

Perceiving a work of art. Between artistic and aesthetic

Abstract: The paper tries to bring the professional harmonic-expressive condition of visual art as an original fundament of particular-artistic quality into the attention of the theoretical setting. This condition, avoided ideologically by the aesthetic project of the 18th century due to the religious nature of the harmonic concept, can be the fundament of an autonomous artistic framework for the reception of visual works of art.

Keywords: harmonic-expressive, essence, experience, professional, illustration, aesthetic function, taste, sensorial taste, conceptual taste

I do not know how much the opinion of a practicing visual artist on the problems brought about by the perception of art can spark the curiosity of those interested in Aesthetics. The two fields, Aesthetics and artistic practice, engage the artistic act in two different areas of analysis, in distinct referential frameworks with different theoretical instruments, etc.¹ From the perspective of understanding them as normal cultural practices, the parallelism and autonomy of the two are primarily based on the fact that aesthetic and artistic practices offer two different cultural experiences – one of philosophical essence, the other, artistic – of a single object – the production of artefacts that assume artistic quality – to a possible receiver. The understanding of artistic particularity as a specific experience – in accord with pragmatist aesthetic thinking (even if the terms and use of this understanding are different), especially with the observations made by Dewey, who signalled that that art manifests itself autonomously only as an experience (Shusterman 2004, 19-20), not a class of objects - assumes, in this paper, a professional conditioning of experience in the field of auctorial success capable of triggering particularities of reception.

This experiential logic was paused in the 18th century, by coupling the two under the idea of necessary aesthetic education for the modern man, as an opportunity to rationally understand art. The result of this conjunction was the emergence (that lingers even today) of a new manner of reception (a modern one) of the for-mentioned production, whose novelty is founded on the intermediation of the artistic interaction between author and lector,

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through the filter of a judgment of taste applied to the objects. The main presupposition of this framework is: art is “born” from an evaluation made by an institutionally legitimated taste and not as a result of the activity within the craft.

I do not want to discuss the crises within the artistic theoretical space. They have been analysed by far more competent authors. I only want to juxtapose two possible understandings of the artistic act – professional-artistic and aesthetic – from the point of view of an author-lector interested in aesthetics who finds himself in a confusing situation due to the bringing together of two types of experience, in a logic setting, where they have been overlapped and restructured theoretically under institutional authority with paideic implementation, as two dimensions – one sensorial, the other, rational – of the same experience. The modern restructuring of art occludes, in my opinion, the artistic quality of art in favour of an ideological stake of taste (Ferry 1997, 30-4), understood here, in the broad sense, as authority on the judgement of taste of art – regardless of the fact that it is based on sensorial faculties (I like) or conceptual (I understand, I agree) – offered to the lector by the modern project as democratic power over art. In short, taste does not engage the artistic quality of a work of art, but its social convenience of the moment, institutionally legitimated as is; it represents the power modern institutional subjectivity exerts to qualify an artefact as art (Dikie 1984; Dikie 1988).

To my understanding, artistic quality does not manifest itself through the logic of taste, because the experience of taste is a different cultural experience that must satisfy man’s structural availabilities for taste and not for art. Such a difference manifests itself objectively on the experience level and is easily observed by anyone in any relation to any artistic expression medium.

For example, the difference between the experience generated by listening to *manele* at a wedding – which is a truly aesthetic experience that satisfies the concept of taste – and the experience produced by listening to the works of Bach – which, for me, is an actual artistic experience. Only in the ideological context of right to taste are they both artistic experiences, identical from the perspective of the logic of reception. The cultural aesthetic identity, shared by both the works of Bach and *manele* – that of similar artefacts ruled by the convenience of taste – can only be based on understanding Bach in the new reception framework, outside the understanding of professional norms for artistic quality. In my opinion, as a craftsman, this only represents a different way of experiencing Bach, which we can call an experience of taste, either sensorial or conceptual, of the artistic qualities of a work of art, different from that of its artistic qualities credited to the result of Bach’s professional competence. The particularity of this new type of experience mainly means one thing: the artistic-aesthetic

quality of art is only the result evaluating the sensorial or conceptual convenience or the work – understood as a judgement of taste based on lectorial benchmarks (so extra-professional) – institutionally legitimated as is. Thus, this quality can be given by anyone, with institutional consent – today, the institution permits, within the logic of completely democratized taste, the lector to choose any of the aesthetic evaluation benchmarks (from sensorial to conceptual) that have been present as a taxonomic corpus within the last 200 years in aesthetic education – because it is not the result of internal professional norms.

The next part of the paper tries to show that there are differences between the reception of a work of art as an autonomous artistic fact and its reception as an aesthetic fact², although from the perspective of Aesthetics, the two seem to overlap. The difference can be mostly based on the understanding of aesthetic qualities as extra-artistic, modern, and contemporary opportunities of use – in virtue of the conceptual existence of taste³ - of a work of art; the same logic used for every object with an aesthetic destination. To question this situation which hides the work of art among aesthetic objects, is to suggest a new particular framework of reception (considered pre-modern), dedicated to artistic quality.

This is my assumption: there is always a specific-artistic essence for visual art – one of a professional nature – that frames the autonomy of a work of art's cultural experience as a specific self-sufficient form of human interaction through the artistic quality of that specific work of art. This essence is its expressive-harmonic origin and marks the difference between the possible (but not necessary) aesthetic qualities and the stable artistic quality, using the logic between the experience of an illustration and the experience of an artistic entity, between applied art and *just is* art (not art for art's sake)⁴. The resuscitation of the harmonic principle, as the original essence of artistic quality⁵ mainly tries to question the ideological side, of an illuminist nature (which suggests a new systematization of art, dedicated to the “new man”), the for-mentioned supposition – art *appears* after an evaluation of institutionally legitimated taste, not a craft driven one – in the following manner: Is it worth losing an antiquated harmonic experience in favour of a taste-driven exercise of authority, which legitimates your position as a modern, strong cultural participant?

Because the aesthetic use of a work is readily available to nowadays lecturer, art's harmonic particularity can be observed through the emphasis on the differences between the two parallel perception frameworks.

1) The taste framework is well known due to 200 years of aesthetic education. It bases itself on an artistic archive of artefacts, differentiated by their appurtenance to various cultural trends; trends artistically defined by different aesthetic norms – *a priori* or *a posteriori* established. The foundation on which this framework is built is the establishment of separate autonomic

functionality of words and images present in a visual work of art, through the labelling of artistic language as retinal language, after applying the distinction between word and image – for iconoclastic reasons (Morley 2003, 12-3). The autonomy of the two linguistic entities must ideologically support the sensorial dichotomy – rationally attributed to man as a modern functioning protocol⁶ – that acknowledges the superiority of reason, and, in consequence, its novelty consists in understanding that the word is more important than the image because it is the form reason manifests itself. In the comprehensive context outlined by the association of the fracture between image and word and the postulate of the word's superiority, the logical manifestation of artistic language is understood outside its harmonic essence (pre-modern) and it gains an illustrative addressing: images (the visible) must illustrate words (the intelligible). According to illustrative logic, the entire “artistic” of a work of art is divided into (a) a theme, (b) visually illustrated according to contemporary “official” norms.

In this illustrative context, the area of aesthetic visual interest of a work is limited to appearance: the different way visible elements can illustrate the intelligible, based on aesthetic norms regarding the hierarchy of text and image, taking into consideration the following:

a) extra-artistic properties of visible elements used to illustrate: colours, objects, sounds, figurative or abstract representations, borrowed performative techniques etc.;

b) conformity or nonconformity of using these era dependent properties and aesthetic norms, which would indicate that these norms (and their evolution) represents the true logic of a dynamic artistic quality (Malița 2009, 67-87), idea justified by the fact that, on representation level (appearance), differences and elemental dynamics are easily observable. The idea of dynamic quality is basically the possibility to label as “art” all the apparent properties of very different objects (including artistic ones). Thus, it seeks to support the logic of evaluations of taste, made not according to a common artistic quality, but to the evolution of cultural ideology.

This new institutionalized understanding of visual artistic professionalism meant, from the beginning, the internalization of certain norms within artistic practice (better said, within a part of artistic practice). They have encouraged the illustration and have opened the artistic archive for the illustrative painters of the 19th century – who illustrated both the new social order and the new aesthetic norms – institutionally legitimated, according to these norms, as artists⁷. The association of old art (antique works, Uccello, Bruegel, Rembrandt etc.) with applied art, in the modern sense of convenient illustration – Gross, Guérin, Bouguereau etc. – is equivalent to the introduction of a work of art into the realm of aesthetic objects, through institutional authority, for the social right to taste. Within this context, we do not have works of art and aesthetic objects anymore – which trigger

different experiences – but only objects with the same status, only more or less aesthetic (more or less acceptable from the perspective of taste).

Thus, the mix between *low art* and *high art* (Groys 2003) is not a contemporary problem, but the immediate result of introducing art into the realm of taste, by not recognizing its cultural independence (as a specific experience), and by replacing its professional, stable, and harmonic identity – for modern novelty ideological reasons (secular art) – with its aesthetic illustrative function. This means it is totally dependent on the evolution of cultural ideologies (outside the normal link any human construct has to social change). The void left behind by artistic identity can be filled under the authority of the institution, with almost any other extra-artistic function, based on the evolution of cultural trends which can be roughly divided into two broad directions of “taste”: a sensorial one and a conceptual one. The appreciation of art in relation to these kinds of functions transforms the work of art into an aesthetically utilitarian item – which manifests itself in both sensorial and conceptual protocol of aesthetic use.

For example, a religious work of art – let us say Rafael’s *Madonna and Child* – can be used as a sensorial experience, reduced to its retinal function, to decorate your living room because the colours match the coach very well; or it can be used conceptually (conventional-symbolic illustration) through its placement in a hall where a Marionology symposium is taking place, where its artistic quality is reduced to its semantic function of intelligently illustrating the theme – in the same manner in which the party leaders’ portraits were displayed in the institutions of the communist state. Thus, a work of art’s artistic quality is reduced to the function of the for-mentioned portraits.

2) Unlike the aesthetic framework, the professional understanding of art, based on the idea of harmonic essence means something else. Modern art, traditional art, byzantine art, African art etc. are just administrative possibilities of technical administration of the same artistic quality, understood as a harmonic unit of expressive nature of a work of art. What is different in this case are only the elements (which an artist articulates according to the same internal norms of arts) provided naturally by the evolution of society. But they do not have artistic qualities. They can only have aesthetic properties, if the fact that the characters in Manet’s paintings are dressed differently from the ones in Rembrandt’s paintings can constitute an aesthetic theme; the same can be said about Duchamp’s *WC* not being represented through classical painting technique – like the trees in Corot’s landscapes – but as an object. From this perspective, such differences do not determine the quality of their use in either of the two works. Thus, in the Duchamp-Corot case, if we reference the artistic, the two elements, the WC and the tree, have the same technical status, that of the *ready-made* – one is natural, the other one is cultural (artificial). What is

different is only the technical manner of representation. Even if the WC and the tree are used by the two respective authors within different technical approaches, they belong to the same internal artistic logic. This means that the only thing that is artistic here is the particular way in which the artist harmonically articulates all the elements of the work. The technical solution (individual or group-work) or the chosen representation medium – and the visible elements linked to them – cannot be relevant markers, helpful to the understanding of the artistic particularities of the work of art.

This situation needs the clarification of a few things:

1. The harmonic essence of visual art means something totally different from retinal beauty. More precisely, it is represented by its antique conceptual fundament: contraries working together, toward a sole goal (the dissolution of parts in a whole). Regarding visual art, these contraries mean:

a) Different initial properties of all elements used in a work of art, which can be divided, in the broad sense (and without covering all the possibilities) into words and images. Thus, the visual artistic language is not only a retinal language (point, line, form, colour), but an open language which can access any element an author desires, thanks to the fact that the initial properties of the used elements have no artistic relevance (see 2.).

b) Contradictions between: author established relationships between the elements of a work of art and the logic conventions of perception; situations arisen from the differences between the reception of a work of art and its experience as an expressive whole; different polemic directions in the theory of art (e.g. sensorialists and conceptualists); different institutional interpretations of a work of art etc.

Practically, when experiencing a work of art, the harmonic essence implies that, in the case of an artistic success, all contradictions present in the reception of art, not only in the work itself, lose their conventionally contradictory character in favour of their reconstitution into a whole of equal possibilities which engage, in this manner, as a field of interactions, the ambiguity of human nature.

This description of the harmonic function means, from a professional perspective, an important difference between understanding harmony as a fundamental principle of contradictory unity and its modern and contemporary internalization into visual practices (artistic and extra-artistic) only as a restrictive harmonic and retinal rule (recipe) which norms a visual approach only from angle of scopic sensorial function.

2. Artistic quality manifests itself as a result of the actions of the harmonic principle, only as a whole, not for every part (elements which constitute the work of art). The simple presence of parts (regardless if they are colours, messages, forms, technological novelties etc.) and their initial properties (before they were artistically used within the work of art) has no relevance regarding artistic quality. This also means – in a harmonic, pre-

modern sense, of artistic quality as a result of harmonic operationalization of words and images (and any other element that is part of a work of art) into a whole that has an expressive nature – (a) retinal properties (beauty, ugliness etc.), or (b) conceptual ones (logical illustrative coherence understood as an aesthetic rhetoric property of conceptual art) of a work of art are only properties of the elements, images or ideas, which are part of a whole and, in the same context, cannot define the artistic quality of the whole, but only its retinal or rhetoric functions. These kinds of presences and properties can be (and have been) used in works of art, if an artist wills it, but they are neither *necessary* nor *sufficient* (Malița 2009, 305) to constitute artistic quality. The only necessary and sufficient step is their harmonic articulation into an expressive whole. The attempt to find artistic quality and/or essence in the simple presence of elements in a work of art or in the extra-artistic qualities inherent to their initial properties means, more or less, a confusion regarding the difference between artistic functionality of the work as a whole and the accountable functionality of the sum of its parts – understood best as the artistic dysfunctionality within the logic of differences between the way an assembled automobile works kinetically whereas the sum of its parts works accountably: sorted according to form, neatly stacked on shelves.

It must be said that the harmonic nature of art as a functional particularity which specifically regulates the relationship between the whole and its parts has been noticed in different theoretical settings, even if not in these particular terms or in the direction of establishing it as an essential part of visual art. In this situation, we can conclude, for example, at the crossroads between the observation of various semioticians – such as Jean Marie Klinkenberg (Klinkenberg 2004, 336) or Anca Mateescu Bogdan (Mateescu Bogdan 1999, 91) who claim, in one way or another, the idea of visual art being a unique sign (elements used lose their semantic independence in favour of the relationship between themselves) – or René Magritte’s observation that – “In a painting, words have the same substance as images” (Magritte 1929) – that parts present in a work of art gain artistic function only if they lose their substantial independence (their initial properties: beauty, ugliness, critical rhetoric, semantic properties etc.) and transform into a unique substance of expressive nature, which is transmitted from the author to the lector through the work of art.

3. The expressive nature of art mainly means two things:

a) There are no hierarchies between the elements of a work of art, for the simple reason that artistic expressivity is only based on the harmonic relationship between elements and not on their independent properties seen here as *initial properties*. Moreover, this relationship cancels the defining function of initial properties, meaning it cancels functional and categorical independence of the said element in favour of engaging it as part which

defines its new function only in relationship with the other elements that suffer the same process of artistic functional restructuring. From this perspective, a work of art is similar to a cogwheel mechanism, self-significant, where any modification to one element brings with it changes to all the other ones. In this context, the initial properties of elements (cogs) – their quantity, form, origin, initial significance, position etc. – are annulled, such as properties which can qualify them for different hierarchic positions, in favour of them working together without any kind of hierarchy.

Here, systemizing parts of a work of art or the attempt to bring a hierarchy to its elements – in the idea that the message is more important than the retinal or vice-versa – is a discourse that has nothing to do with its artistic quality.

b) The expressive nature of art can be understood as a particularly-artistic substantiality of a visual work of art – following the logic of unique artistic substance – which satisfies *which satisfies* the characteristics observed by Wittgenstein in *the world's substance*, which, in his opinion, is both form and content (Wittgenstein 2012, 104). Better said, the harmonic-expressive, artistic particularity of a visual work of art means the following thing: the difference between the visual substance of form and the rhetoric of its content is irrelevant. This does not mean, though, that the work of art cannot be systemized within the terms of these differences, but only that, following this systematization, one gains an illustration and loses the joy of artistic quality⁸ in favour of one brought about by extra-artistic, logic-derived knowledge (historical, ideological, hermeneutical, methodological etc.).

4. Receiving a harmonic whole does not necessarily produce pleasure for the lector, scopic or conceptual, because the harmonic expression is the expression of equilibrium and not of beauty (or convenience). In this sense, harmony particularly produces a state of finding one's self within the world, with the good and the bad altogether. For example, the well-built, harmonic stake from the works of Andrei Tarkovski is well known (Salînski 2012) and easily perceived as such. It is only that receiving the work does not mean immediate satisfaction, in the idea of pleasure or accord. Tarkovski published a few letters he received from spectators (Tarkovski 2015, 6-15), majority of which were sent after viewing the movie *The Mirror*. These letters show a reception that ranges from “We, the poor spectators, see movies that are good, bad, very bad, ordinary and very original. And any of them can be understood, can move you or you can reject it, but this!?!...” (Tarkovski 2015, 7), to “After viewing it you are left with a feeling of spite for your own weakness and ignorance” (Tarkovski 2015, 8) or even “What is this movie about? About man. No, not specifically the one who's voice is heard from the *off*, played by Innokenti Smotunovski. It is a movie about you, about your father, about your grandfather, about the man who will live

after you and who will still be « You ». About the man that lives on Earth, who is part of the Earth's life and Earth is part of his, about the fact that man answers with his life to past and future.” (Tarkovski 2015, 8-9). This range of emotions very well defines the state of reception triggered by the harmonic artistic quality, as a state that has no ties to a lecturer's *agreement* but to his placement in a territory of vital experiences common to all people where he can reflect upon the ambiguities of a world that reflects upon the limits of human reason; even if, from the perspective of taste, this displeases him.

Within the same logic, the initial reception of impressionist works – which have a professional harmonic structure just as evident as Tarkovski's work – means (with all the lectoral dissatisfactions) an artistic quality experience just as powerful (and harmonic) as the ones after its institutional recognition. It is only the reaction of the “institutionalised” critics that is disharmonic and bellicose, but, because it belongs to the realm of judgement of taste, it is irrelevant to the artistic quality of an impressionist work of art.

To me, in somewhat consonance with the observations made by authors who question, from an aesthetic perspective, the importance of an axiological judgement in art – for example Marc Jimenez, Jean-Marie Schaeffer etc. – the reception of a work of art, understood as a cultural experience of its particular artistic quality, does not imply in any way an evaluation. Artistic quality in a work of art is naturally dominant – in the case of an auctorial success – since the dawn of art, as a possibility of surpassing both (a) a work's documentary actuality – understood here as its lack of perennality – towards the harmonic spectrum (which goes beyond actuality and the document), as well as (b) the idea of a fast expedition of artistic quality in the terms of “I like” or “I agree” (Tarkovski 2015, 54). One must not necessarily agree or like an object – although this is not impossible (it is possible but not necessary) – but only has to “engage” this possibility, before cultural hierarchies, a state observed and discussed by the phenomenological aesthetic (even if in different terms). This type of reception is an “open” experience, meaning it takes a long time and – after contact with the work – it engages new angles of reflection upon the work in this new open field. Today, as a result of the presence of aesthetic alternatives, such an experience can only be understood as an option for harmonic artistic quality against aesthetic qualities.

It has to be said that the harmonic essence of art does not mean art's property over harmony, but only the core and artistic claim in this activity, understood as guidelines for artistic success as a cultural human relation through an artificial object⁹.

The cognitive framework opened by visual art's harmonic essence requires a particular engagement – different from the aesthetic one – of the

situation brought about by the use of new elements and techniques in the visual practices from the beginning of the 1960s (situation that marks, in my opinion, the tow territories of taste: sensorial taste and conceptual accord). The idea that “any object could be art” (Malița 2009, 7 note 1) means something different within the framework of professional understanding of art as a practice with a premodern harmonic stake than the aesthetic engagement of this idea within the modern taxonomic framework, where it is the liberation of art from professional restrictions. The difference between the two understandings are based on the following idea: The restrictions talked about in Aesthetics, were, in fact, only external aesthetic institutional restrictions (not professional), because the illustrative norms of sensorial taste are not connected to the artistic use of a complete visual language (they do not have any relation to the harmonic-professional norms, internal to practice, but are only illustrative norms dedicate to the modern evaluation of art as a matter of taste).

From the perspective of stable harmonic norms, the internalization of *ready-mades* into artistic practice means the same thing as, for example, the internalization of technical developments in oil painting. According to harmonic logic, the parts – understood here in the broad sense which also includes different technical aspects – lose their initial identity in favour of the harmonic whole. This means that, between Duchamp’s *Fountain* and Rembrandt’s *Return of the prodigal son* there is no difference in artistic quality just as there are no differences between the artistic qualities of tempera and oil painting.

In this context, the for-mentioned idea can be reworded into: a) any object can, at any time, become an element of a work of visual work of art, regardless of its initial properties, as long as it fulfils the necessary and sufficient condition of becoming part of a harmonic whole of expressive nature, by losing its original identity; b) any object can be work of art if it is comprised of elements that fulfil this condition.

For example, Duchamp’s take on harmonic understanding using *ready-made* is as follows:

A work of art is not only the object, but it is comprised of more elements which can be roughly divided – for a methodologic explanation – into words and images; a) the object as a seen visual representation and b) a text, brought about by placing the object into an artistic context, which “tells a story” about the modern artistic archive (definitions of art, aesthetical theories, historical etc.). Artistic quality is not the result of the objects representation but from Duchamp’s success at engaging the expressive nature of the relationship between the two elements: the fact that they have the same hierarchic level within the work of art, as elements. Thus, it is not in an illustrative form (object) – content (text) type of relationship with the object, but one in which both are forms and the

“significant” content is the relationship itself which manifests as an artistic stimulus that brings all eyes on man’s context in the evolution of the world.

This means the acceptance of artistic experiences (in premodern terms) as a cultural experience of the world (and its ambiguity) through a work of art – situation that “excludes” illustrative logic – not as an experience of the work (as an object) that must be realized as a matter of immediate satisfaction or dissatisfaction.

Regarding the harmonic dimension of the technical solution, one must understand that Duchamp chose the *bazard*¹⁰ – it could have very well been a shoe – and it is, as a choice, meant for the relation with the text about the artistic archive, used in the work. This text assumes, first of all, the modern taxonomic origin of the archive, meaning the target of the avant-gardes that were trying to remove rational order in favour of anarchy. Technically speaking, *bazard* – seen here as a methodologic core in the technical choice of the *ready-made* – is the most harmonic professional choice, the most adequate to convey an anarchist message (essentially a text about Chaos) in a form that best satisfies the expressive unity of the work (the whole). Thus, it is the technical harmonic solution focused on the whole form (text and image together), not just the visible or intelligible. In the same manner, in the retinal-harmonic representation of the world – not beautiful, just harmonic – a religious text was chosen as an adequate technical solution, even though it was – same as byzantine art, impressionist works or *The Mirror* – outside the idea of immediate lectorial satisfaction. Another solution of representation could become an illustration of avant-garde rhetoric, though a possible significance of its aesthetic function in detriment of the harmonic whole: for example, a painting of a WC in a hall at the Louvre, on a pedestal with a tag.

The choice of understanding visual artistic quality as a harmonically autonomous inter-human relation does not try to contest the possible aesthetic use of art. Moreover, a large part of the ideas mentioned earlier, argued here in a functionalist manner¹¹, are present in one way or another, in the observations made within the philosophical discourse about art, even if they are logically instrumented differently, using other terms and contexts of reference¹². The truth behind aesthetic observations cannot be contested. They are pertinent, regarding aesthetic, sensorial or conceptual, reception of objects or situations (meaning true observations about aesthetic functions of these objects and situations, including works of art, in different cultural settings).

Within this context, the distinction between aesthetic and artistic reception of a visual work of art can be especially argued using evidence easily observable by anyone: the aesthetic experiential area is far larger than that of artistic experience. Inside this broad setting, aesthetic reception of works means applying them, through lectorial application of their aesthetic

function, possibly but not necessarily artistic, within the logic outlined by the ideological dimension of taste; logic dedicated to a specific use – linked to the sensorial or conceptual satisfaction – of any other object (or situation viewed as an aesthetic object), cultural or natural (flowers, smells, a sunset, cars, shoes, works of art etc.) based on the attachment of an individual (or group of individuals) to a newer or older cultural trend. The individualisation of artistic experience, as a particular instance of reception only for some artificial objects, present in this broad aesthetic framework, can be done in today's heavily anesthetized society (Harvey 2002, 332) – where not only art (Babias 2004), but even the surgical act is used in an aesthetical manner – by differentiating itself from the aesthetic one¹³, if we are to accept that the existence of artistic quality is something different (more or less) than the satisfaction in terms of taste. Following professional logic regarding the original harmonic-expressive essence of visual art, the autonomy of the two artistic experiences arises from the simple fact that aesthetic and artistic practices are distinct and imply the use of the same visual language with a different stake.

Notes

¹ A situation observed since 1797 by Friedrich von Schlegel. See Zaharia 2002, 9.

² The difference between aesthetic and artistic has been observed for a long time, even if it has been governed differently. See Malița 2009, especially 107-10.

³ In the sense in which Luc Ferry observes the persistent subjectivity of the judgement of taste, included in the idea of novelty, as a link between modern and contemporary (Ferry 1997, 34).

⁴ The distinction is: a) art for the sake of art means a work focused on the harmonic stake; b) *just is* art means that the harmonic stake of practice is focused on a particularly artistic interactive experience between people.

⁵ In the sense of Heidegger's observation "A thing's origin is also the source of its essence" (Heidegger 2011, 17).

⁶ See Foucault 1996, 362 or comments about Baudelaire in Foucault 2004, 73.

⁷ Frunzetti 1985, 19-20. See the distinction between *cultural destination* and *cultural destiny* proposed by Ion Frunzetti regarding institutional administration of French painting in the 19th century and the contradictory result of this administration.

⁸ Marcel Duchamp observed that any systematized work quickly becomes sterile and that *poor Mona Lisa* lost her smile due to being looked at too much (Tomkins 2013, 60).

⁹ Close to the observations of Nicolas Bourriaud, especially regarding the understanding of artistic inter-human relationships (Bourriaud 1998).

¹⁰ Tomkins 2013, 53. Duchamp talks about using the hazard technique as a "rational expression" of man's departure from the conventional control over the use of language.

¹¹ In a way in which they can answer Nelson Goodman's question: When can something be art? Answer: When it works harmonically as the result of an artistic auctorial action.

¹² Shusterman 2004, 32. For example, the observations by Noël Carroll and Nicholas Wolterstorff, that define art as a social or cultural practice governed by internal standards and rationales, commented by Shusterman.

¹³ Shusterman 2004, 49. According to Dewey: "Aesthetic experience is always more than aesthetic." – mentioned by Shusterman.

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