-M. Déchanet and J. Hourlier in arguing that William received his education at the school of Laon (instead of that of Reims), where he was most likely to have been introduced to Eriugena's works, which were to influence him a great deal. After a list of William's works, the 'Introduction' moves on to present the work *On Contemplating God*. In writing this text (half meditation, half treatise) on how to know God through love, William was surely influenced, beside the Scriptures, by Augustine and by works of the Greek Fathers available to him via the translations made mostly by Eriugena.

The next section of the 'Introduction' is probably of the highest interest to the reader, as it is dedicated to the concept of contemplation (*ref., contemplatio*, from the Greek term *theoria*). After a presentation of the manifold, but on the whole material meanings of *theoria* in Aristotle, we are introduced to the rather different concept in the theology of the Greek Fathers (*e.g.*, Maximus the Confessor), where it signifies the vision of God and eventually *théosis*. Out of these, William's understanding would have to fall in the line of "Origen, Dionysius, Maximus and Eriugena", as for him *contemplatio* is the vision achieved by means of the eyes within, rather than the external eyes (p. 52); last but not least, William is heir to the Augustinian

understanding and use of contemplation (influenced on its turn by stoics and by Plotinus). In brief, William considers *contemplatio* a gift from God – still, mankind is called to work towards it as well – and discusses it in terms of the necessary, if limited, process of analogy. Mankind will have to contemplate God in the created order and especially in the human nature of Christ, the Incarnate Son. Thus, for William, contemplating God does not mean acquiring the knowledge of God, *i.e.*, by means of an intellectual vision, but a true and beatific participation in the life of God.

The reader is provided next with an examination of William's understanding of what it means to know God through love, rather than intellect; this seems to be for him a better, if more obscure way to achieve the knowledge of God (“*amor ipse intellectus est*”). The translator proceeds to show the similarities between William's understanding of love and that found in the Greek Fathers, such as Dionysius and especially Maximus.

The following section is an exploration of William's Greek sources, wherein the translator analyses whether our author was indeed indebted to theologians such as Origen (via Rufin's translations or perhaps only via Ambrose), Gregory of Nyssa, Dionysius and Maximus the Confessor (via Eriugena's translations, which he probably became acquainted to at Laon), and not only to the Latin authors, especially to Augustine (as argued by some). The ‘Introduction’ ends with a portrayal of William as an anti-dialectician (alongside Bernard), offering a useful discussion of his literary reaction against the “philosophers”, such as William of Conches and Peter Abelard.

As for the translation proper, one cannot stress enough the often unfathomable character of William's Latin style; the translator has to be commended for undertaking the difficult job of interpreting the text for us in order to produce a translation as close as possible to the original (*i.e.*, quite literal). As the book offers a bilingual text, the reader can clarify for himself or herself any remaining uncertainties in the Romanian version. An appropriate number of endnotes were added as well in order to offer crucial references or further elaborate on important matters. The volume ends with a bibliography but unfortunately offers no indices. All in all, both the translator and the Ars Docendi Publishing House are to be congratulated for introducing William de Saint-Thierry to the Romanian reader.

