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## The Role of Divination in the Stoic System\*\*

**Abstract:** The article explores the Stoic treatment of divination and the epistemological role assumed by the divinatory arts within the Stoic philosophical system. The following pages speak of divination as a genre of knowledge and as an exercise (*ἄσκησις*) for the investigation of nature. Aligned by Chrysippus to theology, the final part of the philosophical exercise, divination would appear as having the role to fulfill the study of physics. Equally, we will argue that the ancient Stoics praised divination not as an art of foreseeing the future, but as a science that discovers the universal chain of causes that determines everything in the world, *i.e.* fate. After a short presentation of the Stoic classification of knowledge, the article discusses stoic cosmology with an emphasis on the idea of order. The last section of the article explores the vast relationship between divination and fate and argues that, for the Stoics, divination is a genre of science that has the role to unveil the non-evident causal structure of the universe.

**Keywords:** divination, cosmology, Stoicism, fate, order.

### 1. Introduction

Divination was a common religious practice in the ancient world, individuals and societies seeking to anticipate the future through the interpretation of natural signs and through ritualic examinations of the divine will<sup>1</sup>. The vast research on the rituality of divination undertaken in the field of religious studies attests to the fact that, whatever ancient society considered, the ancients attempted to anticipate the future through a wide range of divinatory practices<sup>2</sup>. However, in ancient views, future was unrevealing itself not only through ritual, but nature itself was wearing a cloth woven with signs that charmed equally the gaze of diviners and of philosophers. Whether they observed the flight of birds or the entrails of sacrificed animals or whether they consulted the words of individuals under divine possession, the diviners were acting as assuming an already established order of nature. Amazed by the success of divination, the Stoa tackled the questions

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of divination and of its condition of possibility, the natural order, resulting a fine interrogation on the constitution of the universe and a cosmology that rivaled the dominant Platonic cosmology.

Since its beginnings, Greek philosophy proved a great interest in divination, aiming to place it under a rational explanation. In the prologue of *De divinatione*, Cicero exhibits a catalogue of the philosophical interests in divination, dividing the small number of philosophers that reject the validity of divination, such as Xenophanes of Colophon, Epicure and the Epicureans or the Stoic Panaetius, from the large number of those asserting its validity. According to Cicero, Democritus and Pythagoras accepted divination and were followed by the Academy and the Peripatetics. However, the Stoa assumed an unconditioned acceptance of divination, the Stoic philosophers becoming the main apologists of its validity (Cicero *De div.*, I, 5)<sup>3</sup>. The main philosophical endeavor of ancient Stoicism was to include the entire universe with its entire diversity of objects and phenomena within a philosophical system and to represent it as following a rational and understandable order. The Stoic universe is established on a unique substance, the material body (σῶμα), and its phenomena are reduced to a unique model of causation. The human mind is able to produce representations of natural phenomena as a relationship between a cause and its effect using the strict implication ( $p \rightarrow q$ ). Thus, science is described as an effort to represent the ensemble of causal relationships constituting the universe. Letting aside the question of rite and divinatory practice, the following pages will be focused on the Stoic interpretation of divination as a mean to uncover the constitution of the universe. Moreover, we will attempt to determine the status of divination within the Stoic system and to determine its epistemological role. The paper focuses on the ancient Stoic doctrine of divination, and more particularly on the doctrine established by Chrysippus, the third leader of the Stoa.

Cicero's catalogue of philosophers describes Chrysippus as the author of a treatise on divination, probably entitled *Περὶ μαντικῆς*, consisting of two books, *On dreams* and *On oracles*. Although Zeno of Kition and Cleanthes discussed on divination in their writings, Chrysippus is the first Stoic philosopher to dedicate an entire treatise to this problem (*De Div.* I, 6)<sup>4</sup>. Cicero's *De divinatione* also distinguishes between natural divination and technical divination. The first genre includes all the species of divination that are produced under divine inspiration and can be included under the religious category of ἐνθουσιασμός, *i.e.* dreams, prophecies or oracles etc., while the second genre includes those species of divination that require a theoretical knowledge for the interpretation of natural phenomena, *i.e.* auspices, haruspices, or astrology. This classification of divination was employed by the Stoics, but it does not have a Stoic origin. From a Stoic point of view,

the distinction would be made between a type of technical divination (τεχνική) and a type of non-technical divination (ἄτεχνος), since the Stoics assert that nature (φύσις) encompasses everything, including the technical objects. Therefore, although Chrysippus' treatise discusses two topics that pertain to the genre of non-technical divination (natural), *i.e.* dreams and oracles, the following pages will describe how the philosopher's writings reveal his interest in both genres of divination.

## 2. The order of philosophy

Two distinct fragments preserve Chrysippus' definition of philosophy. While the first fragment was transmitted by Aetius' *De placita philosophorum* (SVF II, 35)<sup>5</sup>, the second fragment comes from Plutarch's *De Stoicorum repugnantiis* (SVF II, 42)<sup>6</sup>. The first definition asserts the unity of philosophy and its practical purpose. Philosophy is described as a homogenous exercise aiming to gain wisdom to the philosopher and its division in various domains is founded only on didactical purposes. Wisdom (σοφία), the science of divine and human matters, is the goal the philosopher is aiming for in the exercise (ἄσκησις) of philosophy. The exercise is structured with reference to the type of objects that the philosopher experiments: logic is the exercise of the conceptual inner objects, ethics is the exercise of the limits of human free action and physics is the exercise of the exterior objects of the world, including the divine ones.

The second definition describes a hierarchy of philosophical disciplines. According to Chrysippus, philosophy follows both a didactic order and a "real" one. The didactic order of philosophy proceeds from logic, passes through ethics and ends with the research of nature, *i.e.* physics. The didactic order of philosophy implies an advancement from the most intimate circle of objects, the inner one, towards the widest one, the circle of natural objects. Chrysippus also describes an ordered hierarchy of physics, according to which the philosophical exercise comes to an end in the study of theology. The philosopher takes a different way in the description of the theological exercise: theology transcends the model of the rational study of nature and the appropriation of the theological doctrines is described as an initiation, mystery or rite (τελετή)<sup>7</sup>. The didactic order is followed by a "real" one, *i.e.* logics, physics and ethics, since every ethical research has to be established on the knowledge of the theological principles of physics, *i.e.* Zeus, fate, providence etc. (Gourinat 2000, 24-30; Muller 2006, 51-55).

Therefore, according to Chrysippus, philosophy is an exercise that aims to gain wisdom to the philosopher and the distinction between its domains has only a didactic purpose. Both models of hierarchical order of philosophy affirm theology as the highest level of knowledge. Although it is not

mentioned by Plutarch, divination is part of Stoic theology. In consequence, in order to understand the statute of divination in the Stoic system, we will shortly present the main topics of Stoic theology.

### 3. The order of the universe

#### 3.1. *The fundamentals of Stoic cosmology*

The fact that philosophy is viewed by the Stoics as a unitary exercise is founded on their monistic cosmology. While philosophy is divided into its three parts as a didactic distinction between its objects of study, the universe is divided into its parts according to the interaction between its two founding principles. Thus, since its beginnings, Stoicism asserted that the universe is a unique living being (ζῷον), made of a singular corporal substance (σῶμα) and shaped by the interaction of two principles, a passive one and an active one<sup>8</sup>. While God is the active principle, matter without form is the passive one. Through their interaction, the active principle informs matter and thus generates all the particular objects of the universe (SVF I, 97-98). If Platonism and Aristotelianism postulate an immaterial substance as formal principle, Stoicism asserts the materiality of both of them (SVF II, 299-300)<sup>9</sup>. The corporal matter of the active principle is a specie of subtle fire (πνεῦμα), generated by the mixture of air and fire, that mixes, according to Zeno of Kitium, with the informal matter and remains in all the generated objects. Besides God, the active principle is designated through a series of other names: reason (λόγος), intelligent being (νοερόν), artisan fire (πῦρ τεχνικόν), spirit (πνεῦμα) or intellect producing everything (νοῦς) (SVF II, 1027). Moreover, Chrysippus describes Zeus, the chief god of the Greek pantheon, through the attribute of *active principle* of the world (SVF II, 528). The Stoics preserve the traditional Greek link between religion and cosmology and grant Zeus the statute of artisan principle of the universe. Zeus, or the active principle, takes the role of demiurge, his will being the rational force that rationally orders matter. Cleanthes' *Hymn to Zeus* exhibits the will of Zeus as the rational law governing the entire universe and argues for an antithesis between the divine will, governing the universe in accordance to reason, and the human will, trespassing the laws of the universe in the search of individual goods (SVF I, 537). Therefore, Stoic philosophy assumes the task to deliver a rational theology and its cosmology attempts to include God in the rational description of the universe.

While the theological aspects and the rationality of the universal order are broadly asserted in Greek philosophy<sup>10</sup>, the corporality of the active principle is an innovation of the Stoa and it determined the rise of a series of contradictions. The corporeal active principle is described as piercing all

matter and remaining within the generated objects to assure the cohesion of matter and to determine the set of possibilities that objects can act or suffer (SVF II, 310). Carneades<sup>11</sup> skepticism rejected the possibility of interaction between two corporeal principles and the creation of objects from their mixture. More particularly, the question needed to be answered by the Stoa was that of how the two corporeal principles mix and equally preserve their identity in the resulted object (SVF II, 465a). Chrysippus answered the problem through the theory of the four types of mixture (SVF II, 471). According to the philosopher, the mixing (μίξις) constitutes the model of interaction between the two principles, enhancing them to preserve their identity. The most illustrative example for this type of mixture is the soul's mixing with the body, both corporeal entities preserving their identity in the resulted ensouled creature.

The Stoic universe is generated by the interaction of the active and passive principles. The active principle has the purpose to order the universe, to assure the cohesion of matter and to determine the ontological set of possibilities. The plurality of names taken by the active principle is given in accordance with the type of matter that it interacts with and its function in the generated object (SVF II, 1027). For example, when described as ruler of the universe the active principle is named God or Zeus, as the rational principle of the world order it bears the name reason (λόγος), while presented as principle of life and movement in the human body it is called soul (ψυχή). The rationally ordered universe is the condition of possibility of science. Consequently, the following paragraphs will discuss the Stoic theory of universal order.

### 3.2. Fate

Stoic philosophy considers the universe a predetermined concatenation of causes. Causality is a universal phenomenon; thus, each reality is placed at the intersection of multiple causal interactions with other realities. The set of causal relations is limited and determined by the active principle through the fact that it inhabits each of the particular things in the universe. The active principle determines not only the causal relationships of particular objects, but also the entire causal structure of the universe. Through the fact that the active principle assumes different names with reference to the type of matter that it inhabits and the function that it takes, in the role of determining the causal structure of the universe, the active principle is called εἰμαρμένη, fate.

Cicero's *De divinatione* preserves the stoic definition of fate: "Fatum autem id appello quod Graeci εἰμαρμένην id est ordinem seriemque causarum, cum causae causa nexa rem ex se gignat" (De Div. I, 55)<sup>12</sup>. Cicero presents

fate (lat. *fatum*) as the entanglement of causes that determines the existence of all things and their possible interactions, and differentiates the stoic definition from superstitious belief: fate is the eternal cause of things. Another definition of fate pertaining to Chrysippus can be found in Ioannes Stobaeus' *Anthologicum* (SVF II, 913)<sup>13</sup>. Stobaeus' fragment preserves three versions of the definition, each corresponding to a different work of the Stoic philosopher: fate is (1) the rational principle of the world, (2) the rational principle of the things in the world that are governed by providence and (3) the rational principle through which all the passed things have passed, the present things are and the future will come into being. Much more, Chrysippus presents the substance of fate as a pneumatic potency.

The synonymy between "active principle" and "fate" is revealed by the two definitions above. Accordingly, fate represents the active principle as the establisher of the rational order of the universe. All things in universe are subjects of the imposed rational order and their generation and corruption are determined in accordance to fate. Chrysippus defines fate as well through its relationship to providence. Therefore, fate has a double area of applicability: the entanglement of causes that determines the order of the universe and the principle determining the existence and destiny of particular objects. Moreover, the fact that it institutes a rational order makes the universe knowable and enables the human mind to represent its causal order.

The strong link between the nature of human soul and the order of the universe provides the possibility of knowledge. In Chrysippus' opinion, the first Stoic to discuss the soul in a treatise entirely dedicated to this topic (Gourinat 2005, 557-578), the human soul is one of the many hypostases of the active principle. The material substance of the soul (*ψυχή*) is *πνεῦμα*, also the matter of the active principle. Chrysippus distinguishes between three types of *πνεῦμα*: one that offers cohesion to matter in stones and bones, one that offers growth to plants and animals and the psychological *πνεῦμα* that produces representations and coordinates movement (SVF II, 786). Thus, the human soul is defined with reference to intellection and the coordination of the body. We will argue, therefore, a communion of nature between universe and human soul, that determines knowledge as the ability of the soul to reproduce the order of the universe.

Stoic knowledge is described as the exercise to reproduce within the human mind the causal order instituted by fate. Chrysippus argues for a semiological model capable to formalize the causal relationships, *i.e.* the strict implication, where the function of sign is ascribed to the first element of the implication (Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, II, 97, 104; *Adversus mathematicos*, VIII, 316). Because the causal structure covers the entire universe, Stoicism imposed semiology as a universal scientific method.

Considering all, the exercise of philosophy and the didactical proceeding from logics to theology appears to be an endeavor to reconstruct in an abstract form the causal structure of the universe. Moreover, the fulfillment of philosophy in wisdom (*σοφία*) would be understood as the achievement of a complete image of the predetermined entanglement of causes. Philosophy is described as the ensemble of all possible knowledge and its classification in the three domains indicates its practical stages and also classifies the knowable objects in three categories<sup>14</sup>. In addition, the three domains indicate a triple relationship between human and universe: the relationship between man and himself exercised by logic, the relationship with other humans exercised by the ethical inquiry and the relationship with the gods as the ultimate task of the physical inquiry (Gourinat 2000, 29). We need to assume that, for the Stoics, an object of knowledge consists at all times of a causal relationship. In consequence, logic consists of an exercise on the inner objects of the human mind<sup>15</sup>, ethics is an exercise on the causal relationships particular to human life and physics is the exercise concerning the causal relationships in nature. A distinctive element is the Stoic inclusion of theological objects in the natural realm, hence the research of theology requests the same method, *i.e.* semiology, as the research of more common natural objects. Practicing philosophy, the philosopher advances from the inner objects, passes through the exterior ones and fulfills its knowledge through an exercise regarding the understanding of the divine elements in nature. We will argue that divination is part of the theological section of the philosophical exercise.

The stoic theory of divination, as presented for instance in Cicero's *De divinatione*, argues for two genres of divination: natural divination, comprising prophecy, oracles and oneiromancy, and technical divination, comprising haruspices, auspices and astrology.

The Greek world placed at the center of its religious practices especially the natural genre and, in consequence, the Greek philosophers mostly considered the natural forms of divination. For example, Plato describes in the *Timaeus* the physiology of divinatory knowledge (*Timaeus* 71a-72c) and in other dialogues, like the *Apology*, he makes Socrates to publicly acknowledge his demon. Furthermore, Aristotle took part to his master's interest to divination, although by holding a more critical view, in his *De divinatione per somnum* describing oneiric divination as caused by different physiological dispositions of the human body. Departing from the classical opinions on divination, the Stoa argued for a scientific understanding of the divinatory practices, discussing them mostly with reference to the validity and verifiability of the knowledge they deliver. Accordingly, the Stoics applied to divination their universal method for the research of nature, *i.e.* semiology, offering however an outstanding attention to the genre that

implies the observation of natural phenomena and the identification of patterns in nature, *i.e.* technical divination.

### **3.3. *The relationship between divination and fate***

The stoic description of the world rejects the existence of chance, τύχη being classified as an illusion of the mind in its incapacity to identify the causes of natural phenomena (SVF II, 965-967, 970-971). The chain of causes that establishes the order of the universe encompasses a number of non-evident causes (αίτια ἀδηλοί) (White 2003, 140). The philosopher clashes with the problem of hidden causes also in ethics, when, while evident that it does not originate in our will, the cause of an impulse may not be directly accessible to the human mind. As it follows, when one's mind asserts that an event happens by chance, it is only due its incapacity to determine the natural cause of the event and not because nature contains events with a non-causal genesis. As shown above, the didactical order of philosophy (SVF II, 42) sets the final phase of the philosophical exercise, *i.e.* theology, not under the common scholastic practices, which characterize other philosophical disciplines, but describes it as initiation, τελετή.

The knowledge of the divine aspects of nature, those establishing and sustaining the cohesion and the order of the world, is not teachable through the common didactic ways of philosophy. While the parts of philosophy that research evident causal relationships are taught through regular didactical methods, founded on logic and engaging the basic rational abilities of the human mind, theology requests a different kind of transmission, based on the fact that its causal objects of study are fully non-evident to the human mind<sup>16</sup>. Therefore, the existence of chance would be asserted only by a mind unable to understand the universal entanglement of causes. Moreover, while direct empirical knowledge enables the particular disciplines of philosophy to grasp particular causal relationships, the universal causal chain would remain unreachable to common empirical knowledge and thus, based on Stoic empirical epistemology, completely unknowable. In consequence, although the human mind may determine the causes of particular events, the rational order predetermining all causality would remain completely imperceptible. We propose to call the theological fundamentals of the universe first degree non-evident causes.

Furthermore, there are also second degree non-evident causes. The uninitiated to the observation of nature would reject divination as an art that interprets arbitrary phenomena and ascribes them with signification rooted into the will of the diviner. However, Chrysippus submits divination to the same scientific criteria that determine regular natural knowledge. In consequence, divination is described to study the same causality that determines

the phenomena studied by the other semiological sciences and the diviner, like other researchers of nature, to apply the logical methods of verifiability. Furthermore, divination confronts not only natural recurrence, as in the case of auspices, but it also deals with phenomena deviating from the normal course of nature due to the intervention of the divine will. For instance, Cicero describes how Caesar's grim outcome was announced by the absence of the heart of a sacrificed ox (*De Div.* I, 1190). It follows that divination explores two different kinds of non-evident causes and, in consequence, implies two different types of interpretation and requires to the seers two different kinds of skills (*De Div.* I, 118). The first type consists in those causes unveiled by the rigorous observance of nature. Considering common people, the flight of birds would not produce any signification, but only an initiated augur would be capable to link the flight to the future event that it announces. On the other hand, omens, the non-evident causes determined by the divine intervention in the course of nature, would be linked to the events that they announce not on the base of observing recurrences in nature, thus the seers needing a capacity to read irregularities in the course of nature<sup>17</sup>. In consequence, the common mind would not grasp the causes of certain particular events and would interpret them as happening by chance. Divination, in Stoic opinion, has the purpose to research this class of particular non-evident causes.

If we accept this classification of non-evident causes, we are entitled to wonder on the relationship between the two classes, *i.e.* between the order of the universe and the causes of particular events that are revealed by divination. A fragment of Chrysippus' *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης* seems to provide an answer to our inquiry (SVF II, 939)<sup>18</sup>. Eusebius' *Praeparatio evangelica* preserves a passage of Diogenianus, a critic of Stoicism, that comments and quotes a fragment of Chrysippus' treatise on fate. Diogenianus describes Chrysippus' uses of a circular argument to demonstrate the existence of fate and divination: "For he wants to prove that 'everything happens in accordance with fate' from 'divination exists', and he cannot prove that 'divination exists' in any other way than by presupposing that 'everything occurs in accordance with fate'"<sup>19</sup>. Jonathan Barnes analyses the argument and described it as *reciprocity*, a form of circular argument with only two elements (Barnes 1990, 61). Moreover, Barnes argues that, even though Aristotle qualifies in the *Prior Analytics* (25a 14-17) the circular argument as fallacious, other Hellenistic and Late Antique thinkers approved it and used it as a valid form of philosophical reasoning (Barnes 1990, 66 *sq.*).

Susanne Bobzien discusses the relationship between fate and divination in Chrysippus' thought by analyzing the fragment of Diogenianus (Bobzien 2001, 87-93). The fragment describes each element of the relationship to act as proof for the other. If the dependency of the validity of divination to the

existence of an all-encompassing predetermined order may be understandable, the function of divination as proof for the existence of order seems hardly reachable and this is why Bobzien introduces a new premise that she argues to be implicitly connoted by the argument. According to Bobzien, the fact that Chrysippus describes valid divination to be delivered only by diviners possessing a certain expertise needs to be taken into consideration as a necessary condition for the truth of predictions. The divinatory truth that follows from divination practiced by skilled diviners provides the knowledge of fate. As the scholar shows, a prediction of a future event requires to be classified as true or false not only after the occurrence of the predicted event, but it has to be already true when the seer provides the prediction. Consequently, it's determined the necessity of *a causal nexus that extends from the present (i.e. the time when the prediction is made) to the time when the predicted event happens* (Bobzien 2001, 94). The truth of a prediction reveals the existence of a predetermined structure that includes the causal relationship that divination asserts to be linking a two realities. Therefore, although fate remains beyond empirical knowledge, divination indicates its existence. Bobzien wisely synthetizes the relation between the two genres of non-evident causes, saying that fate is a *ratio essendi* of divination, whereas divination is the *ratio cognoscendi* of fate (Bobzien 2001, 92).

Although Bobzien and Barnes offer impressive analyses of the dialectical relation between fate and divination, describing their statutes of reciprocal proofs and the validity of the circular argument, we propose to push the inquiry furthermore by bringing into discussion the two types of non-evident causes presented above. We will argue that, beyond its logic function, the reciprocity argument exhibits the epistemological relation between universal determinism and divination.

The theory of non-evident causes is developed with a clear reference to the Stoic distinction between manifest and non-manifest facts, the latter reenacting the Epicurean doctrine of evident (ἐναργῆ) and non-evident (ἄδηλα) objects (Gourinat 2000, 231-232). While manifest facts (or evident objects) are directly accessible to the mind, non-manifest facts (or non-evident objects) are hidden to our perception and require indicative signs to reveal them. Nonetheless, not all non-evident objects can be semiologically revealed. For example, the number of stars in the sky remains completely incomprehensible to our mind. In consequence, the sign is able to reveal only partially non-evident objects, hidden either due to a context or to their nature. The smoke seen from afar announces the existence of a fire that cannot be seen due to distance. However, in this case the sign does not have an indicative function, but a commemorative one, because it appeals to previous direct interactions with fire. Other objects are naturally hidden to our knowledge, being yet reachable due to indicative signs: sweat indicates

the existence of skin pores and the movements of the body indicate the soul (Sextus Empiricus, *O.P.* II, 97, 104; *A.M.*, VIII, 316.). In consequence, we would question in which category of non-evident facts the two kinds of non-evident causes find their place?

The diviner practicing technical divination would predict a future consequence by proceeding from a current event. The temporal distance that makes the predicted event inaccessible to direct perception suggests that divination deals with contextually non-evident events and that its semiological reasoning is established on commemorative signs. However, at a further consideration, it is indisputable that Stoicism considers divination particularly for its capacity to reveal causes of events that are commonly described to happen by chance. In this line, the main object of divination is not the future event, but the cause to which the diviner links it. Just like sweat is a self-evident object that indicates the existence of skin pores, the events considered by diviners as causes of future events are equally evident. Consequently, divination deals with indicative signs.

Moreover, a slight difference needs to be taken into consideration. While the movements of the body or the sweat of the skin indicate a causal simultaneity, the causal relationships revealed by divination are considered in a temporal distance and the validity of the predicting syllogism would be verified only posterior to the occurring of the predicted event. Thus, while common indicative signs are established on hypothetical syllogisms<sup>20</sup>, which are sufficient to describe and verify the causal link between two events, we are forced to assume a supplementary experiential criterion for the validation of divinatory indicative signs. For example, in the case of a common indicative sign, the affirmation of the causal relationship is simultaneous to its verification. One can describe an object as ensouled proceeding from the movements of its body. While in this case the effect is ontologically dependent on the simultaneous existence of its cause, in the case of divinatory causality the effect does not rely on the simultaneity of the cause and would occur even at long periods of time after the prediction was made. Because the consequence of an inductive sign is revealed as simultaneous to its cause, to confirm the existence of the effect would be sufficient as validation of the cause. Moreover, while a hypothetical syllogism asserts the cause of an event by proceeding from the self-evidence of the effect, divinatory reasoning would proceed in the other way around, by asserting from the self-evidence of a cause the relationship linking it to its effect. Thus, not the consequence is self-evident in divinatory reasoning, but its cause and, because a temporal distance divides them, a supplementary experiential mean of verification would be advanced. For example, the flight of a bird coming from the right side may be a favorable sign for a future event. However, in this case it would not be sufficient to confirm the flight of the bird in order

to judge the validity of the prediction, but the divinatory reasoning would be validated only if the predicted event would occur.

One would remark how at the center of the Stoic interest in divination is not the success of predictions, but the capacity to reveal the causal relationships that link two events that common knowledge would qualify as contingent. Thus, while the traditional view on divination mostly regarded the capacity to reveal future events, the Stoic point of view considers divination not so much for its prophetic function, as for its function of revelatory for what we have called second degree non-evident causes. While common knowledge would describe both the effect and the cause of a divinatory relationship as happening by chance and as absolutely distinct phenomena, divination reveals the link between the two elements and asserts their causal relationship. Although divinatory reasoning proceeds from the self-evidence of a cause, that cause would still be considered non-evident because its effect would be described as happening by chance if divination would not reveal their relationship. Therefore, although the divinatory cause is self-evident to the senses, its statute of cause for a future event remains non-evident until it is disclosed by divination. While this type of divinatory reasoning works as a revealer of the second-degree non-evident causes, we still need to question whether a similar reasoning would reveal the first-degree non-evident causes.

Stoic cosmology asserts world's utility and beauty as signs of the fact that the universe is not the product of chance but of divine providence, the ordering principle of the universe (Dragona-Monachou 1994, 4428). However, in order to assert providence from natural order, one needs to explain the events that may impede the discovery of universal necessity, *i.e.* the second-degree non-evident causes. Thus, divination becomes a *sine qua non* exercise to the discovery of the principles that determine the universal order, due to its capacity to reveal those areas of the causal chain that the common mind would not comprehend and would describe as happening by chance. We propose to interpret Chrysippus' fragment in Diogenianus by following this line of thought, suggesting that fate has to be viewed as the revealed non-evident cause of a successful act of divination.

If put into the form of a hypothetical syllogism, the first reasoning of Chrysippus would look as it follows: (1) "If divination is successful, fate orders everything/ But divination is successful, / Therefore, fate orders everything." The argument takes the form of a hypothetical syllogism that proceeds from a common indicative sign, the self-evidence of the cause being a sign of the consequence. Thus, not only that successful divination reveals a future event from the self-evidence of its cause, but it essentially indicates that the particular causal relationship takes part to a wider causal web encompassing the entire universe. Between the success of divination

and the determined order of fate the temporal distance inherent to the divinatory reasoning is absent. However, in order to assert the causal relationship between fate and divination, what Bobzien remarks to be the implicit premise of the success of divination has to be considered, the cases of unsuccessful divination being naturally irrelevant to the task to reveal the universal order. Diogenianus' fragment says that Chrysippus is able to deduce the existence of fate from divination only by implicitly assuming the existence of fate as a condition of successful divination: (2) "If fate orders everything, divination is successful, / But fate orders everything, / Therefore, divination is successful."

We propose to interpret both (1) and (2) as asserting divination as the revelatory sign of the universal order. Firstly, we have determined that the first-degree non-evident causes have a more general domain than the particular second-degree causes. Secondly, we have described the indicative sign as a self-evident object or event able to reveal a naturally non-evident object or event. Thirdly, a sign is the antecedent element of a valid implication. Fate is a more general cause than the particular ones, assuming that it encompasses everything. The success of divination is a self-evident event, as the validation a prediction after the occurrence of the predicted event, while fate is by nature occulted to direct sensorial knowledge. The third aspect is unclear in this situation, each of the arguments assuming a different antecedent element and this particular aspect determines the difficulty in the interpretation of the fragment of Diogenianus.

The fact that Chrysippus disposes (2) after (1) is not accidental and needs to be taken into consideration. Thus, just as the soul is known through the movements of the body, but remains completely imperceptible, fate would be known through successful divination, but remain completely imperceptible. Following the example of element (2) of Chrysippus' reciprocity argument, we may assert the bodily movements from the existence of the soul: "If I am ensouled, I can move my body, / But I am ensouled, / Therefore I can move my body." We can see how both arguments proceed from the imperceptible element of the reasoning in order to assert the existence of the self-evident element. Moreover, because the soul and fate are by their nature non-evident causes, the above reasoning needs to be preceded by another argument revealing their existence. Therefore, it is clear why Chrysippus asserts the validity of divination from the existence of fate only after the reasoning that reveals the existence of fate from the success of divination. In order to assume its role in an argument, fate had to be previously revealed by another hypothetical argument.

However, what is Chrysippus' motif to introduce a supplementary argument? While (1) asserts divination as revealing its ontological dependency on the all-encompassing fate, the second element seems to drive the inquiry

further and to reveal other aspects of the relationship between fate and divination. Susan Sauvé Meyer (2009, 71-90) distinguishes two types of causal relationships within Chrysippus philosophy. The first type of causality regards the active principle as the efficient cause of all objects in the universe. The second type of causality comprises all the relationships between particular objects that imply a change in one of the elements of the causal relationship. Sauvé Meyer argues that, while all objects are corporal effects of the active principle, within the causal relationships of particular objects the quality of effect is ascribed to none of the objects, but to the incorporeal consequence that an object causes on the other. In other words, while the active principle is the cause of the existence of all objects, a particular object would not be cause of the existence of another object, but of the incorporeal effect that the other object suffers. For instance, the scalpel is not the cause of flesh, but of the incorporeal predicate 'being cut' that is ascribed to the flesh. While the active principle and informal matter are simultaneous present within the generated object, the cause being simultaneous to the effect, the existence of the particular cause and the object suffering the particular incorporeal effect are not dependent one on the other, independently existing before and after the causal interaction (Sauvé Meyer 2009, 75). Thus, while a particular object is the effect of fate only as long as the active principle remains within its matter, the particular objects exist indifferent to the effect they cause on other objects. We have described how the active principle is an artisan fire piercing all informal matter and shaping it in objects within which it remains and sustains cohesion. The human soul is part of the universal  $\pi\nu\epsilon\delta\mu\alpha$  and thus it follows the causal simultaneity of the active principle. Moreover, the active principle acts as cause not only of the existence of particular objects, but also of the order of universe, ordering all objects in a string of causes. All particular objects obtain thus the statute of cause, producing incorporeal effects one on another, and are ordered in a structure that predetermines their causal interactions.

In consequence, new aspects illuminate the type of causality implied by divination. If applied to the fragment of Diogenianus, the causal models presented earlier suggest that the argument engages fate as cause of divination under two aspects: (1) describes fate as the string of causes that encompasses all particular causal relationships and (2) describes fate as efficient cause of the entire universe. From the fact that divination reveals causal relationships between particular objects, *i.e.* happening under the type of non-efficient causality specific to the particular objects, fate is revealed under its aspect of causal structure comprised of all the particular causalities. As we have described, fate is necessary to divinatory causality due to the fact that a causal nexus has to unite the two elements of the relationship through the long temporal interval which may divide them. The prediction

has to be true from its assertion and the causal nexus, *i.e.* fate, would be the condition of its truth, because it predetermines the causal relationship with the future predicted event. Therefore, (1) describes rather the particular causal relationships capable to reveal fate, than fate as a *sine qua non* condition of divination. After the existence of fate and its predetermining role are revealed, the philosopher further asserts the role of fate as the efficient cause of all objects and as the ontological condition of all particular causality. As we have described, the action of fate as efficient cause of the universe is simultaneous in its existence to the existence of the effect. As long as the active principle remains within matter and provides its cohesion and order, the universe and all its objects would exist. The periodic destruction of the universe asserted by Chrysippus happens due to the separation between the active principle and matter. Therefore, (2) describes fate under its aspect of efficient cause of the universe. As long as it orders matter and predetermines the causal interactions of the resulted particular objects, fate would be the efficient cause of the divinatory causal relationships and the success of divination would be simultaneous to the acting of fate as efficient cause. Divination works as a revelatory sign of the first-degree non-evident cause, *i.e.* fate. While the first part of the argument asserts the existence of fate as a consequence of successful divination, the second part would drive further the semiological reasoning by proclaiming fate as the non-evident cause that determines the validity of divinatory reasoning.

#### 4. Conclusion

The pages above were written in the search of those doctrinal elements able to reveal the role of divination for the Stoic philosophers. We consequently argued for a series of certain doctrinal elements that would serve our task, which we will shortly resume. The symmetry between the order of the universe and the organization of the Stoic system reveals the ethical principle that equally governs the life of the philosopher and his scientific efforts, *i.e.* οἰκείωσις. Not only that the philosophical system assumes the look of the universe, but the philosopher himself conducts his own actions striving to achieve a life in accordance to nature. We have described Stoic philosophy as an exercise meant to obtain wisdom to the philosopher, concluding from here that the philosopher's search for accordance to nature is identical to his scientific practice. Therefore, wisdom as a fulfilment of the philosophical exercise would coincide to the ethical and scientific goals of the Stoic philosopher: to become wisdom implies to coherently represent the universe and to consequently assume a life in accordance to its constitution. The philosopher focuses on the necessity governing nature and strives to achieve a representation of the multiple laws determining the life of the

universe. However, a complete image of the universe would include even those areas of the universe that escape the capacity of our mind to submit them under the governance of necessity. This is the first aspect of the Stoic questioning of divination. The philosopher needs furthermore to achieve the knowledge of those areas of the universe which escape our empirical faculties, this being the second aspect of the Stoic interest in divination. Brief, the question on divination is double, it equally concerns the natural phenomena that have a non-evident cause and the regions of the world that escape our direct perception. The pages above argue for the integration of divination within the theological part of physics, as the discipline that, proceeding from the non-evident causal relationships in nature, is capable to determine the existence of the rational order of the universe. The Stoic interest in divination detoured from the views of traditional religion, *i.e.* the prediction of future events, valuing it as a semiological reasoning that allows to derive the conclusion of the existence of a predetermined web of causes, *i.e.* fate.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> The development of the divinatory institutions within the western Mediterranean basin was marked by the dichotomy between public and private divination. Thus, while Greek divinatory institutions, like the oracles of Delphi, Delos and Dodona, were open to the individuals, offering responses equally to personal questions and to those concerning the entire society, divination developed in Rome mostly into an institution open to questions concerning the ensemble of society. For the legalistic development of the Roman divinatory institutions see Linderski (1986, 2146-2312). The dichotomy was even deeper at the end of the Republic and in the imperial age, once astrology became more popular in the popular and intellectual circles. In this matter are eloquent the edict condemning astrology in 33 BC, thus before the battle of Actium, in order to prevent the use of astrology in the interests of the particulars that endanger the republican order, and the edict of Augustus in 11 BC, condemning the forms of divination concerning individual interests (Volk 2009, 127-172).

<sup>2</sup> For a list of divinatory practices see: Porphyre (2012, fr.43). Even though it was written at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the work of A. Bouché-Leclercq (1879-1882) continues to be relevant; See also the abridged version with a foreword questioning the importance of the work nowadays by S. Georgoudi (2003) at Jérôme Millon, Grenoble. The problem of divination reappeared in the attention of the religious research through the innovative questioning offered by the book of J.-P. Vernant *et al* (1974). From the vast recent research on divination its worth mentioning the works of S. Iles Johnston and P.T. Struck (2005), A. Busine (2005), S. Georgoudi, R. Koch Piettre and F. Schmidt (2012), K. Beerden (2013) and G.H. Renberg (2017).

<sup>3</sup> “Atque haec, ut ego arbitror, veteres rerum magis eventis moniti quam ratione docti probaverunt. Philosophorum vero exquisita quaedam argumenta cur esset vera divinatio collecta sunt; e quibus, ut de antiquissimis loquar, Colophonius Xenophanes unus qui deos esse diceret divinationem funditus sustulit, reliqui vero omnes praeter Epicurum balbutientem de natura deorum divinationem probaverunt, sed non uno modo. Nam cum Socrates omnesque Socratici Zenoque et ii qui ab eo essent profecti manerent in antiquorum philosophorum sententia vetere Academia et Peripateticis consentientibus, cumque huic rei

magnam auctoritatem Pythagoras iam ante tribuisset, qui etiam ipse augur vellet esse, plurimisque locis gravis auctor Democritus praesensionem rerum futurarum conprobaret, Dicaearchus Peripateticus cetera divinationis genera sustulit, somniorum et furoris reliquit, Cratippusque familiaris noster, quem ego parem summis Peripateticis iudico, isdem rebus fidem tribuit, reliqua divinationis genera reiecit.” (Cicero De div., I, 5).

<sup>4</sup> “Sed quom Stoici omnia fere ilia defenderent, quod et Zeno in suis commentariis quasi semina quaedam sparsisset et ea Cleanthes paulo uberiora fecisset, accessit acerrimo vir ingenio Chrysippus, qui totam de divinatione duobus libris explicavit sententiam, uno praeterea de oraculis, uno de somniis; quem subsequens unum librum Babylonius Diogenes edidit eius auditor, duo Antipater, quinque noster Posidonius. Sed a Stoicis vel princeps eius disciplinae, Posidoni doctor, discipulus Antipatri degeneravit Panaetius nec tamen ausus est negare vim esse divinandi, sed dubitare se dixit. Quod illi in aliqua re invitissimum Stoicis Stoico facere licuit, id nos ut in reliquis rebus faciamus a Stoicis non concedetur? Praesertim cum id, de quo Panaetio non liquet, reliquis eiusdem disciplinae solis luce videatur clarius. Sed haec quidem laus Academiae praestantissimi philosophi iudicio et testimonio comprobata est.” (De div. I, 6).

<sup>5</sup> “Οἱ μὲν οὖν Στωικοὶ ἔφασαν τὴν μὲν σοφίαν εἶναι θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων ἐπιστήμην, τὴν δὲ φιλοσοφίαν ἄσκησιν ἐπιτηδείου τέχνης, ἐπιτηδεῖον δ' εἶναι μίαν καὶ ἀνωτάτω τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἀρετὰς δὲ τὰς γενικωτάτας τρεῖς, φυσικὴν ἠθικὴν λογικὴν· δι' ἣν αἰτίαν καὶ τριμερὴς ἐστὶν ἡ φιλοσοφία, ἧς τὸ μὲν φυσικὸν τὸ δ' ἠθικὸν τὸ δὲ λογικόν· καὶ φυσικὸν μὲν ὅταν περὶ κόσμου ζητῶμεν καὶ τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ, ἠθικὸν δὲ τὸ κατησχολημένον περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίον, λογικὸν δὲ τὸ περὶ τὸν λόγον, ὃ καὶ διαλεκτικὸν καλοῦσιν.” (SVF II, 35 = Aetius I, Proem, 2 = Pseudo-Plutarh, 874e1-f1).

<sup>6</sup> “Ο Χρύσιππος οἶεται δεῖν τῶν λογικῶν πρῶτον ἀροῦσθαι τοὺς νέους δεύτερον δὲ τῶν ἠθικῶν μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῶν φυσικῶν, ὡς ἂν τέλος δὲ τοῦτοις τὸν περὶ θεῶν λόγον ἔσχατον παραλαμβάνειν. πολλαχοῦ δὲ τούτων ὑπ' αὐτοῦ λεγομένων ἀρξέσει παραθέσθαι τὰ ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ περὶ Βίων ἔχοντα κατὰ λέξιν οὕτως· ‘πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ μοι κατὰ τὰ ὀρθῶς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων εἰρημένα τρία γένη τῶν τοῦ φιλοσόφου θεωρημάτων εἶναι, τὰ μὲν λογικὰ τὰ δ' ἠθικὰ τὰ δὲ φυσικὰ· εἶτα τούτων δεῖν τάττεσθαι πρῶτα μὲν τὰ λογικὰ δεύτερα δὲ τὰ ἠθικὰ τρίτα δὲ τὰ φυσικὰ· τῶν δὲ φυσικῶν ἔσχατος εἶναι ὁ περὶ τῶν θεῶν λόγος· διὸ καὶ τελετὰς <προς> ἠγόρευσαν τὰς τούτου παραδόσεις· ἀλλὰ τοῦτόν γε τὸν λόγον, ὃν ἔσχατόν φησι δεῖν τάττεσθαι, <τὸν> περὶ θεῶν, ἔθει προτάττει καὶ προεκτίθησι παντὸς ἠθικοῦ ζητήματος· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ τελῶν οὔτε περὶ δικαιοσύνης οὔτε περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν οὔτε περὶ γάμου καὶ παιδοτροφίας οὔτε περὶ νόμου καὶ πολιτείας φαίνεται τὸ παράπαν φθηγόμενος, εἰ μὴ, καθάπερ οἱ τὰ ψηφίσματα ταῖς πόλεσιν εἰσφέροντες προγράφουσιν Ἀγαθὴν Τύχην, οὕτως καὶ αὐτὸς προγράψει τὸν Δία, τὴν Εἰμαρμένην, τὴν Πρόνοιαν, τὸ συνέχεσθαι μιᾷ δυνάμει τὸν κόσμον ἓνα ὄντα καὶ πεπερασμένον” (SVF II, 42 = Plutarch, De stoicorum repugnantis, 9, 1035a1-b11).

<sup>7</sup> The Brill's New Pauly describes Chrysippus' use of τελετή as metaphorical, departing from its fundamental religious sense established within the milieu of ancient Greek religion (Scherf, 'Telete'). The form τελετή is part of the semantic field of τέλος (completion, realization, but also decision, authority or rite) and commonly signifies the initiation in the mystery cults and even the celebration of mysteries. As we observe, Chrysippus uses the word beyond its institutionalized religious usage, but maintains the area of use to the theological context (Chantraine, 1977, 1101-1103).

<sup>8</sup> For the link between Stoic cosmology and Plato's *Timaeus* description of the universe as a living animal Cf. Gretchen Reydam-Schils 1999, 41-115.

<sup>9</sup> While a great part of the manuscripts of Diogenes Laertius describe the principles as corporeal (σώματα), some others, including the Suda, correctly describe them as incorporeal (ἄσωμάτους). Arnim's fragment 299 followed the form ἄσωμάτους (D.L. VII, 134), this

generating a controversy with regard to the nature of the Stoic principles, through the fact that many other of Arnim's fragments attest the corporeal nature of the principles (SVF II 305, 310, 313 *et. al.*). Tiziano Dorandi's new edition of D.L. (2013, 522) attests to the correctness of the *σώματα* version.

<sup>10</sup> For example, Plato's *Timaeus*.

<sup>11</sup> For example, many of the arguments against divination used by M. Cicero in the second book of *De divinatione* would come from Carneades' critique of the Stoic theory of divination (Schofield 1986, 54).

<sup>12</sup> "Fatum autem id appello quod Graeci εἰμαρμένην id est ordinem seriemque causarum, cum causae causa nexa rem ex se gignat. Ea est ex omni aeternitate fluens Veritas sempiterna. Quod cum ita sit, nihil est factum quod non futurum fuerit, eodemque modo nihil est futurum cuius non causas id ipsum efficientes natura contineat. Ex quo intellegitur, ut fatum sit non id quod superstitiose sed id quod physice dicitur, causa aeterna rerum, cur et ea quae praeterierunt facta sint et quae instant fiant et quae secuntur futura sint" (Cicero *De div.*, I, 55).

<sup>13</sup> "Χρῦσιππος δὲ δύναμιν πνευματικὴν τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς εἰμαρμένης, τάξει τοῦ παντὸς διοικητικῆν. Τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ Περι κόσμου, ἐν δὲ τῷ δευτέρῳ Περι ὄρων καὶ ἐν τοῖς Περι τῆς εἰμαρμένης καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις σποράδην πολυτρόπως ἀποφαίνεται λέγων Εἰμαρμένη ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ κόσμου λόγος, ἢ λόγος τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοίᾳ διοικουμένων· ἢ λόγος, καθ' ὃν τὰ μὲν γεγονότα γέγονε, τὰ δὲ γινόμενα γίνεται, τὰ δὲ γενησόμενα γενήσεται. Μεταλαμβάνει δ' ἀντὶ τοῦ λόγου τὴν ἀλήθειαν, τὴν αἰτίαν, τὴν φύσιν, τὴν ἀνάγκην, προσιθεὶς καὶ ἐτέρας ὀνομασίας, ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσίας τασσομένας καθ' ἐτέρας καὶ ἐτέρας ἐπιβολάς. Μοίρας δὲ καλεῖσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ κατ' αὐτὰς διαμερισμοῦ, Κλωθῶ καὶ Λάχεσιν καὶ Ἄτροπον. Λάχεσιν μὲν, ὅτι ὃν κλήρον λελόγγασιν ἕκαστοι κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον ἀπονέμεται" (SVF II, 913).

<sup>14</sup> We may relate our interpretation with the famous passage of Hierocles the Stoic, describing the universe as disposed in concentric circles, the first one, closest to the subject, being the one traced around one's mind, and the final one encompassing the entire universe in a community of humans and gods (Ramelli 2009, 91-93).

<sup>15</sup> The objects of logics are the inner representations of things. Stoic epistemology proposes knowledge as the sensorial representation of exterior things. The Stoics distinguish the rational representations (*φαντασῖαι λογικαί*) of the human soul from concepts. The process of knowledge happens in two steps. Firstly, through distinctive sensorial interactions, the subjects develop unconscious notions (*ἔννοιαι*) of exterior things, these being a form of memorized representations that serve to the recognition of individual objects and as a form of descriptive definition (*ὑπογραφή*). Pre-notions (*ἔννοιαι*) are equated by Chrysippus with Epicure's *πρόληψις*, natural concepts of the human mind based on successive sensorial perceptions. The pre-notion is a criterion of truth. Thus, by comparing the sensorial representation of the exterior object with its afferent pre-notion, the ruling part of the soul (*ἡγεμονικόν*) offers its approval, qualifying the representation as true, or rejects its approval, qualifying it as false. Secondly, concepts, as universal definitions, are formed through logical operations on the pre-notions. For further readings see: Gourinat (1996, 46-62), Dyson (2009) and Tieleman (1996, 219-232).

<sup>16</sup> We are acquainted with Pierre Hadot's thesis that ancient philosophy, and particularly Stoicism, is founded on the practice of philosophy, the philosopher discovering on its own the constitution of nature and the ethical precepts, and not on the scholastic transmission of knowledge. According to Hadot, philosophical education focused on the transmission of the doctrinal core of each school and not on the transmission of a full corpus of knowledge (Hadot 1995). Chrysippus' fragment (SVF II, 42) seems to sustain Hadot's interpretation, by asserting the theological initiation as the introduction to the *sine qua non* core of Stoicism.

<sup>17</sup> We observe that causality has a broader sense than material causality, the later implying that an event is produced due to the material interaction between two objects.

<sup>18</sup> “[ἐξαρκεῖν ἔμοιγε μαρτυρίας χάριν τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος ἡγοῦμαι καὶ μίαν ἐνδὸς τούτων παρὰθεσιν ἀπαντῶσαν πρὸς τὰ Χρυσίππῳ περὶ εἰμαρμένης ἀπὸ τῆς τῶνμαντείων προρρηθείσης κατασκευασθέντα. γράφει δ' οὖν ὁ συγγραφεὺς πρὸς αὐτόν, ἀπελέγχων ὅτι κακῶς ἐκ τῶνμαντείων σημειοῦται τὴν εἰμαρμένην etc.]‘Φέρει δὲ καὶ ἄλλην ἀπόδειξιν ἐν τῷ προεξημένῳ βιβλίῳ τοιαύτην τινά. μὴ γὰρ ἂν τὰς τῶν μάντεων προρρηθείσεις ἀληθεῖς εἶναι φησιν, εἰ μὴ πάντα ὑπὸ τῆς εἰμαρμένης περιείχοντο.’ - ὡς γὰρ ἐναργοῦς ὄντος τοῦ πάσας ἀποβαίνειν τὰς τῶν καλουμένων μάντεων προρρηθείσεις ἢ ὡς μᾶλλον ἂν ὑπὸ τινος τούτου συγχωρηθέντος, τοῦ πάντα γίνεσθαι καθ' εἰμαρμένην, καὶ οὐχὶ ὁμοίως ἂν ψευδοῦς ῥηθέντος καὶ αὐτοῦ, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον, λέγω δὲ τὸ μὴ πάντα ἀποβαίνειν τὰ προαγορευθέντα, μᾶλλον δὲ τὰ πλεῖστα αὐτῶν, ἢ ἐνάργεια δεικνυσιν. οὕτω τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἡμῖν Χρυσίππος κεκόμειεν, δι' ἀλλήλων κατασκευάζων ἐκότερα. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πάντα γίνεσθαι καθ' εἰμαρμένην ἐκ τοῦ μαντικῆν εἶναι δεικνύουσι βούλεται, τὸ δὲ εἶναι μαντικῆν οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἀποδείξαι δύναιτο, εἰ μὴ προλάβοι τὸ πάντα συμβαίνειν καθ' εἰμαρμένην” (SVF II, 939).

<sup>19</sup> We use Susanne Bobzien's (2001, 89) translation.

<sup>20</sup> These are the forms of reasoning commonly known as modus ponendo ponens, modus tollendo tollens, modus ponendo tollens and modus tollendo ponens. For further readings see Bobzien (2002, 359-394).

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