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When Does "Tangible" Meet "Intangible" ? Some Reflections about the Relation between the Tangible and Intangible Cultural Heritage**

Abstract: Cultural heritage is classified by UNESCO as being of two kinds: *tangible* and *intangible*. Is this classification only a *bureaucratic tool* destined to describe the sorts of cultural heritage or does this distinction reflect a real division of cultural heritage? Starting from these questions, this article argues that cultural heritage in its entirety is, actually, intangible and constructed. Tangible and intangible cultural heritages meet in the public domain: cultural heritage is a form of public appropriation and consists in the transformation of the tangible and intangible objects and facts in public goods of a special kind. To the pieces of cultural heritage communities attach outstanding universal value. The appropriation of objects and facts into the public domain is not only a complex activity of conceptualization and institutionalization, but also a part of a social ontological process in which the cultural heritage becomes an important part of social reality endowed with its own characteristics and functionality.

Keywords: cultural heritage, tangible cultural heritage, intangible cultural heritage, public good, public appropriation, outstanding universal value, *sensus communis*.

Cultural heritage (CH) seems to be a self-understood notion. But the institutionalization of the CH notion as referring to tangible objects and, further, the extension of its connotation to conducts and practices of individuals and communities as intangible components of it, was a difficult negotiating process and took a long time. At present, those interested in the domain define institutionally what tangible cultural heritage (TCH) and intangible cultural heritage (ICH) are by working with actually canonical definitions. We could find the working definitions of both TCH and ICH, in a great deal of UNESCO declarations. For example:

> CH is the legacy of physical artefacts and intangible attributes of a group or society that are inherited from past generations, maintained in the present and bestowed for the benefit of future generations. TCH includes buildings and historic places, monuments, artefacts, etc., which are considered worthy of preservation for the future. These include objects significant to the archaeology,

architecture, science or technology of a specific culture. Tangible heritage includes buildings and historic places, monuments, artefacts, etc., which are considered worthy of preservation for the future. These include objects significant to the archaeology, architecture, science or technology of a specific culture. (UNESCO 2018b)

And:

1. The "ICH" means the practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills – as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated therewith – that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognize as part of their cultural heritage. This intangible cultural heritage, transmitted from generation to generation, is constantly recreated by communities and groups in response to their environment, their interaction with nature and their history, and provides them with a sense of identity and continuity, thus promoting respect for cultural diversity and human creativity. For the purposes of this Convention, consideration will be given solely to such intangible cultural heritage as is compatible with existing international human rights instruments, as well as with the requirements of mutual respect among communities, groups and individuals, and of sustainable development.
2. The "ICH", as defined in paragraph 1 above, is manifested inter alia in the following domains:
(a) oral traditions and expressions, including language as a vehicle of the intangible cultural heritage;
(b) performing arts;
(c) social practices, rituals and festive events;
(d) knowledge and practices concerning nature and the universe;
(e) traditional craftsmanship.
3. "Safeguarding" means measures aimed at ensuring the viability of the intangible cultural heritage, including the identification, documentation, research, preservation, protection, promotion, enhancement, transmission, particularly through formal and non-formal education, as well as the revitalization of the various aspects of such heritage. (UNESCO 2018a, 5-6)

The working (and, practically, canonical) definitions were adopted after years of elaboration of the CH original concept. The *Venice Chart* (1964) used and understood the CH notion as referring only to "monuments and sites" (Bouchenaki 2005). The acknowledged necessity to protect ICH has been undervalued and neglected for a long period of time by UNESCO bodies. For example, a *Protocol* to the *Universal Copyright Convention* proposed by the Bolivian delegation in order to protect folklore failed in 1973. At that time, perhaps the crushing of ancient practices, values and ways of life under the assault of modernization seemed an inevitable process. But the reservations linked to the inclusion into CH of the ineffable, intangible and only behavioural and spiritual elements belonging to the day-to-day life of individuals and communities could be explained by the difficulty of a national or international forums and organizations to conceptualize suitably and operationalize bureaucratically the immaterial and leaving things. Someone could think that at first glance we possess *all the instruments, conceptual, legal*

and bureaucratic, for the assimilation of material objects into CH, but we are not able to integrate in it the immaterial facts, subsisting only in our minds, reproduced only by our behaviours, and usually considered only in relation with their utility in everyday life. The integration of the immaterial facts into the CH requires each of us not only to imagine individually how those facts could be thought as having the same status as material things, but also to construct them publicly as real existences. The suitable solution for this dilemma was to coin two categories of CH, TCH and ICH, the former offering us the conceptual possibility of inclusion of the immaterial cultural facts into the CH. With the concept of ICH, we had not only to change our minds in order to accept *the real existence* of such kinds of facts and the possibility to store them, but also to conceive organizational frames and bureaucratic instruments to actually do that. To this end, in 1982, UNESCO, which assumes the role of International Protector of the world CH, grouped a *Committee of Experts on the Safeguarding of Folklore* that included a special *Section for the Non-Tangible Heritage* in the *Recommendation on the Protection of Traditional Culture and Folklore*, adopted in 1989. (Bouchenaki 2005). This *Recommendation* can be considered the first and inaugural big step on the way to identify and work out national and international mechanisms for protecting both TCH and ICH at national and international level. *The Washington International Conference* in June 1999, organized jointly by UNESCO and the Smithsonian Institute, was the next forum with a great contribution to defining a more inclusive and comprehensive CH concept. Starting with this, the opportunity developed to add to the ICH not only imaginary products, more or less resistant over time, but also knowledge and values involved in production, the creative processes and practices, as well as the modes of interaction providing social recognition and integration for the songs, tales, dances and others similar belonging to immaterial aspects of a determined community. Since then a lot of research and actions aimed to refine the conceptualization and institutionalization of the ICH. The abovementioned working definition of ICH is derived from *the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage 2003,* Paris, 17 October 2003 (UNESCO 2018a, 3-9). This Convention showed, evidently, that, on the one hand, the TCH was something formed by material, very palpable components, monuments, artefacts, natural landscapes and human significant material products, since on the other hand, ICH was taken to consist of immaterial facts, processes and practices of individuals and communities.

Obviously, the clarity of concepts in use is very important for custodians of both TCH and ICH because their safeguarding decisions should have the conceptual framework as a first basis. In this article I do not intend to question the conceptual framework used by national and international custodians of CH, and particularly the one proposed by UNESCO, but only *to discuss from a philosophical point of view some aspects of the comprehensive concept of CH, tangible and intangible, claiming that, to a greater or lesser extent, both TCH and ICH could be considered as intangible in order to be understood in their nature*. This is

only a theoretical reflection without any direct and practical relation with the catalogues, lists and UNESCO criteria for TCH and ITC. My question "How could we interpret or, to be more straightforward, what is the nature of CH, tangible and intangible?" considers these catalogues, lists and criteria as undeniable facts. This implies that it is not the mission of philosophy to validate and decide, and perhaps not even to question, what the local, national and international governances value as TCH and ITC. It is an inevitable fact that the components of CH are established by communities, states and international organizations, according with their own values and interests. Philosophy must take and does take resulting catalogues and lists of CH as facts and proceeds theoretically in its reflection about the nature of CH, as TCH or ICH. However, by asking such questions, philosophy could aim to contribute to the clarification of misunderstandings as those appeared around the *Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural, Natural Heritage from 1972 (World Heritage Convention)* (UNESCO 2005) about the Westernization of heritage[1] or to provide a better understanding of so called "cultural criterion" used to identify the *outstanding universal value* (*OUV*) which determines "the inscription of properties on the World Heritage List": "[To] be directly or tangibly associated with events or living traditions, with ideas, or with beliefs, with artistic and literary works of outstanding universal significance." (The Committee considers that this criterion should preferably be used in conjunction with other criteria.) (UNESCO 2005, 52).

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In terms of *Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention* an OUV "means cultural and/or natural significance which is so exceptional as to transcend national boundaries and to be of common importance for present and future generations of all humanity" (UNESCO 2005, 46). An object or fact achieving this status becomes a piece of TCH or ICH, mentioned by various catalogues and lists. This process could be seen as a transition of an object and fact from the non-public to the public domain. I consider this transition from non-public to public domain to be essential in the process through which an object or fact becomes a piece of CH. For the objects and facts in question, this transition counts as a *social ontological mutation*.

For such a transition from the non-public to public domain to be possible, the object and fact must be somehow previously considered as having or being able to receive an OUV. Someone must claim that and requests recognition for this claim. The act by which an object or fact receives an OUV could be seen as an act of attaching values to objects or facts (we attach value to a fact) or as an act of sharing values (we subjectively share or adopt a value referring to a fact as being our value). An objective conception of value involving the attachment of values to objects or facts is more suitable to be adopted as explanation for the way in which we succeed to

consider objects and facts as having OUV, because we frequently consider something to be of an OUV even if we do not share it as a value in itself (perhaps even if we reject it). For example, we claim that some relics of the communism era have OUV, but only in order to show to the future generations the abnormalities of this political regime – and, at the same time, rejecting these values. To conclude, the criterion does not request to attach to an object or fact the values we share, but rather values which have an outstanding importance for different reasons we could identify and argue as being a basis for decisions we make in this regard. In both cases the values we attach to object or fact are intangible and transfer this intangibility to the material object and immaterial facts which become part of CH as TCH and respectively ICH. I reiterate that this intangibility does not follow from the subjectivity of values, but from the fact that in both cases we are dealing with collective attachment of values, tacit or not, to objects or facts. As Toulmin (1971, 195) maintains with regard to the collective uses of the concepts, we can interpret the two ways to consider an object or fact as OUV as *Darstellung* and *Vorstellung*. We represent something in terms of *Darstellung* when we display publicly "what it comprises or how it operates" like a theatrical representation, while *Vorstellung* suggests the private, psychological representation, in our inward minds. So, to attach value to object and facts means *darstellen* these facts. People modify their behaviour and orient to pieces integrated into TCH, seeing in these pieces other things they had seen before they collectively decided on those objects and facts as having the new quality to be of OUV. But how could we attach an OUV to facts, to those kinds of entities able to be integrated to the ICH, which are by their nature immaterial?

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I advance the idea that the answer to this question is intellectually analogous to the way in which we collectively assign artistic character to a very innovative and surprising object or fact which an author, curator or editor simply *wished* to be considered a work of art. In these terms, Duchamp's *Fountain* should be a very good example. Thus, the way in which we consider that an object or fact meets the attributes of an artistic work could be seen as similar with the way we consider or decide that an object or fact could be part of the CH. A community and even more a universal community can validate such claim by vote, for example, spontaneously accepting the claim as entitled or simply legally based on decisions of many or few. We can consider these cases as explanatory for the present UNESCO TCH and ICH lists and catalogues. Moreover, even if a whole community validates the artistic character of an object or fact by vote or legally, there remains the possibility for someone to deny such validation in the name of, say, aesthetical precepts. The same could happen in the case of CH. So, for such OUV to be validated we need to gather not only the complete or incomplete, perhaps, the majoritarian vote of a community, but

also some criteria which belong to a *justificatory theory* or something like this in order to accept that validation is a legitimate one.

Before exposing some justificatory theories related to the way we assign OUV to objects and facts and assimilate them into the public domain, I will give two examples of conceptualization and institutionalization of CH, the first one regarding the history, perhaps incomplete, of the notion of ICH, and the second one regarding a Romanian monument, *Biserica din Densuș*, (Romanian church), with a particular history of its adoption as OUV by its own community of believers. I consider these examples as relevant for the mode of appropriation to the public domain of non-public objects and facts. The first example is general and could be seen as a pattern for explicit public appropriation, and the second for the tacit way. The first example also has the merit of demonstrating the way in which the concept of CH is embraced by the idea of public appropriation.

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In an excellent analysis published in *Journal of Cultural Heritage*, M. Vecco demonstrates that the term of ICH is a result of a process in which the term *heritage* added the immaterial and public aspects of its meaning (Vecco 2010). Through this process *heritage* shifted from its use related with personal, private, in any case, non-public material objects, to the uses related to immaterial and public objects and activities. This semantic transformation has been made possible by the emergence into the public discourse of the idea of the appropriation in the public domain of various private objects.

Giving examples for such transformation, Vecco shows that *patrimoine*, the French word for CH, passed through 5 periods of particular uses: 1790-1791, 1930-1945, 1959, 1968-1969, and 1978-1980, until having acquired the signification French language gives it at present (Desvallées 1995, Vecco 2010, 321). In its first use, on October 4, 1790, somebody called François Puthod de Maisonrouge tried to convince some people to transform their family heritage into national one. This could be the very beginning for the communal understanding of the heritage which will develop subsequently. After the French Revolution, the goods and property of the king were considered public goods and nationalized (Vecco 2010, 321). Heritage as a sort of public appropriation seems to appear again much later in the first Euripide Foundoukidis's use of *artistic heritage* concept in 1931 (Vecco 2010, 321). This new use showed that heritage could be not only material, but also immaterial and yet appropriated by the public. The immateriality and the public character seemed strengthened mutually during these semantic trans-formations. This is confirmed after years in the decree 59-889/July 24, 1954 adopted while André Malraux was Minister of Culture, who regulated the use of term *patrimoine culturel* in relation with culture and the public domain, the cultural values of fine arts being interpreted as belonging to artistic property or national property (Vecco 2010, 322). The years 1978-1980 firmly estab-

lished the term *patrimoine*, both the public and administration adopting it in order to indicate the pieces belonging to the CH. Yet the semantic transformation of the term has been accompanied by an institutionalization process. I will mention a few references by M. Vecco in the analysis I use here. First of all, the *Athena Charter* (1931) acknowledged the importance of the conservation of the artistic and archaeological heritage, but "without defining it" (Vecco, 2010, 322). Further, a more comprehensive and refined definition of heritage appeared in the *International Charter of Venice* in 1960

> (…) the historic monuments of generations of people remain to the present day as living witness of their age-old traditions. People are becoming more and more conscious of the unity of human values and regard ancient heritage as a common heritage. The common responsibility to safeguard them for future generations is recognized. It is our duty to hand them on in the full richness of their authenticity is found. (Vecco 2010, 322)

It is important here that "historic monuments" include not only the great works of art, but also "more modest works of the past which have acquired cultural significance with the passing of time" (Vecco 2010, 322). The interest that people show in the modest testimonials of the past thus became an index of possible OUV. Additionally, the conservation of heritage developed as an important theme of the international documents of the organizations involved in establishment of the international strategies with regard to CH. *The Hague Convention of 1954* regarding the protection of cultural heritage in the case of armed conflict referred to *cultural property* and the necessity of its protection (Vecco 2010, 322) and strengthened the intangible dimension of the things that are usually seen only in their material aspect. Otherwise, *The Hague Convention* of 1954 is also considered the first place where the English word *cultural property* appeared, but only to be soon replaced with CH. (Prott & O'Keefe 1992, 312). After that, the organizations with responsibilities and initiatives in the conceptualization and institutionalization of CH came to be more numerous and the definitions they forged became subtler. So, in 1972, the *Charter of the Council of Europe* proposed the soil as part of world heritage, referring to the soil "understood as a limited and fragile resource" (Vecco 2010, 322). Same year, the *UNESCO Convention on the Protection of World, Cultural and Natural Heritage* added the "wholes" to the monuments of exceptional value which had to be preserved[3]. The same comprehensive understanding of CH can be found in *The Charter for the Protection of Historic Cities* (Washington Charter 1987, ICOMOS) which proposed both tangible and intangible values to be safeguarded. In the same line of treating the tangible and intangible aspect of the objects which need to be protected *The Burra Charter* (ICOMOS, 1982) also stayed (Vecco 2010, 233).

These documents and others that followed consolidated the idea that not only the intrinsic qualities of the objects or facts supposed to be protected are important, but that it is also the interest of communities in adopting them as infrastructure of their identity that gives those things value.

"Gradually, talk is about a heritage that is not tangible but also intangible, and therefore is not closely linked to the physical consistency of the heritage" (Vecco, 2010, 233). For example, The *Krakow Charter* (2000) interpreted the monuments as "a support to memory. In it, memory recognizes the aspects that are pertinent to human deeds and thought, associated with the historic timeline" (Vecco 2010, 323). The last contribution to the general meaning of the CH seems to be the addition to the ICH the concept of *living human treasure* (Vecco 2010, 324) referring to the individuals that have some abilities and traditional knowledge, and are able to carry out traditional activities and perpetuate them.

To conclude, the history of the uses of CH with its *patrimoine* as French variant demonstrates that the condition for an object to be included into the CH is to be appropriated in the public domain. This does not mean to be expropriated from private property, but only to be declared as being of/having OUV by collectively or public procedures.

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There is in Romania, in Transylvania, in the village of Densuş, a special monument well known as *Biserica din Densuş* (the Church of Densuş). Its age and origins have been a matter of contention between historians for a long time. Biserica din Densuş is famous not only for the interest historians, architects, and theologians had in it over time, but also for the lack of critical thinking with which all those treated it (Rusu 2008). This is a diagnosis of a historian who tried to put in order the numerous opinions about the age of the monument, its constructors, architectural characteristics and developments over time, as well as its religious destiny split between the branches of Romanian Orthodoxy, Romanian Orthodox Church and Romanian Church United. Architecturally, *Biserica din Densuş*, mixing medieval and Roman elements, has some features which make it strange. The shrine is placed to the South, while the Christian Orthodox churches have it to the East, other components as *diaconicon*, lateral chapel and *pronaos* (vestibule) are also strangely and originally set. In addition, the walls are built by remnants of ancient romans temples, colonnades, sculptures, stones and bricks with Roman inscriptions the original constructors took up from the nearby Roman capital of Ancient Dacia, Ulpia Traiana Sarmizegetusa. The peculiarity of the construction made some observers consider that *Biserica din Densuş* is actually a Roman temple or mausoleum transformed in Church. Over time, *Biserica din Densuş* suffered not only the hardships of the history itself or political events, but also from the interventions of different restaurateurs and unprofessional archaeologists. Currently, *Biserica din Densuş* is greatly valued by the community, village authorities, and the Romanian nation. But during its history it was at a very little distance from demolition even by the believers whose property it was. For example, "after the middle of the nineteen century*, Biserica din Densuş* had to be demolished. The villagers intended to destroy the church thinking to build a larger one. The catastrophe

has been stopped by authorities which, later in 1878, put it under the protection of the monuments law" (Rusu 2008, 127). Nevertheless, the community of Densuș is currently proud of monument and consider it as invaluable part of their cultural heritage and identity.

The history of the uses of word *patrimoine*, the institutionalization of CH and the episode of demolition regarding *Biserica din Densuș,* through which communities become aware about their CH are forms of public appropriation of a certain kind. This appropriation is neither a nationalization process of taking over some objects or facts from private property and move them to public one, nor creation or recreation of a common good by communities or collective decisions. It is a case reconsideration through which objects and facts are raised up to the status of OUV adopted as public good. This recognition is, simultaneously, behavioural, cognitive and institutional.

But which is the mechanism that supports the new perspective towards objects and facts and transforms them by attaching an OUV in CH? Is it something located in the things themselves or is it something which transcends the existence of things, material or immaterial? Do things become over time more important for people? Or is something changing in people and their relations with things, and with one another as a community or individuals, readopting those things with an existence apart in their world and refusing to abandon or to throw them?

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There are at least three viewpoints from which we could deliver answers to such questions: from anthropological, cognitive and from social ontology points of views. In each of these visions I am interested only in the mechanism they suggest for my purpose to identify justificatory theories for attaching OUV to objects and facts and not to present, discus or confront them. If someone says that these perspectives are not only various, but rather eclectic, I will say that here the eclecticism is needed in order to throw lights towards different parts and surfaces of our problem in a way we could not find using another methodology. I will present below one by one the answers originated in three visions. These answers should be considered both justificatory theories for the way in which we attach OUV to tangible or intangible objects and facts, and conclusions of this article.

i) From an anthropological point of view, the whole CH could be interpreted as imagined, and in these terms intangible, much the same way in which Benedict Anderson maintained that nations are *imagined* political communities: "because the members of even smallest nations will never know of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion" (Anderson 2016, 7). Nations and the pieces of CH, are *Darstellungen,* these sort of representations which are public not individual and serve the need to collective life of individuals in time. Evidently, our interactions as individuals take place mutually

only in space, but there is symbolic interaction also in time. Simple individual interaction in space has a lot of imagined elements, be these those linked to the representations of ourselves as members of a nation. In time, the imagined is dominant in our experience of others. The imagined involving interaction in time unfolds practically only in the plane of intangible because we interact with individuals from the past and perhaps from the future only in a very constructed cognitively and socially way. For this construction to be possible even the tangible objects as monuments must be reconsiders as *Darrstelungen* of the past time. Time is the place when tangible meets intangible and becomes in turn intangible. In these terms the TCH and ICH offer tools for people of a determined society and era to interact with other individuals not only in space, synchronically, but also in time, diachronically.

ii) John Searle pioneered in the last years in social ontology, developing his initial and original theory of speech acts based on the distinction between facts and institutional facts. Searle recently restated that all institutional facts are produced linguistically (Searle 2010). The institutional facts are cases of creation of a reality by representing it as existing. So, we create things with words representing them as existing, and related with them as real existences, facts. (Searle 2010, 93). In this case the place where the things created by words exist is our minds. But we could encounter in society institutional facts whose existence is only symbolic and which are not created by language. Searle supposes that we could imagine a tribe which builds a wall around its territory. The wall controls access to the territory of the tribe in virtue of his structure, being very massive and high to be climbed easily by outsiders. Over time, the wall disappears remaining only a line that continued to be recognized by insiders and outsiders as a boundary line. Searle considers that in this case the remains of wall play their functions as boundary not in virtue of their physical structure, "but in virtue of the fact that is a collective recognition or acceptance by the people involved both inside and outside the line of stone." (Searle 2010, 93). The example of Searle could be considered an explanation of the way the tangible transforms into the intangible. This could happen tacitly by transformation of an object or fact in symbols collectively recognized. The status of an object and fact can be changed tacitly, but also by certain declarations which establish constitutive rules for the future. According to Searle's theory of institutional facts, a new status of an object can also be produced linguistically by statements through which people declare that object X since now counts as Y in a certain context. The declarations of different reunions or those of international organizations regarding could be considered as these kind of constitutive rules and CH as a deposit of institutional facts. Symbols and declarations are also the second place where tangible meets intangible or tangible is reinforced and subsists over time.

iii) For Kant *sensus communis* is a faculty of aesthetical knowledge with both historical and public dimensions. Aesthetically, *sensus communis* explains

the aesthetic judgement that is essentially judgement of taste. Kant's defini-
tion of *sensus communis* is the following:

> By "sensus communis"... must be understood the idea of a communal sense,
> i.e., a faculty for judging that in its reflection takes account *(a priori)* of everyone
> else's way of representing in thought, in order as it were to hold its judgement
> up to human reason as a whole and thereby avoid the illusion which, from
> subjective private conditions that could easily be held to be objective, would
> have detrimental influence on the judgement (Kant 2006, 173-174).

We could adopt Kant's idea of *sensus communis* for explaining the estab-
lishment and functioning of the CH. For Kant, *sensus communis* is not a col-
lective one, that is a sense a collective, a community as a whole, attaches to
an object or fact, but public or communal, that is every individual as indi-
vidual attaches the sense to a particular object or facts. In Kant's terms
public means to be shared by all individuals as individuals and not by collec-
tives or communities as a whole. Yet, the publicness, the fact of being pub-
lic, exists only to the extent that individuals are members of a community,
that is individuals orient reciprocally their conduct and judgement about
objects and facts. In my interpretation, Kant does not refer only to the con-
tingent communities, but also to all the individuals existing in time, to all
historical communities. When he says that by *sensus communis* we need "to
account *(a priori)* of everyone else's way of representing in thought", he
means that we need to be aware that our conduct and judgement in relation
with the sense we attach to objects and facts has a universal dimension. As
aesthetic experience does constitute only as public experience (a Robinson
Crusoe might not try to adorn his house) and, in the same way CH, TCH
and ICH, must be public. This condition of publicness is more obvious for
ICH, because ICH exists only insofar as it is considered and subsists in in-
dividual minds. ICH is both an inner and outer aspects of our internal life.
For Kant, *sensus communis* is not a concept from the sphere of cognition, but
related to the sphere of representation, internal mind representation. By
representations (*Vorstellungen*) we do not receive information from the ex-
ternal world, but represent an object that subsists only in our mind, as in the
case of pleasure and pain. Even when a representation transmits some in-
formation about an object present in the external world the representation
of object belongs to the subject and reproduce none of the characteristics
of the object it represents. So, *sensus communis* does not inform us about the
world but create the possibility to have representations about it, being a way
to thinking publicly *(offlenliche Denken)* and not a way of knowledge. Because
the intersubjective control of our judgements is impossible and we judge
only about object existent in our minds, in order to be rational we need, as
Kant says, presuppose by reflection the possible judgement of others re-
garding the same object or fact represented only mentally and check in our
minds if they will judge in the same way. In Kant's words we need to take

"account *(a priori)* of everyone else's way of representing in thought, in order as it were to hold its judgement up to human reason as a whole" (Kant 2006, 173). This *a priori* account could offer also a way to understand and justify the way we confer OUV to immaterial entities, facts, that exist only behaviourally or only in our representations. By integrating them in the ICH we replicate them as *Darstellungen* and create the possibility to inner representation to be replicated in a public way. The communal or collective uses of concepts by individuals is a third place where the tangible meets the intangible.

Notes

[1] The concept of *heritage* as regarding a shared heritage of humanity and its universal value must be not only an object of the dispute regarding the Westernization or non-Westernization of this notion, but a possible way to understand the nature of CH in its division as TCH and ICH (Byrne 1996).

[2] However, regarding the "wholes", Georg German (quoted in Vecco 2010, 322) shows that the idea of the whole linked to monuments and their environments is not a new one, as we could believe still 1578 Camillo Bolognino, suggested that San Petronio Church must be treated together with his environment.

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